British aircraft carriers in WW2

[Slater]

http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-030.htm

 

This article doesn't speak very highly of these ships. Is this generally accurate?

[Old Bunyip]

What has to be remembered is that the British carriers were designed to operate in the restricted waters of the Mediterrean and the North Sea, as Fleet units. The US Carriers would not have survived in "Bomb Alley".

 

 

 

[Edited by Old Bunyip (04 Dec 2004).]

[Scott Cunningham]

US carriers didn't take damage as well as Brit carriers, but were FAR more powerful offensively. They carried many more planes, and could launch larger airstrikes faster than the Brits.

 

After 1942 not a single large US carrier was lost, although some (Saratoga, Enterprise, Bunker Hill, Essex, Intrepid, Franklin) took some decent hits.

 

The Franklin was knocked out of the war, and I dont think she ever served again, but the others were all repaired and used extensively.

 

The article is a good discussion on an often overlooked aspect of ship design: wear & tear. The Brit ships essentially were all wasted and twisted by wars end.

[Guest DwightPruitt]

Originally posted by Scott Cunningham:

The Franklin was knocked out of the war, and I dont think she ever served again, but the others were all repaired and used extensively.

 

 

Was the Franklin knocked out by kamikazes or bombs?

[Guest Sargent]

Originally posted by Old Bunyip:

What has to be remembered is that the British carriers were designed to operate in the restricted waters of the Mediterrean and the North Sea, as Fleet units.  The US Carriers would not have survived in "Bomb Alley".

 

 

Bovine feces. US carriers survived in environments just as hostile as "Bomb Alley" by carrying enough planes to interdict enemy bases and intercept enemy attacks.

 

British CVs were designed to BE TARGETs and survive. US CVs were designed to carry attack groups, not be targets.

 

The British Armored Hanger CVs were designed when the entire British naval air force could be accomodated on two or three ships (leaving five without planes), and the fact that the RAF and the Air Ministry had complete control over the a/c the RAF was using and the training of pilots meant that there was NO way the RN was going to come up with a modern air arm of any strength. The RN never did in WW2, the air arm they took to victory was American - American planes, American doctrine, American operating techniques, and American training.

 

Looking at the British Illustrious class CVs, one sees that they were AA cruisers (heaviest AA batteries in the world at the time) with the capablity of limited flight operations. RN doctrine in the face of air attack was to huddle the Fleet around the CV, under the umbrella of the CV's AA batteries. The CV would degas all planes to reduce fire hazard and strike them below into the armored hanger for protection, which meant they could neither intercept nor stike back.

 

The British get all misty-eyed about Taranto, when 20 obsolete Stringbags put the Italian Fleet out of action in a daring strike. I think it is appalling that the world's premier navy could only muster 20 a/c for such an important strike, and only managed to reach the 20 mark by transferring Eagle's a/c to Illustrious after Eagle broke down.

 

Somehow, I think that Taranto might have been even more successful had a USN CV with a 72-plane group been there instead of Illustrious. And don't say that Illustrious would have survived the Italian retaliation where a US CV would not, the Italians did not find or strike the attack force.

 

Post-war, the RN conducted a survey of all the bomb and Kamikaze damage done to RN Armored Hanger CVs. They found ONE instance where the armored hanger was vital - IOW, unarmored CVs would have survived the hits and that doesn't even figure in that the larger air groups of the unarmored CV might have prevented the attackers from getting at the CV in the first place.

 

I find it interesting that the Japanese attacks that got through to TF 57 (AKA British Pacific Fleet) off Shakishima Gunto got through when the RN fighters were off on strikes and the CAP was attenuated. The RN CVs did not have the planes (and munitions and avgas stowage) to both mount strikes and provide effective CAP at the same time.

 

The RN should have done better; the RN could have done better except for the stranglehold of the RAF on the RN Air Arm. The RN had possibly the best CV admiral between the wars of any nation - Henderson. He formulated doctrine and tactics for multi-CV task forces. He was also the man responsible for the Armored Hanger CVs, when he realized that there would never be enough a/c to fill USN or IJN-style CVs.

 

Henderson died in 1939. One of my fantasies is having him in command of TF58.....

[Guest Sargent]

I should have read the article before going off on my tirade. Stu and Richard said almost everything already....

[Scott Cunningham]

The Japs really pioneered the large carrier strike concept. Pearl Harbor is not seen as revolutionary (massing 6 big flat tops as the main efforts). It was. It took the US until 43 or 44 to get a 6 carrier task force operational. By 44 the US was using massive carrier battlegroups and task forces, and the japs were taking it in the a$$ because of it.

 

The brits, and the US up until the war mainly operated carriers in the support role. One ship would support a small battlegroup of surface combattants.

 

US Carriers usually operate independently today and not in huge WWII style task forces. There are numerous carrier battlegroups formed around individual carriers.

[Guest Sargent]

Originally posted by Scott Cunningham:

The Japs really pioneered the large carrier strike concept. Pearl Harbor is not seen as revolutionary (massing 6 big flat tops as the main efforts). It was. It took the US until 43 or 44 to get a 6 carrier task force operational. By 44 the US was using massive carrier battlegroups and task forces, and the japs were taking it in the a$$ because of it.

 

The IJN was the first to use multiple CVs in battle, but the concept was pioneered by Henderson when he was Rear Admiral, Aircraft Carriers in the Med in the early 1930s. At the time the IJN and USN didn't have enough CVs to practice using them in groups. The RN had ship numbers, but not plane numbers. Henderson had to strip the whole RN and even then he couldn't full Furious, Glorious, and Courageous to capacity (which is the reason he plumped for Armored Hangers in 1935).

 

Incidentally Henderson was the guy who noticed the error in British counts of ships entering and leaving port in 1917. His spotting of the error made convoy viable.

[Fermi2]

Actually The USN Pioneered the large carrier strike not the IJN. The USN invented the tactics and prooved a carrier could launch a large strike. It didn't matter how many carriers the IJN used on the strike, in carrier warfare so long as the enemy has one carrier he's just as dangerous as you are.

 

There's no proof at all the Brits carriers could take damage any better than their USN cousins. USN Carriers often took damage as well as the Brits.

 

Right now I'm reading Britisah Carrier Aviation by Friedman and their thought process makes sense, when you consider during the period the Brits were developing their carriers the FAA did not control the pilots.

 

Mike

[Old Bunyip]

Originally posted by Sargent:

Bovine feces. US carriers survived in environments just as hostile as "Bomb Alley" by carrying enough planes to interdict enemy bases and intercept enemy attacks.

 

An interesting hypothesis. That only works if your fleet air arm outnumbers the enemy. By the time the US Carriers came into range of a number of airbases that equalled that of the Mediterrean, the Japanese were unable to mount strikes of sufficient numbers and intensity to counter the USN's aircraft.

 

"Bomb Alley" was surrounded by enemy airfields from Italy, Sardinia, Sicily, Greece, Crete and North Africa. The RN's fleet air arm was unable, because of circumstance at that point of the war, to assemble either sufficient numbers of aircraft or flattops to carry them. Basically you're comparing apples and oranges. The USN faced a defeated enemy, the RN an ascendent one.

 

British CVs were designed to BE TARGETs and survive. US CVs were designed to carry attack groups, not be targets.

 

Yes, different recipes for different puddings.

 

The British Armored Hanger CVs were designed when the entire British naval air force could be accomodated on two or three ships (leaving five without planes), and the fact that the RAF and the Air Ministry had complete control over the a/c the RAF was using and the training of pilots meant that there was NO way the RN was going to come up with a modern air arm of any strength. The RN never did in WW2, the air arm they took to victory was American - American planes, American doctrine, American operating techniques, and American training.

 

What was the words you used? "Bovine feces" The two forces in 1945 still fundamentally different, with the USN severely lagging behind the RN in innovation and operating capability. While the USN was still worrying about the bounce of the Corsair's undercarriage, the RN was operating them off carriers. The British were fielding twin-engined fighters and fighter-bombers, while the USN couldn't make its mind up about the Tigercat. The British were testing jet powered aircraft while the USN was so dubious about them they produced the mediocre Fireball.

 

Look, the RAN, which was essentially an Australian extension of the RN, showed just how different the doctrines and operational methods of the two fleets were. Despite working closely with the USN they were still essentially the RN in 1945 and its noted that they were very, very, different in Tom Frame's book on the post-war integration of the RAN with the USN.

 

 

 

[Edited by Old Bunyip (05 Dec 2004).]

[Guest Sargent]

Originally posted by Old Bunyip:

Originally posted by Sargent:

Bovine feces. US carriers survived in environments just as hostile as "Bomb Alley" by carrying enough planes to interdict enemy bases and intercept enemy attacks.

 

An interesting hypothesis. That only works if your fleet air arm outnumbers the enemy. By the time the US Carriers came into range of a number of airbases that equalled that of the Mediterrean, the Japanese were unable to mount strikes of sufficient numbers and intensity to counter the USN's aircraft.

 

"Bomb Alley" was surrounded by enemy airfields from Italy, Sardinia, Sicily, Greece, Crete and North Africa. The RN's fleet air arm was unable, because of circumstance at that point of the war, to assemble either sufficient numbers of aircraft or flattops to carry them. Basically you're comparing apples and oranges. The USN faced a defeated enemy, the RN an ascendent one.

And just WHO defeated the enemy the USN was facing?

The "circumstances at the point of the war" were exactly as I put them. Because of the RAF, the RN was unable to field a naval air arm worthy of it.

The attacks in "Bomb Alley" rarely (I hesitate to say 'never' but I can't recall one) matched in strength those found in the Pacific that USN (and RN) CVs fought through.

What made "Bomb Alley" so difficult is that there was no getting away from it. The RN couldn't pull back out of range to rest and replenish during the crucial operations. (We won't go into the lack of strategic insight that put the RN in "Bomb Alley" in the first place....)

That said, I still believe that the US approach with heavier fighter squadrons would have been superior - provided, of course, those fighter squadrons were directed by British-developed radar and controllers.

 

British CVs were designed to BE TARGETs and survive. US CVs were designed to carry attack groups, not be targets.

 

Yes, different recipes for different puddings.

The only "different pudding" was that the USN kept control of its air arm and the RN didn't. IMHO April Fool's Day 1918 was the biggest military disaster to befall Britain in the 20th Century.

The British Armored Hanger CVs were designed when the entire British naval air force could be accomodated on two or three ships (leaving five without planes), and the fact that the RAF and the Air Ministry had complete control over the a/c the RAF was using and the training of pilots meant that there was NO way the RN was going to come up with a modern air arm of any strength. The RN never did in WW2, the air arm they took to victory was American - American planes, American doctrine, American operating techniques, and American training.

 

What was the words you used? "Bovine feces" The two forces in 1945 still fundamentally different, with the USN severely lagging behind the RN in innovation and operating capability. Let me add Horse Puckey to that. The RN in 1945 was using American operating techniques, including out-rigger and deck stowage of a/c, safety barriers - the RN practice had been to limit aircraft to flights of six, because their slow operating procedures could not put up more than that at once. And just WHERE were the RN's aircrew trained from 1942 on? The United States, at US bases and off US decks. While the USN was still worrying about the bounce of the Corsair's undercarriage, the RN was operating them off carriers. Granted, but the Brits didn't manage to come up with a comparable shipboard a/c. The RN used the Corsair because the USN was prepared to give them lots of them, since we were concentrating on the Hellcat. When we needed the F4U's performance and greater numbers of VF to counter kamikazes in 1945, the USN had no problem operating the Corsair from CVs and CVEs. Of course, we had fixed the bounce problem by then - a USN enlisted man came up with the solution. The British were fielding twin-engined fighters and fighter-bombers, while the USN couldn't make its mind up about the Tigercat. Excuse me? The first twin engine a/c to land on a Brit CV was post-war, and the Sea Mosquito and Sea Hornet were both conversions of land-based a/c. The USN was playing with the indifferent XF5F twin-engine fighter before we entered the war (it eventually evolved into the F7F), and had had twin-engine torpedo-bombers in the 1920s (the Army screamed bloody murder about the USN having multi-engine planes with wheels, so the USN had to put them on floats and use them as patrol planes). The British were testing jet powered aircraft while the USN was so dubious about them they produced the mediocre Fireball. Beta Phi Delta. The Fireball was an attempt to get around the atrocious fuel consumption of the early jets. The piston engine was to provide fuel economy and range, the jet to provide combat performance. Who operated Sea Furies in Korea when the USN was flying Banshees and Cougars?

 

Look, the RAN, which was essentially an Australian extension of the RN, showed just how different the doctrines and operational methods of the two fleets were. Despite working closely with the USN they were still essentially the RN in 1945 and its noted that they were very, very, different in Tom Frame's book on the post-war integration of the RAN with the USN.

I am not saying the services were not different. For one thing the LSO's ('Batsmen's) signals to landing a/c were about 180* off. A USN pilot going by an RN LSO's signals would end up in the drink, and vice-versa.

Still, the RN at the end of the war was using American a/c, American operating techniques, training their pilots in America, and a good many of them were flying off decks the US provided. The RN could never have deployed TF57 in 1945 without American materiel and assistance. I will not go so far as to say that the RN wouldn't have kept abreast or ahead of the USN had the RN been able to free its air arm from the pernicious influence of the RAF.

 

You are back to the tired jingoistic "Everything the British did was great and any other opinion is an attack on God, the Queen, and British History" school of non-thought. I am attempting to present lessons from history, not savagely attacking everything British (not that warm beer couldn't do with a trouncing). The RN did just great with what they had. It just happens to be that by the end of the war most of what they had was American. (The French Air Force was American by that time, too.) It didn't have to be that way, but British politicoes backed the wrong horse in every race for 25 years at least. This is not meant to denigrate British servicemen, it is to demonstrate where their leadership went wrong. Anybody else operating under the constraints the British government put on their services would have collapsed. The British services did not collapse, but it was not thanks to their political leadership between the wars.

[Tiornu]

This article doesn't speak very highly of these ships. Is this generally accurate?

Well, the part written by that Richard Worth character is especially good.

I had, as one of my goals in writing that piece, the intent to overturn some of the misconceptions that have become common knowledge and have made it difficult to understand where the armored-box designs came from. You can't grasp the RN intent if you don't realize that the small air group was a given BEFORE the armor went on, or if you're stuck with the idea that these ships were meant primarily for "restricted waters."

 

It took the US until 43 or 44 to get a 6 carrier task force operational.

Fortunately we didn't try anything so foolish during the critical, early phase. The Americans correctly chose to keeps their carriers dispersed, and Midway is a perfect illustration of the results. Right through the war's end, the USN continued to divide its carriers within the limits imposed by escort availability and logistics.

 

Was the Franklin knocked out by kamikazes or bombs?

Bombs. She was restored to full operational capability.

 

when you consider during the period the Brits were developing their carriers the FAA did not control the pilots.

My tendency is to see this factor as somewhat exaggerated. To the best of my knowledge, the RN was never turned down in a request for carrier airmen. However, the issue is admittedly more complex than that. There's another book, also by Friedman (and Mandeles and Hone), called American & British Aircraft Carrier Development, that specifically examines the ramifications of the different organizational systems.

 

"Bomb Alley" was surrounded by enemy airfields from Italy, Sardinia, Sicily, Greece, Crete and North Africa.

As the articles point out, "Bomb Alley" wasn't all that intense.

 

The British were fielding twin-engined fighters and fighter-bombers, while the USN couldn't make its mind up about the Tigercat.

Actually, the planes the British were fielding were, to a large extent, American.

[Guest Sargent]

"Well, the part written by that Richard Worth character is especially good." Shame on you....

 

"My tendency is to see this factor as somewhat exaggerated. To the best of my knowledge, the RN was never turned down in a request for carrier airmen. However, the issue is admittedly more complex than that."

 

I think the problem was that the RAF did not teach navigation to pilots. The fumblings of Bomber Command trying to find Germany during the early war years emphasize that. Studies of BTW training showed that RAF pilots often had to be coached by ground controllers to find their goal, and that was in an island where one is never more than 60 miles from the sea. One would think that a sighting of the coast could provide a clue as to where the flier was, but apparently RAF pilot navigation abilities ended at finding the bar at the OC.

 

(The USAAC pilots learned to navigate when they carried the US Mail - mustn't have an airmail letter delivered to the wrong address! Long over-water flights to the Panama Canal Zone and Hawaii also honed navigation skills, as did flying over Kansas where a different shade of wheat in a field was a major landmark... )

 

Because the pilots were all RAF personnel and admittedly (by the RAF) could not find their a$$ with both hands, the naval a/c had to carry an RN officer to navigate. Except for the Fairy Flycatcher, which could not operate out of sight of its carrier, all FAA a/c BTW were at least two-seaters, with the concomitant penalties in loss of payload and performance. Some of the early FAA a/c (Blackburn Blackburn and Avro Bison) carried the navigator's comfort to somewhat ridiculous extents, providing him with an enclosed cabin so his charts didn't blow around while the rest of the aircrew froze in the slipstream.

 

British-designed naval a/c in WW2 carried on the tradition, the Fulmar and Firefly fighters both lugged around a navigator. It's instructive that when the Swordfish carried long-range tanks, the crewman displaced was the TAG (Telegraphist/Air Gunner) rather than the navigator. Apparently (and wisely) navigation was considered more important than communications and self-defense.

 

Just another example of my "The RAF was the worst thing to happen to Britain" bias....

[Redbeard]

There's no doubt in my mind, that as things turned out, the "big airfleet, thin skinn" CV proved the superior concept - in effect it was the ideal ship of Fisher's mind

 

But at the time both the Illustrious class and the US Enterprise class CV's were designed radar and radar controlled CAP weren't realities yet and could not be counted on to be.

 

So if by second half 30's having to expect operating in waters infested by strong landbased airpower (Italian airforce was considered the strongest in the world by mid/late 30's) the idea of "bombers getting through" is diificult to avoid and combined with a significant superiority of your own heavy gun ships the British concept appear sound. An Enterprise CV would not be able to utilse its large strikes to very much in the Med. before radar controlled CAP became practical (43-44?).

 

Next the RN incl. the airarm had since Jutland developed a capability to operate at night, an asset which would make large strikes impossible anyway. When airborne radar became a practical reality in the FAA somewhen in 1941 the necessity of operating at night suddenly became a really potent weapon. This is usually overlooked when estimating the potential of the FAA in WWII, I believe much because the airborne radar was guarded by tight secrecy. Even today information about when which units/planes had what radar is scarce, although it made all the difference for most FAA planes.

 

Finally the armoured made enough impression to have thousands of armour put into US CV designs (Midway class), but admittedly also for British designs to approach the US concept.

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

[Guest Sargent]

Originally posted by Redbeard:

There's no doubt in my mind, that as things turned out, the "big airfleet, thin skinn" CV proved the superior concept - in effect it was the ideal ship of Fisher's mind

 

But at the time both the Illustrious class and the US Enterprise class CV's were designed radar and radar controlled CAP weren't realities yet and could not be counted on to be.

Very true. But the USN achieved some measure of interception capability in maneuvers, largely because they could carry enough airplanes to make patrols worthwhile. The IJN almost gave up on carrier-based fighters in the mid-30s (only retaining them when long-range escort over China became necessary), and the Brits in effect did give up.

 

So if by second half 30's having to expect operating in waters infested by strong landbased airpower (Italian airforce was considered the strongest in the world by mid/late 30's) the idea of "bombers getting through" is diificult to avoid and combined with a significant superiority of your own heavy gun ships the British concept appear sound. An Enterprise CV would not be able to utilse its large strikes to very much in the Med. before radar controlled CAP became practical (43-44?).

Radar-controlled interception was used by the USN in 1942, although all the wrinkles weren't worked out until 1944 - maybe 1943, but there weren't any interceptions to test the concepts that I know of in 1943 (and I know a lot about the period). Ground-based radar controlled interception certainly worked for US forces by late 1942.

Your point is well made, however - absent radar and GCI, the equation changes to the benefit of the attacker, whether carrier or land-based.

 

Next the RN incl. the airarm had since Jutland developed a capability to operate at night, an asset which would make large strikes impossible anyway. When airborne radar became a practical reality in the FAA somewhen in 1941 the necessity of operating at night suddenly became a really potent weapon. This is usually overlooked when estimating the potential of the FAA in WWII, I believe much because the airborne radar was guarded by tight secrecy. Even today information about when which units/planes had what radar is scarce, although it made all the difference for most FAA planes.

The USN had a significant night operating capability in the 1930s. This went away when the Truly Professional Regular Squadrons were broken up to provide cadres for the masses of new kids coming from the Training Schools.

 

Night operations were also not emphasized because of the strain 24/7 operations put on the carrier crews. The USN eventually went from having detachments of night-capable a/c on each CV to having CVs dedicated to solely night operations.

 

At the risk of appearing snide, I will point out that the miserable performance of British naval a/c made night operations easier - it is less difficult to fly at night in a 'low 'n slow' a/c than a high-performance one. A Swordfish could putter around in the dark more easily than an Avenger.

 

Finally the armoured made enough impression to have thousands of armour put into US CV designs (Midway class), but admittedly also for British designs to approach the US concept.

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

As the article in the threadhead points out, the armor on the Midways appeared more for structural than tactical reasons. OTOH, the Eagles(2) and cancelled Malta classes moved away from protection and towards greater operating capability - not just more a/c, but more munitions and avgas as well.

 

The performance of the RN's carrier expert (Henderson, my heeero) indicates that he would have preferred massed strikes and more a/c if he could have gotten them. Since he knew that that was an impossibility whilst the RAF and the Air Ministry were running aviation matters, he plumped for ship qualities (armor and AA) in the Illustrious class when he was the RN's Controller in 1935-6.

 

Henderson did his experiments in the Med, and he thought large air groups were the ideal way to go in that environment. He couldn't get large air groups because of the political scene, so he went for defensive capability.

[Redbeard]

Hi King

 

I actually think the British started to depart from the armoured box concept already in the last of the four Illustrious class (Indomitable) and took it a step further in the Implacables before ending in Eagle and Malta classes. The first two Illustrious were funded in the 1936 programme when the 1935 experience of not being able to wage war against Italy was in vivid memory. I guess anything optimised for Mediterranean action could sell, but that most gradually came to their senses a little later wanting something a little more versatile. But in mid 30’s, when the number of active FAA pilots often would be less than 200, it indeed would be hassardous to build carriers sacrificing protection for the capacity of not available large aircomplements.

 

But anyway I actually think the Illustrious class did the job very well in the Med. and I doubt any ship available in 40-42 would have done it better. And had the IJN followed its schedule and stepped into Somerville’s trap in April 42 “putter around in the darkness” might indeed have been connected with crippling losses to the IJN. Judging the Illustrious by their Pacific service indeed is a hard test, as that probably was the kind of action they certainly not were intended for. A British oriented anti-Japan campaign would have started from SEA and in many ways have resembled the Mediterranean (vincinity of landbased airpower and restricted waters).

 

I agree that the FAA really can’t blame anybody else for the planes they started WWII with, they got what they asked for. But I don’t think that it was the planes quality (or lack of) that made night fighting necessary. Bascially an Avenger is insignificantly less lost than a Swordfish if attacking in bright daylight without tight fightercover. The big aircomplement of USN CV’s is of course necessary to have enough fighters around, but I have a suspicion that the system mainly worked because the quality and numbers of the enemy had fallen through earlier attrition (and some divebombers bumping over a profitable target just before running out of fuel). A longer period with more equal opportunity battles like at Coral Sea and Midway (and luck more evenly distributed) would most likely have led to more emphasis on nightattacks, especialy as USN easily could aquire the necessary technology and tactics from the RN.

 

Anyway I think the basic quality needed for night action from carriers is landing qualities, and as Avengers were operated with success from small CE’s in the North Atlantic I guess it was as good as could be asked.

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

[JOE BRENNAN]

Originally posted by Redbeard:

And had the IJN followed its schedule and stepped into Somerville’s trap in April 42 “putter around in the darkness” might indeed have been connected with crippling losses to the IJN.

 

Let's duly note the superior equipment and training of best FAA carrier groups ca. 1942 for night attack v. USN and IJN, but let's not get carried away. Reading between the lines it's fairly to clear to me, though an opinion, that the Eastern Fleet wasn't trying super hard to have a conclusive engagement with the 5 IJN carriers in April 1942. Understandably so. Two carriers with a striking power of [45] Albacores, and 36 [or 37] fighters, 16 of them F4F's but the rest, Sea Hurricanes and Fulmars, hopelessly inferior to A6M's (the two general types went 20-some to 1 in kills v. A6M's landbased from Ceylon), v. 5 Japanese carriers. Indomitable's sdns' were established but training had been upset by using the carrier as a ferry; but Formidable's Albacore sdn, almost half the torpedo force, was barely trained. In general half trained Commonwealth aircrew, unfortunately common, did exceedingly poorly against the Japanese in 1942, esp considering real results not claims.

 

Even assuming sharp edge of readiness, contemporary ops don't suggest a high % likelihood of torpedoing fast warships moving in the open at night on any given raid, though such night attacks would be effective for attrition, esp. against eg. convoys or against an enemy in harbor. Whereas the chance of destruction for the 2 British CV's once found by the Japanese in daylight was essentially 100%, even if the Japanese were by then down a carrier or two.

 

Joe

 

[Edited by JOE BRENNAN (05 Dec 2004).]

[Guest Sargent]

Originally posted by Redbeard:

Anyway I think the basic quality needed for night action from carriers is landing qualities, and as Avengers were operated with success from small CE’s in the North Atlantic I guess it was as good as could be asked.

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

 

When I said "putter around in the dark" I meant just that. A slow a/c like a Swordfish is much more forgiving in conditions of reduced visibility than a plane whose landing speed is greater than the Stringbag's max. Slow and stable gives the pilot a somewhat greater opportunity to recognize trouble and avoid it. By the time the pilot of a "hot little ship" sees a danger like another plane, it's already too late to do anything since the collision will occur before momentum of the plane can be re-directed.

 

As for night attacks against 1AF in the IO, I have yet to find a case of a maneuvering warship being hit by a Stringbag or Albacore at night. As Joe says, the night strike ability might have worked against Italian convoys but was never proven in fleet combat.

 

The IJN did come up with a night attack capability for their land-based a/c (they weren't operating too many off carriers by the time they did it) that managed to hit some US warships. They might have been able to use the technique off their CVs if they could have trained enough aircrew.

 

Let's see, the RN had 45 strike a/c on two carriers - that is only three more strike a/c than the air group on ONE IJN CV, and 1AF had five. Even assuming all the Albacores flew (not realistic for Albacore, they had a dicey engine) and were used for attack (ie, no scouts, shadowers, or flare-dropping a/c), that works out to 9 planes per CV; not a real good chance of causing serious damage. The US SBDs at Midway had 18 attackers per CV, and they inflicted killing damage only by a miraculous series of events. For one thing, torpedoes aren't going to land in a deck and hangar covered with fuel and loose ordnance as the US bombs did at Midway.

 

And all the IJN has to do is trail an Albacore going home and discover where the RN CVs are and they will be cheese-graters as soon as it's light. Can we say Cornwall and Dorsetshire? The RN had no chance of getting out of strike range of 1AF once they had closed to Albacore range, particularly since they were limited to 23 knots unless they wanted to leave Warspite (and the admiral) behind.

 

I really can't see the RN having a hope if they confronted 1AF in the IO in April 1942.

[Tiornu]

"I have yet to find a case of a maneuvering warship being hit by a Stringbag or Albacore at night."

Bismarck?

[Guest Sargent]

Originally posted by Tiornu:

"I have yet to find a case of a maneuvering warship being hit by a Stringbag or Albacore at night."

Bismarck?

 

At night?

[Scott Cunningham]

You would have a tough time finding any ship hit by a torp at night.

[Guest aevans]

IMO, the important thing to remember here is that once the enemy main body was detected, carrier aircraft not in the air, trying to attack enemy ships were liabilities. Additionally, with the exception of fighters reserved for CAP, aircraft in fleet actions were in practice cruise missiles -- meaning they were expendable and should be used at the first opportunity. The American practice of having more per ship, and actually utilizing them in this fashion, paid big, big dividends in combat.

[DKTanker]

Originally posted by Tiornu:

"I have yet to find a case of a maneuvering warship being hit by a Stringbag or Albacore at night."

Bismarck?

 

Just after midnight on 25 May, a strike by nine Swordfish aircraft launched from aircraft carrier Victorious managed to hit Bismarck with one torpedo. This was not the "fatal" torpedo hit which was made by Swordfish from HMS Ark Royal the next evening.

[JOE BRENNAN]

Originally posted by Tiornu:

"I have yet to find a case of a maneuvering warship being hit by a Stringbag or Albacore at night."

Bismarck?

 

Sargent's statement is too absolute. Let's try another dangerous "always/never" statement coming from the other direction (I can't think of an exception offhand but there may be one): if a daylight carrier strike group sighted an enemy carrier in the four 1942 carrier battles it was always sunk or seriously damaged (some sighted by recon a/c, or in company of those struck were nonetheless apparently not sighted by the actual strikes).

 

Against that sort of decisive weapon, the attritional kind of result likely in night carrier attack ca. 1942, even by well trained British groups which the two at hand weren't really, esp. without shadowing surface ships and aircraft (able to survive shadowing even in daylight) like the Bismarck hunt to coach in the attackers, wasn't a viable counter to mass attacks of day carrier groups. Not to say the British thought otherwise; night attack were just the best slim hope in the circumstances; if the IJN had forced a battle by getting between Somerville and bases as he feared, or if he had really been seeking one otherwise, which I doubt he was and don't see why he would have been given the likely outcome.

 

Joe

 

 

[Edited by JOE BRENNAN (05 Dec 2004).]

[Guest Sargent]

Originally posted by DKTanker:

Just after midnight on 25 May, a strike by nine Swordfish aircraft launched from aircraft carrier Victorious managed to hit Bismarck with one torpedo.  This was not the "fatal" torpedo hit which was made by Swordfish from HMS Ark Royal the next evening.

 

It's nit-picking, but there is daylight at 2400 in those latitudes on that date. Ark Royal's strike returned after dark, but was delivered at dusk, as was Formidable's at Matapan.

 

TF 58's strike during the Philippine Sea was delivered at dusk and the planes returned after dark, but that isn't counted a night strike either.

 

Victorious's strike at Bismarck probably is closest to a "true" night strike of any of the examples.