Battlecruisers

[Guest aevans]

Originally posted by Scott Cunningham:

What about the Seydlitz. I think it had most turrets knocked out as well.

 

I know it was essentially wrecked by the end of the fight.

 

Only one serious turret casualty -- Seydlitz's real problems were caused by a torpedo and multiple gun hits to the hull.

 

Where the British AP shells appear to have consistently failed was against German belt armor. This may be where the whole "bad British AP" story got started. I'm not totally convinced that this was as much function of bad British shell design as it was a case of the Germans having good hull armor. German shells certainly had a tough time with British turrets -- though when they got in, they did their work well.

 

I'm just not convinced by the evidence that results would have been all that different if the British had had higher penetration rates on their AP shells. German ships that were hard hit were badly enough damaged that had they had the vulnerabilities the of the British, they would have been lost without the Brits needing to have more effective shells.

[Tiornu]

"Niet. The british battlecruisers were well known to the the natural hunters of armoured cruiser,like the falkland war shown it very well."

You are incorrect. If you read Parkes and Beeler and (especially) Roberts, you will see that actual reasoning behind British battlecruisers, not the mass of hindsight that has found its way into print. The British intended their battlecruisers as multi-role warships, and among their jobs was to deal with battleships in fleet actions.

[Tiornu]

"But it is also true that British ammunition functioned well enough to penetrate almost every turret and barbette that it hit at least once." It would be a mistake to interpret a holed barbette as the proper result of a shell hit. The definition of an "effective penetration" is that the shell penetrate the armor and enter into the ship before exploding. Holing and partial penetrations are all very nice, but they do not represent a true success for the shell. The British defined what they wanted from their shells when they said that top priority is to cause an explosion inside the target. The shell itself is there only to convey the explosive into the interior.

Seydlitz (going from memory here) took a direct hit on a turret faceplate from a 15in shell. The shell knocked a plug into the gunhouse interior. That is NOT a success for the shell, which was supposed to enter into the gunhouse itself and explode there. In this particular case, no blast at all entered, and the only damage was the temporary disabling of the elevating gear for one gun.

Please note that, except for the mishandling of powder, barbette and turret penetrations do not do very much to sink a ship. Likewise, similar hits on the hull--shells that explode before getting into the hull interior--do very little to sink a ship. They are supposed to get into the ship, explode there, and destroy watertight boundaries there. British shells at Jutland did a poor job of this. The shells in British service just a couple years later were ripping hull interiors to shreds. Refer to the Baden trials and you'll see what a good AP shell can do.

[Scott Cunningham]

Try this link

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/offici...60.html#art_45a

[DB]

aevans, (is that Tony?) excellent summary, thanks and I see now what you mean. An analogy would perhaps be playing an "open hand" card game.

 

On the (mis) use of radio, one of the major laments of Jellicoe in what was effectively his AAR was that many sightings of (for example) course changes by the enemy were not reported to him, and this is speculated to be because the captains concerned didn't imagine that what they could see couldn't be seen by Jellicoe, add in the failure of the seaplane radio report to make it to the fleet (or, it appears, to anyone at all) suggests that this was not radio's finest hour.

 

On the major damage inflicted on Derfflinger, this abstracted from Jutland 1916's excerpts of von Hase's memoire, when 18 dreadnoughts concentrated on four BCs:

 

1. 38cm (15") shell penetrated Caesar turret. He contradicts himself a little, stating first that everyone was killed then that five survived from a total of 78. He notes that all of the ready cordite charges burned (2 in turret, four in "transfer chamber" and four more in the "case-chamber". Note that this suggests that compartmentalisation between these chambers was not the best, but in this case the charges burned rather than detonated.

 

(I find this part of his account interesting as it provides support for the "bad cordite" primary cause for the British BC explosions as opposed to the poor practice of leaving hatches open, etc.)

 

2. 38cm shell pierced Dora turret, with similar results.

 

3. "A heavy shell" struck the fore control about 50cm (!) in front of von Hase. He notes that this burst, but did not penetrate, putting this down to a grazing impact angle. Although it did throw large chunks of armour about.

 

4. 38cm shell exploded under the bridge, destroying inter alia the charthouse.

 

There were a total of fourteen major hits at this point, the four above seem to have worked as well as could be expected. Derfflinger suffered more killed than any other ship in the battle that did not sink, and more than Lutzow, which did.

 

On the move to improve British shells, it seems reasonable to suggest that there is always room for improvement, and if you can make it so, "better" is better than merely "good enough".

 

David

[Guest aevans]

DB,

 

Yes, this is me. The big problem with the Battle of Jutland is that every controversy that pops us is always answerable with a simple rhetorical question: "What could have been done differently that makes any sense?"

 

Tiornu,

 

Really? If you exclude catastrophic kills due to turret hits, and you allow for the fact that dreadnoughts could take one heck of a lot of hull damage before getting in serious trouble, then mission kills of main armament become extremely significant. And if a non-penetrating hit does the job, then you rate that a mission success for your weapon system. You don't carp and whine about how it wasn't an accoring-to-Hoyle righteous hit.

 

Keep swinging, you'll get a hit eventually.

[Tiornu]

"then mission kills of main armament become extremely significant."

That's a different subject entirely. I have said that British shells did not give a good AP performance. While this doesn't mean they won't cause damage, it does mean they under-achieve. There is a huge difference between knocking out a turret and causing a catastrophe. If I may borrow an example from WWII, Boise took a barbette hit during Cape Esperance; the shell broke apart and fizzled and inflicted no serious hurt on the ship, though it did jam the turret. Shortly afterward, a shell penetrated into the forward magazine and properly exploded. The forward portion of the hull was swept by a horrible flash, with widespread flooding and fatalities. Both shells were damaging hits, but only one functioned properly. At Jutland, the British shells tended not to function properly. By the Germans' own account, this allowed three dreadnoughts to make it home when they should have been sunk. That is a big difference.

[istvan47]

about the battlecruisers:

 

the armour of the first (invincible) battlecruiser was around:

152 belt, 63 deck, 178 towers (63mm roof) displacement:17500 t., width:23,9m

 

the first german, the von der tann, had:

250 belt, 50 deck, 230 towers (90mm roofs) displ. 19400 t, (30% protection), width 26,6m.

 

Already by these datas is cleary that, if the british battlecruisers were menat as multirole units, they were a real failure. They effectively were only cruiser-hunters, while the german ships were able to fight with every kind of enemy.

 

A comment of W Churcill:

 

"I don't believe in the rightful to have the battlecruisers. i fi t is worthly to expend much more than a battleship to have a fast battle cruiser, is worthly to expend a bit more to have also a better protection. perhpas this will cost 50 more than a normal battleship, but htis kind of unit will be able to do everything.

expende the money for a first clss battleship to have a unit that cannot wihtstand hte damages of a first line employ is a wrong way of projectations"

 

Perhpas he liked more the von der tann.

[Guest aevans]

Tiornu,

 

You're not making any sense. First you rule out catastrophic kills as a technical consideration, because they represent easily correctable human error (a point with which I happen to agree, BTW). Then you say that had British shells been better pentrators, they would have sunk ships. All of this based on anecdote that is at best speculative, given the proven ability of the ships in question to withstand non-catastrophic damage.

 

When we face facts, we realize that the fate of dreadnoughts in battle is pretty much a question of chance. Had Lion suffered the propulsion casualties of Dogger Bank at Jutland, there would have been no saving her. Yet Lion in fact took much more damage in absolute terms at Jutland and emerged combat effective, even if she lost a turret and many more men. Hood was sunk by luckiest of all lucky hits. (The entire progress of Rheinubung was in fact a dance with the fates, with Murphy conducting the orchestra.) Hiei was rendered combat ineffective by 8" and 5" gunfire. South Dakota was put out of action (and would have probably been lost, had Washington not been present) by a World War One legacy dreadnought and two cruisers -- ships that she theoretically should have had no trouble handling, even all at once.

 

What's my point? Trying to attribute a given success or lay off some perceived failure to an assumed technical defficiency or superiority, based on proving ground exercises or non-combat trials -- or, worse yet, conjuring with specifications and a little bit of elementary math -- is a nice parlor game, but proves nothing about anything.

 

Also, your insistence that the British opinions of how their weapon technology succeeded or failed be taken as gospel is quite ammusing. It is fairly well established that of all of the participants in the dreadnought game, they were at once the producers of some of the greatest technological marvels and the proponents of some of the wildest misapprehensions and misunderstandings about the very technologies they created and helped advance. Their opinions, if anything, should be taken as a guide to what not to think or believe.

 

[Edited by aevans (26 Nov 2004).]

[Rich]

Originally posted by aevans:

Tiornu,

 

You're not making any sense. First you rule out catastrophic kills as a technical consideration, because they represent easily correctable human error (a point with which I happen to agree, BTW). Then you say that had British shells been better pentrators, they would have sunk ships. All of this based on anecdote that is at best speculative, given the proven ability of the ships in question to withstand non-catastrophic damage.

 

Actually he is making eminent sense and being very careful in what he says, you and others simply appear to be misunderstanding.

 

1) Catastrophic kills could be the result of either correctable human error or due to effective functioning of the weapon system (i.e., the shell exploding as designed, otherwise why build it as a shell in the first place?). The first may be characterized as the "somethings wrong with our ships today" type and was the result of combinations of events including poor design, unstable propellents and poor crew practices, all of which were correctable by the defender. The second may be characterized as the "Boise" type where the shell did exactly what it was meant to do, penetrate into the vitals of a ship and explode with near-catastrophic results (although in this case the 'catastrophe' was mitigated by good design and some luck).

 

2) I do not believe Tiornu ever said the British shells were inadequate as penetrators - that is an interpretation on your part. What he has said is that they were designed using an unstable detonating material as a filler - picric acid - and so suffered from premature detonation and partial detonation or both. The result of using a different filling that enabled the shell to perform as designed - penetrate to the limit of the fuze timing and then explode - could have resulted in the loss of 3 more German capital ships at Jutland. Note that von Hase on Derfflinger may well not have survived to write his memoir if the "heavy shell" striking in front of his position at the fore control had penetrated and then detonated as it was designed to do, rather than exploding on impact as it actually did.

 

3) I have never seen that Tiornu has used anecdotal data, rather he has consistantly reported the results of each opposing sides testimony, reports and experimental data - how does that equate to 'anecdotal'? And you miss again the point of the German AAR - they judged that the result of the British penetrations was 'non-catastrophic' (and as the evidence shows they were correct, all the vessels survived those pentrations) but that if the penetrations had been accompanied by first-order explosions then the results would likely have been catastrophic, an opinion that was neither 'anecdotal' nor far-fetched given the locations where some of those poorly performing (in terms of explosions) shells were found. Which meant that all of those vessels ability to withstand catastrophic damage was simply not tested.

[Wolf Werther]

Originally posted by aevans:

...South Dakota was put out of action (and would have probably been lost, had Washington not been present) by a World War One legacy dreadnought and two cruisers -- ships that she theoretically should have had no trouble handling, even all at once.

 

This battle took place at night and at close range. South Dakota was definitly not designed to brawl at that range, eliminating her advantage of superior top-protection and her longer combat distance. Not to mention that torpedo-carrying enemy cruisers could easily ruine her day, while her only advantage was her flip-flop radar.

[Guest aevans]

Originally posted by Wolf Werther:

This battle took place at night and at close range. South Dakota was definitly not designed to brawl at that range, eliminating her advantage of superior top-protection and her longer combat distance. Not to mention that torpedo-carrying enemy cruisers could easily ruine her day, while her only advantage was her flip-flop radar.

 

And the point I was making was that tactical factors and chance dominate technical factors.

 

[Edited by aevans (26 Nov 2004).]

[Guest aevans]

Rich,

 

Look at what the adequately penetrating and functioning German shells did to British ships that didn't suffer catastrophic casualties, then tell me that "proper" British shell performance would have made that much difference. Remember, the British only learned of the supposed poor performance of their shells through second-hand anecdote, relating speculation -- expert speculation to be sure, but still speculation uninformed by knowledge of how tough British ships (which, you may remember, have been widely criticized for almost nine decades as being weak) were under the assault of the speculators' own well-performing ordnance. Saying that the British would have sunk three (or any specific or estimated number) of German dreadnoughts, had certain shells hitting in certain places performed better, is an exercise in squaring the circle.

[Tiornu]

"You're not making any sense."

Yes, I am. You are not perceiving it.

 

"First you rule out catastrophic kills as a technical consideration, because they represent easily correctable human error (a point with which I happen to agree, BTW)."

No, I have not. Please show where I have "ruled out" catastrophic kills. And what have I supposedly ruled them out of?

 

"Then you say that had British shells been better pentrators, they would have sunk ships."

Yes, they would have sunk more ships than they did historically. Do you disagree? On what basis?

 

"All of this based on anecdote that is at best speculative, given the proven ability of the ships in question to withstand non-catastrophic damage."

It must by definition be speculative since it is anticipating the results of an alternative. Likewise, to anticipate an antithetical set of results would be speculative, though with lesser support.

 

"Trying to attribute a given success or lay off some perceived failure to an assumed technical defficiency or superiority, based on proving ground exercises or non-combat trials -- or, worse yet, conjuring with specifications and a little bit of elementary math -- is a nice parlor game, but proves nothing about anything."

This is inaccurate in the most spectacular way. Appraisal of success and failure is the single most important factor in generating Lessons Learned. This is done routinely and with great profit by any successful military.

 

"Also, your insistence that the British opinions of how their weapon technology succeeded or failed be taken as gospel is quite ammusing."

Considering I have made no such insistence, I must conclude you're amusing yourself. Please show where I made this insistence.

 

"It is fairly well established...."

I do not believe you are familiar with what is well established with regard to the British shell situation. Superficial citations and the choice to sweep valid evidence into a well of cynicism shouldn't supplant the large body of source material on this topic, some of which is available in published form. The ongoing series in the recent Warship volumes would be the logical starting place.

[DB]

Hmm.

 

Would one consider that the 15" shells that penetrated the Caesar and Dora turrets of Derfflinger worked "properly"? That is, they penetrated then had a high-order detonation?

 

Given that von Hase states that the deaths seem to have mainly been from cordite fires started by the shells' explosions, it seems to me that the shells must have "fizzled" pretty badly. What would one have expected of a high-order detonation?

 

David

[Tiornu]

It's possible that the shell exploded magnificently, but while still in the process of penetrating. This can send blast and flame into the enclosed space and cause all sorts of mischief. It's also possible that the shells worked perfectly in that case. I do not know. If someone has Campbell's book, it is the best hit-by-hit analysis available.

British shells would tend to do better against turret faces than against belt or barbette armor because the impact angles would tend to be closer to the normal.

[larrikin]

Originally posted by istvan47:

about the battlecruisers:

 

the armour of the first (invincible) battlecruiser was around:

152 belt, 63 deck, 178 towers (63mm roof) displacement:17500 t., width:23,9m

 

the first german, the von der tann, had:

250 belt, 50 deck, 230 towers (90mm roofs) displ. 19400 t, (30% protection), width 26,6m.

 

Already by these datas is cleary that, if the british battlecruisers were menat as multirole units, they were a real failure. They effectively were only cruiser-hunters, while the german ships were able to fight with every kind of enemy.

 

 

1900 tons greater displacement, smaller guns, and how many years later? VdT didn't make anything obsolete, the Invincibles made every previous AC, and several later, at the very best. obsolescent

[Guest aevans]

Yes, I am. You are not perceiving it.

 

We shall see...

 

No, I have not. Please show where I have "ruled out" catastrophic kills. And what have I supposedly ruled them out of?

 

Please note that, except for the mishandling of powder, barbette and turret penetrations do not do very much to sink a ship.

 

How else should one interpret this, except that it rules out catastrophic kills in the absence of poor ammunition handling practices? Anticipating that your response will be something along the lines of: "I meant partial penetrations or penetrations that do not lead to high-order detonations of the filler", why did you not specify such conditions? Either you were being imprecise (whether by intention or inattention I will not speculate), or you're not being consistent. Take your pick and I'll meet you on either ground.

 

Yes, they would have sunk more ships than they did historically. Do you disagree? On what basis?

 

I've made my position quite clear on this point. British ships of widely proclaimed inferior design and construction suffered numerous fully qualified "righteous" hits without sinking or in some cases even suffering serious combat power degredation. IOW, real evidence, not speculation, tends to support the interpretation that better performing shells were not trumps, by any stretch of the imagination.

 

It must by definition be speculative since it is anticipating the results of an alternative. Likewise, to anticipate an antithetical set of results would be speculative, though with lesser support.

 

I am manifestly not anticipating any results. I am merely pointing out that anticipation of results based on uninformed speculation (for the Germans who speculated on what better British shells would have done to their ships had no clue at the time how well the inferior British ships had performed against their superior shells) is assinine and should not be indulged in. Better performing British shells may have led to more German sinkings. They may not have.

 

Were the British right to improve their shells when they heard reports of poor performance? Certainly. Had they had better shells in the event, would it have made a difference? Who knows?

 

This is inaccurate in the most spectacular way. Appraisal of success and failure is the single most important factor in generating Lessons Learned. This is done routinely and with great profit by any successful military.

 

Ever actually been involved in a lessons learned exercise? One thing that responsible leaders don't do is play might have been games. They look at what works, what doesn't, and seek ways to lock in success and redress failure.

 

The point I am making is that theoretical games based on poorly understood technological factors -- and heavy naval artillery is still a poorly understood technology, because it went out of scope long before sufficient operational data was developed -- tend to be misleading in the extreme.

 

Considering I have made no such insistence, I must conclude you're amusing yourself. Please show where I made this insistence.

 

You quote British standards and British trials at every turn, as if they are definitive and final proof of yuor argument.

 

I do not believe you are familiar with what is well established with regard to the British shell situation. Superficial citations and the choice to sweep valid evidence into a well of cynicism shouldn't supplant the large body of source material on this topic, some of which is available in published form. The ongoing series in the recent Warship volumes would be the logical starting place.

 

This is nothing less than specious sophistry. You are the one denying the only real valid evidence by refusing to confront the fact that ships stood up well to heavy naval artillery that worked as advertised, in favor of speculation by the partially informed, and narrowly defined distinctions of effectivness that make those speculations sound plausible to you.

 

Better performing British shells may have sunk more German ships -- but nobody knows that to be a fact. It is equally likely that more effective British shells would have done no more damage to German ships than well-performing German shellsdid to British ones. In fact, if I had to bet on it, I would bet on that, because that is where the actual operational evidence lies. This is where I make the distinction that you are speculating and I'm not -- we know the damage that penetrating shells that explode inside ships causes. And it ain't the ship sinking kind of destruction that you're claiming for your mythical better British shell.

[Tiornu]

"How else should one interpret this, except that it rules out catastrophic kills in the absence of poor ammunition handling practices?"

You should probably interpret it according to what it says. A turret penetration does little to sink a ship.

You did not answer my question: it rules out of what?

 

"Anticipating that your response will be something along the lines of: 'I meant partial penetrations or penetrations that do not lead to high-order detonations of the filler', why did you not specify such conditions?"

I did not anticipate that I would have that response, perhaps because I didn't have those conditions in mind.

 

"Either you were being imprecise (whether by intention or inattention I will not speculate), or you're not being consistent. Take your pick and I'll meet you on either ground."

I suppose you could say I'm not being consistent with your meager and jangled grasp of the issues, but I have no intention of meeting you on that ground.

 

"IOW, real evidence, not speculation, tends to support the interpretation that better performing shells were not trumps, by any stretch of the imagination."

To the best of my knowledge, no one has referred to them as trumps except you. Better-performing shells are what they are--better-performing shells. As a shell's purpose is to damage the target, a better performance means the target suffers more damage. Increased damage increases the likelihood of sinking. At least we agree on that much.

 

"I am manifestly not anticipating any results. I am merely pointing out that anticipation of results based on uninformed speculation (for the Germans who speculated on what better British shells would have done to their ships had no clue at the time how well the inferior British ships had performed against their superior shells) is assinine and should not be indulged in."

Then by all means, don't do it. If you are uninformed, get informed. Then perhaps you can contribute fruitfully tothe discussion.

 

"You quote British standards and British trials at every turn, as if they are definitive and final proof of yuor argument."

I invited you to show where I had insisted that the British opinions be taken as gospel. You have answered with a factually incorrect assertion. I will accept this as your best effort.

 

"This is nothing less than specious sophistry."

That is little more than redundancy--the "little," in this case, being inaccuracy as well.

 

"You are the one denying the only real valid evidence by refusing to confront the fact that ships stood up well to heavy naval artillery that worked as advertised, in favor of speculation by the partially informed, and narrowly defined distinctions of effectivness that make those speculations sound plausible to you."

Whenever I ask you to show where I have done something, you fail to do so. Yet I will try again and ask you to indicate where I have denied any evidence?

 

"Better performing British shells may have sunk more German ships -- but nobody knows that to be a fact. It is equally likely that more effective British shells would have done no more damage to German ships than well-performing German shellsdid to British ones. In fact, if I had to bet on it, I would bet on that, because that is where the actual operational evidence lies. This is where I make the distinction that you are speculating and I'm not"

You have just rated as equally likely two possible outgrowths of a change. But you are not speculating...? It's good to know that you are not speculating, because you seem to be speculating that better-penetrating shells containing charges as much as three times as destructive "would have done no more damage."

 

"we know the damage that penetrating shells that explode inside ships causes."

You haven't demonstrated that you know anything of the sort.

 

"And it ain't the ship sinking kind of destruction that you're claiming for your mythical better British shell."

Ah, thanks for the correction. I didn't realize that better British shells were mythical. These myths proved extremely destructive to the German-built Baden. Have you looked even momentarily at the report of the Baden trial? Then look up Round No 16 and see the results. It destroyed all boundaries for the entire width of the ship--and that was just the damage caused by debris thrown off by the shell impact. The shell itself went its own way and riddled the two deck levels below that.

You have determined that the Germans couldn't rightly assess the results of a theoretical switch to better British shells. You base this on the fact that the Germans had not seen the results of their own fire on British ships. You seem to be saying this was the only benchmark that mattered. You do not address any firing trials conducted by the Germans as part of their development of better AP shells. You seem to think that you, on the other hand, understand the subject well enough to validly dismiss their views even though you don't have the slightest idea what they've based their assessments on. Unless you can address this apparent disparity between your expertise and theirs, I can't imagine that you have anything more worth saying on this topic--though my imagination is admittedly small.

[istvan47]

"""1900 tons greater displacement, smaller guns, and how many years later? VdT didn't make anything obsolete, the Invincibles made every previous AC, and several later, at the very best. obsolescent"""

 

THIS IS exactly what could be said of the M1 vs T-72s...(heavier, years after, smaller gun, BETTER armour and design), so what's the point?

 

Is it difficult to understund that teh german battlecruisers were meant as fast battleships rather than very heavy cruisers?

The protection, the structure etc. were much stronger and cleary thinked to withstand the heaviest rounds of its times..

 

The project specifics and the real combat experiences both show cleary that the british battlecruisers were unable to fight similar units while the germans managed to fight very well. Despite one of the german vessel sunk, there wasn't the blows of TREE different british battlecruisers and of TREE different class, and this is not counting that aslo the Lion was nearly to explode with Beatty inside. And we talk about german guns with 280-305mm caliber...what could happened if the germans had already 356-380mm?

[Tiornu]

German battlecruisers were not, as far as I can tell, intended for the same purpose as their British counterparts. They were much more specialized for fleet actions, and the Germans saw their battlecruisers as a direct counter to British battleships. This was true up until the appearance of the Queen Elizabeth class, which discouraged the Germans on a number of levels. It was clear that the QEs could not be countered by battlecruisers. At that point, the Germans would have abandoned construction of battleships and battlecruisers, building instead a fleet of "GK" ships--Grossekampfschiffe, true fast battleships.

Since a paucity of armor was not the key factor in the British BC losses at Jutland (perhaps in one case?), any argument based on that factor is going to be inadequate.

[Alex]

Originally posted by istvan47:

"""1900 tons greater displacement, smaller guns, and how many years later? VdT didn't make anything obsolete, the Invincibles made every previous AC, and several later, at the very best. obsolescent"""

 

THIS IS exactly what could be said of the M1 vs T-72s...(heavier, years after, smaller gun, BETTER armour and design), so what's the point?

 

Is it difficult to understund that teh german battlecruisers were meant as fast battleships rather than very heavy cruisers?

The protection, the structure etc. were much stronger and cleary thinked to withstand the heaviest rounds of its times..

 

The project specifics and the real combat experiences both show cleary that the british battlecruisers were unable to fight similar units while the germans managed to fight very well. Despite one of the german vessel sunk, there wasn't the blows of TREE different british battlecruisers and of TREE different class, and this is not counting that aslo the Lion was nearly to explode with Beatty inside. And we talk about german guns with 280-305mm caliber...what could happened if the germans had already 356-380mm?

 

Give the British BCs in Jutland the armor and guns of the German BCs and they would still blow up. That had nothing to do with their armor. If the German BCs had 380mm guns then they would have to have less armor and speed and more would probably be sunk.

 

The German BCs were built to counter the British BCs. They were more defensively oriented than the British, and it was the same with German and British BBs.

 

The Germans had their fleet-in-being doctrine and designed their ships accordingly, survival being the first priority. The British ships were built to sink other ships. The German ships were built not to be sunk themselves.

[hojutsuka]

Originally posted by Alex:

The Germans had their fleet-in-being doctrine and designed their ships accordingly, survival being the first priority. The British ships were built to sink other ships. The German ships were built not to be sunk themselves.

 

I think this has less to do with the fleet-in-being doctrine and much more to do with being the weaker naval power. A weaker naval power with the guerre-de-corse doctrine for example, would still rationally build its ships class for class with more emphasis on speed and protection at the expense of firepower compared with the RN, because any damage that reduced the mobility would likely result in the loss of the ship. Look at Dogger Bank. SMS Bluecher lagged behind and was sunk. HMS Lion had damage to machinery and IIRC had to be towed home. If the Bluecher had been with Beatty and Lion with Hipper, Bluecher would have survived and Lion would have been sunk even though Lion was superior to Bluecher in everything including protection.

 

Hojutsuka

[Guest aevans]

Tiornu,

 

Your position, as I understand it, please correct me where I am mistaken:

 

British shells underperformed at Jutland. Had British shells performed in action up to the standard that later models performed in trials, a number -- you stated three -- of German ships would have been sunk by shellfire.

 

My perception of your evidence:

 

British trials against the Baden.

 

German opinions about the performance of British shells, heard second hand from a neutral naval officer.

 

the fact that a single eight inch Japanese shell was remarkably effective in one instance, against the USS Boise.

 

Would you care to bring forward any other evidence, or, perhaps more useful, actually detail your impressions of the above, with specific commentary on why you think non-operational trials* and anecdote constitute overwhelming evidence?

 

(*Especially in light of the fact that British trials led to the shells they did have at Jutland, which they were satisfied with until they decided to believe rumor being passed around by a neutral third party.)

 

My position:

 

Improved British shells may have contributed to the sinking of more German ships, or they may not have, but coming down on one side or the other of that question is irresponsible.

 

My evidence:

 

British shells, which you characterize as underperforming, caused numerous casualties and contributed materially to the sinking of at one German dreadnought (Lutzow).

 

German shells, which you have not objected to being characterized as satisfactorily performing, were in one battle capable of causing a decisive propulsion casualty in Lion on a relatively small number of hits, while in another battle they were not able to render the same ship combat ineffective after many more hits.

 

Several other British dreadnoughts were hard hit at Jutland, yet, excluding the ones that were lost to what most agree to be human error, the worst thing that happened to any of them was to be forced fall out of line and head home for repairs.

 

Would you care to comment on how your Baden trials and anecdote stand up to the evidence of actual ships, loaded with actual men, ammunition, and fuel, actually fighting one another, and why your interpretation, based on your evidence, should be taken over one based on real events?

 

BTW, I haven't addressed it before, but I'll address your initial assertion on this thread now: it is incorrect. Fisher was quite clear that he expected the BCs to be fight less well armed opponents and run from equally or more heavily armed ones. This would have worked had the BCs managed to inhabit a world with no class equivalents. The British were quite shortsighted in believing that such a world would exist for very long after their BCs were introduced. In fact, they must have been on extremely good drugs where the BCs were concerned, considering the fact that they knew the Dreadnought would be immitated and were prepared for that.

 

The German BCs were designed to fight other battlecruisers not because that was the understood mission of all battlecruisers, but because the British BCs already existed when the German ones were planned. The Germans, IOW, built BCs to confront a reality, while the British built BCs to match their ideal of reality.

[Redbeard]

I really don't think this has to be so complicated - or emotional. Go and see John Campell's "Jutland, an analysis of the fighting" and count the number of heavy British hits on Germans ships that failed to penetrate and detonate properly. Then try, as an experiment of thought, to replace the actual shells with ones performing to the standard of the later Greenboy standards, and it now appears probable that the Germans would have lost 2-3 extra capital ships. This of course is based on an assumption that a heavy shell penetrating main armour and detonating does far more excessive damage (not necessarily blowing up) than a shell either breaking up, only partially penetrating or penetrating but not detonating. If anyone has evidence or even indications of this not being so, I would really like to hear.

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard