WWII IJN navy vs. Allied Shipping

[DesertFox]

The IJN CVs barely made it to Hawaii and back with the assistance of almost all (if not all) of the IJN's oilers. Getting to Panama - or the US West Coast - was not an option in December 1941.

 

Ouch, any way they might be able to use civilian tankers with some minimal modifications as tankers. If they could and take out the Canal, and not trying to say it is, just playing hypothetical, it would be a hard to recover from.

[Tiornu]

How are they going to get home? The main base of the enemy fleet is in their way.

[DesertFox]

How are they going to get home? The main base of the enemy fleet is in their way.

 

Couldn't they just swing way around?

[KingSargent]

Let's see, you said A IJN CV goes to Panama. Getting one there might be possible if the Hawaii raid is cancelled and the Japanese commit all their oilers. Given the hardness of the Canal Zone as a target and the ability of US Engineers to keep it in operation, I doubt any damage would be long-lasting.

[DesertFox]

Let's see, you said A IJN CV goes to Panama. Getting one there might be possible if the Hawaii raid is cancelled and the Japanese commit all their oilers. Given the hardness of the Canal Zone as a target and the ability of US Engineers to keep it in operation, I doubt any damage would be long-lasting.

 

Well, a single larger carrier in the beginning of the war has a better chance to do something than nine aircraft from submarines when the defenses had likely been greatly upgraded.

 

Still, I never tried suggesting that it was practical, sorry if I gave that impression, but see what possibilities there might have been.

 

When it came down to it, Pearl Harbor was a crew up. Fuel storage should have been hit but Admiral Nagumo seemed to lose his nerve. That would have hurt a lot too.

[KingSargent]

Ouch, any way they might be able to use civilian tankers with some minimal modifications as tankers.

I looked into this on a 'Japan Invades Hawaii' thread some time ago. I found it COULD have been done with aggressive pre-War planning by the Japanese, but that wasn't too likely.

 

In fact, I found the LACK of pre-war preparation to be the best indicator that Japan really had no serious intention of waging aggressive war against the West. They wanted China and figured the West wouldn't give enough of a damn to get involved (and they were right).

[KingSargent]

When it came down to it, Pearl Harbor was a crew up. Fuel storage should have been hit but Admiral Nagumo seemed to lose his nerve. That would have hurt a lot too.

I dunno. Fuel storage is hard to knock out with bombing. So are machine shops - you can get the buildings but the tools survive. So it's not quite as simple as the 'he shudda' folk say. US defensive response was growing, Nagumo had expended the special ammunition (shallow-running torpedoes and heavy AP bombs) and had a bunch of very thirsty ships with a long way home. Achieving too much more against possible losses was more or less a case of diminishing returns vs. increased risk.

[Redbeard]

Let's see, you said A IJN CV goes to Panama. Getting one there might be possible if the Hawaii raid is cancelled and the Japanese commit all their oilers. Given the hardness of the Canal Zone as a target and the ability of US Engineers to keep it in operation, I doubt any damage would be long-lasting.

 

Exactly, the problem is not staging an attack, that just needs creativity, resources and some sacrifice, but judging from how fast bombing targets elsewhere were back in business any attack from the Pacific side is hardly worth the effort. The best I can think of would be loading a (kamikaze) cargo ship with explosives labeled "marcipan" or whatever and then detonate the whole damned thing while going through one of the locks. I'm sure there were all kind of (costums) control at the canal, but I would not exclude it would be possible to do it in peacetime (on 7th of December 1941 - co-ordinated with PH?).

 

From the Atlantic side one or more European powers well into the 20th century would be able to gain naval supremacy in the Atlantic and Caribean and thereafter from some paradise island in the Caribean stage a major amphibius operation vs. the canal zone. It would indeed be a huge and resource draining operation, but the biggest problem would be that it is difficult to keep the USA from supplying/reinforcing the canal zone from the Pacific side.

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

[KingSargent]

Exactly, the problem is not staging an attack, that just needs creativity, resources and some sacrifice, but judging from how fast bombing targets elsewhere were back in business any attack from the Pacific side is hardly worth the effort. The best I can think of would be loading a (kamikaze) cargo ship with explosives labeled "marcipan" or whatever and then detonate the whole damned thing while going through one of the locks. I'm sure there were all kind of (costums) control at the canal, but I would not exclude it would be possible to do it in peacetime (on 7th of December 1941 - co-ordinated with PH?). As tense as the international situation was, I'm pretty sure they would be watching or that, but I don't know.

 

From the Atlantic side one or more European powers well into the 20th century would be able to gain naval supremacy in the Atlantic and Caribean and thereafter from some paradise island in the Caribean stage a major amphibius operation vs. the canal zone. It would indeed be a huge and resource draining operation, but the biggest problem would be that it is difficult to keep the USA from supplying/reinforcing the canal zone from the Pacific side.

This Caribbean scenario was the subject of much US planning and exercises in the early 20th century, although the fear was more an invasion of the US than seizure of the Canal Zone. Try Googling War Plan Black and see what you come up with.

[JOE BRENNAN]

Ouch, any way they might be able to use civilian tankers with some minimal modifications as tankers.

That's what 7 of the 8 'oilers' in the PH operation were, only Shiraya was one the IJN's old slow purpose built oilers. The USN situation was similar. The only modern USN AO's at the opening of the war were the 12 Cimarron class, ordered as subsidized 'national defense tankers' by Standard Oil, in a program partly inspired by knowledge of a similar Japanese one, then requisitioned at various stages of construction by the Navy. Their conversions were more extensive than the Japanese ones though, alongside refueling gear (which some of the old IJN purpose built oilers had, but most of their conversion were astern gear only) and expensive and then-scarce armament (4* 5"/38 enclosed mount with Mk.37 director) in 3 of them.

 

The Japanese had 20 ships total comparable to those 7, tankers with cruising speeds in excess of 16kts. But, kido butai was one relatively small part of the IJN in logistical footprint of their opening operations, not to mention normal commerce. To concentrate greatly more force against US targets east of the PI (strikes/sub ops HI, west coast, Panama, even try to invade HI), the Japanese would have had to scale back (do in series not parallel) or postpone the logisitically large attacks on the primary objectives, Malaya and DEI, and the secondary objective more directly in the way, PI. But it isn't clear even in hindsight that such a strategy could force the US to negotiate a settlement, while, especially without hindsight, it would have introduced serious risk that attacks on the primary objective bogged down rather than going quickly and cheaply as they did, because too small or postponed giving the British and Dutch more time to prepare. Cutting off sea lanes from both Indian and Pacific Oceans to SEA, without having taken any of SEA, was not feasible for Japan.

 

On Panama defense, extensive coast defense arty and Army air units as HI, though latter could perhaps also have been taken completely by surprise. Also I've frequently seen the statement that leftover armor from cancelled (pre Washington Treaty) South Dakota class ships was used to protect the lock gates, though I don't know the details. Anyway as suggested above, transit of that carrier force to north of HI without detection was a calculated risk not viewed as certain, hard to see how anybody could have assumed non-detection all the way to Panama even with enough fuel.

 

Joe

Edited July 12, 2007 by JOE BRENNAN

[Tiornu]

The best I can think of would be loading a (kamikaze) cargo ship with explosives labeled "marcipan" or whatever and then detonate the whole damned thing while going through one of the locks.

I believe that was the method suggested by Hector Bywater.

[swerve]

Exactly, the problem is not staging an attack, that just needs creativity, resources and some sacrifice, but judging from how fast bombing targets elsewhere were back in business any attack from the Pacific side is hardly worth the effort. The best I can think of would be loading a (kamikaze) cargo ship with explosives labeled "marcipan" or whatever and then detonate the whole damned thing while going through one of the locks. I'm sure there were all kind of (costums) control at the canal, but I would not exclude it would be possible to do it in peacetime (on 7th of December 1941 - co-ordinated with PH?).

 

Fill as many ships (preferably crappy old ones) with cement as you can (have to consider the risk of raising suspicion - have them under assorted flags if possible, have 'em in transit on December 7th, & scuttle 'em in locks, or other critical points. Would take a while to shift 'em. Could jam up some ports at the same time.

[nitflegal]

I dunno. Fuel storage is hard to knock out with bombing. So are machine shops - you can get the buildings but the tools survive. So it's not quite as simple as the 'he shudda' folk say. US defensive response was growing, Nagumo had expended the special ammunition (shallow-running torpedoes and heavy AP bombs) and had a bunch of very thirsty ships with a long way home. Achieving too much more against possible losses was more or less a case of diminishing returns vs. increased risk.

 

Plus, the Japanese considered their CV's essential to their success and knew that they could not have been easily replaced, their front line full CV production was what, one (Taiho)? A ginormous A/C ferry doesn't count. It's probably fair to say that actually sinking the islands wouldn't have been worth losing the Japanese carriers present. Carriers at sea that they couldn't locate, strengthening defenses, etc were way too many risk factors.

 

Matt

[JOE BRENNAN]

Re: sabotage of Panama Canal, the canal was closed to Japanese ships in September 1941, which would probably have been construed as any ship linked to Japan, though in those days Japanese owned ships flew the Japanese flag with few exceptions, flags of convenience were a limited and mainly American practice. So a high grade cloak and dagger subterfuge would be needed to come up with ships controlled by Japanese agents but giving no indication of Japanese ownership or control, to get into the canal. And in general fifth column or special operations were what Allied authorities in distant locations from Japan seemed to be more on the lookout for than conventional military attacks.

 

Because of the embargoes and danger in the Atlantic (where a few Japanese ships had been lost) sizeable Japanese merchant ships were rarely seen outside East Asia by late 1941. Small ships and fishing vessels were, and attracted attention in places like DEI and Central America, for fear of espionage and special operations.

 

Joe

Edited July 13, 2007 by JOE BRENNAN

[KingSargent]

To concentrate greatly more force against US targets east of the PI (strikes/sub ops HI, west coast, Panama, even try to invade HI), the Japanese would have had to scale back (do in series not parallel) or postpone the logisitically large attacks on the primary objectives, Malaya and DEI, and the secondary objective more directly in the way, PI. But it isn't clear even in hindsight that such a strategy could force the US to negotiate a settlement, while, especially without hindsight, it would have introduced serious risk that attacks on the primary objective bogged down rather than going quickly and cheaply as they did, because too small or postponed giving the British and Dutch more time to prepare. Cutting off sea lanes from both Indian and Pacific Oceans to SEA, without having taken any of SEA, was not feasible for Japan.

That assumes there was anything in the IO and/or Pacific to send to SEA. There wasn't, and the Japanese were pretty sure of it, in the short run at least. Getting time to prepare doesn't help much if you have nothing to prepare with.

 

Considering the very narrow approaches to Singapore, I would have taken my time and let the West try to reinforce/relieve Singapore and sunk everything they sent in the Straits of Malacca.

[p620346]

QUOTE "The IJN CVs barely made it to Hawaii and back with the assistance of almost all (if not all) of the IJN's oilers. Getting to Panama - or the US West Coast - was not an option in December 1941. "

 

I believe that Prange mentions that some of the IJN carriers in the Pearl Harbor attack force actually carried extra fuel in 55 gal DRUMS to make it to Pearl Harbor and back to their refueling point. Most IJN warships were relatively short ranged since they were designed to fight a DECISIVE BATTLE relatively close to Japan.

[JOE BRENNAN]

1. That assumes there was anything in the IO and/or Pacific to send to SEA. There wasn't, and the Japanese were pretty sure of it, in the short run at least. Getting time to prepare doesn't help much if you have nothing to prepare with.

 

2. Considering the very narrow approaches to Singapore, I would have taken my time and let the West try to reinforce/relieve Singapore and sunk everything they sent in the Straits of Malacca.

1. Not so, just some examples: most British fighters lost in SEA were not there in December. I Australian Corps was a formidable force compared to anything in the Far East in Dec but could not be used in Malaya or Burma, a small portion was committed and lost on Java, because of advances the Japanese had already made, and seas not longer under Allied control by the time they got there. The 2 carriers that almost fought kido butai in April were not there in December, etc. The British had *limited* resources to send east but definitely non zero, and piecemeal commitment of what they did have was a serious factor in the ease of the Japanese victories. The Dutch were also receiving arms purchased mainly in the US, that they didn't have time to train with or even receive, and the US forces that fought in DEI also came piecemeal (many of the B-17's via Africa and India). Besides material resources, all those forces suffered from hastily thrown together basing and command arrangements as they reeled backward and the Japanese gained momentum. Consider a force like the USN carriers. They clearly benefitted from 5 months of wartime work up and generally minor actions as cohesive units rather than immediate heavy combat in their December 7 state of readiness, or being fed in piecmeal to a losing situation, like the (later designated) ABDA forces.

 

2. The Japanese didn't prevent sea resupply of Singapore until right near the end. At the beginning the Japanese airbases in Indochina were close enough for hunting around some for ships north of Singapore (RN capital ships) and preplanned strikes on Singapore, not effectively interdicting shipping south of Singapore. The British put in a convoy w/o loss with a brigade and 51 Hurricanes in January even when the Japanese already had Malayan bases, though poor weather helped. The heart of DEI was entirely out of Japanese landbased air range until they seized the northern DEI. The spread out IJN sub fleet had modest achievements in SEA; all concentrated against the US they'd have had none in SEA, of course.

 

In hindsight we conclude that actually knocking the US out of the war was the only way for Japan to win, so why not pursue this goal singlemindedly (and not just w/ subs)? But even if we accept that, a simultaneous desultory war against UK and Neth might actually have been counterproductive, causing acceleration of their preparations and reinforcement, and perhaps worse risk clearer decision and preparation to thoroughly destroy oil facilities when threatened. Better to leave UK/Neth alone altogether for time being. However either way, the Japanese wouldn't have the oil fields in hand when negotiating the US exit from the war. I find it easy to understand why they wanted that bird in hand. But as you must know by now I find "this is what would have happened, for sure" about alternative what if's, a ridiculous idea. I think you can replay fickle fate and have all kinds of things turn out differently even without changing anybody's strategy

 

Joe

[hojutsuka]

Plus, the Japanese considered their CV's essential to their success and knew that they could not have been easily replaced, their front line full CV production was what, one (Taiho)? A ginormous A/C ferry doesn't count.

The IJN actually commissioned two more fleet carriers besides Taiho. But by the time Unryu and Amagi commissioned in August 1944, there were not enough trained carrier aircrew nor enough fuel for ships and aircraft. The "ginormous A/C ferry" (aka Shinano) was never completed; she was sunk while being transferred to Kure for final fitting out.

 

Hojutsuka

[KingSargent]

2. The Japanese didn't prevent sea resupply of Singapore until right near the end. At the beginning the Japanese airbases in Indochina were close enough for hunting around some for ships north of Singapore (RN capital ships) and preplanned strikes on Singapore, not effectively interdicting shipping south of Singapore. The British put in a convoy w/o loss with a brigade and 51 Hurricanes in January even when the Japanese already had Malayan bases, though poor weather helped. The heart of DEI was entirely out of Japanese landbased air range until they seized the northern DEI. The spread out IJN sub fleet had modest achievements in SEA; all concentrated against the US they'd have had none in SEA, of course.

That they didn't doesn't mean they couldn't have. Please note that I did not say to stay out of MALAYA, I said not rush to grab Singapore. Half ot 2/3 of the way down the Malay peninsula and they are right on the Straits of Malacca. The bombers that flew over Singapore after December '41 flew mostly out of ex-RAF Malayan bases. As the actual ending showed, letting the British get troops to Singapore and let them take all the Malay refugees in would have been the thing to do. The British didn't have enough water in Singapore's resources for the military and the civvie populace. Let the Allies pack Singapore and watch them die of thirst. In any case after retreating to Singapore the British had no more chance of making a comeback than Wainwright had of reconquering the Philippines from Corregidor.

 

BTW, explain to me exactly what good the reinforcements sent to Singapore did? Oh, I know - they strained the Japanese food supply feeding all those POWs. :rolleyes: :rolleyes:

[Tiornu]

Shinano was not a ferry so much as a forward staging area. She would have operated alongside Taiho.