Stand-ins for HMS Hood?

[Tiornu]

Why?

[AdmiralB]

Why?

 

Jurens gives the idea some credence, in his paper. He maintains that a 380cm hit is most likely, but doesn't completely discount the possiblity of something unrelated to Bismarck.

[AdmiralB]

The DDs were left behind because they could not keep up in the heavy seas and/or did not have the fuel for prolonged high-speed chase. Had he kept the DDs, Holland would have missed the intercept.

 

The signal to the destroyers containing the "if you can't keep up we'll leave you behind" came a little after 8PM. They did keep up; he didn't dismiss them until after midnight, when the battleships had gone to stations.

[Tiornu]

Jurens gives the idea some credence, in his paper. He maintains that a 380cm hit is most likely, but doesn't completely discount the possiblity of something unrelated to Bismarck.

He also doesn't discount that a Klingon battlecruiser did it (which is my pet theory). There is no more indication that Hood exploded spontaneously than there is that Arizona or Bretagne did so. Edited July 8, 2007 by Tiornu

[DesertFox]

The issue is where they could be built; British shipyards had also suffered during the inter-war years and 'capital ship' size slips were limited. You could only have had "earlier Vanguards" by not building something else.

 

The USN solved the problem by throwing money at it and enlarging or creating new shipyards.

 

You can only get one Vanguard unless you scrap of of the "R" class for its turrets. What I am curious is could one of the KGV class have been altered to be basically a Vanguard with the four 15 inch /42 turrets from the Courageous and Glorious?

[philgollin]

BS.

 

http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNBR_15-45_mk2.htm

During 1935 the Director of Naval Construction produced several design studies showing various alternatives for what became the King George V class battleships. One of these, designated 15C, was for a design with nine 15"/45 (38.1 cm) guns in three triple turrets. This design was considered to be one of the best proposals for these ships, but Treaty restrictions prevented the use of guns larger than 14" (35.6 cm). For this reason, work on designs with 15 and 16 inch (38.1 and 40.6 cm) guns was discontinued and only 14 inch (35.6 cm) designs were pursued.

 

Construction of these new 15" (38.1 cm) guns would not have resembled the older wire-wound 15"/42 (38.1 cm) Mark I. Instead, they would have been of an "all steel" design similar to the 14"/45 (35.6 cm) Mark VII guns actually used on the King George V class. They were to have had a new-gun bore diameter of 14.985 inches (38.06 cm) in order to reduce clearance and thus increase accuracy life with 6crh shells.

 

Each of these new 15"/45 (38.1 cm) guns would have been about 3 tons (3.1 mt) lighter than the old 15"/42 (38.1 cm) Mark I, even though the new guns were three calibers longer than the old ones. It must be kept in mind that weight reduction was an important consideration for all of the Treaty limited warship designs of the 1920s - 1930s. A weight savings of 27 tons (28 mt) for nine guns, plus the accompanying reduction in ship's structure, would be considered quite significant for that reason.

 

It is possible that the new 15" (38.1 cm) triple mountings would have had the same interlock and other reliability problems found with the 14" (35.6 cm) mountings actually used on the King George V class battleships, as they shared similar design concepts.

 

***

 

Note that there were also 15" gun King George V class designs 15A & 15B and IIRC 15D (it has been so long since I read a fairly detailed account of the King George V class design/developement history). ALL of the 16" design proposals were either well over 35,000 tons or had unacceptable compromises in speed, armor protection &/or number of guns. The only "greater detail" for 16" gun proposals was more (& perhaps more detailed) designs in a vain attempt to find a 35,000 ton design that would be satisfactory.

 

At any rate Britain decided that it was going to stick to the 14" treaty limit and no further 15" or 16" gun or ship design continued until the Lion class. Given (among other factors) that the 15" design proposals (15C in peticular) were more balanced than ANY of the 16" design proposals, if Britain had decided not to stick to the 14" treaty limit it is more likely that the King George V class would have had 15" guns rather than 16" guns

 

Amazingly despite your claims, a 15" gun (intended for the King George V) was developed/studied far enough to have been given a designation (although no guns were ever built). Can you find a 16" gun designation intended for the King George V class?

 

That's the problem of working with incorrect secondary sources (and then misreading them)

 

First, the paper was not a serious design paper, merely outlines to indicate to the board the general characteristics of possible ships. Secondly - remind me again how long it was before this paper was overtaken by another ?

 

Second, D & G are wrong re. the 16-inch designs :- "..... For this reason, work on designs with 15 and 16 inch (38.1 and 40.6 cm) guns was discontinued ...." unless of course the ships cover has been falsified !

 

Yes, it was extremely unlikely that the Admiralty would accept a "slow" 16-inch battleship (after all the nominal name for the ship was a "battlecruiser" or "armoured battlecruiser") but there was some work done on the 16-inch versions.

 

Your idea that it was "more likely" that the British would, if abandoning the 14-inch, go to a 15-inch is pure suposition with nothing to back it up. Only the 14-inch and 16-inch guns were developed into working versions, the 15-inch stayed only as a stagnating paper design.

 

The 15-inch (and 16-inch) both had designations, however the 16-inch was made and tested - and then two more versions designed.

[philgollin]

According to Garzke and Dulin, the Admiralty began the design process for the 1937 battleships by looking at 14" (Design 14A), 15" (15A) and 16" (16A) armed ships. On 20 September 1935 the Sea Lords reviewed the designs and decided that the 1937 battleship should be armed with nine 15" guns in three triple turrets and attain a speed of not less than 29 knots. In October 1935 the US Secretary of the Navy told the Bureau of Construction and Repair that the US 1937 battleships were to be armed with 14" guns. Given the American decision to go with 14" guns, the Admiralty met on October 10 and rescinded the decision to go with 15". They then proceeded to further develop the 14" design, with Design 14P being approved in May 1936.

 

The G & D statement (if accurate) that "On 20 September 1935 the Sea Lords reviewed the designs and decided that the 1937 battleship should be armed with nine 15" guns in three triple turrets and attain a speed of not less than 29 knots." is incorrect.

 

The "paper" was only a brief outline of characteristics and nothing was "decided" it was "preferred" and even then only on the basis of further reference (to both more studies - which went for the 14-inch and to the Foreign Office - who most definately told them the facts of life)

[philgollin]

Quote :-

 

The British insisted on all sorts of 'safety' interlocks to prevent accidental detonation or flash from a turret hit reaching a magazine. The USN did not have all these elaborate additions which could malfunction and seize the turret up.

 

unquote

 

They most certainly did - I'm glad to say !

 

The problems with the KGV "interlocks" are not all "problems with interlocks". There was a variety of problems which have come down through published works all (or at least mainly) as "interlocks".

 

(For instance - In the POW there was one interlock failure due to buckling of a piece of the mechanism)

 

There were difference between USN and RN practices of Flashproofing. The USN tended (due both to their turret design and their philosophy to have much larger individual flashproof areas. The RN considered the USN practices insufficiently safe.

 

There are, in the various RN gun manuals, details of the flashproof areas and divisions and detailed instructions on clearling jams or blockages in the flashproof arrangements (scuttles or flaps) between each area.

[philgollin]

QUOTE "Why couldn't have Britain at least built enough aircraft for each & every active carrier to have a full airgroup by May 1941 (it is not like it would have require THAT many planes)?"

 

I would imagine that the RAF had pretty much of a strangle hold on UK aircraft production and the Bomber Barrons would begrudge the FAA any more aircraft than they historically had. The FAA relied heavily on USN aircraft via Lend Lease

 

As above - re-armament production priorities and money.

 

The increase in defence spending from 1935 onwards was vast, but it had to be prioritised and the FAA came last from both the Admiralty and British aircraft manufacturers (the RAF having very high priority)

 

It wasn't so much that people dumped on the FAA - it was more that other things had higher priority the Admiralty needed new ships and the RAF needed uptodate aircraft. IF (?) war had come in 1941 maybe the FAA might have had some decent aircraft (but the designs produced don't inspire much confidence).

[philgollin]

You can only get one Vanguard unless you scrap of of the "R" class for its turrets. What I am curious is could one of the KGV class have been altered to be basically a Vanguard with the four 15 inch /42 turrets from the Courageous and Glorious?

 

There was a single page question and similar answer about whether a KGV hull could mount 3 (THREE) 15-inch turrets - the answer to which was yes, but why ?

 

The KGV hull as such couldn't take a 4-turret solution. Vanguard was based more on a Lion hull - but a lot of work went into strengthening the hull around Y-turret and then all sorts of changes after the loss of POW - so it ended up rather different to even the second Lion design.

[philgollin]

You're mixing up things quite amazingly.

And you are SUCH a dingbat... I only respond to you lest your idiocy infect others.

 

Massed attacks - I was countering the claim that the idea was only for scouting - which was wrong.

I see; a service which could not launch more than six planes at a time was going to "mass attacks." :rolleyes: The FAA did have a strike function, but it was very much secondary to recon and spotting. This was also true to a lesser extent in the IJN and USN. The USN tasked 1/4 of a CAG with scouting and relied on BB-carried floatplanes for gunnery spotting; the IJN developed special large floatplanes for scouting. CarDiv5 relied on their own CV planes for scouting at Coral Sea because they didn't have the specialist floatplanes of CruDiv8 along.

 

Yes there was a lack of aircraft, but what was available was shunted round to provide the best mix on ships for each area.

Not a solution to the problem. Illustrious took Eagle's AG to Taranto because Eagle broke down, not to "obtain an optimum mix." Also note that the Taranto attack went in two small waves, although they did beat the peacetime six-planes-per-strike limit. Twenty-one Swordfish off of two CVs sort of indicates a lack of a/c IMHO.

 

The main reasons for the armoured carriers was the perceived lack of performance of carrier aircraft to land based (still true at the end of WW2) and the requirement for RN carriers to operate near enemy coasts where enemy air attacks were likely. Also remember they were designed before the abilities of radar were really understood or accepted.

"Perceived lack of performance" was because the British CV a/c WERE inferior. And they were inferior because their supply agencies (RAF to 1938, then Air Ministry) kept them that way. The IJN and USN did not have the problem and their a/c equalled or surpassed their land-based contemporaries. The RN didn't have the Perceived Performance Problem at the end of WW2 because they were using US a/c; had they had no Lend-Lease and been stuck with Fireflies and Barracudas they would have had neither the numbers nor the performance of the USN a/c. The RN also had enough naval pilots after 1942 because the US trained them.

As for "operating where enemy air attack was likely" the RN solved the problem with AA guns. Its CVs were essentially AA cruisers that carried a few aircraft. Doctrine during air attack was for the planes to be de-gassed and struck below while the rest of the fleet clustered around the "AA umbrella" provided by the 16 heavy and 24-48 light AA guns (and AA directors) of the RN CVs. Between The Wars the British believed the AA people's advertising and put too much reliance on AA (at least until 1938 when the whole Mediterranean Fleet shot at a target drone for an hour without hitting it). They quite rightly (before Radar Fighter Direction) discounted any possibility of carrier fighters making successful intercepts.

Incidentally, Reginald Henderson, the man responsible for the armored CVs, was also the man who pushed radar development in the RN and found the flaw in the 'facts' that prevented British use of convoy in WW1. An outstanding man who unfortunately died in 1939.

 

Night-time ops - No, the RN, including the FAA, trained pre-war and operated throughout the war at night. It had a 24-hour per day attitude to fighting. It had much more training at night. You seem to have missed all that.

BS. Read "Carrier Glorious." Flight ops stopped at night or in fog, unless the weather was clear and the ships could be illuminated - hardly conditions to rely on in actual combat. The rest of the RN trained at night, I grant you.

 

Low performance aircraft - the "myth" about the FAA/RAF problems is just that, a myth. It was really around the lack of priority/money available for FAA re-armament and them losing out in the preparation for war.

The "myths" were quite real. The problem was, indeed, lack of money. I am quite sure the Air Staff would have given the FAA state of the art aircraft if the money was available - AFTER they had 1000 strategic bombers to win the war with. British budgetary priority BTW went to the RAF, then the RN, and then (trailing badly) the Army.

 

- I think, in general, you believe the myths rather than reading up the facts

No, I just don't make excuses for fools. Nor do I believe that the RN's problems (or the RAF's, or the Army's) were their fault. Given the political direction and funding they received BTW, I have no hesitation at all in blaming Britain's political "leadership" :rolleyes: for her problems.

 

You're being a drama queen.

 

You are wrong (and provably wrong) about strikes (both full deck or massed strikes)

 

The 21 Taranto raid indicates a single available carrier and contaminated fuel (oh and problems of operating at night)

 

USN and IJN carrier aircraft were inferior to land based aircraft - it was not just a FAA problem. I think you have some strange ideas if you believe that any USN or IJN aircraft was better than the best available land based equivalent or opponent. The Corsairs, Hellcats, Seafires, Avengers and Barracudas were not superior to land based aircraft.

 

Thanks for agreeing about the rationale for RN carrier design

 

What is the relevence to the Glorious quote compared to the whole Aircraft Carrier operating philosophy of the RN ?

 

The problem was NOT the RAFs as such but the Admiralty's and the Aircraft manufacturers (who had to supply the Higher priority RAF orders - such priority being set by the government NOT the RAF)

 

Please try to believe the facts - not the myths

[Ken Estes]

There were difference between USN and RN practices of Flashproofing. The USN tended (due both to their turret design and their philosophy to have much larger individual flashproof areas. The RN considered the USN practices insufficiently safe.

 

I think there was cause for concern in the Iowa explosion, last of the kind, such that the investigation found inadequate flashproofing or equipment performance that made it a close call for a magazine detonation. The USN had only turret explosions in its BBs, all peacetime [edit: I am unsure now], and no magazine explosions so the luck held throughout. [uSS Maine was not a BB].

Edited July 8, 2007 by Ken Estes

[KingSargent]

You're being a drama queen. Better than a pompous poseur.

 

You are wrong (and provably wrong) about strikes (both full deck or massed strikes) Prove it then. You have never answered a challenge yet, on any topic where I have read your posts. You simply say "I'm right and you're wrong, nyaah nyaah." I gave up arguing like that in second grade.

 

The 21 Taranto raid indicates a single available carrier and contaminated fuel (oh and problems of operating at night) No, 21 aircraft from two combined air groups indicates very small air groups.

 

USN and IJN carrier aircraft were inferior to land based aircraft - it was not just a FAA problem. I think you have some strange ideas if you believe that any USN or IJN aircraft was better than the best available land based equivalent or opponent. The Corsairs, Hellcats, Seafires, Avengers and Barracudas were not superior to land based aircraft. [b[The Barracuda certainly wasn't superior to anything there was progress made, though - the tails only fell off the Mark 1. The Seafire was too fragile as a carrier a/c. The IJN's planes were superior to those of the IJA, and the USN's planes were superior to both by 1944. The IJN planes in 1941 were certainly superior to anything the British put up against them. In any case the comment was made in reference to the 1930s, when the British came out with "carrier planes are always inferior." USN planes were certainly equal or superior to any USAAC contemporary in their class (the Army airforces did not operate many torpedo bombers for example), and so were IJN planes when compared to contemporary IJA designs.[/b]

 

Thanks for agreeing about the rationale for RN carrier design I know WHY the RN was forced to do things the way they did. Their reasons were not rational in view of the way the IJN and USN operated CVs. If the RN doctrine was good, why did the RN drop it and adopt USN operational practices and design (specifically that the primary role of the CV is to carry and operate bunches of planes).

 

What is the relevence to the Glorious quote compared to the whole Aircraft Carrier operating philosophy of the RN ? The Glorious book talks about what actually happened, not what the philosophy was.

 

The problem was NOT the RAFs as such but the Admiralty's and the Aircraft manufacturers (who had to supply the Higher priority RAF orders - such priority being set by the government NOT the RAF) Pull the other one. The Air Ministry supplied the planes, and the RAF got first grabs. The RAF got the priorities the RAF wanted - they didn't get as much as they wanted, but they got a bigger slice of the budget than the other services. The RAF snowed the politicians into believing the RAF could win wars by itself, which is why the politicians set the priorities, even after it was demonstrably clear that the RAF was lying through their teeth about their effectiveness.

 

Please try to believe the facts - not the myths Cough up some facts and maybe I will, but you simply regurgitating your opinions isn't going to change my mind.

[DesertFox]

USN and IJN carrier aircraft were inferior to land based aircraft - it was not just a FAA problem. I think you have some strange ideas if you believe that any USN or IJN aircraft was better than the best available land based equivalent or opponent. The Corsairs, Hellcats, Seafires, Avengers and Barracudas were not superior to land based aircraft.

 

The US Military did a test between a Corsair, Hellcat, and Fw-190 and found that the Corsair has advantages in several areas and the Hellcat was about equal to the FW-190

 

http://mywebpages.comcast.net/markw4/index1.html

[Ken Estes]

The US Military did a test between a Corsair, Hellcat, and Fw-190 and found that the Corsair has advantages in several areas and the Hellcat was about equal to the FW-190

 

http://mywebpages.comcast.net/markw4/index1.html

Nice, DF; decades ago, I used to wonder how the USN would have faired had it operated CVs in the ETO close to shore, not that it mattered. Comparing the aircrew

quality would remain pure speculation, of course. Goes to show us, what the crucial development in engines by the US in the pre-war period meant in terms of

effectiveness; said engines, of course, responded to commercial airliner [read trans-ocean seaplanes] demands, not the military in the beginning.

 

Strap 2200 HP on anything and it will give a performance. By 1945, the US had a 5000hp radial in hand.

[Guest pfcem]

The G & D statement (if accurate) that "On 20 September 1935 the Sea Lords reviewed the designs and decided that the 1937 battleship should be armed with nine 15" guns in three triple turrets and attain a speed of not less than 29 knots." is incorrect.

 

The "paper" was only a brief outline of characteristics and nothing was "decided" it was "preferred" and even then only on the basis of further reference (to both more studies - which went for the 14-inch and to the Foreign Office - who most definately told them the facts of life)

I think you are getting caught on the word "decided" (perhaps concluded or recommended would have been better). And note that they said it should be armed with nine 15" guns in three triple turrets, not would be...

[philgollin]

I think you are getting caught on the word "decided" (perhaps concluded or recommended would have been better). And note that they said it should be armed with nine 15" guns in three triple turrets, not would be...

 

No - not "should" either - you keep mixing up an outline paper setting out possibilities with an actual decision or design process. As long as you do you won't clear up the mess.

[philgollin]

The US Military did a test between a Corsair, Hellcat, and Fw-190 and found that the Corsair has advantages in several areas and the Hellcat was about equal to the FW-190

 

http://mywebpages.comcast.net/markw4/index1.html

 

Apart from the Me-262 and Meteor, the Spitfires, Tempests and Fw-190s were all regarded as better than any of the carrier fighters.

 

You need to be very careful about comparing variants and dates

[philgollin]

You're being a drama queen. Better than a pompous poseur.

 

You are wrong (and provably wrong) about strikes (both full deck or massed strikes) Prove it then. You have never answered a challenge yet, on any topic where I have read your posts. You simply say "I'm right and you're wrong, nyaah nyaah." I gave up arguing like that in second grade.

 

The 21 Taranto raid indicates a single available carrier and contaminated fuel (oh and problems of operating at night) No, 21 aircraft from two combined air groups indicates very small air groups.

 

USN and IJN carrier aircraft were inferior to land based aircraft - it was not just a FAA problem. I think you have some strange ideas if you believe that any USN or IJN aircraft was better than the best available land based equivalent or opponent. The Corsairs, Hellcats, Seafires, Avengers and Barracudas were not superior to land based aircraft. [b[The Barracuda certainly wasn't superior to anything there was progress made, though - the tails only fell off the Mark 1. The Seafire was too fragile as a carrier a/c. The IJN's planes were superior to those of the IJA, and the USN's planes were superior to both by 1944. The IJN planes in 1941 were certainly superior to anything the British put up against them. In any case the comment was made in reference to the 1930s, when the British came out with "carrier planes are always inferior." USN planes were certainly equal or superior to any USAAC contemporary in their class (the Army airforces did not operate many torpedo bombers for example), and so were IJN planes when compared to contemporary IJA designs.[/b]

 

Thanks for agreeing about the rationale for RN carrier design I know WHY the RN was forced to do things the way they did. Their reasons were not rational in view of the way the IJN and USN operated CVs. If the RN doctrine was good, why did the RN drop it and adopt USN operational practices and design (specifically that the primary role of the CV is to carry and operate bunches of planes).

 

What is the relevence to the Glorious quote compared to the whole Aircraft Carrier operating philosophy of the RN ? The Glorious book talks about what actually happened, not what the philosophy was.

 

The problem was NOT the RAFs as such but the Admiralty's and the Aircraft manufacturers (who had to supply the Higher priority RAF orders - such priority being set by the government NOT the RAF) Pull the other one. The Air Ministry supplied the planes, and the RAF got first grabs. The RAF got the priorities the RAF wanted - they didn't get as much as they wanted, but they got a bigger slice of the budget than the other services. The RAF snowed the politicians into believing the RAF could win wars by itself, which is why the politicians set the priorities, even after it was demonstrably clear that the RAF was lying through their teeth about their effectiveness.

 

Please try to believe the facts - not the myths Cough up some facts and maybe I will, but you simply regurgitating your opinions isn't going to change my mind.

 

Re. the proveably wrong, I have already stated where the proof is - the Aircraft Carrier Handbook.

 

I prove you wrong about your claim about strike sizes (and nightime work) by quoting Taranto and you claim it doesn't - what is wrong is your inability to admit your mistaken statements by changing ideas when shown to be wrong.

 

Again when arguing about carrier aircraft performance your argument suddenly changes when shown to be wrong.

 

The only specifically USN operational practice the FAA adopted was deck parks - whilst, of course the USN adopted the British fighter direction procedure. They didn't adopt USN design practices during the war.

 

The Glorious example is only one event - not FAA procedure which is why you are again wrong.

 

Re. blaming the RAF - again you are moving onwards when shown to be wrong.

 

It seems that at one and the same time you claim that I haven't done anything to change your mind whilst changing you argument on all points - a wonderful acheivement on my part I thank-you

[Guest pfcem]

No - not "should" either - you keep mixing up an outline paper setting out possibilities with an actual decision or design process. As long as you do you won't clear up the mess.

No, you are the one confused. Nobody is saying that it was EVER decided that the King George Vs would be armed with 15" guns. But after reviewing many, many possible designs the Sea Lords determined that nine 15" guns in three triple turrets was the preferred design. They did not decide that is what King George Vs would be, but rather simply stated that in their opinion that was the best overall design.

 

As I have said before, the decision that was made was to go with 14" guns & all work on possible 15" & 16" designs stopped.

[JOE BRENNAN]

The US Military did a test between a Corsair, Hellcat, and Fw-190 and found that the Corsair has advantages in several areas and the Hellcat was about equal to the FW-190

In their only European fighter0-fighter combat, in 1944, FAA Hellcats shot down 3 Bf109G's for 2 Hellcats, (they also claimed an Fw190); in a 1945 combat Wildcat VI's (FM-2's) defeated Bf109G's 3:0. Very small sample but numerically even WWII fighter combat was mainly about pilots if the planes were at all competitive. By 44-45 LW training was failing and veterans being depleted. The USN's length of training for new pilots was even higher than other Allied air arms, with a large cadre of successful combat veterans to teach and then lead them, so I don't see how or why the general success of the also numerically superior Allied air arms v LW in 44-45 would have been reversed inserting the USN. Earlier on, that USN pilot advantage wouldn't have been there to the same degree or perhaps at all, and some earlier plane matchups were less competitive than F6F-5/F4U-1D v '44-45 German fighters.

 

There were other cases and periods where Japanese and US carrier fighters were competitive with contemporary landbased fighters, especially ones their real enemies actually had. Much more competitive matchups than say Fulmar v Bf109E/T the FAA faced over Kirkenes in July '41. For example when it first appeared the Japanese Type 96 (1936) was one of the better fighters in the world, so was the Zero in 1940, not to get into an argument 'absolutely best'. And those two consistently bested in combat all landbased fighters they actually met from 1937 to the end of 1942. The first fighter to meet the Zero on consistently even terms was another carrier fighter, the F4F. And according to each side's account of its losses, Zeroes bested Spitfire V's by a wide margin over a series of combats in 1943; hard to see how the Zero could be deemed non competitive v the Spit with a several to one kill ratio in the Zero's favor, even if that ratio might have differed in another situation.

 

Anyway the basic issue for carriers in Europe wasn't fighter plane or pilot quality, but numbers. Prewar fleets consisted of a handful of carriers that would not be rapidly expanded. Prewar or relatively quickly mobilizable land based air arms might bring 100's of a/c to bear on carrier strikes against large landmasses. Another factor was the difficultly in intercepting attacks on ships pre radar, but even when that changed the basic numerical balance didn't. European carriers could only hope to survive outside the range of landbased single engine fighters, so combatting them was not a natural requirement. As noted above there were a few late war exceptions, and in a more major operation of RN fleet carriers, escorting Malta convoys, they were forced within the edge of Italian/German single engine fighter range, but not enough for the Axis fighters to help their bombers much: carrier fighters in Europe were mainly for shooting down unescorted bombers. In the Pacific in 1945 an enormous war built carrier force (with replacement ships in the pipeline) attacked a landmass as large as Japan; but that wasn't feasible in 1942 either, on account of numbers and non-expendability of carriers (hence symbolic one way B-25 mission).

 

Joe

Edited July 9, 2007 by JOE BRENNAN

[philgollin]

No, you are the one confused. Nobody is saying that it was EVER decided that the King George Vs would be armed with 15" guns. But after reviewing many, many possible designs the Sea Lords determined that nine 15" guns in three triple turrets was the preferred design. They did not decide that is what King George Vs would be, but rather simply stated that in their opinion that was the best overall design.

 

As I have said before, the decision that was made was to go with 14" guns & all work on possible 15" & 16" designs stopped.

 

Pointless

[KingSargent]

Re. the proveably wrong, I have already stated where the proof is - the Aircraft Carrier Handbook. Really? Where did you say that? Is that one of your 'WXYZ 4352" 'proofs?'

 

I prove you wrong about your claim about strike sizes (and nightime work) by quoting Taranto and you claim it doesn't - what is wrong is your inability to admit your mistaken statements by changing ideas when shown to be wrong. You said nothing that "proved me wrong." YOU saying anything is not "proof," regardless of what you claim.

 

Again when arguing about carrier aircraft performance your argument suddenly changes when shown to be wrong. I notice that there are more on this thread supporting my arguments than yours. Once again where did I "change arguments." I clarified the timeframe I was talking about, that is not "changing arguments."

 

The only specifically USN operational practice the FAA adopted was deck parks - whilst, of course the USN adopted the British fighter direction procedure. They didn't adopt USN design practices during the war. Barriers, massing planes on deck and warming them up, rapid launches. I did not say design practices, I said design rationale - IOW, the RN abandoned enclosed armored hangars for US-style open hangars in their late-war designs (which never got built). They went to acceptance that a large air group capable of massed strikes is preferable to a few a/c cowering in fear on an impregnable (hopefully) ship.

 

The Glorious example is only one event - not FAA procedure which is why you are again wrong. You've never even heard of the book, have you? It is not about one event, it is a history of the career of HMS Glorious, including accounts of maneuvers and training in the 1930s.

 

Re. blaming the RAF - again you are moving onwards when shown to be wrong. I haven't been shown to be wrong.

 

It seems that at one and the same time you claim that I haven't done anything to change your mind whilst changing you argument on all points - a wonderful acheivement on my part I thank-you

Well, you see, I don't simply repeat everything I say and hope that somebody will tire of it and not respond so I can claim 'victory.' I will attempt to clarify and provide examples. You don't.

[Tiornu]

What Glorious book are you referring to?

[philgollin]

Re. the proveably wrong, I have already stated where the proof is - the Aircraft Carrier Handbook. Really? Where did you say that? Is that one of your 'WXYZ 4352" 'proofs?'

 

I prove you wrong about your claim about strike sizes (and nightime work) by quoting Taranto and you claim it doesn't - what is wrong is your inability to admit your mistaken statements by changing ideas when shown to be wrong. You said nothing that "proved me wrong." YOU saying anything is not "proof," regardless of what you claim.

 

Again when arguing about carrier aircraft performance your argument suddenly changes when shown to be wrong. I notice that there are more on this thread supporting my arguments than yours. Once again where did I "change arguments." I clarified the timeframe I was talking about, that is not "changing arguments."

 

The only specifically USN operational practice the FAA adopted was deck parks - whilst, of course the USN adopted the British fighter direction procedure. They didn't adopt USN design practices during the war. Barriers, massing planes on deck and warming them up, rapid launches. I did not say design practices, I said design rationale - IOW, the RN abandoned enclosed armored hangars for US-style open hangars in their late-war designs (which never got built). They went to acceptance that a large air group capable of massed strikes is preferable to a few a/c cowering in fear on an impregnable (hopefully) ship.

 

The Glorious example is only one event - not FAA procedure which is why you are again wrong. You've never even heard of the book, have you? It is not about one event, it is a history of the career of HMS Glorious, including accounts of maneuvers and training in the 1930s.

 

Re. blaming the RAF - again you are moving onwards when shown to be wrong. I haven't been shown to be wrong.

 

It seems that at one and the same time you claim that I haven't done anything to change your mind whilst changing you argument on all points - a wonderful acheivement on my part I thank-you

Well, you see, I don't simply repeat everything I say and hope that somebody will tire of it and not respond so I can claim 'victory.' I will attempt to clarify and provide examples. You don't.

 

1: You've already seen and referred to the Carrier Handbook reference - see your post number 52 !

 

2: Again, your own reference shows you wrong, but you ignore it - why ?

 

3: No, you tried to claim that carrier aircraft became as good as land-based ones and was shown to be wrong and then tried to change the argument - again why ?

 

4: Strangely enough barriers were already there pre-war, and so was warming up planes on deck. There were no RN "open" hangar Fleet carrier designs - the Gibraltars were closed hangars

 

5: What possible relevance is your blustering about the Glorious book (which from your description I both have andhave read)

 

6: Again you started out with the myth that the RAF starved the FAA of funds/aircraft - it was actually the Admiralty (if anyone) acting on government priorities due to funding limitations.

 

7: Again, meaningless bluster