Pre-WW2 Carrier Comparison

[DesertFox]

I wanted to do this as a new thread instead of continuing in the original thread.

 

Reading KS's post, he stated that the British Navy had to go through the air ministry to purchase aircraft while the US Navy and Japanese Navy had their own procurement agencies. What happened? The British Navy was always the darling of the British Nation and was one of the first Navies to get involved in Aviation. HMS Hermes and HMS Eagle were extremely early designs and were both commissioned before Lexington and Eagle. As well, the Birtish Navy did have the funds to be reboilered and refitted in the early Thirties. Did the British Navy see limited actual value in their carriers and what type of observations were made of the carriers being operated across the pond?

 

Also from KS, he talks about warming up planes one at a time on deck. Was that a direct consequence of having such small air groups or was it for another reason? Also, is it literally ONE at a time or kind of slow, a couple of time? As well, what kind of reaction did their observation of carrier operations in the US and Japan cause among the British Navy?

 

Finally with regard to open hanger designs, would the Lexington and Saratoga be consider to be open hangers?

[irregularmedic]

Did the UK actually get to observe IJN carrier operations?

 

I would assume that RN officers observed either USN carrier operations and/or fleet excercises, but does anyone know for sure?

[KingSargent]

Did the UK actually get to observe IJN carrier operations?

 

I would assume that RN officers observed either USN carrier operations and/or fleet excercises, but does anyone know for sure?

I don't know for sure, but there was a LOT of Anglophobia in the USN at the time, carried to ridiculous extents. OTOH, there were quite friendly contacts at lower levels, especially among officers on "distant posts" like China Squadron and Asiatic Fleet.

 

Nobody got to observe IJN operations, at least after the UK withdrew from its alliance with Japan.

[KingSargent]

Reading KS's post, he stated that the British Navy had to go through the air ministry to purchase aircraft while the US Navy and Japanese Navy had their own procurement agencies. What happened? The British Navy was always the darling of the British Nation and was one of the first Navies to get involved in Aviation. HMS Hermes and HMS Eagle were extremely early designs and were both commissioned before Lexington and Eagle. As well, the Birtish Navy did have the funds to be reboilered and refitted in the early Thirties. Did the British Navy see limited actual value in their carriers and what type of observations were made of the carriers being operated across the pond?

'Twas on the Black Day of April 1, 1918 (Portentious April Fool's Day) that the RN lost its air arm, when the Royal Naval Air Service merged with the Royal Flying Corps (Army aviation) to form the independent RAF. Naturally the air-minded RN officers went to the new service. Also, carrier flying was unpopular because the pilots were neither 'fish nor fowl' Carrier pilots tended not to reach high rank because they were out of the 'line of succession.' The USN deliberately opened promotion slots for pilots by decreeing that anybody commanding an aviation unit had to be an airman.

 

The RN lost its air arm and the officers who had sparked the RNAS and who cared about Naval interests. The RFC lost its officers who were fond of close support of ground forces. The RAF wanted to preserve its independence and discouraged cooperation with the other services. Officers who went to play during Army maneuvers to work out what planes could and could not do were threatened with court-martial. This lack of cooperation continued through WW2, a gross example being the lack of support given to British Airborne by the RAF. Incidentally, our own BillB wrote the book on this.

 

The independent US Army and Navy airforces also competed, racing their planes against each other and vying for new designs. The USN ordered a/c in small lots, usually one or two squadron's-worth at a time. This was deliberate policy to foster and support the USian aviation industry during the Depression years. Very often if a company was struggling to avoid bankruptcy a Navy (or Army) order could keep it in business. New companies with new ideas like Grumman were also nurtured with Navy contracts. This policy went back to the 1880s when Congress decreed that all guns, armor, and machinery had to be American-made; this boosted the US steel and mechanical industries and was a sort of 'concealed subsidy' for industry. Anyway, the competition ensured that lots of different models of planes got tested and used, and replaced quickly, while the FAA had to use the same design for sometimes a decade (Flycatcher, Fairy IIIF). These factors kept USN planes close to state-of-the-art while the FAA babied its collection of antiques.

 

Also from KS, he talks about warming up planes one at a time on deck. Was that a direct consequence of having such small air groups or was it for another reason? Also, is it literally ONE at a time or kind of slow, a couple of time? As well, what kind of reaction did their observation of carrier operations in the US and Japan cause among the British Navy?

It was because of very stringent safety regulations when the FAA was under RAF control - only one plane on deck at a time, to prevent accidents. And also the small air groups. With few planes the RN didn't need to adopt quicker operational methods. The USN kept most of the airgroups parked on deck and used the hangar for maintenance and learned to operate quickly. If an FAA pilot ran into another aircraft on deck, it was a major disaster; in the USN they'd sweep up the mess and pull one of the 'spares' out of storage.

 

Finally with regard to open hanger designs, would the Lexington and Saratoga be consider to be open hangers?

Not in the same sense as later US CVs which had large ports that could be closed by large 'garage doors' for ventilation. Interestingly, while all the purpose-designed US CVs had these openings, the CVLs modified from CL hulls under construction did not, presumably because the conversions precluded it. These openings were also useful when loading planes or stores and the CVLs had to use large cranes to hoist things to the flight deck.

[philgollin]

I wanted to do this as a new thread instead of continuing in the original thread.

 

Reading KS's post, he stated that the British Navy had to go through the air ministry to purchase aircraft while the US Navy and Japanese Navy had their own procurement agencies. What happened? The British Navy was always the darling of the British Nation and was one of the first Navies to get involved in Aviation. HMS Hermes and HMS Eagle were extremely early designs and were both commissioned before Lexington and Eagle. As well, the Birtish Navy did have the funds to be reboilered and refitted in the early Thirties. Did the British Navy see limited actual value in their carriers and what type of observations were made of the carriers being operated across the pond?

 

Also from KS, he talks about warming up planes one at a time on deck. Was that a direct consequence of having such small air groups or was it for another reason? Also, is it literally ONE at a time or kind of slow, a couple of time? As well, what kind of reaction did their observation of carrier operations in the US and Japan cause among the British Navy?

 

Finally with regard to open hanger designs, would the Lexington and Saratoga be consider to be open hangers?

 

The pre-war FAA is a totally mixed-up situation, being mainly caused by the split and then re-absorbtion of the FAA from the RN to the RAF and then back (ALTHOUGH THE SPLIT WAS NEVER "COMPLETE").

 

Even whilst the RAF had control, the Admiralty specified the aircraft it wanted - BUT it liased with the RAF and due to the split career paths and hence influence were heavily skewed. So alot of the "blame" attached to the RAF actually belongs to the Admiralty (obviously with RAF input) and latterly to the government set priorities. The "myth" that it was all the RAF's fault is just that, a myth.

 

When the Admiralty regained full control it already had its re-armament spending flat-out (including its new armoured carriers) AND it still specified the aircraft requirements, whilst losing out in the government set priorities (strangely enough the government was more interested in updating the home defence and army co-operation aircraft).

 

The best source for all this is the British Staff History on the Fleet Air Arm in the Inter-War Period - or David Hobbs who is extremely damning of the Admiralty (rather than the RAF).

 

The FAA did warm up its strikes on deck, NOT below decks as the closed hangars were not condusive to engines working below decks (engine testing had to take place in special bays - except for special cases where aircraft could be moved to openings).

[philgollin]

Did the UK actually get to observe IJN carrier operations?

 

I would assume that RN officers observed either USN carrier operations and/or fleet excercises, but does anyone know for sure?

 

Yes, the RN "observed" (usually indirectly - they were invited to receptions and talked to participants and hence got filtered views) but did not really pick-up on the changes in tactics.

[philgollin]

Reading KS's post, he stated that the British Navy had to go through the air ministry to purchase aircraft while the US Navy and Japanese Navy had their own procurement agencies. What happened? The British Navy was always the darling of the British Nation and was one of the first Navies to get involved in Aviation. HMS Hermes and HMS Eagle were extremely early designs and were both commissioned before Lexington and Eagle. As well, the Birtish Navy did have the funds to be reboilered and refitted in the early Thirties. Did the British Navy see limited actual value in their carriers and what type of observations were made of the carriers being operated across the pond?

'Twas on the Black Day of April 1, 1918 (Portentious April Fool's Day) that the RN lost its air arm, when the Royal Naval Air Service merged with the Royal Flying Corps (Army aviation) to form the independent RAF. Naturally the air-minded RN officers went to the new service. Also, carrier flying was unpopular because the pilots were neither 'fish nor fowl' Carrier pilots tended not to reach high rank because they were out of the 'line of succession.' The USN deliberately opened promotion slots for pilots by decreeing that anybody commanding an aviation unit had to be an airman.

 

The RN lost its air arm and the officers who had sparked the RNAS and who cared about Naval interests. The RFC lost its officers who were fond of close support of ground forces. The RAF wanted to preserve its independence and discouraged cooperation with the other services. Officers who went to play during Army maneuvers to work out what planes could and could not do were threatened with court-martial. This lack of cooperation continued through WW2, a gross example being the lack of support given to British Airborne by the RAF. Incidentally, our own BillB wrote the book on this.

 

The independent US Army and Navy airforces also competed, racing their planes against each other and vying for new designs. The USN ordered a/c in small lots, usually one or two squadron's-worth at a time. This was deliberate policy to foster and support the USian aviation industry during the Depression years. Very often if a company was struggling to avoid bankruptcy a Navy (or Army) order could keep it in business. New companies with new ideas like Grumman were also nurtured with Navy contracts. This policy went back to the 1880s when Congress decreed that all guns, armor, and machinery had to be American-made; this boosted the US steel and mechanical industries and was a sort of 'concealed subsidy' for industry. Anyway, the competition ensured that lots of different models of planes got tested and used, and replaced quickly, while the FAA had to use the same design for sometimes a decade (Flycatcher, Fairy IIIF). These factors kept USN planes close to state-of-the-art while the FAA babied its collection of antiques.

 

Also from KS, he talks about warming up planes one at a time on deck. Was that a direct consequence of having such small air groups or was it for another reason? Also, is it literally ONE at a time or kind of slow, a couple of time? As well, what kind of reaction did their observation of carrier operations in the US and Japan cause among the British Navy?

It was because of very stringent safety regulations when the FAA was under RAF control - only one plane on deck at a time, to prevent accidents. And also the small air groups. With few planes the RN didn't need to adopt quicker operational methods. The USN kept most of the airgroups parked on deck and used the hangar for maintenance and learned to operate quickly. If an FAA pilot ran into another aircraft on deck, it was a major disaster; in the USN they'd sweep up the mess and pull one of the 'spares' out of storage.

 

Finally with regard to open hanger designs, would the Lexington and Saratoga be consider to be open hangers?

Not in the same sense as later US CVs which had large ports that could be closed by large 'garage doors' for ventilation. Interestingly, while all the purpose-designed US CVs had these openings, the CVLs modified from CL hulls under construction did not, presumably because the conversions precluded it. These openings were also useful when loading planes or stores and the CVLs had to use large cranes to hoist things to the flight deck.

 

Re. RAF/FAA/Admiralty - please see my other post. It was not the RAF's fault as such.

 

No, they were not restricted to one at a time and the responsibility for safety and operation was still the Admiralty's (OF COURSE under RAF/FAA advice).

[DesertFox]

A few new questions,

If the US Navy was keeping small orders and keeping current with designs, how did the Brewster Buffalo end up being the US Navy's "New" fighter in the start of ww2 when the British were fielding the Spitfire and the Germans were fielding the Me-109 for ground aircraft. Also, didn't it fair pretty poorly to the Japanese Zero? What caused the United States to seem to fall behind?

 

Without the "Garage Doors" on the Lexington class and Light Carriers, are there any reports of dangers from petrol vapors?

 

I noted that the Ranger was never really operated as a fleet carrier due to being too slow and unarmored. The problem is that Japanese carriers which they used as fleet carriers were even slower and also basically unarmored. Was there any additional factors which kept it from being used a fleet carrier? In World War II, it would seem to be more effective than a light casrrier cruiser conversion.

 

Your comment about British Pilots not wanting to get involved in ground support, I have heard similar comments in interviews with US Air Force pilots. Should air forces be merged back with their parent armies to avoid this sort of attitude? Of course you statement about commanders of Naval Air Assets having to be pilots is why Halsey had to become a pilot.

 

I imagine that the US Navy pilot that crashed an airplane on a deck, it was not a very good thing for his career

[KingSargent]

The FAA did warm up its strikes on deck, NOT below decks as the closed hangars were not condusive to engines working below decks (engine testing had to take place in special bays - except for special cases where aircraft could be moved to openings).

What I said. The USN could warm up a/c on the hangar deck, the RN could not. And having the safety requirements they could not warm up on deck more than one at a time. This did change about as soon as the RN got the FAA back photos from 1939-40 show several a/c on deck and warming up at once.

 

My point is not that the operational methods continued into wartime use, they didn't. What they did do was prevent the FAA/RN from experimenting with the mass tactics evolved over the BTW years by the USN and IJN.

[KingSargent]

A few new questions,

If the US Navy was keeping small orders and keeping current with designs, how did the Brewster Buffalo end up being the US Navy's "New" fighter in the start of ww2 when the British were fielding the Spitfire and the Germans were fielding the Me-109 for ground aircraft. Also, didn't it fair pretty poorly to the Japanese Zero? What caused the United States to seem to fall behind?

The F2A was quite state of the art when introduced. It fell behind quickly because it was designed around one engine model and could not take advantage of the rapid growth in HP in the late 1930s. When forced to add armor and self-sealing tanks, it did not have the reserve power to cope with the extra weight and became a dog and inferior to the Zero - the Zero left off the armor and retained its agility. Note that the early models of Buffalo that were sent to Finland remained quite competitive.

The F2A-1 was more contemporary to the Hurricane than the Spit as far as service introduction. It could also (probably) handle the Bf109s prior to the E model. It was definitely better armed.

 

Without the "Garage Doors" on the Lexington class and Light Carriers, are there any reports of dangers from petrol vapors?

Well, the Lexington was destroyed by avgasl explosion and fire at Coral Sea. The leaking avgas was a result of battle damage, however. Whether the "garage doors" would have dispersed the avgas fumes under those conditions I don't know, but they couldn't have hurt.

 

I noted that the Ranger was never really operated as a fleet carrier due to being too slow and unarmored. The problem is that Japanese carriers which they used as fleet carriers were even slower and also basically unarmored. Was there any additional factors which kept it from being used a fleet carrier? In World War II, it would seem to be more effective than a light casrrier cruiser conversion. Ranger operated as a fleet carrier in the 1930s, and she operated as one in WW2. She just operated in the Atlantic. The USN had to have something there (a lot of the time she operated with the Home Fleet), and she was the least capable of the USN CVs. She was a lot more capable than a lot of 'furrin' CVs like the Junyo conversions, Bearn, and some of the RN's earlier gaggle of experiments. She could operate more a/c than any foreign CV until the Shokakus came along, so she was really "inferior" only to the bigger USN CVs. It should also be noted that a lot of the "inferior" stories came from testimony before Congress when the USN was trying to get money for bigger CVs than Ranger.

 

Your comment about British Pilots not wanting to get involved in ground support, I have heard similar comments in interviews with US Air Force pilots. Should air forces be merged back with their parent armies to avoid this sort of attitude? Of course you statement about commanders of Naval Air Assets having to be pilots is why Halsey had to become a pilot.

It wasn't so much the RAF pilots not wanting to do it (although nobody was really thrilled about flying low over machine-guns), it was Air Staff policy. The Bomber Barons got an early lock on the RAF and seriously frowned upon anything that detracted from war-winning strategic bombing. The USAAC blooped the same way over Sicily, providing no air cover for ships or troops because they were "destroying the enemy air" by bombing their bases. That shit got stomped on quickly.

 

I imagine that the US Navy pilot that crashed an airplane on a deck, it was not a very good thing for his career

Not particularly harmful, the USN regarded airplanes as ammunition as far as expendability - IOW, a blooper was no big deal unless it became habitual. There is a tape floating around of USN pilots crashing planes all over the carrier decks. The pilots are identified (along with date of accident) on the film. As all the names I recognized became carrier admirals in WW2, I would say that their careers didn't suffer much.

[DesertFox]

This question is for philgollin,

You keep saying that US and Japanese fighters were not as good as contemporary ground based fighters on the other discussion topic (which I pulled this one from.)

 

Other than stating that you got it from a book, what are you specific contention points for this? What features do you consider specifically inferior on naval planes or superior on ground based planes? I have read many sources which contradict other sources.

 

There are many discussions which call the F4U simply the finest fighter of World War II. There are also discussion that the F8F Bearcat is the equal of the Ta-152 (At least according to Wiki it has 1000 ft/min greater climb speed)

[Redbeard]

Interesting thread with a lot good info and comments!

 

As already indicated I agree with most that is so far said, but would like to add some of the benefits/advantages the RN/FAA had - perhaps because they needed to be creative.

 

I first of all of course think of night fighting. The RN had had focus on that since Jutland in 1916, and that included the naval aviation. So when Taranto was planned it was natural to execute that as a night attack, well before airborne radar. I can't say for sure to what degree it was the tight budgets (small airgroups, slow planes etc.) that necessiated night tactics or it was the night tactics that made the tight budgets able to live with, but anyway the FAA by the start of WWII had an unrivaled capacity to strike at night - when large strikes are more of a nuissance than an asset. When reliable airborne radar became available in 1941 that further enhanced that capacity, but sadly there never was a highly profiled opportunity to show the potential. But judging from Mediterranean oparations it gave the FAA a way to operate single or small number of aircraft at night with considerable effect. Further it worked well with the armoured carrier concept tucking away its planes in daylight and hope to survive to become Queen of the Night.

 

BTW when talking about the mishaps following from establishing RAF there must be more to it than that. In Germany the Luftwaffe also was an independent arm but stayed well in the army support role - even with Luftwaffe being the Nazi pet arm and with a person like Göring on top. You could have imagined him being an easy prey to bomber barons of Germany. He certainly had his follies about Luftwaffe glory and greatness (ending up being named Meyer), but the Luftwaffe nevertheless kept its focus on army co-operation and at least during the war developed similar procedures with the Kriegsmarine.

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

[KingSargent]

Interesting thread with a lot good info and comments!

 

As already indicated I agree with most that is so far said, but would like to add some of the benefits/advantages the RN/FAA had - perhaps because they needed to be creative.

 

I first of all of course think of night fighting. The RN had had focus on that since Jutland in 1916, and that included the naval aviation. So when Taranto was planned it was natural to execute that as a night attack, well before airborne radar. Primarily because the Swordfish wouldn't have survived in daylight. I can't say for sure to what degree it was the tight budgets (small airgroups, slow planes etc.) that necessiated night tactics or it was the night tactics that made the tight budgets able to live with, but anyway the FAA by the start of WWII had an unrivaled capacity to strike at night - when large strikes are more of a nuissance than an asset. When reliable airborne radar became available in 1941 that further enhanced that capacity, but sadly there never was a highly profiled opportunity to show the potential. But judging from Mediterranean oparations it gave the FAA a way to operate single or small number of aircraft at night with considerable effect. Further it worked well with the armoured carrier concept tucking away its planes in daylight and hope to survive to become Queen of the Night.

Yet when Nagumo and 5CVs entered the Indian Ocean in March 1942 all ADM Somerville could do was retire out of range of 1AF by day and hope to close the range enough at night to make a night strike. He was unable to make it work and patently unable to face the IJN in daylight.

FTM, I challenge the "FAA great at night" groupies to name any warship sunk or even damaged at sea by a British torpedo-bomber at night. The IJN managed to develop night torpedo tactics that managed to sink a CA and damage CVs with night torpedo strikes. Admittedly the IJN planes were landbased, but they didn't have many flight decks available then.

 

BTW when talking about the mishaps following from establishing RAF there must be more to it than that. In Germany the Luftwaffe also was an independent arm but stayed well in the army support role - even with Luftwaffe being the Nazi pet arm and with a person like Göring on top. You could have imagined him being an easy prey to bomber barons of Germany. He certainly had his follies about Luftwaffe glory and greatness (ending up being named Meyer), but the Luftwaffe nevertheless kept its focus on army co-operation and at least during the war developed similar procedures with the Kriegsmarine.

The Luftwaffe grew out of Seeckt's Reichswehr with officers transferring to the LW after it was formed. With less than five years to the beginning of the war, there wasn't time for Bomber Barons to leach the army-mindedness out of senior staff. The LW was also NOT very interested in tactical close support (only one gruppe of Hs123s in 1939) although they did support army operations. There was LW-KM cooperation pre-war, but it was confined to seaplanes until war experience showed that the seaplanes were less than stirling in attack roles.

[philgollin]

What I said. The USN could warm up a/c on the hangar deck, the RN could not. And having the safety requirements they could not warm up on deck more than one at a time. This did change about as soon as the RN got the FAA back photos from 1939-40 show several a/c on deck and warming up at once.

 

My point is not that the operational methods continued into wartime use, they didn't. What they did do was prevent the FAA/RN from experimenting with the mass tactics evolved over the BTW years by the USN and IJN.

 

No, the FAA regularly warmed up more than one at a time even during the RAF period - I'm glad you've acknowledged the fact that it was definately done before your fictional take-up of USN doctrine.

 

It was NOT the RAF era "operational methods" that stopped the development of massed tactics. "Massed" (in the RN sized sense) tactics were developed - but planes were regarded as too precious to waste. The tactics were developed for the size of groups available and the limitation of warming up on deck.

 

I'm glad to see your views are changing.

[philgollin]

................ It wasn't so much the RAF pilots not wanting to do it (although nobody was really thrilled about flying low over machine-guns), it was Air Staff policy. The Bomber Barons got an early lock on the RAF and seriously frowned upon anything that detracted from war-winning strategic bombing. ..................

 

No. The RAF did quite a lot of work and put a high priority on Army Co-operation (witness the Battle and Lysander). Once the Battle of Britain was over the Desert Air Force (and eventually the Second Tactical Air Force) followed on.

[philgollin]

This question is for philgollin,

You keep saying that US and Japanese fighters were not as good as contemporary ground based fighters on the other discussion topic (which I pulled this one from.)

 

Other than stating that you got it from a book, what are you specific contention points for this? What features do you consider specifically inferior on naval planes or superior on ground based planes? I have read many sources which contradict other sources.

 

There are many discussions which call the F4U simply the finest fighter of World War II. There are also discussion that the F8F Bearcat is the equal of the Ta-152 (At least according to Wiki it has 1000 ft/min greater climb speed)

 

 

Simple (apart from all the others) - which Navy Fighter was better than the Me-262 or Meteor III ?

[philgollin]

Interesting thread with a lot good info and comments!

 

As already indicated I agree with most that is so far said, but would like to add some of the benefits/advantages the RN/FAA had - perhaps because they needed to be creative.

 

I first of all of course think of night fighting. The RN had had focus on that since Jutland in 1916, and that included the naval aviation. So when Taranto was planned it was natural to execute that as a night attack, well before airborne radar. Primarily because the Swordfish wouldn't have survived in daylight. I can't say for sure to what degree it was the tight budgets (small airgroups, slow planes etc.) that necessiated night tactics or it was the night tactics that made the tight budgets able to live with, but anyway the FAA by the start of WWII had an unrivaled capacity to strike at night - when large strikes are more of a nuissance than an asset. When reliable airborne radar became available in 1941 that further enhanced that capacity, but sadly there never was a highly profiled opportunity to show the potential. But judging from Mediterranean oparations it gave the FAA a way to operate single or small number of aircraft at night with considerable effect. Further it worked well with the armoured carrier concept tucking away its planes in daylight and hope to survive to become Queen of the Night.

Yet when Nagumo and 5CVs entered the Indian Ocean in March 1942 all ADM Somerville could do was retire out of range of 1AF by day and hope to close the range enough at night to make a night strike. He was unable to make it work and patently unable to face the IJN in daylight.

FTM, I challenge the "FAA great at night" groupies to name any warship sunk or even damaged at sea by a British torpedo-bomber at night. The IJN managed to develop night torpedo tactics that managed to sink a CA and damage CVs with night torpedo strikes. Admittedly the IJN planes were landbased, but they didn't have many flight decks available then.

 

BTW when talking about the mishaps following from establishing RAF there must be more to it than that. In Germany the Luftwaffe also was an independent arm but stayed well in the army support role - even with Luftwaffe being the Nazi pet arm and with a person like Göring on top. You could have imagined him being an easy prey to bomber barons of Germany. He certainly had his follies about Luftwaffe glory and greatness (ending up being named Meyer), but the Luftwaffe nevertheless kept its focus on army co-operation and at least during the war developed similar procedures with the Kriegsmarine.

The Luftwaffe grew out of Seeckt's Reichswehr with officers transferring to the LW after it was formed. With less than five years to the beginning of the war, there wasn't time for Bomber Barons to leach the army-mindedness out of senior staff. The LW was also NOT very interested in tactical close support (only one gruppe of Hs123s in 1939) although they did support army operations. There was LW-KM cooperation pre-war, but it was confined to seaplanes until war experience showed that the seaplanes were less than stirling in attack roles.

 

Again you are squirming.

 

The FAA worked out night tactics before radar and apart from Taranto, it also operated at night in the Mediterranean quite often using Swordfish (and later Albacores) as night bombers attacking coastal targets and airfields.

 

The problem with your asking about a successful night time torpedo attack is the problem of the lack of targets. If you look at the nighttime operation of aircraft versus U-boats there are plenty of examples.

[DesertFox]

Simple (apart from all the others) - which Navy Fighter was better than the Me-262 or Meteor III ?

 

I never said Naval Fighters were better but approximately equal.

 

Ever heard of the FH-1 Phantom?

Edited July 10, 2007 by DesertFox

[Guest aevans]

I never said Naval Fighters were better but approximately equal.

 

Ever heard of the FH-1 Phantom?

 

More to the point, when was it ever valid to make performance comparisons between jets and prop jobs -- except to point out that they are in entirely different classes?

[DesertFox]

More to the point, when was it ever valid to make performance comparisons between jets and prop jobs -- except to point out that they are in entirely different classes?

 

You are right, I was just trying to show that the Navy had jets in the pipeline too!

[Guest aevans]

You are right, I was just trying to show that the Navy had jets in the pipeline too!

 

Of course they did. I was just making the point that if you were dealing with a serious student of history, and not just another member of LIC's extended family, it wouldn't have been necessary.

[p620346]

QUOTE "The Bomber Barons got an early lock on the RAF and seriously frowned upon anything that detracted from war-winning strategic bombing. "

 

The Bomber Barons were obcessed with strategic bombing because it provided the JUSTIFICATION for an independent RAF. In theory, an Army Air Corps could provide ground support and a FAA could provide naval aviation but only an independent RAF could do strategic bombing. Even in WW II, the RAF Bomber Barons resisted sending Lend-Lease B-24 Liberators to Coastal Command for ASW duties, where they would have been far more effective against Germany, instead of the ineffective night bombing campaign.

[philgollin]

I never said Naval Fighters were better but approximately equal.

 

Ever heard of the FH-1 Phantom?

 

The Me-262 and Meteor III were operational in WW2 and were much better than any operational naval aircraft.

 

The point being discussed was the false claim that USN naval fighters were the equal of their land based contemporaries.

[irregularmedic]

The Me-262 and Meteor III were operational in WW2 and were much better than any operational naval aircraft.

 

The point being discussed was the false claim that USN naval fighters were the equal of their land based contemporaries.

 

 

And if Germany had as many carriers as the US did they would have had a navalized Me-262, but that, like comparing the Meteor to the vast majority of other a/c used in the conflict doesn't really address the issue does it?

 

The Corsair was at least the equal of any land-based prop-engined fighter during the war. I'd say better.

The Zero has it's faults, but during the time when it ruled the skies it was clearly the equal of any land based fighter including the Spitfire.

Let it go, there is no wiggling out of those facts.

[Guest aevans]

The Me-262 and Meteor III were operational in WW2 and were much better than any operational naval aircraft.

 

The point being discussed was the false claim that USN naval fighters were the equal of their land based contemporaries.

 

Based on operational dates, the land based contemporaries of the F4U and F6F were roughly the P-47, P-51, Fw 190, Ki-84, and La-7. Jets were an advanced class of aircraft compared to all of them, land or sea based. Overlapping service periods do not make fundamentally different classes of aircraft "contemporary" for purposes of comparing performance.