British aircraft carriers in WW2

[Scott Cunningham]

I think the USS Enterprise was converted to be a night ops carrier around the time of Leyte Gulf. Its war involvement drops dramatically at the last part of the war.

[Tiornu]

"It's nit-picking, but there is daylight at 2400 in those latitudes on that date."

What latitudes exactly?

[Tiornu]

Enterprise and Independence were specialized night fighter carriers.

[Guest Sargent]

Originally posted by Tiornu:

Enterprise and Independence were specialized night fighter carriers.

 

 

 

They became night carriers to relieve the strain of each carrier having a small detachment of night-capable a/c so that the deck crews had to work 24/7 to operate. With the US deck park, a lot of planes had to be shoved around to operate four F6F-Ns and a couple of TBM-3Es at night.

 

And they weren't just Night Fighter CVs, the special electronic equipped search Avengers were just as if not more important than the fighters, providing 24/7 search and scouting capability.

 

BTW both Enterprise and Independence were late-war casualties. What happened when they were out of service? Did the other CVs go back to having night detachments? (I could look this up, but I'm feeling a little lazy right now )

[Guest Sargent]

Originally posted by Tiornu:

"It's nit-picking, but there is daylight at 2400 in those latitudes on that date."

What latitudes exactly?

 

 

Around Iceland, whatever latitude that is. My globe's in Idaho.

[DKTanker]

Bah, having trouble editing and adding link.

 

 

[Edited by DKTanker (05 Dec 2004).]

[DKTanker]

I'll try again.

According to Admiralty log, ADM234-509, on 25 May 1941 the hours of darkness were from 0200-0500. The same log notes that the Bismarck was attacked and hit by Swordfish aircraft from the Victorious at 2330 on 25 May 1941. I am assuming the times are GMT. So, it appears that the Bismarck was never hit by aircraft weapons during the hours of darkness.

[Guest Sargent]

posted by DKTanker:

"I'll try again.

According to Admiralty log, ADM234-509, on 25 May 1941 the hours of darkness were from 0200-0500. The same log notes that the Bismarck was attacked and hit by Swordfish aircraft from the Victorious at 2330 on 25 May 1941. I am assuming the times are GMT. So, it appears that the Bismarck was never hit by aircraft weapons during the hours of darkness."

 

Thank you for looking that up. My own abilities for detailed research are a bit constrained at the moment (IOW, I'm winging it from memory ).

[Redbeard]

The Bismarck action was done before airborne radar. By April 42 both CV's with Somerville had enough radarsets to perform a radar guided night attack. The radar would mainly be used to locate the target and the attack itself would be carried out with flares silhuetting the target. This was a well rehearsed procedure and the Med. contains enough examples of it basically working. I believe that some of the Albacore attacks on Italian warships were performed at night, but I'll have to check. Anyway I don't think the speed of the target makes that big a difference once the target is located. The FAA and RAF achieved good results with very few planes in a strike, some times even involving fueling behind enemy lines from fuel dumps flown in.

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

[JOE BRENNAN]

Originally posted by Redbeard:

The Bismarck action was done before airborne radar. By April 42 both CV's with Somerville had enough radarsets to perform a radar guided night attack. The radar would mainly be used to locate the target and the attack itself would be carried out with flares silhuetting the target. This was a well rehearsed procedure and the Med. contains enough examples of it basically working. I believe that some of the Albacore attacks on Italian warships were performed at night, but I'll have to check. Anyway I don't think the speed of the target makes that big a difference once the target is located. The FAA and RAF achieved good results with very few planes in a strike, some times even involving fueling behind enemy lines from fuel dumps flown in.

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

 

Actually the Bismarck attacks used ASV radar also, not only the Swordfish but surface ships shadowing the target w/ radar and coaching them in, obviously impossible in the 1942 situation. The 26 May attack occurred at around 48N latitude, far south of the battle with Hood; by standard almanac type references sunset would have been around the time of the attack; there'd be twilight but OTOH by all sources visibility was very poor. I'd accept that this attack, among others, demonstrates the possibility of successful night attacks in this period, just looking overall I'd still maintain they couldn't be relied on for decisive results in a any given raid; whereas large day carrier strikes (of highly trained IJN groups, but USN ones similarly) literally always hit any carrier target they spotted.

 

Especially night raids couldn't be expected to pick out and hit all key targets, for example the penultimate Swordfish raid went after the shadowing Sheffield instead of Bismarck, well before night but again poor visibility. Or IOW with several nights to work with 45 Albarcores with well trained crews from a safe base would be a serious attrition menace to 5 IJN carriers, but in one night they wouldn't likely inflict heavy losses (night only a/c recon, no survivability of any day shadowers) and their "base" would have been quickly anihilated next day.

 

Plus once again Somerville's force was one fairly trained group not at peak readiness, and one raw group. They'd have had little chance.

 

In hindsight, we might say why not sink even one IJN carrier and perhaps shorten the war "for want of a nail"? in the long run the Allies could have afforded even a 2:0 loss. But it's not realistic looking from the time and I think explains the British caution.

 

Joe

[Redbeard]

Hi Joe

 

Thanks for the info on the twilight zone. I thought I recalled something about the attack being done in twilight and bad visibility, but wasn’t sure.

 

I don’t agree however, that the large daylight attacks always got through – the torpedobombers at Midway being a prime example. And regarding the divebombers that “bumped” over a target in the last minute through a hole in the clouds, a radar equipped Albacore squadron probably would have had a better chance of detecting the target being independent of “holes”. But attacking in daylight before your own fighters have swept away those of the enemy would be suicide – Albacores or not. Next I have a suspicion that two CV forces both on a technological and tactical level of USN late WWII would very fast grind each other down and achieve marginal results only. CAP, radar pickets and VT fuses simply made the defense to strong, but luckily that was only available to one side (the right one).

 

I don’t think the difficult thing about CV night operations is the attack itself, once you have located the target – and that was with the 1942 British radar sets mainly a technological and reasonably solved question. The difficult part was landing if that had to be done in pitch darkness and here a slow flying double-decker might have been a serious advantage.

 

The FAA squadron in the IO in April 42 were – veterans or not – fully operational. And if you want an assessment of what really green squadrons in the FAA was up to HMS Victorious’ efforts in the Bismarck chase can be taken into the account. Caution was of course in its place when up against a force as potent as the CV’s of the IJN in 1942, but there is no basis for saying that Somerville would not have launched the attack if the preconditions had been present – I.e. the IJN arriving according to its own schedule – which the British knew through code breaking. We will never know what kind of results would have followed from such an attack, but there is no basis for concluding that the FAA would have screwed up. I’m not fantasizing about the entire IJN force going down in flames, but 2-4 torpedo hits out of the 30+ attack planes would not appear improbable. Some of those hits could of course well be on other ships than carriers, but even a single torpedohit on a CV will be critical for the IJN being so far from home and with some many enemies waiting.

 

For the British most of the ships in the IO in 42 were expendable, but politically I guess it would be very critical to announce any more losses on top of Force Z and Singapore. That of course contributed to caution, but also promised an important award in striking back. Finally Somerville based his attack on a secret base on an island to the S (forgot the name). The IJN had no knowledge of this base and probably wouldn’t have looked in that direction. But when the IJN didn’t show up, Somerville really couldn’t know what next and decided to withdraw.

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

[Ken Estes]

Originally posted by Scott Cunningham:

You would have a tough time finding any ship hit by a torp at night.

 

No books at hand, but did not the Catalinas pull that off, one being a support or transport ship in the Midway preliminaries?

 

I thought the two articles summarized the design problems well, but I would have liked more attention to what was known/assumed at the time each design was finalized, as opposed to built. Note the USN never placed Ranger at risk and Wasp was perhaps too small a hull as well. They ought to be considered failures. The RN had to stress night combat/flight ops viz. Jutland lessons and the problems of facing the IJN and Italians [later Germans] at a presumed inferiority in numbers. How they got to A. Royal and Illustrious from Furious [three different config.] might be considered miraculous, given their state of aviation. I am still waiting for a definitive study of RN tactical prep for WWII.

 

One thing about carrier war I noticed was that it is fought in pulses, the first strike being usually decisive [unless it fails to find tgt], but landbased air can carry out continuous attacks, if coordinated well. The USN does not face an air fleet until 1944, and it is not the same as Force Z faced.

 

What would have been US results in 1940/41 with Devastators, Vindicators and Buffaloes, etc. as an air group? Whatever, I suspect it would not be pretty!

[DKTanker]

Originally posted by JOE BRENNAN:

The 26 May attack occurred at around 48N latitude, far south of the battle with Hood; by standard almanac type references sunset would have been around the time of the attack; there'd be twilight but OTOH by all sources visibility was very poor.

Joe

 

 

Per US Naval observatory data. Sunset at 48N on 26 MAY 1941 occured at 1945. Noting that ADM log234-509 appears to use GMT/Zulu instead of local. I'm not sure of the longitude but, if the torpedo hit of 26 May occured 30 degrees west of GMT, very plausible, that would mean sunset occured at 2145* GMT. This would fairly closely track with the attack occuring during twilight or darkness.

 

If we assume that the attack of 25 MAY occured approximately half way between the battle against the Hood and when it was attacked by Ark Royals Swordfish this puts the Bismarck at about 55N and almost due north of the next days attack. Sunset occurs at 2017 local or 2217 Zulu.

 

On 24 May 1941 at Latitude 62N sunset occurs at 2110 Local. Apparently the entry in ADM Log 234-509 that hours of darkness were between 0200-0500 are in error whether GMT or local time is used.

 

*End of Civil Twilight was approximately 90 minutes after sunset at these latitudes. So, given that data both attacks occured just at last light or during darkness. However, given that there was apparently low cloud cover it is entirely plausible that at least the attack of 25 May 1941 was accomplished during darkness.

[Old Bunyip]

You are back to the tired jingoistic "Everything the British did was great and any other opinion is an attack on God, the Queen, and British History" school of non-thought. I am attempting to present lessons from history, not savagely attacking everything British (not that warm beer couldn't do with a trouncing). The RN did just great with what they had. It just happens to be that by the end of the war most of what they had was American. (The French Air Force was American by that time, too.) It didn't have to be that way, but British politicoes backed the wrong horse in every race for 25 years at least. This is not meant to denigrate British servicemen, it is to demonstrate where their leadership went wrong. Anybody else operating under the constraints the British government put on their services would have collapsed. The British services did not collapse, but it was not thanks to their political leadership between the wars.

 

No, you misunderstand me. What I am saying is not that the RN always made the right decision. Rather what I am saying is that considering the restraints, economic, institutional and personal on the decision makers, they came to the decisions they did, in the belief they were correct.

 

Lets put it this way. All too often in military history, authors all too often are severely critical of the subjects they are studying. They apply perfect hindsight and ask why didn't "so-and-so, decide this instead?" And then make no effort to explain the contraints that so-and-so was under.

 

Basically, there was no way that the RN could become the USN, which is how I read what you're writing. The two services were fundamentally different at the most basic levels and you cannot blame the RN for making the decisions it made. They were made within the constraints the operators were under and so, as far as the RN was concerned, should be considered the right, if not necessarily the correct decision.

 

And on a final note - the Sea Mosquito was in service and being deployed to the Far East in August 1945. That it was a land plane originally is IMO quite immaterial. It showed that the RN was indeed far more innovative, than you give them credit for, particularly when one remembers the tools they had to work with earlier in the war.

[Garth]

While Ranger was an experiment to see how big of an airwing could be put aboard a small, twin-screw hull and Wasp was a way to get the most out of the remaining treaty tonnage, I'm not sure either can really be called a "failure" inasmuch as they never fulfulled what I believe to be their intended roles circa 1941: operation as a screening/covering force for the battle line (with the fleet CVs acting in a more autonomous manner). They were "obsolete", at least in a sense, on the day WWII started for the US: when the battle line essentially ceased to exist.

 

While other "obsolete" designs (like the fast BBs) were able to transition to other roles (AA farms, shore bombardment), Wasp didn't survive long enough to have a chance. Ranger was utilized pretty well in the Atlantic (Torch, Norway), and I've read that there were plans to attach her to the fast CV task force in 1944/45 as a night fighter carrier (the role given the smallish Enterprise and the more limited Saratoga).

 

As it was, while not up to the same standards as the Yorktowns or Essexes, Ranger and to a lesser extent Wasp were at least effective enough to put to good use in roles that allowed other units to be freed up for major combat operations.

 

--Garth

 

Originally posted by Ken Estes:

I thought the two articles summarized the design problems well, but I would have liked more attention to what was known/assumed at the time each design was finalized, as opposed to built. Note the USN never placed Ranger at risk and Wasp was perhaps too small a hull as well. They ought to be considered failures. 

[Skip]

Thru the 30s untill sometime in 1940 the US navy pilots were trained in both single engine and multi engine planes and were not type assigned untill after training. That is why some pilots change types early in the war like Bill Martin for one. The pre war pilots also had night trainng. In 1940 the US had 12 carriers building or ordered. The need for pilots would out strip the suply so the traing was cut back. This allowed for increase pilots by training on type at an earler point.

[Colin Williams]

Originally posted by Scott Cunningham:

You would have a tough time finding any ship hit by a torp at night.

 

From the New Zealand official history covering operations out of Malta -

 

"The most significant tactical feature of the operations which now began, and which were a necessary prelude to the El Alamein land offensive, was the development of a long-range torpedo-bomber, for the Royal Navy had demonstrated that there was no more effective weapon for attacking merchant vessels than the torpedo. Beaufort aircraft, supplemented by light naval forces and particularly submarines, could be expected to close the shipping lanes by day, but the enemy convoys could still slip across under cover of darkness. The problem appeared insoluble, but the answer came from the ingenious airmen on the spot. The twin-engined Wellington bomber, now being out-moded in the United Kingdom, was still the mainstay of the Middle East night-bomber force. Trials were therefore begun over the Red Sea to modify this aircraft into a torpedo-bomber, and the Air Ministry was finally convinced that these aircraft could form a highly efficient striking force. The Wellington, slow, unweildy, and fabric-covered as it was, would be too vulnerable a target by day, but possessed the necessary long range for night

operations. Throughout the early months of 1942, pilots, among whom were Squadron-Leader M. J. Earle24 and Flight-Sergeant A. G. Metcalf,25 flew tirelessly over the Red Sea formulating tactics, and a new and interesting series of operations ensued.

 

Radar-equipped Wellingtons, loaded with parachute flares, patrolled the shipping lanes for up to ten hours throughout the night. Sighting reports were sent to base, and a striking force of torpedo-Wellingtons was homed on to the target convoy by continual position signals and by direction-finding radio. The search-Wellingtons, popularly known as ‘Snoopingtons’, promptly dropped parachute flares in an L-shaped pattern around the convoy from 4000

feet, utilising any moon path on the sea as well, so that the whole convoy might be trapped in a rectangle of light and the dispositions of the escorting destroyers clearly picked out. Meanwhile the strike-Wellingtons, or ‘Torpingtons’, attacked at sea level, making their runs so that the enemy merchant vessels were silhouetted against the flares. The torpedoes had to

be dropped at approximately seventy feet above sea level, and on dark nights pilots sometimes flew into the sea. Radio-altimeters and some curious forms of torpedo-sights were later refinements, but pilots generally relied on their own judgment.

 

The night offensive on shipping exceeded all expectations."

[vardulli]

in Aircraft of the RAF since 1918

it states that the first U-boat (U502) was sunk in a night attack on 6.7.42.

[DougRichards]

Originally posted by Tiornu:

when you consider during the period the Brits were developing their carriers the FAA did not control the pilots.

 

The problem with British carrier aviation pre about 1940 was that the pilots were RAF, so in order to maintain some naval presence they had to fly with a naval officer in a back seat.

 

Hence, when the rest of the world was building single seat naval fighters the RN was wedded to two seaters, therefore the Fulmar and the Roc. It was only under wartime pressure that RN was able to get their own NAVAL pilots and develop decent single seat fighters, the best of the bunch being the Sea Fury.

[Redbeard]

For an account of the FAA in early WWII I can recommend Charles Lamb: War In A Stringbag. He flew mainly in the Med. (and practically always at night) until taken PoW by the Vichy in late 41 IIRC.

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

[JOE BRENNAN]

The question isn't whether there were successful night attacks against shipping before and during 1942, as well as later on, by for example the Japanese, with radar and even without. Obviously there were many. The issue is, for the near carrier battle of April 1942 or in general for WWII, whether a night strike carrier could hope to match the decisive power of the "eggshell armed with hammer" the large day carrier, even striking first. From reading of night antishipping attacks of WWII, I very much doubt it. The posts here are focusing on successes over periods of time, but in a carrier battle you have to achieve decisive results in less than a day, or likely be destroyed yourself. This would be the key problem with relying on night attack from carriers against other carriers, let alone with less well trained and ready crews outnumbered (in planes) ~3.5:1.

 

Rather than simply quote individual successes, I'd look at it the other way and read day to day accounts of surface ships coming under night attacks, like "South Pacific Destroyer" by Crenshaw about USS Maury in the South Pacific '42-43, or "Fighting Destroyer" by Connell about HMS Petard mainly in the Med 42-43: constant night air attacks (esp. latter ship's experience) harrowing and a psychological burden on crews, and occasionally sinking ships, but not achieving decisive results in any given raid.

 

Likewise one reason for US night carriers was attrition by Japanese twilight/night torpedo attackers over many raids (combined with the belief that mixed day/night groups were inefficient, obviously revised eventually). Later they had radar, and with or without they were the only Japanese platforms to put torpedoes into US fast carriers after 1942. But the idea of even experienced units of that type scoring several major sinkings in one make or break raid...it can't be said it couldn't happen, just would seem a remote possiblity based on WWII results. So it may work for land based attackers whose bases can hope to survive the day carrier's strikes next day, but launched from essentially defenseless opposing carriers it would be quite unlikely to work out well for them, IMO.

 

Joe

 

[Edited by JOE BRENNAN (07 Dec 2004).]

[Scott Cunningham]

Getting back to the carrier design bit:

 

I think the US carriers were better suited to fighting the japs effectively, but the brit carriers took damage better.

 

You would need 2-3 brit carriers to equal the striking power of a single Essex. Lets say two for arguments sake because a certain portion of US carriers would be out for damage repair.

 

The funny thing is the japanese started with US style designs, then started armoring theirs more like the brit concepts. WWII's biggest carrier (the Shinano) was heavily armored, but had a tiny air group.

 

With the exception of the decent Taiho, the best jap war carriers were the Shokaku and Zuikaku class, with the Akagi and Kaga next in order of merit.

[Jeff]

Originally posted by Scott Cunningham:

Getting back to the carrier design bit:

 

I think the US carriers were better suited to fighting the japs effectively, but the brit carriers took damage better.

 

You would need 2-3 brit carriers to equal the striking power of a single Essex. Lets say two for arguments sake because a certain portion of US carriers would be out for damage repair.

 

The funny thing is the japanese started with US style designs, then started armoring theirs more like the brit concepts. WWII's biggest carrier (the Shinano) was heavily armored, but had a tiny air group.

 

With the exception of the decent Taiho, the best jap war carriers were the Shokaku and Zuikaku class, with the Akagi and Kaga next in order of merit.

 

My guess is they were heading towards the same concerns as the Brits had pre-war, few trained pilots(left) and a need to defend what carriers they had. This led them to a similar reality, small air groups and tough carriers. The right choice for bad reasons. In the end, a carrier's job is to carry planes, if it needs big guns (Lex and early Sara) or lots of armor (Brits) it's compensating for an inadequacy in it's prime roll of fighting with planes and not guns and armor.

[FITZ]

Originally posted by Jeff:

My guess is they were heading towards the same concerns as the Brits had pre-war, few trained pilots(left) and a need to defend what carriers they had. This led them to a similar reality, small air groups and tough carriers. The right choice for bad reasons. In the end, a carrier's job is to carry planes, if it needs big guns (Lex and early Sara) or lots of armor (Brits) it's compensating for an inadequacy in it's prime roll of fighting with planes and not guns and armor.

 

 

In the pre-radar era British thinking in regard to carrier design was perfectly sound. The carrier's own fighters could contribute little if anything to the air defense of the carrier. They could never hope to get enough warning to get off in time. In case of air attack they would be stowed below in the protected hangar. The ships own guns would provide air defense. With radar came viable early-warning adn the fighter changed from being an escort for the strike group to being a viable carrier-defender.

[Tiornu]

"WWII's biggest carrier (the Shinano) was heavily armored, but had a tiny air group."

Shinano had a small air group, not because of her armor scheme, but because she was planned to operate aircraft other than her own. She was to position herself near the enemy force, and planes from other carriers would land on her after their attacks, rearm and refuel, and attack again before heading home. Thus in theory only the tough Shinano would be exposed to attack.

Sounds like a ridiculous theory to me.