Stand-ins for HMS Hood?

[Tiornu]

??

Listing the statistics for armor thickness accounts for only part of the issue. Look also at the angles. The faceplate is angled back only a little; at all ranges where it presents the primary target area, it is penetrable. Above that is the 180mm portion of the "roof," as you have called it. It can be hit at short range, and despite its angle, the thickness is insufficient to totally reject a shell; as the range increases, it becomes a major portion of the target area, and it is penetrable. The flat roof is 130mm, the thinnest turret roof among all the treaty battleships. As it becomes the major target area, it too becomes penetrable. There is no range where the Bismarck turret armor is likely to reject large-caliber shells. So what good is it?

[KingSargent]

Re. Aircraft Carriers

 

The Fighting Instructions did envisage the main aim of Aircraft Carriers as scouts and to slow the enemy "fleet" down. True.

 

The Aircraft Carrier Handbook, however, also envisaged massed attacks (up to 3 carriers) on enemy ships. Yes, and the ONLY time it was tried (on maneuvers) Admiral Henderson had to strip all the CVs in the RN to get nearly-full airgroups for the three Outrageous class CVs.

 

There are some points not covered.

 

1: The main reason that Victourious was not carrying her full airgroup was that she was acting as an aircraft ferry with crated aircraft on board. The planes she flew off were not hers either. The Fulmars were "800Z" squadron, a replacement flight for 800 suadron in the Med. You imply that Vic would have had a full group of her own planes if not ferrying; not so, Formidable had about 17 a/c on board at Matapan .

 

2: There was a lack of fleet carriers to cover all the areas that required them. The loss of Corageous and Glorious meant that only Ark Royal and Furious survive from pre-war (Eagle was useful but too slow and Argus and Hermes not regarded as suitable). Illustrious and Victorious had joined but the RN needed carriers for the Home Fleet, Force H and Mediterranean.

3: The main reasons for the RN's lack of reliance on aircraft carriers were (in no particular order) ;

 

a: Lack of numbers Exacerbated by losing two of their biggest to stupidity in 1939-40. Lack of a/c was the main reason. The RN could not rely on the RAF for planes and pilots (the RAF did have its own problems). After his experience in struggling to fill the three Outrageouses air groups, Henderson was Third(?) Sea Lord. He was largely responsible for the armored hangar CVs, which sacrificed aircraft numbers for ship qualities because when designed the RAF still had the FAA and Henderson knew there would never be enough planes.

 

b: Inability (or rather limited ability) to attack at night and poor weather - This was just changing at the time of the Bismarck sortie as ASV equipped Swordfish but was seen as a disadvantage considering the need to operate worldwide, 24 hours per day. They were unable to operate at night because they couldn't train for it with all the "mustn't lose an aircraft chaps" safety rules. Both the USN and IJN managed to train their professional 'between the wars' pilots in night ops.

 

c: Low performance aircraft Because the RAF wouldn't supply good ones, nor would the Air Ministry after the RN got operational control of the FAA in 1938. The FAA was restricted to multi-seat a/c because the RAF did not teach pilots to navigate, which meant lugging a naval officer along so they knew where they were or staying within sight of the carrier (the Flycatcher).

 

4: The duplex pistol equipped air dropped 18-inch torpedo was regarded at the time* as capable of defeating any ship (from below the keel), but the duplex pistol was unreliable (although it SEEMS to have been effective at Taranto. The replacement magnetic exploder (CCR - late '43/early '44) was regarded as effective - but not deployed on aircraft torpedoes.. Just like the RAF's secret ship-killer, the 'B-bomb.' They were still not as potent as US torpedoes (when they worked :rolleyes: ) or IJN torpedoes.

 

[* Actually the review of the performance of Duplex pistols was already underway by the time of the Bismarck sortie, but hadn't reached its conclusion to withdraw (or actually modify the pistol for contact only operation) until afterwards).

At least the RN gets credit for noticing the problem early, unlike the USN's torpedo supply people.

[KingSargent]

SUPP 6 files at the TNA:PRO and not "1936" - why "1936" ?

That begs the question of WHERE the guns were going to be built. "1936" because that was when the ships were ordered.

[Ken Estes]

Yes, Bismarck had three screws and two rudders. A ship with a single rudder that gets jammed is not necessarily up a creek...if you know what I mean. The US cruiser Marblehead had a rudder jammed in a turn and still managed to regain some control before the rudder was freed.

 

But Marblehead's damage was from an aerial bomb, not nearly as nasty as a torp hit, usually. They ended up using hand steering as I recall, so it was steering engines, not the rudder that was damaged?

[Guest pfcem]

There was never any "work" done on a 16-inch gun specifically for a KGV. There were outline designs for 16-inch armed KGV designs - very different. The 16-inch was developed for general use - following on from the 14-inch (whilst the 15-inch was never developed from the paper design) and eventually the 16-inch emerged for use on the next class (Lion) by Board choice. The gun designs were overseen by the Ordnance Board (and DNO) whilst the ship design by the DNC (and Board).

Exactly my point. No 16" gun King George V EVER came any closer to reality than a 15" gun King George V. Britain was going to do the upmost to stay within the 35,000 ton & 14" treaty limits. So much so that in order to stay within the 35,000 ton limit they reduced the number of 14" guns from twelve to ten.

 

 

 

There is no "what-if" game going on.

Yes there is. Read some of the other posts in the thread.

 

 

 

There is no design work done on any sort of 15-inch KGV, whilst there is for the 14-inch and 16-inch versions (very limited). The only 15-inch versions are intial outlines prepared for board guidance - nothing else, which were never taken forward (as opposed to the 14-inch ones and to a limited extent the 16-inch slow ones).

No 16" gun King George V EVER came any closer to reality than a 15" gun King George V. But given the realities of the time it is more likely that if the King George Vs were to have had guns larger than 14" that they would have been 15" rather than 16". A King George V based 16" gun battleship would have required too great a compromise in speed &/or protection &/or number of guns.

 

 

 

You seem not to understand how the British design process worked.

Yes I do & that understanding makes it abundantly clear that there was no real way the King George V where going to have 16" guns.

[KingSargent]

A detailed look at a modern computer analysis of the hull's eventual impact on the sea bottom explains some damage as a result of hydrodynamic impact shock inside the ship, which was still apparently girded by an uninterrupted curtain of armour.

Which means nothing. Divers on USS Arizona reported the armor belt as "substantially intact" even though the forward part of the hull essentially disintegrated and left little shards of hull facing out from the belt. The forward turrets and barbettes were still there too, although they had dropped through the space where the hull had been. Tell me that Arizona did not sink and that IJN weapons were ineffective against her armor - I know, her crew scuttled her because ADM Kidd had denied them liberty...... :rolleyes:

[DesertFox]

A couple of questions on this discussion

 

From what I have read, both the Nelson class and King George V class had problems with their turrets. Maybe it was not as severe as some discussions seem to indicate. What I don't understand is that the US battleships appear to have had no such problems. Is there a reason why they did not have that problem

 

Second, once the London Treaty was dead, how hard would it have been to build an earlier Vanguard using the left over turrets? Could it have been ready by the time of the hunting of the Bismarck?

[Tiornu]

But Marblehead's damage was from an aerial bomb, not nearly as nasty as a torp hit, usually. They ended up using hand steering as I recall, so it was steering engines, not the rudder that was damaged?

Right, the steering compartment was flooded, which stopped the steering motors with the rudder at 30deg. The crew managed to get the ship out of the turn and under some degree of control. The rudder was eventually freed, and the ships steered by engines. I'm looking at the damage report which says the ship remained in a turn until the rudder was freed, but my recollection of the action report says otherwise.

[philgollin]

Re. Aircraft Carriers

 

The Fighting Instructions did envisage the main aim of Aircraft Carriers as scouts and to slow the enemy "fleet" down. True.

 

The Aircraft Carrier Handbook, however, also envisaged massed attacks (up to 3 carriers) on enemy ships. Yes, and the ONLY time it was tried (on maneuvers) Admiral Henderson had to strip all the CVs in the RN to get nearly-full airgroups for the three Outrageous class CVs.

 

There are some points not covered.

 

1: The main reason that Victourious was not carrying her full airgroup was that she was acting as an aircraft ferry with crated aircraft on board. The planes she flew off were not hers either. The Fulmars were "800Z" squadron, a replacement flight for 800 suadron in the Med. You imply that Vic would have had a full group of her own planes if not ferrying; not so, Formidable had about 17 a/c on board at Matapan .

 

2: There was a lack of fleet carriers to cover all the areas that required them. The loss of Corageous and Glorious meant that only Ark Royal and Furious survive from pre-war (Eagle was useful but too slow and Argus and Hermes not regarded as suitable). Illustrious and Victorious had joined but the RN needed carriers for the Home Fleet, Force H and Mediterranean.

3: The main reasons for the RN's lack of reliance on aircraft carriers were (in no particular order) ;

 

a: Lack of numbers Exacerbated by losing two of their biggest to stupidity in 1939-40. Lack of a/c was the main reason. The RN could not rely on the RAF for planes and pilots (the RAF did have its own problems). After his experience in struggling to fill the three Outrageouses air groups, Henderson was Third(?) Sea Lord. He was largely responsible for the armored hangar CVs, which sacrificed aircraft numbers for ship qualities because when designed the RAF still had the FAA and Henderson knew there would never be enough planes.

 

b: Inability (or rather limited ability) to attack at night and poor weather - This was just changing at the time of the Bismarck sortie as ASV equipped Swordfish but was seen as a disadvantage considering the need to operate worldwide, 24 hours per day. They were unable to operate at night because they couldn't train for it with all the "mustn't lose an aircraft chaps" safety rules. Both the USN and IJN managed to train their professional 'between the wars' pilots in night ops.

 

c: Low performance aircraft Because the RAF wouldn't supply good ones, nor would the Air Ministry after the RN got operational control of the FAA in 1938. The FAA was restricted to multi-seat a/c because the RAF did not teach pilots to navigate, which meant lugging a naval officer along so they knew where they were or staying within sight of the carrier (the Flycatcher).

 

4: The duplex pistol equipped air dropped 18-inch torpedo was regarded at the time* as capable of defeating any ship (from below the keel), but the duplex pistol was unreliable (although it SEEMS to have been effective at Taranto. The replacement magnetic exploder (CCR - late '43/early '44) was regarded as effective - but not deployed on aircraft torpedoes.. Just like the RAF's secret ship-killer, the 'B-bomb.' They were still not as potent as US torpedoes (when they worked :rolleyes: ) or IJN torpedoes.

 

[* Actually the review of the performance of Duplex pistols was already underway by the time of the Bismarck sortie, but hadn't reached its conclusion to withdraw (or actually modify the pistol for contact only operation) until afterwards).

At least the RN gets credit for noticing the problem early, unlike the USN's torpedo supply people.

 

You're mixing up things quite amazingly.

 

Massed attacks - I was countering the claim that the idea was only for scouting - which was wrong.

 

Yes there was a lack of aircraft, but what was available was shunted round to provide the best mix on ships for each area.

 

The main reasons for the armoured carriers was the perceived lack of performance of carrier aircraft to land based (still true at the end of WW2) and the requirement for RN carriers to operate near enemy coasts where enemy air attacks were likely. Also remember they were designed before the abilities of radar were really understood or accepted.

 

Night-time ops - No, the RN, including the FAA, trained pre-war and operated throughout the war at night. It had a 24-hour per day attitude to fighting. It had much more training at night. You seem to have missed all that.

 

Low performance aircraft - the "myth" about the FAA/RAF problems is just that, a myth. It was really around the lack of priority/money available for FAA re-armament and them losing out in the preparation for war.

 

- I think, in general, you believe the myths rather than reading up the facts

[philgollin]

That begs the question of WHERE the guns were going to be built. "1936" because that was when the ships were ordered.

 

?????

 

The guns would be built in the same gun pits whether they were 14-inch or 16-inch (although changing from one design to another would probably involve a delay (depending on advanced notice)

 

The gun foundry and gun pits were the same.

[philgollin]

Exactly my point. No 16" gun King George V EVER came any closer to reality than a 15" gun King George V. Britain was going to do the upmost to stay within the 35,000 ton & 14" treaty limits. So much so that in order to stay within the 35,000 ton limit they reduced the number of 14" guns from twelve to ten.

Yes there is. Read some of the other posts in the thread.

No 16" gun King George V EVER came any closer to reality than a 15" gun King George V. But given the realities of the time it is more likely that if the King George Vs were to have had guns larger than 14" that they would have been 15" rather than 16". A King George V based 16" gun battleship would have required too great a compromise in speed &/or protection &/or number of guns.

Yes I do & that understanding makes it abundantly clear that there was no real way the King George V where going to have 16" guns.

 

No (for about the 15th time.

 

Why do you insist on your fantasy version of history instead of the truth ?

 

The 15-inch ship was a mere outline for the board to look at - never , as such, part of the KGV class studies.

 

The possible 16-inch KGVs were looked at in slightly more detail but then discarded - they were possible, but never favoured.

[philgollin]

A couple of questions on this discussion

 

From what I have read, both the Nelson class and King George V class had problems with their turrets. Maybe it was not as severe as some discussions seem to indicate. What I don't understand is that the US battleships appear to have had no such problems. Is there a reason why they did not have that problem

 

Second, once the London Treaty was dead, how hard would it have been to build an earlier Vanguard using the left over turrets? Could it have been ready by the time of the hunting of the Bismarck?

 

The first has been the subject of much discussion on dedicated warship boards - mostly there is lots of discussion and few facts

 

Vanguard type ships were consistently discussed - in all manner of ways, but the availability of suitable building way and priority going to escorts and lthen landing craft scuppered its completion date

[Tiornu]

As has been shown elsewhere, the 14-inch guns reliability problems have been grossly over-stated - not so much that they didn't miss salvos but more that other guns were almost as bad in operational conditions.

The handiest benchmark would be a comparison between the 14in twins and quads. Were the quads any less reliable than the twins?

 

As has been shown elsewhere, the 14-inch guns reliability problems have been grossly over-stated - not so much that they didn't miss salvos but more that other guns were almost as bad in operational conditions.

Which guns were almost as bad?

[Guest pfcem]

No (for about the 15th time.

 

Why do you insist on your fantasy version of history instead of the truth ?

 

The 15-inch ship was a mere outline for the board to look at - never , as such, part of the KGV class studies.

 

The possible 16-inch KGVs were looked at in slightly more detail but then discarded - they were possible, but never favoured.

BS.

 

http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNBR_15-45_mk2.htm

During 1935 the Director of Naval Construction produced several design studies showing various alternatives for what became the King George V class battleships. One of these, designated 15C, was for a design with nine 15"/45 (38.1 cm) guns in three triple turrets. This design was considered to be one of the best proposals for these ships, but Treaty restrictions prevented the use of guns larger than 14" (35.6 cm). For this reason, work on designs with 15 and 16 inch (38.1 and 40.6 cm) guns was discontinued and only 14 inch (35.6 cm) designs were pursued.

 

Construction of these new 15" (38.1 cm) guns would not have resembled the older wire-wound 15"/42 (38.1 cm) Mark I. Instead, they would have been of an "all steel" design similar to the 14"/45 (35.6 cm) Mark VII guns actually used on the King George V class. They were to have had a new-gun bore diameter of 14.985 inches (38.06 cm) in order to reduce clearance and thus increase accuracy life with 6crh shells.

 

Each of these new 15"/45 (38.1 cm) guns would have been about 3 tons (3.1 mt) lighter than the old 15"/42 (38.1 cm) Mark I, even though the new guns were three calibers longer than the old ones. It must be kept in mind that weight reduction was an important consideration for all of the Treaty limited warship designs of the 1920s - 1930s. A weight savings of 27 tons (28 mt) for nine guns, plus the accompanying reduction in ship's structure, would be considered quite significant for that reason.

 

It is possible that the new 15" (38.1 cm) triple mountings would have had the same interlock and other reliability problems found with the 14" (35.6 cm) mountings actually used on the King George V class battleships, as they shared similar design concepts.

 

***

 

Note that there were also 15" gun King George V class designs 15A & 15B and IIRC 15D (it has been so long since I read a fairly detailed account of the King George V class design/developement history). ALL of the 16" design proposals were either well over 35,000 tons or had unacceptable compromises in speed, armor protection &/or number of guns. The only "greater detail" for 16" gun proposals was more (& perhaps more detailed) designs in a vain attempt to find a 35,000 ton design that would be satisfactory.

 

At any rate Britain decided that it was going to stick to the 14" treaty limit and no further 15" or 16" gun or ship design continued until the Lion class. Given (among other factors) that the 15" design proposals (15C in peticular) were more balanced than ANY of the 16" design proposals, if Britain had decided not to stick to the 14" treaty limit it is more likely that the King George V class would have had 15" guns rather than 16" guns

 

Amazingly despite your claims, a 15" gun (intended for the King George V) was developed/studied far enough to have been given a designation (although no guns were ever built). Can you find a 16" gun designation intended for the King George V class?

[ABNredleg]

According to Garzke and Dulin, the Admiralty began the design process for the 1937 battleships by looking at 14" (Design 14A), 15" (15A) and 16" (16A) armed ships. On 20 September 1935 the Sea Lords reviewed the designs and decided that the 1937 battleship should be armed with nine 15" guns in three triple turrets and attain a speed of not less than 29 knots. In October 1935 the US Secretary of the Navy told the Bureau of Construction and Repair that the US 1937 battleships were to be armed with 14" guns. Given the American decision to go with 14" guns, the Admiralty met on October 10 and rescinded the decision to go with 15". They then proceeded to further develop the 14" design, with Design 14P being approved in May 1936.

Edited July 7, 2007 by ABNredleg

[binder001]

Interesting thread - I am fascinated by Dreadnaught BBs and have always found the Bismarck affair one of the most interesting actions in the war.

 

1) In the original "what if" question; what id Norfolk and Suffolk had joined in the action in Denmark Straight? Yes, very risky to send a couple of older CAs to engage a first-rate BB, but they would have divided Luetjens attention and possibly his fire. I know that the 8" weapons would have added to difficulties in spotting fall of shot. From looking at accounts of actions in the Solomons it appears that 8" fire CAN inflict annoying, if unleathal, damage on a BB.

 

2) When did the information come out about the Bismarck putting a shell into Hood's foretop? I saw this in the Bismarck episode of "Dogfights" but have never seen another reference to it until this thread.

 

3) In reading a web-site analyzing the Hood vs Bismarck encounter there is mention of evident of a second explosion aboard Hood in the area of the forward magazines. Has any more information come to light on this explosion?

[ABNredleg]

2) When did the information come out about the Bismarck putting a shell into Hood's foretop? I saw this in the Bismarck episode of "Dogfights" but have never seen another reference to it until this thread.

 

In Bruce Taylor's The Battlecruiser HMS Hood he states that:

 

" This shell (the fatal shell from Bismarck's final salvo) or another from the same salvo seems to have passed through the spotting top because the boat deck was now showered with debris and body parts from the upper reaches of the bridge structure."

(Parenthetical comment added by me.)

 

This was based on the comments of AB Seaman Bob Tilburn, one of three survivors.

 

BTW, I highly recommend this book. Not only does it have an incredible amount of photos and illustrations. it also gives a great depiction of life in the Royal Navy between the Wars.

Edited July 7, 2007 by ABNredleg

[AdmiralB]

I thought the boat deck was afire from the PE's hit on ammunition lockers there.

 

It seems more than plausible, based on observations from the PoW, that Hood may have simply blown itself up - unstable/old propellant, perhaps.

 

Holland would also have been well served to have not dismissed the destroyers that morning.

[KingSargent]

A couple of questions on this discussion

 

From what I have read, both the Nelson class and King George V class had problems with their turrets. Maybe it was not as severe as some discussions seem to indicate. What I don't understand is that the US battleships appear to have had no such problems. Is there a reason why they did not have that problem

The British insisted on all sorts of 'safety' interlocks to prevent accidental detonation or flash from a turret hit reaching a magazine. The USN did not have all these elaborate additions which could malfunction and seize the turret up.

 

Second, once the London Treaty was dead, how hard would it have been to build an earlier Vanguard using the left over turrets? Could it have been ready by the time of the hunting of the Bismarck?

The issue is where they could be built; British shipyards had also suffered during the inter-war years and 'capital ship' size slips were limited. You could only have had "earlier Vanguards" by not building something else.

 

The USN solved the problem by throwing money at it and enlarging or creating new shipyards.

[KingSargent]

Holland would also have been well served to have not dismissed the destroyers that morning.

He would definitely have lived longer, because there would have been no battle. The DDs were left behind because they could not keep up in the heavy seas and/or did not have the fuel for prolonged high-speed chase. Had he kept the DDs, Holland would have missed the intercept.

[p620346]

QUOTE "Why couldn't have Britain at least built enough aircraft for each & every active carrier to have a full airgroup by May 1941 (it is not like it would have require THAT many planes)?"

 

I would imagine that the RAF had pretty much of a strangle hold on UK aircraft production and the Bomber Barrons would begrudge the FAA any more aircraft than they historically had. The FAA relied heavily on USN aircraft via Lend Lease

[Tiornu]

In the wartime inquiry, one of the Hood survivors mentionscrewmen falling from the foretop after a Bismarck salvo.

The idea of a forward magazine explosion is unfortunate nonsense started by the Mearns expedition. Mearns correctly noted an area of destruction at Hood's bow. This was actually anticipated by his expert consultant (Bill Jurens) who said they would likely find IMplosion damage there. The bow area of destruction is a fraction of what occurred around the aft magazines, and the bow destruction isn't even centered on the forward magazines. In fact, the hull has an armored bulkhead between the magazines and the area of destruction. There's nothing there to explode, but it's exactly where implosion damage would be likely.

There is no reason to think Hood would have spontaneously detonated.

Edited July 8, 2007 by Tiornu

[KingSargent]

You're mixing up things quite amazingly.

And you are SUCH a dingbat... I only respond to you lest your idiocy infect others.

 

Massed attacks - I was countering the claim that the idea was only for scouting - which was wrong.

I see; a service which could not launch more than six planes at a time was going to "mass attacks." :rolleyes: The FAA did have a strike function, but it was very much secondary to recon and spotting. This was also true to a lesser extent in the IJN and USN. The USN tasked 1/4 of a CAG with scouting and relied on BB-carried floatplanes for gunnery spotting; the IJN developed special large floatplanes for scouting. CarDiv5 relied on their own CV planes for scouting at Coral Sea because they didn't have the specialist floatplanes of CruDiv8 along.

 

Yes there was a lack of aircraft, but what was available was shunted round to provide the best mix on ships for each area.

Not a solution to the problem. Illustrious took Eagle's AG to Taranto because Eagle broke down, not to "obtain an optimum mix." Also note that the Taranto attack went in two small waves, although they did beat the peacetime six-planes-per-strike limit. Twenty-one Swordfish off of two CVs sort of indicates a lack of a/c IMHO.

 

The main reasons for the armoured carriers was the perceived lack of performance of carrier aircraft to land based (still true at the end of WW2) and the requirement for RN carriers to operate near enemy coasts where enemy air attacks were likely. Also remember they were designed before the abilities of radar were really understood or accepted.

"Perceived lack of performance" was because the British CV a/c WERE inferior. And they were inferior because their supply agencies (RAF to 1938, then Air Ministry) kept them that way. The IJN and USN did not have the problem and their a/c equalled or surpassed their land-based contemporaries. The RN didn't have the Perceived Performance Problem at the end of WW2 because they were using US a/c; had they had no Lend-Lease and been stuck with Fireflies and Barracudas they would have had neither the numbers nor the performance of the USN a/c. The RN also had enough naval pilots after 1942 because the US trained them.

As for "operating where enemy air attack was likely" the RN solved the problem with AA guns. Its CVs were essentially AA cruisers that carried a few aircraft. Doctrine during air attack was for the planes to be de-gassed and struck below while the rest of the fleet clustered around the "AA umbrella" provided by the 16 heavy and 24-48 light AA guns (and AA directors) of the RN CVs. Between The Wars the British believed the AA people's advertising and put too much reliance on AA (at least until 1938 when the whole Mediterranean Fleet shot at a target drone for an hour without hitting it). They quite rightly (before Radar Fighter Direction) discounted any possibility of carrier fighters making successful intercepts.

Incidentally, Reginald Henderson, the man responsible for the armored CVs, was also the man who pushed radar development in the RN and found the flaw in the 'facts' that prevented British use of convoy in WW1. An outstanding man who unfortunately died in 1939.

 

Night-time ops - No, the RN, including the FAA, trained pre-war and operated throughout the war at night. It had a 24-hour per day attitude to fighting. It had much more training at night. You seem to have missed all that.

BS. Read "Carrier Glorious." Flight ops stopped at night or in fog, unless the weather was clear and the ships could be illuminated - hardly conditions to rely on in actual combat. The rest of the RN trained at night, I grant you.

 

Low performance aircraft - the "myth" about the FAA/RAF problems is just that, a myth. It was really around the lack of priority/money available for FAA re-armament and them losing out in the preparation for war.

The "myths" were quite real. The problem was, indeed, lack of money. I am quite sure the Air Staff would have given the FAA state of the art aircraft if the money was available - AFTER they had 1000 strategic bombers to win the war with. British budgetary priority BTW went to the RAF, then the RN, and then (trailing badly) the Army.

 

- I think, in general, you believe the myths rather than reading up the facts

No, I just don't make excuses for fools. Nor do I believe that the RN's problems (or the RAF's, or the Army's) were their fault. Given the political direction and funding they received BTW, I have no hesitation at all in blaming Britain's political "leadership" :rolleyes: for her problems.

[ABNredleg]

The British insisted on all sorts of 'safety' interlocks to prevent accidental detonation or flash from a turret hit reaching a magazine. The USN did not have all these elaborate additions which could malfunction and seize the turret up.[/b]

 

When I visited the USS North Carolina I was struck by how straight forward and simple the shell and powder handling arangements were. I posted some photos of the North Carolina's shell handling flat and powder magazine in this previous thread about the differences in turret loading arangements.

Edited July 8, 2007 by ABNredleg

[KingSargent]

There is no reason to think Hood would have spontaneously detonated.

Vanguard (the WW1 one) and various pre-Dreadnoughts provide ample reason to wonder, methinks.