Russia, Summer 1942

[Jim Martin]

So we know what happened in 1942, the German summer offensive in the south, towards the Caucasus and Stalingrad. The Soviet Army collapsed in front of the summer attacks, though in rather better order than the disasters of 1941. What would have happened had the Germans made their main effort against Moscow, as the Sovs expected them to do? I recognize the bulk of Soviet forces were defending Moscow, but as their efforts in the south show, they still weren't yet up to holding a determined German attack in summer of '42. Given a full summer in which to campaign, from their starting lines west of Moscow, could the Germans have taken--and held Moscow? Possibly with the potential of a bigger bag of Soviet prisoners, given the concentrations of Soviet formations in front of the capitol?

 

I remain convinced that Moscow was *the* target to take in order to reduce the USSR. Not as a political objective, and not even so much for industrial objectives, but as a crucial communications hub for the Soviets.

[Guest aevans]

I remain convinced that Moscow was *the* target to take in order to reduce the USSR. Not as a political objective, and not even so much for industrial objectives, but as a crucial communications hub for the Soviets.

 

That is in fact the correct analysis. But the Soviets knew it too, so the Germans would have had some pretty tough sledding.

[Jim Martin]

That is in fact the correct analysis. But the Soviets knew it too, so the Germans would have had some pretty tough sledding.

 

 

In the summer of '42, the German Army could pretty much go wherever it pleased in the USSR--they demonstrated that quite nicely in the Caucasus. Granted the resistance would have been greater, but given the lack of strategic depth the Sovs had (they could only retreat so far before they were east of Moscow!), and the likely "hold at all costs" orders, I actually envision further great encirclements a la 1941.

[Guest aevans]

In the summer of '42, the German Army could pretty much go wherever it pleased in the USSR--they demonstrated that quite nicely in the Caucasus.

 

On the plains they demonstrated that they could maneuver in the face of an enemy that chose to delay rather than defend. When they actually got to the Caucasus, it was a considerably different story.

 

 

Granted the resistance would have been greater, but given the lack of strategic depth the Sovs had (they could only retreat so far before they were east of Moscow!), and the likely "hold at all costs" orders, I actually envision further great encirclements a la 1941.

 

That's not a slam dunk by any stretch of the imagination.

[Guest JamesG123]

Not to mention that the Germans would have had to defend the flanks of that central drive towards Moscow.

[Jim Martin]

Not to mention that the Germans would have had to defend the flanks of that central drive towards Moscow.

 

An offensive which wound up taking Moscow would have wound up with a salient far less exposed than the actual salient caused by the drive into the Caucasus, where the Hungarians and Italians wound up defending the northern flank of Stalingrad--and we all know what happened there.

[KingSargent]

The terrain between Army Group Center and Moscow was much less conducive to offensive action, as the Soviets found when AGC trounced Zhukov's MARS offensive.

 

MARS has been kinda lost in the historical shuffle (primarily because the USSR didn't like to talk about it), it was the northern counterpart to Stalingrad which was codenamed URANUS. The USSR actually committed stronger forces to MARS than they did to URANUS, and got nowhere.

 

Of course MARS faced nothing but Germans, not underarmed and unenthusiastic Axis Allies.

[Luckyorwhat]

I remain convinced that Moscow was *the* target to take in order to reduce the USSR. Not as a political objective, and not even so much for industrial objectives, but as a crucial communications hub for the Soviets.

 

What if they took Moscow and the Russians just kept fighting? It'd be hard to plan a next move then, wouldn't it, if you just ended up gifting the Russians a more diversified leadership. It'd probably be harder to organize grand offensives, but things could be more efficient at all levels, and more robust.

[JWB]

People are failing to realize the scope and scale of the requirements to acheive something close to victory. It would require occupying Leningrad, Stalingrad, and Moscow all at the same time to even get close. Even that might not be enough.

[Cromwell]

Yes Moscow was the thing. Much of the vital Soviet Railways went via the Moscow rail junctions. Further inspite of Soviet Propaganda, the loss of Moscow would have been a severe psychological blow to Russia and the morale of the conquered nations of Europe. But trying to define a logic in a strategicly illogical war of agression is not very helpful. To be the greatest nation in Europe, by far, Germany could have just held Austria and Czecoslovakia. It probably would have been its present borders. But when riding a tiger's back it is difficult to get off.

[KingSargent]

People are failing to realize the scope and scale of the requirements to acheive something close to victory. It would require occupying Leningrad, Stalingrad, and Moscow all at the same time to even get close. Even that might not be enough.

Stalingrad was never a really necessary strategic target, except in Hitler's eyes; nor does the Caucasus (which was important necessarily fall without Stalingrad.

 

Moscow was the key. Without Moscow as a rail center, Leningrad is isolated. At least in 1941 (may have changed by '42, but I doubt it) the only rail links to Leningrad that did not go through Moscow were to Murmansk and Archangel.

[Redbeard]

The drive to Moscow would indeed be much tougher than to Stalingrad. The terrain was much more "defensive minded" and the Russians were better prepared for that option, but I certainly wouldn't exclude it would be possible. As others have pointed out Stalins "stay and/or die" orders were quite desparate and probably would mean huge Soviet losses. Where the Soviet forces defeated in the south in 1942 were secondary the force around Moscow were their main force, I'm far from sure they could survive loosing that.

 

Hitler apparently had "learnt" from previous lessons of history where going for a city had gone all wrong (like Nap. before Moscow in 1812 and the allies before Dresden in 1813), but I agree that Moscow's role as a communication (read: railway) hub was very important. Considering the German reliance on their own railway network it is strange that they ignored that, but apparently Hitler was very focussed on the Ukranian grain and the Caucasian oil - he quite oversaw however that the enemy's main army also was around Moscow - and going for the enemy's main army was the original rationale behind leaving the cities.

 

With Moscow on German hands the war might still go on for many years, but it will much more a widespread (in time and space) low intensity (anti-partisan) conflict rather that the extremely intense eastern front of WWII. The Soviet factories, resources and manpower will either be gone or separated too much to have the Red Army we know from 1943-45 rise from the ashes and defeat Germany.

 

BTW the "rebirth" of the Red Army after the defeats of 1941-42 is extremely interesting and indeed one of the great feats of human history.

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

[KingSargent]

The drive to Moscow would indeed be much tougher than to Stalingrad. The terrain was much more "defensive minded" and the Russians were better prepared for that option, but I certainly wouldn't exclude it would be possible. As others have pointed out Stalins "stay and/or die" orders were quite desparate and probably would mean huge Soviet losses. Where the Soviet forces defeated in the south in 1942 were secondary the force around Moscow were their main force, I'm far from sure they could survive loosing that.

 

Hitler apparently had "learnt" from previous lessons of history where going for a city had gone all wrong (like Nap. before Moscow in 1812 and the allies before Dresden in 1813), but I agree that Moscow's role as a communication (read: railway) hub was very important. Considering the German reliance on their own railway network it is strange that they ignored that, but apparently Hitler was very focussed on the Ukranian grain and the Caucasian oil - he quite oversaw however that the enemy's main army also was around Moscow - and going for the enemy's main army was the original rationale behind leaving the cities.

 

With Moscow on German hands the war might still go on for many years, but it will much more a widespread (in time and space) low intensity (anti-partisan) conflict rather that the extremely intense eastern front of WWII. The Soviet factories, resources and manpower will either be gone or separated too much to have the Red Army we know from 1943-45 rise from the ashes and defeat Germany.

Agree 100% with all of the above.

BTW the "rebirth" of the Red Army after the defeats of 1941-42 is extremely interesting and indeed one of the great feats of human history.

Agree 1000%

[NickM]

The drive to Moscow would indeed be much tougher than to Stalingrad. The terrain was much more "defensive minded" and the Russians were better prepared for that option, but I certainly wouldn't exclude it would be possible. As others have pointed out Stalins "stay and/or die" orders were quite desparate and probably would mean huge Soviet losses. Where the Soviet forces defeated in the south in 1942 were secondary the force around Moscow were their main force, I'm far from sure they could survive loosing that.

 

Hitler apparently had "learnt" from previous lessons of history where going for a city had gone all wrong (like Nap. before Moscow in 1812 and the allies before Dresden in 1813), but I agree that Moscow's role as a communication (read: railway) hub was very important. Considering the German reliance on their own railway network it is strange that they ignored that, but apparently Hitler was very focussed on the Ukranian grain and the Caucasian oil - he quite oversaw however that the enemy's main army also was around Moscow - and going for the enemy's main army was the original rationale behind leaving the cities.

 

With Moscow on German hands the war might still go on for many years, but it will much more a widespread (in time and space) low intensity (anti-partisan) conflict rather that the extremely intense eastern front of WWII. The Soviet factories, resources and manpower will either be gone or separated too much to have the Red Army we know from 1943-45 rise from the ashes and defeat Germany.

 

BTW the "rebirth" of the Red Army after the defeats of 1941-42 is extremely interesting and indeed one of the great feats of human history.

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

 

Steffen:

 

How DID the Red Army rebuild after 1941-42; I had heard that UP to 90% of the pre-1941 Army became casualties? I know it's probably NOT the sort of question for a short email but IF you have any reading suggestions that would be great to;

[Old Tanker]

Steffen:

 

How DID the Red Army rebuild after 1941-42; I had heard that UP to 90% of the pre-1941 Army became casualties? I know it's probably NOT the sort of question for a short email but IF you have any reading suggestions that would be great to;

 

I recently read a book titled Ivan's War that covers the recovery and includes lots of insight into the war.

 

Various things were done like lessening the authority of the political commissars and increasing officer stature. Changing emphasis of war from Commie vs. NAZI to revenge and patriotism. Drafting previous undesirables like children of Kulaks into mil.

The main benefit was slowly biulding a viable officers corps with combat experience as the enlisted ranks barely survived to gain experience. The author claims the average Red army soldier only lasted 90 days in combat then either killed or wounded.

[Redbeard]

I recently read a book titled Ivan's War that covers the recovery and includes lots of insight into the war.

 

Various things were done like lessening the authority of the political commissars and increasing officer stature. Changing emphasis of war from Commie vs. NAZI to revenge and patriotism. Drafting previous undesirables like children of Kulaks into mil.

The main benefit was slowly biulding a viable officers corps with combat experience as the enlisted ranks barely survived to gain experience. The author claims the average Red army soldier only lasted 90 days in combat then either killed or wounded.

 

"Ivans War" by Catherine Merridale has been one of most interesting reading experiences I've had for a long time. She has a lot of new data and perspectives on life in the Red Army during WWII, incl. how large a part threatening the soldiers to be shot was of the motivation. But also of the huge sacrifices everybody made and of the indefatigable spirit of the Russians.

 

The works of David M. Glantz can also be recommended. He is a (the?) leading expert on the Red Army during WWII. In "Colossus Reborn" he specifically deals with rebuilding the Red Army.In "When Titans Clashed" he deals with the operational part of the story. Also very interesting is IMHO "Stumbling Colossus" where he gives a very good insight into the Red Army lost in 1941.

 

You can't be anything but impressed by the scale of everything concerning the Red Army. First they plan an army of 500+ Divisions with modern equipment. Then in the middle of transition they are attacked, loose a couple of million men and most materiel, move all the factories to the Urals, raise 500+ Divisions and throw out the Germans. USA and UK had problems fielding 150 Divisions combined!

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

[Detonable]

1. The Soviets didn't lose their army in Barbarossa. They lost 3 million men in a year or so, but started with 6 million. So they lost 1/2 their army. They started with 20,000 tanks, and ended up with a few thousand. While this is an enormous loss, the Germans ended the first year with a few thousand, so at that point they were somewhat equal. So in one sense the Soviets didn't have to build an army, they had already built an enormous one, and still had a good sized one left.

 

2. The Soviets were on a war footing before the war even began. The Germans didn't really get serious until Stalingrad. The United States didn't get serious until Pearl Harbor, and started from a miniscule army. Therefore the American weapons industry was sized to support an miniscule effort. That's why America shipped steel, copper, food, etc. to the Soviet Union - that's where the tank plants were. So the Soviets didn't need to build an enormous weapons industry, they had to move some of it to safety beyond the Urals.

 

3. The Moscow battle might not go the Germans way. The fact that Moscow was a rail hub means that weapons and troops could come in from all non-occupied directions. So the Germans would have needed to expend a lot of effort keeping the city surrounded. At the same time, the fight inside Moscow would have been very difficult. The Germans had some trouble at Voronezh, and they didn't take Stalingrad. Why assume they could take Moscow? Soviet reinforcements could reach Moscow a lot easier than they could get to Stalingrad. And the Soviets had started building defences at Moscow the previous year. Given the German losses of the previous year, and taking into account their lack of trucks and horses, isn't it possible that the decisive battle with a large percentage of the Red Army was beyond Germany's grasp in 1942? They stripped units in the north to make possible the drive in the south. The drive south made possible a decisive economic blow without facing the whole Russian Army.

 

4. While the German advance south in 1942 ended disasterously, it didn't have to. The original plan was to have the 1st and 4th Panzer Armies form an encirclement near Stalingrad. The pocket would then be eliminated by the 6th Army. So you'd have 3 armies just outside Stalingrad in late August. At this point, they probably could have taken the city (they took Voronezh and Rostock around this time). Not only would you have three armies, instead of the 6th and part of the 4th, but all three armies and their air support were bigger at this time. (They shrunk as the summer went on due to the slow resupply from German industry, so the earlier in the summer they fought, the bigger they were.) After taking Stalingrad, the Germans could probably mount a good drive in the Caucasus with the 1st and 4th panzer armies, because they would have been supplied much better than historically. Historically, the supply effort and Luftwaffe support went to Stalingrad, and the Caucasus drive withered out.

[Rich]

1. The Soviets didn't lose their army in Barbarossa. They lost 3 million men in a year or so, but started with 6 million. So they lost 1/2 their army. They started with 20,000 tanks, and ended up with a few thousand. While this is an enormous loss, the Germans ended the first year with a few thousand, so at that point they were somewhat equal. So in one sense the Soviets didn't have to build an army, they had already built an enormous one, and still had a good sized one left.

 

Not quite, but close. They began the 3rd quarter of 1941 (actually 22 June) with 3,334,400 mobilized. They then lost - depending on the source - 3,137,673 irrecoverable losses and 1,336,147 wounded and sick or 4,158,765 'total' losses (evidently irrecoverable plus wounded and sick minus returned-to-duty) to 1 January 1942....but had 4,186,000 under arms at that date. If you do the math it shows that they mobilized over 5,000,000 in six months.

 

That was done, in addition to the other measures mentioned, by a massive transferal of people from peasant agriculture into industry and the armed forces. In essence, Soviet leadership took the hard decision to draw agriculture production down to a bare minimum in the anticipation that they could weather the immediate shortfalls and then make up the difference through other means (Lend-Lease foodstuffs and draconian food rationing in the civilian sector) before famine became widespread. And it worked, just. Advantages of a near complete command economy.

 

2. The Soviets were on a war footing before the war even began. The Germans didn't really get serious until Stalingrad. The United States didn't get serious until Pearl Harbor, and started from a miniscule army. Therefore the American weapons industry was sized to support an miniscule effort. That's why America shipped steel, copper, food, etc. to the Soviet Union - that's where the tank plants were. So the Soviets didn't need to build an enormous weapons industry, they had to move some of it to safety beyond the Urals.

 

Again, not quite. The Soviets were just beginning to mobilize and in fact a large proportion of those 3.3-million mobilized men as of 22 June were quite recent inductees and reservists, forming the six armies and four separate corps of the STAVKA reserve that were instrumental in slowing the German advance after the frontier armies were mostly crushed. But there industrial mobilization had barely begun and was delayed in many sectors by the neccessity of relocating much equipment in front of the German advance. But they did already have a higher proportion of their economy allocated to munitions production than had the Germans, which was enough of a lead for them even after losses, given the requirments the Germans had in other theaters.

 

And it wasn't that the Germans didn't get serious until Stalingrad, they simply didn't have the economic means to get serious. Fundamentally they tried to fight war on the cheap, because they were poor, and the result was predictable. The idea that Germany didn't "go onto a war footing until Speer got control" (not your words I know, but a prevailing viewpoint with many) is pure malarkey and is founded primarily on Speer's self-aggrandizing propaganda. Pretty much the whole notion has been shot down by economic historians beginning (in English at least) with Mark Harrison and Speer's story has been most recently completely debunked by Adam Tooze in his comprehensive history of the Germany war economy published lastyear as "Wages of Destruction" (highly recommended).

 

The United States is substantially correct, although mobilization had actually begun in November 1940, not after Pearl Harbor. And by Pearl Harbor it was pretty close to where the Soviets were in mid 1941.

[Brummbaer]

An offensive which wound up taking Moscow would have wound up with a salient far less exposed than the actual salient caused by the drive into the Caucasus, where the Hungarians and Italians wound up defending the northern flank of Stalingrad--and we all know what happened there.

ahem... actually it was the romanian collapse north and south of Stalingrad to allow the Sixth Army encirclement. Italians and Hungarians more to the north along the Don were smashed later.

Back on topic, iirc terrain around Moscow was much more wooded and less suitable to armor manouvre than in the south; this together with the stronger forces and defences easy to reinforce made it a much tougher nut to crack. I do not much agree with the germans more or less capable of go whereever they pleased once the Red Army chose to stand. The problem with the flank was due to the drive in the Caucasus before taking Stalingrad.

[yak_v]

Couple of things to consider:

 

1) Germans were able to get trough the Russian defenses in the South precisely because there weren't enough troops and not because they were that much better than the Soviets (they were, but not to the level of 1941). Had they attacked towards Moscow the main ingredient of that success - lack of defenders would be eliminated.

 

2) The Germans attacked towards Moscow exactly in the same place in 1941 and it is unlikely that the Soviet Generals will commit the same mistakes in the same place as they did in 1941.

 

3) Moscow was an important railway hub, but given the ability of the Soviets to relocate factories, why do people here think that they will not be able to build a RR around Moscow was Moscow to fall?

 

Vladimir

[irregularmedic]

You can't be anything but impressed by the scale of everything concerning the Red Army. First they plan an army of 500+ Divisions with modern equipment. Then in the middle of transition they are attacked, loose a couple of million men and most materiel, move all the factories to the Urals, raise 500+ Divisions and throw out the Germans. USA and UK had problems fielding 150 Divisions combined!

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

 

It's important to keep in mind that Soviet divisions were smaller than western allied ones. Even when Barbarossa started many divisions were well below the 14,000 men that the best of them were at. Some as low as 5-6000 men IIRC. Later in the war they were usually still understrength. The numbers of divisions is still impressive, but it should be viewed in context.

 

 

2. The Soviets were on a war footing before the war even began. The Germans didn't really get serious until Stalingrad. The United States didn't get serious until Pearl Harbor, and started from a miniscule army. Therefore the American weapons industry was sized to support an miniscule effort. That's why America shipped steel, copper, food, etc. to the Soviet Union - that's where the tank plants were. So the Soviets didn't need to build an enormous weapons industry, they had to move some of it to safety beyond the Urals.

 

The Soviets army wasn't on a war footing before the war even began, at least not fully. The reason so many of the divisions were so understrength was because they didn't have their wartime complement of reservists called up yet.

Edited July 13, 2007 by irregularmedic

[Detonable]

Not quite, but close. They began the 3rd quarter of 1941 (actually 22 June) with 3,334,400 mobilized. They then lost - depending on the source - 3,137,673 irrecoverable losses and 1,336,147 wounded and sick or 4,158,765 'total' losses (evidently irrecoverable plus wounded and sick minus returned-to-duty) to 1 January 1942....but had 4,186,000 under arms at that date. If you do the math it shows that they mobilized over 5,000,000 in six months.

 

That was done, in addition to the other measures mentioned, by a massive transferal of people from peasant agriculture into industry and the armed forces. In essence, Soviet leadership took the hard decision to draw agriculture production down to a bare minimum in the anticipation that they could weather the immediate shortfalls and then make up the difference through other means (Lend-Lease foodstuffs and draconian food rationing in the civilian sector) before famine became widespread. And it worked, just. Advantages of a near complete command economy.

Again, not quite. The Soviets were just beginning to mobilize and in fact a large proportion of those 3.3-million mobilized men as of 22 June were quite recent inductees and reservists, forming the six armies and four separate corps of the STAVKA reserve that were instrumental in slowing the German advance after the frontier armies were mostly crushed. But there industrial mobilization had barely begun and was delayed in many sectors by the neccessity of relocating much equipment in front of the German advance. But they did already have a higher proportion of their economy allocated to munitions production than had the Germans, which was enough of a lead for them even after losses, given the requirments the Germans had in other theaters.

 

And it wasn't that the Germans didn't get serious until Stalingrad, they simply didn't have the economic means to get serious. Fundamentally they tried to fight war on the cheap, because they were poor, and the result was predictable. The idea that Germany didn't "go onto a war footing until Speer got control" (not your words I know, but a prevailing viewpoint with many) is pure malarkey and is founded primarily on Speer's self-aggrandizing propaganda. Pretty much the whole notion has been shot down by economic historians beginning (in English at least) with Mark Harrison and Speer's story has been most recently completely debunked by Adam Tooze in his comprehensive history of the Germany war economy published lastyear as "Wages of Destruction" (highly recommended).

 

The United States is substantially correct, although mobilization had actually begun in November 1940, not after Pearl Harbor. And by Pearl Harbor it was pretty close to where the Soviets were in mid 1941.

 

 

Its not quite true that the Germans didn't have the means to get serious. Their 1944 production of tanks and aircraft was not bad compared to the Soviet Union, and absolutely dwarfed what they (Germany) produced in 1941. Remember in 1944 their industry, and the rail and canal network it depended on were absolutely pounded, and without this pounding, production would have been considerably higher. In 1941, when they invaded the Soviet Union, their tank production was reduced to less than 2,000 vehicles. And, until they invaded, they were receiving vital imports from the Soviet Union. Production of high strength steel would have been easier in 1941 than later in the war, for example.

 

Found this quote in the Amazon.com review of the Tooze book.

"The problem was that although Germany had access to the industrial plant of Northern Italy, France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands they were not able to use it to match either the Soviets or the British in war production."

 

I liked other things I read in the review but I think the above is simply wrong, given 1944 production figures.

[Rich]

Its not quite true that the Germans didn't have the means to get serious. Their 1944 production of tanks and aircraft was not bad compared to the Soviet Union, and absolutely dwarfed what they (Germany) produced in 1941. Remember in 1944 their industry, and the rail and canal network it depended on were absolutely pounded, and without this pounding, production would have been considerably higher. In 1941, when they invaded the Soviet Union, their tank production was reduced to less than 2,000 vehicles. And, until they invaded, they were receiving vital imports from the Soviet Union. Production of high strength steel would have been easier in 1941 than later in the war, for example.

 

Dear me, I'm not sure I have the time for this.

 

The Germans went into the war with an economy that was near collapse and that was at barely at subsistance level in terms of resources. Most German agriculture was backward and labor intensive, for one thing sucking dry the pool of female labor that the West put into factories (but there was no way politically that they couldn't emphasize food production after the stigma of the near starvation at the end of the great War).

 

Virtually all the growth in production was via limited sources, such as the capital investment planned in November 1938 in the second "Four-Year Plan", that resulted in - among other things - the opening of Bibelungenwerke in 1941 and the conversion and expansion of Vomag and Maschinenfabrik into tank production at about the same time. The effect was to nearly double the available tank production facilities as they came on line in 1942 and so long as steel was fed to them they cranked nicely along.

 

Another problem was simple lack of labor, linked partly to the agricultural sector but also a general problem and why so many men were discharged from the Wehrmacht in late 1940 and again in 1941. My favorite is the old saw about how "German industry was so unmobilized that they didn't go to a full 24-hour round-the-clock production cycle until Speer sorted them out." Which is a huge red herring. By 1942 labor shortages were so endemic that workers in the tank industry were on a mandatory 72-hour work week and all the rest of the industry followed by spring 1944. Plus they added about 8-million effectively slave laborers into the mix....and still had labor shortages. All this while US laborers were routinely striking to protest having to work in excess of 40 hours.

 

Found this quote in the Amazon.com review of the Tooze book.

"The problem was that although Germany had access to the industrial plant of Northern Italy, France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands they were not able to use it to match either the Soviets or the British in war production."

 

I liked other things I read in the review but I think the above is simply wrong, given 1944 production figures.

 

Er, how is the above proved wrong by 1944 production? Virtually none of that was produced in occupied countries for various reasons. Aside from motor vehicles in France and Belgium, which augmented the small German motor vehicle industry that wasn't converted to aircraft and tank subcomponent production, about the only thing accomplished was maintenance and spare parts production along with a small number of AFV and artillery produced in Italy. The 'highly industrialized, modern" Germany was incapable of doing more than matching the Soviet Union in terms of artillery and ammunition production, grossly underproduced them in terms of AFV and only exceeded them in producing U-Boote. Pardon me, but big whoop!

[KingSargent]

Couple of things to consider:

 

1) Germans were able to get trough the Russian defenses in the South precisely because there weren't enough troops and not because they were that much better than the Soviets (they were, but not to the level of 1941). Had they attacked towards Moscow the main ingredient of that success - lack of defenders would be eliminated.

And they were weakened because of Stalin's idiotic notion to attack to Kharkov in spring 1942. Predictably the Germans trounced the offensive and destroyed the best forces on the AGS front.

 

2) The Germans attacked towards Moscow exactly in the same place in 1941 and it is unlikely that the Soviet Generals will commit the same mistakes in the same place as they did in 1941.

Well, there aren't too many options while going to Moscow from the west. At least if they had tried in Spring 1942 they would have had better supply and weather conditions than they had in Winter 1941. It still would have been a stone bitch, and German success (or survival) bt no means assured.

 

3) Moscow was an important railway hub, but given the ability of the Soviets to relocate factories, why do people here think that they will not be able to build a RR around Moscow was Moscow to fall?

Which is why I made the comment in my post that taking Moscow in 1941 would isolate Leningrad, but things could have changed by 1942.

 

Vladimir

[Martin M]

Nonwithstanding what sort of – and/or - to what measure the Germans were idiots for not doing numerous things “ better “ in WWII, tank production of major contenders is nearly equal, relatively speaking.

 

 

Measured in tanks produced per 100000 people:

 

Great Britain ca. 60

USSR ca. 60

Germany ca. 60

USA ca. 70

 

Yes, there are all sorts of reasons and excuses for all sides, but thats the numbers.