Battlecruisers

[Ken Estes]

Originally posted by Lev:

I don't think the Battlecruisers did too badly at Jutland. Sure a few suffered catastrophic explosions, which is of course not a good thing, but that seems to be more related to design failure than anything.

Also the BC were more handicapped by useless rounds than by lack of armour (the hits that caused the catastrophic explosions would not have been stopped by a thicker armor belt).

 

BCF shot fast and poorly, which was in the first their doctrine and in the second a reflection that no gunnery drill could be done out of Rosyth [which is why Hood's BCS went to Scapa before Jutland and 5th BCS was finally assigned to Beatty as comp.]. In order to fire fast, they violated their safety in handling the charges, leaving them all over the gunnery spaces, allowing the powder trains to carry into the magazines when turrets were hit. After the battle, the design of the powder hoists was declared faulty, in part to protect the guilty.

[TheSilentType]

Poor ammo handling had more to do with the losses at Jutland than any significant design flaw. Seydlitz was nearly lost for the same reason at the Dogger Bank, despite the supposed toughness of the German BCs. If the Germans hadn't changed their ammunition handling as a result of the nearly castastrophic hit on Seydlitz, some of their BCs might very well have shared the same fate as the lost British ships at Jutland.

 

Originally posted by Lev:

I don't think the Battlecruisers did too badly at Jutland. Sure a few suffered catastrophic explosions, which is of course not a good thing, but that seems to be more related to design failure than anything.

Also the BC were more handicapped by useless rounds than by lack of armour (the hits that caused the catastrophic explosions would not have been stopped by a thicker armor belt).

[Tiornu]

Just an observation: if we look at the labels, the number of battlecruisers sunk by battleships is equal to the number of battleships sunk by battlecruisers.

[Ken Estes]

Originally posted by Tiornu:

Just an observation: if we look at the labels, the number of battlecruisers sunk by battleships is equal to the number of battleships sunk by battlecruisers.

 

That piqued my curiosity. Tick 'em off, there can't that many. You must not be using Scharnhorst as a BC, and Kirishima too? I may have a brainlock, but I can't think of a BC sinking BB right now....!?

[Tiornu]

Both incidents involved Hood.

She was sunk by Bismarck.

She sank Bretagne.

One could well argue that Hood was herself a battleship rather than a battlecruiser, but that's why I specified looking at the labels. For the same reason, I can ignore the crushing of poor Kirishima, since she was officially labeled as a battleship at the time.

We can also note that the labels in all these incidents had nothing to do with the outcome. Bretagne was sunk because she was an old ship stuck in a harbor. Hood was sunk because she was an old ship fighting a brand new one. Kirishima was an old ship fighting two brand new ones. BB or BC made no difference.

[yak_v]

Originally posted by Tiornu:

"Germans didn't call their WW1 battlecruisers as battlecruisers?"

They continued to use the same designation as they had for their armored cruisers, "large cruisers." The Russian battlecruisers got past the paper phase, and a couple were launched and advanced enough to earn some attention by the Soviets. However, none reached completion.

 

Literal translation of the Russian terms for these ships are:

Pre-dreadnought - Bronenosets - Armorclad

Dreadnought - Lineynyi Korabl' - Ship of the line

Battlecruiser - Lineynyi Kreyser - Cruiser of the Line

 

Vladimir

[yak_v]

Originally posted by Ken Estes:

All big gun armament owed as much to the gunnery problems of firing three different calibers on the predreadnoughts. Since the Rus BBs at Tsushima were overloaded past design displacement, many had their thicker belt armor submerged. In any case the ends were 4-5". Most Rus hits were from the secondary batteries against the IJN ships. Battle range quickly fell to 3000 yds after opening at c.6400. Curiously, I have never seen data on penetration of the Tsushima ships, and Rus gunnery was pathetic there. Only the Orel and a few flatirons surrendered. What do we really know? What sank Oslyabya [visibly holed when she rolled over], Borodino [only 1 survivor], and Suvorov  [mortally wounded before the final torpedo]?

 

Russians shot pretty well in the opening hours of the battle (For example Mikasa was hit with 10 - 12", 22 - 6" and 8 light shells, all other ship were hit with 5-10 rounds), but russian shells sucked and they didn't have the desired effect.

 

As to the causes of the Russian ship deaths:

Kniaz Suvorov - All of the topside superstructure destroyed and on fire, but until hit by 3-4 torpedoes there were no visible problems with flotation (which would mean that waterline was mostly intact).

 

Borodino - 12" shell from Fuji penetrated secondary turret (armor 6") causing a magazine explosion.

by the hits). Borodino class

 

Imperator Alexandr III - Capsized after numerous hits, no survivors, no data as to why.

 

Orel - Survived 5 - 12", 2 - 10", 9 - 8", 39 - 6", 21 smaller caliber hits. Remained combat capable (but out of ammo). None of the armor over 6" was penetrated.

 

Oslyabia - Capsized after several hits to the bow (where there was only narrow 7" belt - which according to some accounts didn't get penetrated, but rather several armor plates were ripped off

Peresvet class

 

All of the other ships were damaged to various degrees, but none of them were life threatening.

 

Vladimir

 

 

[Edited by yak_v (18 Nov 2004).]

[Guest Sargent]

Originally posted by Ken Estes:

 

Hi Sergeant,Sargent, please Have you a copy of Andrew Gordon, The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command (London: John Murray, 1996 [paper 2002])? It is as essential as John Sumida in gunnery for understanding Jutland with the new research, as well as understanding how historians and other writers have allowed the Jellicoe or Beatty camps to color their analyses. He has also revealed appalling inaccuracies in logbooks, track charts and timekeeping in the official records. No, I don't have it.

 

Gordon convincingly shows that E-T, one of the leading signals experts in the RN, failed to conform to Beatty's movements, as BCF Orders required, and that VABCF (Beatty) might execute his flaghoists without waiting for all subordinates to acknowledge. The 'enemy in sight' signal from the Galatea went out on wireless at 0220, was copied throughout the fleet. The other two light cruiser squadrons turned toward the enemy w/o orders, also authorized in the BCFO. Barham's signalmen could not read Beatty's hoist, but the 'enemy in sight' and the turn by Lion should have been sufficient. Tiger ought to have repeated the hoist, but in any case, E-T's own flag captain and flag commander urged him to follow Beatty, but E-T insisted on a clear order. E-T thus remained on his reciprocal course, adding 20 yards/sec to the already poor position 5th BS had to act in its support mission. Murphy's Law was exacerbated by E-T to add over 7 minutes delay and 10 miles distance to what could have happened.

I don't know if this book you tout covers it, but the Grand Fleet was maneuvered by Jellicoe like a squad by a drill sgt. "Interpreting" orders was not in fashion. Evan-Thomas was coming from a rigid organization, and apparently was never informed by Beatty that the BCF was supposed to dash all over the place without orders.

Personally, I can see E-T wondering what was going on, if Beatty had a reason for not having 5th BS follow him, like Beatty was trying to maneuver so as to trap Hipper between two fires.

 

About the "run to the north" my understanding from several books is that Beatty's signal specified a column turn, not for E-T to "cut corners" to catch up. Again, the rigidity of the Grand Fleet's maneuvers would make someone like E-T prone to follow orders as received.

 

The "Turn to the North" was, as you say, signaled by Beatty, "turn 16 pts to starboard" [thus toward the enemy] in order to fall in behind VABCF[prolong the line]. The standard excuse is that 'orders are orders.' But Beatty had his hoist in the air before the two formations passed, and E-T dithered apparently 3 minutes after Lion's hoist was executed. Again, the intention of the VABCF was obvious, that the 5th BS not advance alone against the entire HSF, but instead to [finally] join Beatty, who next intended to turn across the HSF course. With a closing rate of 40 kts vs. the HSF, E-T thus closed the Germans c.4000 yds unnecessarily, lost his chance to rejoin the BCF, and invited the concnetrated fire of the best German battleships to concentrate on his ships in turn. Malaya turned 20 sec. early on her initiative, avoiding perhaps worse treatment than she could have, as tail end ship.

 

The problems of these signals and movements provide the jist of Gordon's study. I know you will enjoy it. Ken

 

I'll see if I can find it.

[Lev]

Originally posted by TheSilentType:

Poor ammo handling had more to do with the losses at Jutland than any significant design flaw. Seydlitz was nearly lost for the same reason at the Dogger Bank, despite the supposed toughness of the German BCs. 

 

The problem was that the powder hoist provided an open conduit between the fighting compartment and the magazine, that's a design flaw (excerbated by poor ammunition handling).

[Guest Sargent]

Originally posted by Lev:

The problem was that the powder hoist provided an open conduit between the fighting compartment and the magazine, that's a design flaw (excerbated by poor ammunition handling).

 

Actually, there were several doors in the ammo chain. The BCF left them open.

 

DK Brown examines the explosions in The Grand Fleet. He believes the biggest problem was overage and unstable cordite propellant. He notes that the Warrant Gunner in Lion had a fit when he found magazine crews had uncased propellant charges (they were kept in a flashproof case - with a "use by" date on the case) to speed up the rate of fire during gunnery practice and then were stuffing the charges back into any old case, making dating the cordite hopeless. He scrapped the lot and ordered a whole new cordite supply for Lion. It should be noted that Lion's Q turret burned out but the magazine did not explode. (There are several possible reasons for this, including that the shell hit ripped the turret roof open and allowed the flames to vent instead of building up pressure to detonation levels.)

 

Brown states that when the Grand Fleet got back to Scapa Flow, tons of outdated cordite were dumped over the side, indicating the fleet had woken up to the danger.

 

In 1917, HMS Vanguard blew up in port from a magazine explosion, very possibly due to unstable cordite.

[Fermi2]

Gordon in no way shape or form proved or advocated ET did anything of the sort. In fact Gordons main point throughout his excellent book was Grand Fleet Admirals were conditioned to follow signals and do as the Commander In Chief ordered, and not think independently.

 

Mike

[Guest aevans]

Another point to throw into the mix -- the German Derfflinger class BCs (Derfflinger, Lutzow) were as well armored as the British Iron Duke class BBs. Their other BCs were slightly less well armored, but still comparable to the Bellerophons and St. Vincents, except for somewhat thinner turrets and barbettes.* German BCs were in reality just fast battleships.

 

(*Which is not to say that this wasn't a problem, as Dogger Bank and Jutland both clearly demonstrated. If you were going to lose a BC, or come close to losing one, it wasn't going to be to a propulsion casualty -- even the thin-belted Brits didn't suffer decisive engine room hits -- or flooding -- though Seydlitz came close -- it was the result of turret and barbette hits.)

[Tiornu]

Derfflinger broadside: 7143 lbs

Iron Duke broadside: 14,000 lbs

There's more to the BB-BC distinction than just the armor.

[Guest Sargent]

Originally posted by Tiornu:

Derfflinger broadside: 7143 lbs

Iron Duke broadside: 14,000 lbs

There's more to the BB-BC distinction than just the armor.

 

Derfflinger: expert gunnery.

Iron Duke: who knows?

[Tiornu]

Hee! Are battleships designed for inexpert gunnery?

[Scott Cunningham]

Unstable cordite caused the loss of the Brit BB in WWI (in harbor) as well as the jap Mutsu in 1943 (and the USS Maine).

 

When a mag goes up, it is usually the powder, not the shells (they are pretty foolproof).

 

The US suffered a few catastrophes, mainly the two bad turret fires on the USS Mississippi, and later the Iowa. These were loading problems.

[Guest Sargent]

Originally posted by Scott Cunningham:

Unstable cordite caused the loss of the Brit BB in WWI (in harbor) as well as the jap Mutsu in 1943 (and the USS Maine).

 

When a mag goes up, it is usually the powder, not the shells (they are pretty foolproof).

 

Maine wasn't using cordite, she was using a variant of black powder (which is even more dangerous). ISTR reading something about testimony during an investigation that indicated there mighthave been a spontaneous combustion fire in a coal bunker next to the magazine. That could raise temperatures in the magazine to the detonation point. Maine's design with the turrets far out on the beam, meant that the magazines were surrounded by coal bunkers, while in ships with magazines on the centerline there was space between magazines and coal bunkers.

 

When Audacious sank after hitting a mine in 1914, she blew up as she capsized. Brown speculates that shells might have fallen out of their racks as she turned over and the shells detonated.

 

Pommern, the pre-Dreadnought lost at Jutland, blew up after being torpedoed in the vicinity of the 6.7" magazines. These were on the beam of the ship and the shells were stowed with fuzes pointing outwards. The torpedo probably detonated the shells.

 

So there are a couple of instances where the culprits are at least suspected of being shells rather than propellant. Of course shell fillings in those days weren't as stable as they are now...

[Scott Cunningham]

Good data

 

No idea about the Pommern. It just blew up and sank when the torpedo hit, and it was at night. Might have been the shells.

 

The Audacious was already going down. Tipping over all the shells in a mag is a good way to find out if something isn't secured right.

 

Barham blew up as well, but the smoke from that looked like a powder explosion.

 

I think the Yamato exploded as it went down also. Lots of smoke, so it was probably powder, not shells (although a shell explosion would surely blast the powder flats as well)

 

Just think about it though. You have to look at two major wars to find any evidence of shell explosions in magazines, but powder explosions are common.

[Guest aevans]

Originally posted by Tiornu:

Derfflinger broadside: 7143 lbs

Iron Duke broadside: 14,000 lbs

There's more to the BB-BC distinction than just the armor.

 

Broadside weight is way, way, way oversold as a decisive technical factor. All other things being equal, bigger shells guaranteed more armor penetration, not necessarily a vastly greater amount of damage per hit. The Germans were of the opinion that their smaller shells were still sufficient in both penetrative power and explosive force. (Yes, bigger shells had proportionally larger bursting charges, but the inverse square law rears it's ugly head to tell us that that didn't make that much difference in practice.) Additionally, their (marginal, but statistically significant) higher rates of fire would tend to get them on target quicker.

[Guest Sargent]

Originally posted by aevans:

Additionally, their (marginal, but statistically significant) higher rates of fire would tend to get them on target quicker.

 

Higher rate of fire is not all that meaningful, as you have to wait on the fire control even if the gun is loaded quickly.

 

Where the Germans had an edge was that their technique enabled them to find the range more quickly. They would shoot rapid, changing the elevation for each round until they got a staddle. Then they would settle down to deliberate fire once they had the range.

[Nick Sumner]

Where the Germans had an edge was that their technique enabled them to find the range more quickly.

 

But their shooting became more ragged because their fire control was too demanding for operators who were fatigued and probably frightened out of their wits. By contrast the British system was easier to use by the fatigued and frightened which is at least part of the explanation for the very accurate British shooting and the very poor German shooting in the last main fleet engagement just before dark.

Where Tiornu asks:

 

Are battleships designed for inexpert gunnery?

 

I think the answer should perhaps be ‘No but fire control systems should be.’

 

 

[Edited by Nick Sumner (22 Nov 2004).]

[Guest aevans]

Originally posted by Nick Sumner:

But their shooting became more ragged because their fire control was too demanding for operators who were fatigued and probably frightened out of their wits. By contrast the British system was easier to use by the fatigued and frightened which is at least part of the explanation for the very accurate British shooting and the very poor German shooting in the last main fleet engagement just before dark.

 

If you read the report of the Derfflinger's gunnery officer, it's pretty clear that German BC shooting went downhill for a much more obvious reason -- they were losing turrets and internal communications as a result of British fire. It's also pretty obvious, in the case of the Derfflinger, at least, that the British were not applying enough lead to their solutions, because almost all of the hits were distributed from the bridge aft, with the majority grouping in the vicinity of the C and D turrets.

 

[Edited by aevans (22 Nov 2004).]

[Tiornu]

Was German FC at Jutland any more demanding than the systems that became standard in most navies between the wars?

[Nick Sumner]

If you read the report of the Derfflinger's gunnery officer, it's pretty clear that German BC shooting went downhill for a much more obvious reason -- they were losing turrets and internal communications as a result of British fire.

 

I don’t doubt that too was a contributing factor. In the summary section of Campbell’s ‘Jutland- An analysis of the Fighting’ there are charts showing hits by caliber and by time. These seem to indicate that German shooting started good and got worse while British shooting started bad and got better. Part of this is certainly attributable to the fact that only the British BCs were initially engaged. Their shooting was much poorer than either the GF battleships or their opposite numbers.

 

It's also pretty obvious, in the case of the Derfflinger, at least, that the British were not applying enough lead to their solutions, because almost all of the hits were distributed from the bridge aft, with the majority grouping in the vicinity of the C and D turrets.

 

Again in Campbell there is a diagram of Derfflinger (pp 350 – 351) that contradicts this view. It shows hits from stem to stern (literally)

 

Was German FC at Jutland any more demanding than the systems that became standard in most navies between the wars?

 

Sorry Rich, I’ve no idea.

 

 

[Edited by Nick Sumner (22 Nov 2004).]

[Guest aevans]

I don’t doubt that too was a contributing factor. In the summary section of Campbell’s ‘Jutland- An analysis of the Fighting’ there are charts showing hits by caliber and by time. These seem to indicate that German shooting started good and got worse while British shooting started bad and got better. Part of this is certainly attributable to the fact that only the British BCs were initially engaged. Their shooting was much poorer than either the GF battleships or their opposite numbers.

 

Another factor is that the odds were initially even during the run to the South, started getting worse during the run to the north (though the Germans had things quite their own way against the Barham while 5th Battle Squadron engaged in reversing course), and became totally untenable during the main fleet engagement, especially for the BCs, which were ordered to engage the enemy closely (according to the Derfflinger's gunnery officer, the actual signal decoded as an order to attempt ramming, and in any case die fighting). Also, during the BC action, the British were silhouetted against the setting sun, while during the main fleet engagement, the Germans had this disadvantage, especially during the second go-round. I think the tactical factors quite adequately explain the timing and distribution of hits.

 

Again in Campbell there is a diagram of Derfflinger (pp 350 – 351) that contradicts this view. It shows hits from stem to stern (literally)

 

According to the diagram available to me, of apparently 34 marked hits, only seven were forward of the conning tower. Of these, three appear to be grouped around the A turret port side (the fourth in that part of the ship was a starboard side hit, making it an outlier of indeterminate origin and relevance) and the rest appear to be random. While there is a major grouping in the vicinity of the conning tower, there is also one around the C and D turrets, and a smaller but distinct one at the stern. Ships aiming at center mass might be expected to produce these results, but I'm pretty sure that the British had a habit of aiming at the enemy bridge.

 

 

Sorry Rich, I’ve no idea.

 

Excuse me, but you just got through saying:

 

"But their shooting became more ragged because their fire control was too demanding for operators who were fatigued and probably frightened out of their wits."

 

Sounds to me like you have a pretty firm opinion that the German fire control system was unusually demanding. In fact, though the German system was less well integrated than the British, it was not measurably more demanding in any real sense. In both navies, the director trained the guns in the direction of the desired target, and ranges were steadily taken in every turret. The major difference was that the Germans set elevations based on local ranges, instead of receiving that information from the central director, and they fired their guns under local control on voice command, instead of on remote control. It's hard to see how that was so much more stressful than what the British did, and it is arguable that since German range accuracy was dependent on four turret pointers, instead of one man in the fighting top, they had a better chance of getting hits, because they had three more chances per salvo for someone to be holding the right bead when the guns fired.