Sir Arthur "Bomber" Harris

[Sparviero]

But they did have CAS and interdiction aircraft - those awesome Battles and Lysanders... IIRC, RAF even ordered more Battles than any other aircraft prior the war.

 

RAF was of course not the only air force catching the douhetism fever - Soviets for example put priority on complex & expensive DB-3, even minor nations insisted having force of bombers.

 

The RAF purposely avoided aircraft that could fit a CAS role, no? I recall there being a promissing pre-war design the Hawker Henley?

 

---

What was the purpose of bombing Italian civilian centers in 44-45? The only thing it seemed to do was give the RSI bucket loads of propaganda material.

Edited July 15, 2007 by Sparviero

[rmgill]

The RAF purposely avoided aircraft that could fit a CAS role, no? I recall there being a promissing pre-war design the Hawker Henley?

 

Bristol Beufort and Beufighter? The Whole Hawker line of aircraft?

[Sparviero]

Bristol Beufort and Beufighter? The Whole Hawker line of aircraft?

 

Referring to prewar efforts. Both became operational post 1939.

[Sardaukar]

Well...Hawker Typhoon was excellent CAS-plane, right with Thunderbolt. Latter was more survivable with radial engine, tho.

 

Mosquitoes and Dambuster heavy bomber attacks were great.

 

But night or day city bombing, IMHO, was not war-winning effort. Attacking oil and transportation was what really made it felt in Europe. And that is not to undermine British efforts, because they did make themselves felt too.

Edited July 16, 2007 by Sardaukar

[KingSargent]

Well...Hawker Typhoon was excellent CAS-plane, right with Thunderbolt. Latter was more survivable with radial engine, tho.

 

Mosquitoes and Dambuster heavy bomber attacks were great.

 

But night or day city bombing, IMHO, was not war-winning effort. Attacking oil and transportation was what really made it felt in Europe. And that is not to undermine British efforts, because they did make themselves felt too.

Hawker Typhoon became a CAS airplane because it was a failure as a fighter. Notice that the Tempest which corrected Typhoon's faults was not used for CAS.

 

P-47 became a CAS plane after it was mostly replaced as a bomber escort by the P-51.

 

P-40 became a CAS plane just as soon as anything better appeared.

 

Note the progression? None of the "Famous CAS planes" were designed or intended to be CAS. All were pure fighter designs that were either failures as fighters or supplanted by more successful fighters.

 

US Attack planes had been CAS in the 1930s, but had grown to practically medium bomber size and roles. The only real "Attack enthusiast" in the USAAC was George Kenney who commanded 5th USAAF in SWPA.

 

Russians were probably the most enthusiastic practicioners of CAS in WW2.

[Guest aevans]

But night or day city bombing, IMHO, was not war-winning effort. Attacking oil and transportation was what really made it felt in Europe. And that is not to undermine British efforts, because they did make themselves felt too.

 

I think you have to nuance that a bit. Strategic bombing wasn't a war winning effort as originally envisioned.

 

For the US daylight effort, air supremacy had to first be achieved (which the bombing actually helped, as described by some already, in the sense that it forced the Luftwaffe to fight and be attrited), then transportation and energy targets could be engaged.

 

For the British effort, numbers and techniques had to be developed to the point that area targetting did enough damage to be worthwhile. It's just not credible to me that the British effort was useless simply because morale bombing didn't deliver the knockout punch, as originally intended. Whatever the British didn't do, they sure scattered enough destruction around to have some significant effect. (If you're thinking I'm going back on my original criticism of Harris, I am, mea culpa -- reflection and rereading of some semi-forgotten sources is a wonderful thing.)

 

BTW, for those who criticise the bombing effort because it wasn't really effective until the last year of the war, well, what did you expect? Most of the bombs were dropped in the last year of the war. They had to climb the learning curve and build up forces.

[swerve]

...

BTW, for those who criticise the bombing effort because it wasn't really effective until the last year of the war, well, what did you expect? Most of the bombs were dropped in the last year of the war. They had to climb the learning curve and build up forces.

 

It had one very large effect before then, i.e. the diversion of German industrial effort & manpower to fighting it.

[Guest aevans]

It had one very large effect before then, i.e. the diversion of German industrial effort & manpower to fighting it.

 

Of course it did. But the simplistic bottom liners (and they know who they are) don't want to know about strategic effects and opportunity costs. They want to hear about tactical outcomes like bombs dropped, bombing accuracy, and absolute manufacturing output.

[Bearded-Dragon]

Interesting discussion. Yet in over 3 pages of posts, not one poster has pointed out that Arthur Harris's nickname wasn't "Bomber". That was an invention of the Information Ministry. His real nickname, from the days when he was a pilot was "Butch".

 

As to the validity or not of the tactics he pursued, Harris reminds me a great deal of Haig. Both were determined sons-of-bitches and who hardened themselves against the losses their forces suffered in pursuit of what was essentially a war of attrition between Bomber Command and the Luftwaffe's nightfighter forces. Harris had the advantage over Haig in that he could be a great deal more flexible in where he attacked and how he attacked but he never flinched from the mission he had been given. Like Haig, he was praised initially but now is much maligned by an ungrateful public who flinch from the hard decisions he was forced to make, to achieve victory. Perhaps eventually we'll see a John Terraine-like historian arise who will, like Terraine and Haig cause a fundamental reappraisal of that, in my opinion, ungrateful attitude.

[Mote]

It had one very large effect before then, i.e. the diversion of German industrial effort & manpower to fighting it.

 

Wasn't much of the manpower used in German air defense manpower that couldn't be used elsewhere and so represented no net loss to the Germans?

[Sardaukar]

RAF did contribute...a lot. Those night raids were not useless and added the pressure. Efforts to reduce the effects of those raids were quite extensive and had big impact on economy/war production..maybe bigger than damage and casualties caused by night attacks...mainly because of diversion of resources.

 

About Harris and Haig...stubborness to see that things they use are not the most efficient or most useful is not a recommendable trait in especially higher command officer. If you cannot see outside your own set of beliefs despite evidence of contrary and surround oneself with sycophants, that can result to critical reviews..hindsight or not.

[swerve]

Wasn't much of the manpower used in German air defense manpower that couldn't be used elsewhere and so represented no net loss to the Germans?

 

They could have been working in factories, instead of being up all night manning guns. And think what all those tens of thousands of guns could have done in the front line.

[KingSargent]

About Harris and Haig...stubborness to see that things they use are not the most efficient or most useful is not a recommendable trait in especially higher command officer. If you cannot see outside your own set of beliefs despite evidence of contrary and surround oneself with sycophants, that can result to critical reviews..hindsight or not.

Haig was constantly trying to upgrade equipment, doctrine, and training. He also didn't 'surround himself with sycophants', although he should have gotten rid of Kiggell(? - his Intelligence officer). Still, I don't think that anyone has come up with a better candidate to replace Kiggell. Battlefield intelligence under the conditions of the WW1 Western Front were as new to everybody as all the other aspects.* When your army is expanding 1000% it is hard to find experts to fill every personnel slot - even the critical ones.

 

Harris, OTOH, just wanted more of the same old bombs, bombers, and tactics. He opposed the Pathfinders, IIRC.

 

* One example of new conditions leading to blunders was the Somme. The first reports to reach HQ were of 'light casualties.' This was determined by the reports of wounded treated by the Medical Corps. Nobody thought that the reason that few wounded were treated is that everyone was dead or still laying out in No Man's Land.

[DougRichards]

In short, Aevans and Swerve are right, its too simple to say 'The RAF didn't drop it in the pickle barrel, so they didn't contribute'.

 

Just how many pickle barrels did the Germans leave out for the RAF bomb anyway?

 

(I recall that when a B-17 actually hit a Japanese ship some wag made the remark - in deference to all the Norden bomb sight enthusiasts - the the ship must have left a pickle barrel on deck...)

[KingSargent]

Just how many pickle barrels did the Germans leave out for the RAF bomb anyway?

 

(I recall that when a B-17 actually hit a Japanese ship some wag made the remark - in deference to all the Norden bomb sight enthusiasts - the the ship must have left a pickle barrel on deck...)

In the Solomons an IJN DD was stationary in the water picking up survivors when B-17s came over. The DD captain ignored them. After his ship sank and he was picked up, he remarked, "Oh well, I guess even B-17s have to hit something sometime."

[Mote]

They could have been working in factories, instead of being up all night manning guns.

 

How much slack was there in the German war industry that could have been filled by those persons, allowing for the fact that Germany was not on a war economy for much of the war? Given the massive use of slave labor already, I'd guess not much.

 

And think what all those tens of thousands of guns could have done in the front line.

 

Absolutely nothing without the logistics and manpower to support them there. Did they have it?

Edited July 21, 2007 by Mote

[JOE BRENNAN]

Westermann in "Flak" gives a number of statistics on the economic/resource issue of bombing Germany, mainly wrt to his topic ground defences. And the stats he gives in this analysis section are mainly late war.

 

He gives costs of a heavy bomber at around $300k (US examples ca. 1942), just for the plane. The cost of a heavy flak kill is calculated at $107k. He notes however, as is obvious, that German resources were not nearly equal to Allied in mid-late war, so this 'profit' doesn't imply that bombing was ineffective in attrition. And of course doesn't consider the damage that would be done by bombers with and without flak. He just uses the stat to show that flak itself was not a disproportinately expensive way to kill bombers even if one assumes it had no effect on the damage done by bombers.

 

In April 1945, 1.2million people were employed by the flak arm. 44% were civilians, auxiliaries and POW's, 56% 'regular' military. Of the military personnel though 21% 39-48 years old and 35% over 48 or medically disqualified from other service, so only around 1/4 of the flak arm was 'prime' military manpower. OTOH 'sub prime' manpower was used with some effectiveness in occupation and the final defence of Germany on the ground.

 

The number of people devoted to flak manufacture in 1944 is estimated as 250-300k out of 7.5 million total.

 

2,320 artillery, tank and AT guns and 570 heavy flak were delivered in Dec '43; 1360 v 700 in Dec '44. But the ammo share was lower, flak ammo was about 9% of the total cost of ammo in '43-44. The USSBS concluded flak material production didn't significantly displace other war production prior to 1943, but did somewhat, late in the war. In the last 6 months of the war especially flak ammo production significantly displaced artillery ammo production, but then flak guns were used in ground combat a lot in that period too.

 

Westermann reaches no grand conclusion about *bombing* effectiveness, rather that flak was relatively cost effective and not as great a drag on the German war effort as is sometimes suggested, but it couldn't prevent the highly effective bombing of 1944. Separately of course, German fighters committed to Reich defence were one reason German field armies had to operate under almost complete air supremacy of their opponents, though their own air would have been outnumbered anyway by late war.

 

As usual my complaint against super-certain what-iffers in favor of totally different ways of prosecuting WWII, is their reliance on hindsight. Planners at the time just didn't have it. Pre Dec 1941 there was no certainty Britain alone would ever have the capability to re-cross the Channel and open a true second front. Without a strategic air campaign there was no certain way to take the war directly to Germany. Even waiting for the Soviets to do it was uncertain, besides all the uncertainties which would, and did, follow when they were able to. And those risks would be raised by the UK taking no direct military action to help the USSR (beyond defending its own convoys and fighting basically against the Italians in the Med, who had limited assistance from the Gemans). Post Dec 1941 there was a lot of water under the bridge in already prosecuting a bombing campaign, and it was still the only way to immediately conduct war directly against Germany, for the US too. And in any case the industrial and organizational processes of building strategic AF's and experienced ground forces with amphibious and tacair capability to invade N Europe, each had their own bottlenecks. They competed for resources in some basic ways but totally de-emphasizing one would speed up the other only by so much, especially over a period of a only a few years like WWII. And bombing was eventually quite effective, but it would have defied prediction ca. 1941 what types of bomber capabilities and force level that would require, and that it would only happen when the Allies were about ready to invade France anyway.

 

Joe

Edited July 21, 2007 by JOE BRENNAN

[swerve]

...

Harris, OTOH, just wanted more of the same old bombs, bombers, and tactics. He opposed the Pathfinders, IIRC....

 

" Harris was blunt, honest and to the point, as always. Roughly, the gist of his conversation with me was that he had opposed the idea of a separate Path Finder Force tooth and nail - that he did not believe it was right to weaken the Command by taking its best crews in order to form a corps d'elite as a leading body. He thought it was unfair to the other Groups, and he had, therefore, done everything he could to stop the idea of a Path Finder Force. However, he had been given a direct order from the Prime Minister through the Chief of the Air Staff, and since it was forced upon him he insisted that I should command it, in spite of my relatively junior rank. I was to be promoted to acting group-captain immediately, and as a group-captain could not command such a force, I should do so in his name as a Staff Officer of Headquarters Bomber Command, and I should therefore have a subordinate headquarters to handle the Pathfinders at a station of my choosing convenient to the aerodromes which I also had to choose for the establishment of the Force. He categorically refused to allow it to be called a Target Finding Force, because that was the name which had been put forward by the Directorate of Bomber Operations, and which he, therefore, automatically opposed. He did not put it in quite those words, but that was obviously the implication. He told me that whilst he was opposed to the Path Finder Force and would waste no effort on it, he would support me personally in every way."

 

Donald Bennett, autobiography. BTW, IIRC Bennett liked Harris, & praised him in general.

[KingSargent]

As usual my complaint against super-certain what-iffers in favor of totally different ways of prosecuting WWII, is their reliance on hindsight. Planners at the time just didn't have it. Pre Dec 1941 there was no certainty Britain alone would ever have the capability to re-cross the Channel and open a true second front.

I take it you choose to ignore the possibility that increased budget for the Army in the 1930s, and/or concentration on tactical air by the RAF, just MIGHT have prevented the 1940 debacle and made a "Second Front" an Eastern rather than a Western one. If a front in France is maintained there is no need for an amphibious re-entry into Continental Europe.

 

There is also the possibility that a stalemate in France would have kept Italy out of the war, hence no Mediterranean/Desert/Balkans Front.

 

Before May 1940, the Allies fully expected a stalemate until about 1943, at which time they expected their economic superiority would allow a buildup that would allow offensives into Germany. Aside from the substitution of the USA for the French, that schedule was fairly well adhered to.

[BillB]

" Harris was blunt, honest and to the point, as always. Roughly, the gist of his conversation with me was that he had opposed the idea of a separate Path Finder Force tooth and nail - that he did not believe it was right to weaken the Command by taking its best crews in order to form a corps d'elite as a leading body. He thought it was unfair to the other Groups, and he had, therefore, done everything he could to stop the idea of a Path Finder Force. However, he had been given a direct order from the Prime Minister through the Chief of the Air Staff, and since it was forced upon him he insisted that I should command it, in spite of my relatively junior rank. I was to be promoted to acting group-captain immediately, and as a group-captain could not command such a force, I should do so in his name as a Staff Officer of Headquarters Bomber Command, and I should therefore have a subordinate headquarters to handle the Pathfinders at a station of my choosing convenient to the aerodromes which I also had to choose for the establishment of the Force. He categorically refused to allow it to be called a Target Finding Force, because that was the name which had been put forward by the Directorate of Bomber Operations, and which he, therefore, automatically opposed. He did not put it in quite those words, but that was obviously the implication. He told me that whilst he was opposed to the Path Finder Force and would waste no effort on it, he would support me personally in every way."

 

Donald Bennett, autobiography. BTW, IIRC Bennett liked Harris, & praised him in general.

Fair one. Problem is that Churchill gave the Air Ministry a clear order to form an airborne force in mid 1940 but they still managed to waste almost year paying lip service while undermining the thing behind the scenes, whilst simultaneously attempting to use the directive as a tool to garner more resources for Bomber Command. Harris was intimately involved in all this, he made it very clear he was opposed to any "waste of effort", and claimed that as only trained bomber pilots were capable of flying gliders there would have to be an increase in the bomber pilot training . Strangey enough his objection to the ridiculous notion that mere "infantry corporals" could fly gliders suddenly vanished when the Army asked the RAF to provide all the extra bomber pilots as promised. The same sentiment is clear in the above - personal support isn't worth a lot if it comes second to not wasting effort, which was his line with regard to the airborne thing too, incidentally. Consequently I wouldn't put much store in his assurances to Bennett, and suspect his co-operation had a lot more to do with Churchill keeping a closer eye on the difference between the Air Ministry's/RAF's pronouncements and actions after April/May 1941.

 

BillB

[JOE BRENNAN]

I take it you choose to ignore the possibility that increased budget for the Army in the 1930s, and/or concentration on tactical air by the RAF, just MIGHT have prevented the 1940 debacle

There are infinite possibilities, I'm just often amused by the certainty sometimes expressed about alternative outcomes, sometimes by people with less than a complete grasp of what actually happened, just speaking generally, of course.

 

Joe

[Bearded-Dragon]

" Harris was blunt, honest and to the point, as always. Roughly, the gist of his conversation with me was that he had opposed the idea of a separate Path Finder Force tooth and nail - that he did not believe it was right to weaken the Command by taking its best crews in order to form a corps d'elite as a leading body. He thought it was unfair to the other Groups, and he had, therefore, done everything he could to stop the idea of a Path Finder Force. However, he had been given a direct order from the Prime Minister through the Chief of the Air Staff, and since it was forced upon him he insisted that I should command it, in spite of my relatively junior rank. I was to be promoted to acting group-captain immediately, and as a group-captain could not command such a force, I should do so in his name as a Staff Officer of Headquarters Bomber Command, and I should therefore have a subordinate headquarters to handle the Pathfinders at a station of my choosing convenient to the aerodromes which I also had to choose for the establishment of the Force. He categorically refused to allow it to be called a Target Finding Force, because that was the name which had been put forward by the Directorate of Bomber Operations, and which he, therefore, automatically opposed. He did not put it in quite those words, but that was obviously the implication. He told me that whilst he was opposed to the Path Finder Force and would waste no effort on it, he would support me personally in every way."

 

Donald Bennett, autobiography. BTW, IIRC Bennett liked Harris, & praised him in general.

 

How is this different to the other commanders who have resisted the formation of such corps de elite'? Slim in particular was very anti such forces and resistent to the formation of the Chindits under Wingate. Many commanders refused to release soldiers for the Commandos in a similar way.

 

I still see Harris as doing the best job he could with the tools at hand. He may have been a little unimaginative but there is nothing wrong with that. He was a good manager of resources, as far as I know and in what was essentially a battle of attrition, that is not in the end such a bad thing.

 

I think too many people are too easily critical of commanders like Haig and Harris. Both were learning their way, doing things that no one else had tried before and attempting to defeat a technically competent, if perhaps not tactically superior enemy. Both had a long, steep learning curve and their forces became considerably more competent as the war progressed. Remember, just as for Haig there was a Somme and a Hundred Days, for Harris there was the debacles of 1940 and the triumph of the destruction of complete German cities. War is about making tough decisions and Harris had to make some of the toughest, I believe.

[Guest aevans]

I take it you choose to ignore the possibility that increased budget for the Army in the 1930s, and/or concentration on tactical air by the RAF, just MIGHT have prevented the 1940 debacle and made a "Second Front" an Eastern rather than a Western one. If a front in France is maintained there is no need for an amphibious re-entry into Continental Europe.

 

There is also the possibility that a stalemate in France would have kept Italy out of the war, hence no Mediterranean/Desert/Balkans Front.

 

Before May 1940, the Allies fully expected a stalemate until about 1943, at which time they expected their economic superiority would allow a buildup that would allow offensives into Germany. Aside from the substitution of the USA for the French, that schedule was fairly well adhered to.

 

I take it you choose to ignore the fact that without strategic bombing, regardless of what effectiveness you assign to it, the German war effort is in the same strategic position as it was in 1914-18. What were the likely ground casualties of waiting around in the trenches for one side or the other to build up superiorty for a breakthrough? It seems to me that the Eastern Front give us a good idea.

[KingSargent]

I take it you choose to ignore the fact that without strategic bombing, regardless of what effectiveness you assign to it, the German war effort is in the same strategic position as it was in 1914-18. What were the likely ground casualties of waiting around in the trenches for one side or the other to build up superiorty for a breakthrough? It seems to me that the Eastern Front give us a good idea.

Actually, Germany would be better off as long as she did not attack the USSR - or Stalin did not attack Germany. With the USSR a friendly neutral Germany had access to more resources than she had in 1918.

 

If there was no Eastern Front and Germany was receiving Soviet resources, the case for strategic bombing - especially ineffective strategic bombing - weakens, because so much is outside of bomber range from the West.

 

As for "likely ground casualties," the Allies expected a stalemate for at least 2-3 years. They would not have been launching ill-prepared attacks trying to get the war over yesterday.

 

The Allies are also better off as far as importation of resources goes, because the U-boat offensive will be weakened without the French bases. Especially if some of the reduced air effort went to ASW a/c, the U-boats could be penned up north of the GIUK line - assuming Norway falls, otherwise they can be penned up in the North Sea.

 

And getting into some real might-bes, would Hitler's regime survive a stalemate in NWE? As Rich has pointed out, Germany was broke by 1940. AIUI, there were Germans opposed to Hitler, but it wasn't really practical to oust him when he was winning. Get an indigent Germany involved in a long stalemated war with no conquered nations to plunder, and Hitler's popularity is going to decline.

[Guest aevans]

Actually, Germany would be better off as long as she did not attack the USSR - or Stalin did not attack Germany. With the USSR a friendly neutral Germany had access to more resources than she had in 1918.

 

If there was no Eastern Front and Germany was receiving Soviet resources, the case for strategic bombing - especially ineffective strategic bombing - weakens, because so much is outside of bomber range from the West.

 

As for "likely ground casualties," the Allies expected a stalemate for at least 2-3 years. They would not have been launching ill-prepared attacks trying to get the war over yesterday.

 

The Allies are also better off as far as importation of resources goes, because the U-boat offensive will be weakened without the French bases. Especially if some of the reduced air effort went to ASW a/c, the U-boats could be penned up north of the GIUK line - assuming Norway falls, otherwise they can be penned up in the North Sea.

 

And getting into some real might-bes, would Hitler's regime survive a stalemate in NWE? As Rich has pointed out, Germany was broke by 1940. AIUI, there were Germans opposed to Hitler, but it wasn't really practical to oust him when he was winning. Get an indigent Germany involved in a long stalemated war with no conquered nations to plunder, and Hitler's popularity is going to decline.

 

Let's examine your assumptions...

 

The Germans were unlikely to avoid a war with the Soviet Union, even if they were engaged in France. Either Hitler would start it because it was in his head to do so all along, or the Soviets would have regarded an ongoing campaign in the West as an opportunity.

 

Or, to play in your ballpark for a moment, no war with the Soviets guarantees greater German strength at the front in the West, making it harder for the Allies to accomplish anything and stretching things out, causing more casualties. Alternatively, it would give the Germans enough resources to break your supposed interdiction of the u-boat campaign.

 

Does a stalemate equate to a lack of action? No. Without the relief valve of a strategic bombing campaign, there would have been constant public pressure to do something, pressure that I doubt the Allies could have resisted. Even with no major operations, there is still the attrition of patrolling, localized operations, artillery exchanges, and tactical air operations. On hundreds of miles of front, over the period of two or three years, that's likely to cost many more Allied casualties than the SBC did.

 

You may have a point about Germany's economy, but I wouldn't bet the farm on an economic collapse, given the history of totalitarian regimes of the 20th Century to resist internal unrest.