Battlecruisers

[Richard Lindquist]

Originally posted by ABNredleg:

The American Navy considered the Alaska class to be heavy cruisers since they were built to cruiser, rather than battleship, standards. 

 

There were also the Brit Courageous and Glorious (Outrageous and Spurious) battlecruisers which were briefly classified as "large light cruisers" after the war before being converted to aircraft carriers with the Courageous having a brief career as a minelayer whose launching rails earned her the nickname "Clapham Junction". The two ships made up the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron. There was also their near sister, the Furious, which was a never served as a cruiser, but which was completed as a hybrid carrier/cruiser before being rebuilt as a jackass carrier before being rebuilt as a carrier. These ships were Jackie Fisher's BC wet dreams carried to their ultimate absurdity.

[TheSilentType]

Weren't Fisher's Follies primarily designed to support his idea of an amphibious landing in the Baltic? In the end they were obviously a dumb concept, but they weren't meant to serve as regular battlecruisers. Renown and Repulse were somewhat closer to Fisher's idea of what a proper battlecruiser should be. Of course, their paper-thin armor horrified just about everyone else, so they were quickly rebuilt so that they wouldn't be complete deathtraps.

[Tiornu]

"Weren't Fisher's Follies primarily designed to support his idea of an amphibious landing in the Baltic?"

It now appears that the link between the the Baltic operation and the Curious class was entirely fictional, representing Fisher's effort to trick the powers-that-be into building them when they were simply intended to squash enemey light cruisers. So why the 15in guns? Good question!

 

"Germans didn't call their WW1 battlecruisers as battlecruisers?"

They continued to use the same designation as they had for their armored cruisers, "large cruisers." The Russian battlecruisers got past the paper phase, and a couple were launched and advanced enough to earn some attention by the Soviets. However, none reached completion.

 

"Armored cruisers didn't have exactly stellar record against battleships and battlecruisers in WW1, did they?"

No, they did as poorly as one would expect. Armored cruisers were even more obsolescent than pre-dreadnoughts. The leap from pre- to Dreadnought involved a single development in main battery, a unified layout. The leap from armored to battle cruiser was two-fold: unified and BB-caliber. So armored cruisers fell way behind the curve by 1914.

[Guest Sargent]

Originally posted by nemo:

Battlecruisers are much more expensive than battleships -- that

extra 5 knots takes about twice as much horsepower.  I submit that people won't spend that kind of money on something which is useless.

 

Aha, methinks I sense a Procurement Challenged Person. Militaries (any gov't agency) routinely spend vast sums on things which are useless.

 

It was more than just the machinery that made the BC so expensive, it was the greater size needed to accomodate the machinery, the extra personnel to operate it, and the extra fuel to feed it. Those extra 5 knots aren't going to do you much good if increased fuel consumption means your bunkers run dry after an hour...

[RETAC21]

Originally posted by Tiornu:

"Weren't Fisher's Follies primarily designed to support his idea of an amphibious landing in the Baltic?"

It now appears that the link between the the Baltic operation and the Curious class was entirely fictional, representing Fisher's effort to trick the powers-that-be into building them when they were simply intended to squash enemey light cruisers. So why the 15in guns? Good question!

 

One shot, One kill?

[Ol Paint]

Originally posted by nemo:

Don't knock the battlecruisers.

 

Although it is ideal to chase down commerce raiders or conduct raids, it's not the primary function of the battlecruisers.

 

In the days before radar and aircraft, battle cruiser serves vital function as heavy scout and scout destroyer. It's heavy enough to force through the screen of cruiser and destroyers or destroy scouting cruisers and destroyers.

 

Just think about what Jutland would be if one side did not have battlecruiser. If British did not have battle cruiser, High Sea Fleet could escape unharmed and the battle would never take place.  If German did not have battlecruisers, High Sea Fleet could be trapped and destroyed because Grand Fleet is faster and twice as powerful.

 

Battlecruisers are much more expensive than battleships -- that

extra 5 knots takes about twice as much horsepower.  I submit that people won't spend that kind of money on something which is useless.

 

 

 

Actually, that 5-10kts of speed (or much more, if we are comparing to the "standard" battleship at 21kts) would keep the BCs relevant in the carrier world. A 30-35kt BC or CB was much more useful than a 20-25kt BB due to its ability to keep up with the carriers (which needed speed for aviation operations). I get the impression that a major part of what "doomed" the BC concept wasn't the advent of aviation, but sufficiently compact machinery installations that permitted a fully protected vessel to make speed.

 

Douglas

[Ken Estes]

"In the beginning" Fisher just wanted battle cruisers for the battle line, fast and hardhitting. The fighting ranges of the turn of the century were not impressive and the Span-Am and Russo-Japanese War actions affirmed it. Since all armor could be penetrated at 4000 yds by 12" guns, why not build for power and speed? But by the time these ships began to emerge from the yards, the gunnery reforms and devices were permitting good results at 8-10,000 yards, and there armor plating could resist the projos, and the thin-skinned designs had to go in favor of the old balance. Fisher later hoped that the Pollen fire control system would allow the fast ship to dictate the range in the so-called 'zone of invulnerability' and use superior firepower to do the job. But the BB and the fast BB were here to stay. As noted below the Brits called them battle-cruisers, after an early 'supercruiser' (1905) term. The Queen Elizabeths began to relieve the battlecruiser force of the essential 'flying squadron' role in the battle line, and the Admiralty actually scheduled the battlecruiser squadron for disbandment in May 1915, but this was before the war broke out. In the end, the opposite happened, the Battlecuisers formed the BC Force, and the QEs even were attached to it temporarily while the 3rd BC Squadron went to Scapa for gunnery practice, sorties with the Grand Fleet for the Juitland Battle, and we all know what happened.

 

The early German term for the BC was Linienschiff Kruezer, from the battleship term, Linienschiff. At some point, I think post WWI, the term Schlachtschiff and Schlachtkruezer come into use. In any case, no German BC are built after 1918, the Scharnhorst class being rated as battleships.

[Guest Sargent]

Originally posted by RETAC21:

One shot, One kill?

 

 

With current FC, one shot = one miss. Salvoes were necessary for any chance of hitting with anything but a Golden BB.

 

Even if it hit, a 15" shell did not guarantee a kill, even on a DD-size target. Heavy shell would often go right through light ships without hitting enough resistance to initiante the fuze. And as with any other shell, exactly where it hit was vital.

[Tiornu]

Almost no main armor was penetrated successfully during the Russo-Japanese War, and it was the increasing battle ranges that made larger-caliber guns more desireable.

The "superior" speed of the QEs (maybe 3 knots) was found to be tactically insignificant.

I believe the first use of the term "battle cruiser" was in a Proceedings article c1903.

German battlecruisers were rated as Grosse Kreuzer, though there may have been some creep by "GK" into meaning "capital ship."

[Guest Sargent]

Originally posted by Tiornu:

Almost no main armor was penetrated successfully during the Russo-Japanese War, and it was the increasing battle ranges that made larger-caliber guns more desireable.

 

Nothing heavier than 9" was penetrated at Jutland, at least on the RN receiving end.

[Richard Lindquist]

Originally posted by Sargent:

With current FC, one shot = one miss. Salvoes were necessary for any chance of hitting with anything but a Golden BB.

 

Even if it hit, a 15" shell did not guarantee a kill, even on a DD-size target. Heavy shell would often go right through light ships without hitting enough resistance to initiante the fuze. And as with any other shell, exactly where it hit was vital.

 

 

Chances of hitting a fast light cruiser at 10,000 yards with a four gun 15" salvo from Courageous or Glorious were pretty small. Chances of doing it with a two gun 18" salvo from Furious were miniscule.

[Guest Sargent]

Originally posted by Richard Lindquist:

Chances of hitting a fast light cruiser at 10,000 yards with a four gun 15" salvo from Courageous or Glorious were pretty small.  Chances of doing it with a two gun 18" salvo from Furious were miniscule.

 

 

And as my 1919 Jane's pointed out, hitting one with one shot from a forward turret during a chase (usually they fired only one gun/turret at a time) was even less likely.

[Ken Estes]

Originally posted by Tiornu:

Almost no main armor was penetrated successfully during the Russo-Japanese War, and it was the increasing battle ranges that made larger-caliber guns more desireable.

The "superior" speed of the QEs (maybe 3 knots) was found to be tactically insignificant.

I believe the first use of the term "battle cruiser" was in a Proceedings article c1903.

German battlecruisers were rated as Grosse Kreuzer, though there may have been some creep by "GK" into meaning "capital ship."

 

All big gun armament owed as much to the gunnery problems of firing three different calibers on the predreadnoughts. Since the Rus BBs at Tsushima were overloaded past design displacement, many had their thicker belt armor submerged. In any case the ends were 4-5". Most Rus hits were from the secondary batteries against the IJN ships. Battle range quickly fell to 3000 yds after opening at c.6400. Curiously, I have never seen data on penetration of the Tsushima ships, and Rus gunnery was pathetic there. Only the Orel and a few flatirons surrendered. What do we really know? What sank Oslyabya [visibly holed when she rolled over], Borodino [only 1 survivor], and Suvorov [mortally wounded before the final torpedo]?

 

Battle Fleet speed at Jutland was 17 Kt cruising, ordered up to 20 when Jellicoe detached RAdm Hood to reinforce Beatty at 25 Kt. Beatty fought the BCF at 25 Kts, Evan-Thomas steamed the QEs of 5th Battle Squadron at 24. These are certainly tactically significant speeds, and only E-T's mishandling of the opening turns kept his ships from supporting Beatty in the first fight against Hipper. Despite superior speed, E-T risked losing one or more with his turn in sequence in range of the van of the High Seas Fleet.

 

Penetrations at Jutland? Something sank Luetzow, flooded Seydlitz with 2000 tons sea water, almost sank Derfflinger. Malaya took 2 12" hits below WL at fwd firerooms , took on a 4 degree list. Warspite fared even worse. In any case, these ships have varying belt thicknesses, none built on the all-or-nothing concept.

 

Never saw Grosse Kreuzer used, but I have not the right German sources at hand. Are you talking about 1914 usage or what the official histories of the 1920s used?

 

<font size=1>[Edited by Ken Estes (16 Nov 2004).]

 

[Edited by Ken Estes (16 Nov 2004).]

[Scott Cunningham]

The 'fast battleships' of the Warspite class were easily the best balanced European design of WWI. They had a great mix of everything, and served well in two wars. Even some of the follow on designs were nowhere near as good.

 

I think the US ships were also good designs, but never got into the fight, and all were only 20 knot ships.

[Guest Sargent]

Originally posted by Ken Estes:

These are certainly tactically significant speeds, and only E-T's mishandling of the opening turns kept his ships from supporting Beatty in the first fight against Hipper. Despite superior speed, E-T risked losing one or more with his turn in sequence in range of the van of the High Seas Fleet.]

 

Beg pardon, but Beatty screwed up the opening, not Evan-Thomas. Lion was notorious for poor signalling and her flag halyards being badly arranged, yet Beatty did all his signalling by flag, when he could have used signal lamps. In any case he should have made sure E-T got the order, instead of sailing off and leaving 5th BS on the wrong course.

 

As for the turn-away after the HSF was sighted, Beatty specifically ordered a column turn at that point.

 

Seems to me all Evan-Thomas is guilty of is being too diligent in obeying his CO's orders.

[TheSilentType]

Didn't Beatty do little or nothing to coordinate plans with the 5th BS before they sailed? From what I can remember he was always pushing Jellicoe to have the Queen Elizabeths support him, but once he got the ships he couldn't seem to bother that they were used properly.

[DesertFox]

One question I have is on the construction of battlecruisers.

Why didn't anyone consider reducing firepower for greater armor while keeping the speed, effectively creating a early fast battleship. My thinking is based on the idea of using the Iron Duke, Orion, Arkansas, or New York basic hull and removing the middle turret(s) and using that tonnage for additional propulsion. Why did no-one seem to follow that direction of planning?

[Ken Estes]

Originally posted by Sargent:

Beg pardon, but Beatty screwed up the opening, not Evan-Thomas. Lion was notorious for poor signalling and her flag halyards being badly arranged, yet Beatty did all his signalling by flag, when he could have used signal lamps. In any case he should have made sure E-T got the order, instead of sailing off and leaving 5th BS on the wrong course.

 

As for the turn-away after the HSF was sighted, Beatty specifically ordered a column turn at that point.

 

Seems to me all Evan-Thomas is guilty of is being too diligent in obeying his CO's orders.

 

 

Hi Sergeant, Have you a copy of Andrew Gordon, The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command (London: John Murray, 1996 [paper 2002])? It is as essential as John Sumida in gunnery for understanding Jutland with the new research, as well as understanding how historians and other writers have allowed the Jellicoe or Beatty camps to color their analyses. He has also revealed appalling inaccuracies in logbooks, track charts and timekeeping in the official records.

 

Gordon convincingly shows that E-T, one of the leading signals experts in the RN, failed to conform to Beatty's movements, as BCF Orders required, and that VABCF (Beatty) might execute his flaghoists without waiting for all subordinates to acknowledge. The 'enemy in sight' signal from the Galatea went out on wireless at 0220, was copied throughout the fleet. The other two light cruiser squadrons turned toward the enemy w/o orders, also authorized in the BCFO. Barham's signalmen could not read Beatty's hoist, but the 'enemy in sight' and the turn by Lion should have been sufficient. Tiger ought to have repeated the hoist, but in any case, E-T's own flag captain and flag commander urged him to follow Beatty, but E-T insisted on a clear order. E-T thus remained on his reciprocal course, adding 20 yards/sec to the already poor position 5th BS had to act in its support mission. Murphy's Law was exacerbated by E-T to add over 7 minutes delay and 10 miles distance to what could have happened.

 

The "Turn to the North" was, as you say, signaled by Beatty, "turn 16 pts to starboard" [thus toward the enemy] in order to fall in behind VABCF[prolong the line]. The standard excuse is that 'orders are orders.' But Beatty had his hoist in the air before the two formations passed, and E-T dithered apparently 3 minutes after Lion's hoist was executed. Again, the intention of the VABCF was obvious, that the 5th BS not advance alone against the entire HSF, but instead to [finally] join Beatty, who next intended to turn across the HSF course. With a closing rate of 40 kts vs. the HSF, E-T thus closed the Germans c.4000 yds unnecessarily, lost his chance to rejoin the BCF, and invited the concnetrated fire of the best German battleships to concentrate on his ships in turn. Malaya turned 20 sec. early on her initiative, avoiding perhaps worse treatment than she could have, as tail end ship.

 

The problems of these signals and movements provide the jist of Gordon's study. I know you will enjoy it. Ken

[Archie Pellagio]

The only area you can fault Lion/beatty for with signals was Seymore, beatty's flag lieutenant. He buggered up after the scarbourough raid, he buggered up at dogger bank and he buggered up twice at Jutland.

 

The intended role of the battlecruisers ie the "I" class, was to "Lick up armoured cruisers like an armadillo in an anthill" according to Jackie Fisher.

 

The problem is when you combine a personality like Beatty, with the culture prevalent in the royal navy at the time, especially after the court-martial of Troubridge for not engaging Goeben, (Case in point Craddock at Coronel) they're going to get used as fast-light-battleships, a role which they are not.

 

 

A personality like Beatty would've been superb commanding a squadron of Queen Elizabeth type super-dreadnoughts, but when they were put in with the Battle cruiser sqdn, presumably to give the sqdn a complete superiority over Hipper, the lightly armoured BC's were then forced to act as mini-BB's, and just look at what happened at jutland, handling/procedural errors or not, a similar result was inevitable.

 

As for speed, in WWI you have to remember they were all coal burners, thus a theoretical top speed, is largely irrelevent, because you have to factor efficiency into it, which grows expenentionally with speed, and the BC's were far more efficient. And once you factor in condenser wear suddenly you're meagre difference can be as much as 7-8kts, and given they'll be a significant distance apart to start with, that might as wel be half way to the moon.

[Tiornu]

"Never saw Grosse Kreuzer used, but I have not the right German sources at hand."

Groner has the official rating for all these ships at the time of being ordered, and he also mentions occasions when ratings were changed (for example, armored ships to heavy cruisers). The designation of Large Cruiser was carried over from the armored cruisers (including Blucher).

[RETAC21]

Originally posted by DesertFox:

One question I have is on the construction of battlecruisers.

Why didn't anyone consider reducing firepower for greater armor while keeping the speed, effectively creating a early fast battleship. My thinking is based on the idea of using the Iron Duke, Orion, Arkansas, or New York basic hull and removing the middle turret(s) and using that tonnage for additional propulsion. Why did no-one seem to follow that direction of planning?

 

I think that's precisely what was done: Check the Invincibles vs. Dreadnought, and all classes thereafter, but lower caliber means much less hitting power and you also need to reduce armor to achieve speed. OTOH, IIRC, lack of armor wasn't what killed the British battlecruisers, and the punishment Lutzow suffered would have finished a BB too.

[Bob Lyle]

As Jackie Fisher intened it, the Battlecruisers sole purpose was to fight cruisers. They were fast and heavily armed to win the information battle with the generalized cruisers other Navies used as scouting forces. No cruisers could stand up to them and no BBs could catch them.

 

Because these ships were as big and heavily armed as a small battleship, the temptation to use them that way was irresistable. Thus Jutland and the Hood.

[Lev]

Originally posted by Luke_Yaxley:

The problem is when you combine a personality like Beatty, with the culture prevalent in the royal navy at the time, especially after the court-martial of Troubridge for not engaging Goeben, (Case in point Craddock at Coronel) they're going to get used as fast-light-battleships, a role which they are not.

 

[..] and just look at what happened at jutland, handling/procedural errors or not, a similar result was inevitable.

 

I don't think the Battlecruisers did too badly at Jutland. Sure a few suffered catastrophic explosions, which is of course not a good thing, but that seems to be more related to design failure than anything.

Also the BC were more handicapped by useless rounds than by lack of armour (the hits that caused the catastrophic explosions would not have been stopped by a thicker armor belt).

[Ken Estes]

Originally posted by Tiornu:

"Never saw Grosse Kreuzer used, but I have not the right German sources at hand."

Groner has the official rating for all these ships at the time of being ordered, and he also mentions occasions when ratings were changed (for example, armored ships to heavy cruisers). The designation of Large Cruiser was carried over from the armored cruisers (including Blucher).

 

Thanks, I finally caught that. Ken

[Tiornu]

"Why didn't anyone consider reducing firepower for greater armor while keeping the speed, effectively creating a early fast battleship."

If you check the battlecruisers as they matured into WWI, you'll see they already had a reduced armament. The typical BC had less firepower and protection but more size and speed than a BB.

 

"As Jackie Fisher intened it, the Battlecruisers sole purpose was to fight cruisers."

I think you've missed the fundamental point here, that the commonly held idea about BCs never being meant to fight BBs is totally inaccurate. They were indeed meant to fight battleships just as armored cruisers had been intended to fight battleships.

 

"Because these ships were as big and heavily armed as a small battleship, the temptation to use them that way was irresistable. Thus Jutland and the Hood."

The BCs at Jutland were not used as BBs, and not one BC at Jutland was sunk by a BB. Attributing Hood's loss to the fact that she wore the BC label misses the point. She was not sunk because she was a BC--in fact, Hood was arguably the most heavily protected ship in the RN at the time she commissioned--she was sunk because she was unmodernized. An "R" class battleship would have been in the same "boat" in a duel against a modern opponent.