Chamberlain or Churchill

[Guest SILL]

Originally posted by JohnB:

Alan Brooke's ideas were to clear Africa, invade Italy and make the Med an Allied lake before the invasion of France.

 

Well strategy that certainly defined dilly dallying around rather than getting to the job at hand.

Africa - cut off and ignore

Italy - irrelevant

Med - nice to control but essential to defeating Germany? Hardly.

[Ken Estes]

Originally posted by Tim the Tank Nut:

Ken, my frustration with your posting style just keeps me coming back.  For a trained historian with impeccable credentials you make unsupportable statements.  The quickest two I can come up with are the great Hitler and Germany was just on the coast, no big deal.  Even after I called you on both of those you breezily jetted along to other, less controversial topics.  Since you discredit MHQ as pop history that confirms another of my reasons that your posting style is frustrating.  You are an elitist historian.  That means if it isn't primary it doesn' count and history you don't agree with is "inaccurate" or "revisionist".  In fact we just had a thread a while back that covered the value of continuing research and the "big picture" information that comes with it.  Quoting an MHQ article does not discredit me or my position.  In fact, your assertion that I am "losing it" seems to come after your positions in this thread have been eroded pretty completely.  While I regret the tone of the discussion to a degree I also won't run from a good honest argument. 

 

To reiterate my position so it will be clear to you:

Winston Churchill was a better man than Neville Chamberlain.  Churchill's service to his nation assisted in the survival of Britain during WW2.  Chamberlain held the same position before Churchill and left Britain "naked in the dark".  Churchill's determination and tenacity became the spark which kept Britain in the war.  His unwillingness to compromise with Adolf Hitler's Germany almost certainly was THE reason Germany's Nazis were destroyed by war as opposed to being "contained" by a political settlement.  Chamberlain supported diplomacy with no threat of war to back it up.  Churchill supported any means necessary including war to deal with the threat.  Winston Churchill's tenacity was the key.  That same type of tenacity is what is required to end the Islamic terror threat.

 

Footnote:

This is note a backtrack of my position.  This is as clear as I can make it.  It is what I think, therefore an opinion.  I believe the weight of fact sides completely with my opinion.  Certainly, history does (pop or otherwise).  The fact that I have to add a footnote to insure your understanding of what I am saying and prevent my words from being twisted is unfortunate.  Perhaps you could post in a short paragraph your assertion that Churchill was NOT a substantial factor in the outcome of the war, or clarify how history was wrong in its condemnation of Chamberlain as a leader.

*********************

Dear Tim, I will give you the complete answer you seem to want, although nobody, including myself, has a natural right to have everything answered or all his claims credited on this or any other bulletin board.

 

Your charge that I am an 'elitist historian' begs the Q of why I would therefore expose myself to the fairly frequent hazing and namecalling on this thread or FFZ. I have never seen so much "Snip 'n' Snark" regarded as real dialogue, but it comes with the general behavior pattern, I guess. You don't see the likes of Wick Murray here, or even Steve Zaloga, who makes a living off of his writing and therefore needs to appeal to TN people. The 'elitist' charge, like 'liberal,' is unwarranted in civil discourse. You don't know me or anything about me, so why say these things?? You don't see me doing it, I don't even call you by the last word in your TN moniker, hmmmm?

 

I am 57 years old, so I have no real posting style, but if I did, it would not change for you. Maybe your problem is your reponse to it. Note how you claim that it is your 'frustration' that keeps you coming back. I made no post between your 12:26 and 21:34 posts, so let's leave your frustration as just that.

 

If your idea of an 'unsupportable statement' is one where I do not respond to all the [almost inevitable in FFZ] cheap jibes, then I will remain just so. In your case, let's go: Hitler as a "great" figure in the 20th Century - an arrogant elitist would simply tell you to look up the 15 or so definitions of 'great' that have nothing to do with 'best' or superior in quality. It's not like saying the Beetles' Greatest Hits, is it? So if you want me to say, Hitler, Stalin, Mao and other unsavories were 'major' figures of the 20th Century, I will also do that, but don't bother to correct my usage of "great," it is simply accurate. Only you were trying to say that Churchill is 'a better man' than Chamberlain, but that is like saying Monty was a 'better' general than Slim, and nobody but an amateur would ever play such games, totally devoid of context. You'll not see Wick Murray doing that.

 

Germany at the doorstep: well many of us are still uncertain whether Fall Seeloewe was real or a feint covering Barbarossa, at least in Hitler's mind. In any case, the German Army on the wrong side of the channel was a danger, but not a disaster, any more than various French and Spanish armies have been when there. There was little chance that the RAF would lose air control over England/Ireland, as the Luftwaffe could not even range into the Midlands with escorts. Murray is a German and Luftwaffe historian, not a Churchill scholar, and will verify this readily. So the Royal Navy was never going to have to fight without air support, and a German success was not likely, Hitler himself shying from the risks. By the way, it is doubful that large units like KG V would have entered the Channel, or been necessary there; the major [greater] units would have been reserved for meeting the Kriegsmarine at sea.

 

A lot of this stuff is like the myth of Singapore's guns facing the wrong way. Actually, they did not all, but the big guns did have mostly AP and fired their small HE stores off early in the battle. We professionals learn in grad school not how much we know, but how much we do not, and may never, know.

 

I did not diss' MHQ, I merely pointed out that Murray was doing a quick pop essay, not original research, and not getting into the weeds of when and where Churchill did not measure up to his own high opinion of himself.

 

"Breezily jetted along" -- you are in a snit, huh? I won't even ask for proof.

 

Unlike your pals on FFZ, I do not consider others in the thread my 'opponents' as you often see written. So, Tim, I certainly am not trying to defeat you and certainly don't see myself in contention either. Sometime, you and others will have to understand what Discourse is, and being civil will prove a big assist. It may be useless in FFZ though, where rudeness is praised.

 

I find there is little to do with your last para. It does not correspond to the thrust of your opening statement on 1938, which is where this started. Churchill has received plenty of honors regarding 1940-45, but he was not 'better' than anybody or everybody else. The one thing that has always impressed me about the SWW is its vastness; simply beyond the play of any single character. Nor was WSC always right, and his insistence that he was got him into trouble and did at times complicate British strategy. Nobody can even be clear that he was the essential man for Britain to survive 1940 and end up on the winning side. These are imponderables that you and others are free to game. Chamberlain, for his part, did lead the govt and manage the budget in the 1930s, when Churchill had responsibility for nothing. History is a lot kinder with him now, and we now know a lot more than we used to, or appears in the high school textbooks about the Little Man with the Umbrella: Britain was deliberately brought to a level of preparedness by Sept 39, from a time when the Oxford Oath [and others] showed widespread pacifism resident in the UK [as in the US]. Even then, it was a close-run thing, and the entry of the US into the war apparently had Churchill falling on his knees getting very religeous for a moment. That's enough for now, right? We don't want to act like this is FFZ and spit at each other, do we.

 

Cheers, Ken

[Guest SILL]

Originally posted by BillB:

Well as I think he served as an infantry officer on the Western Front, I don't think Chamberlain can have been all that spineless. I beleive he exchanged trench maps with Hitler at one point. I suspect he is the opposite of Churchill in the sense he was perhaps the right man at the wrong time. After all, if he had been dealing with a more rational individual than the amoral proto-terrorist Hitler, we might be hailing him as a hero for saving the world from a world war with his peace in our time thing.

 

all the best

 

BillB

 

???? Hardly Was age 45 in 1914

From: http://www.bartleby.com/65/ch/ChamberlN.html

(Arthur Neville Chamberlain), 1869–1940, British statesman; son of Joseph Chamberlain and half brother of Sir Austen Chamberlain. The first half of his career was spent in business and, after 1911, in the city government of Birmingham, of which he became lord mayor in 1915. In 1917 he was director of national service, supervising conscription, and the following year, at the age of 50, he was elected to Parliament as a Conservative.

 

Chamberlain = Kerry

Works for me

[JohnB]

Originally posted by SILL:

Well strategy that certainly defined dilly dallying around rather than getting to the job at hand.

Africa - cut off and ignore

Italy - irrelevant

Med - nice to control but essential to defeating Germany?  Hardly.

 

 

Yup, go for Germany by attacking where they are strongest, preferably flinging in the British first.

[Tim the Tank Nut]

Deal Ken,

We'll just have to agree to disagree. My rose colored glasses are such a different shade than yours that we just don't see things in the same light. I read what you and I have both written and you read what you and I have both written and we get completely different results. Since there isn't any common ground between us we'll just have to come down on opposite sides of the fence.

[JohnB]

Originally posted by Ox:

Dumb question but why didn't the CW forces advance along it?

 

 

Yes that is a dumb question

[Guest SILL]

Originally posted by JohnB:

And how much experience did Brooke's US counterpart, George Marshall have of war? A brief stint as a staff officer at 1st US Division in 1918.

 

George Catlett Marshall

-was commissioned a second lieutenant, February 1902, and served with the 30th Infantry in the Philippines, 1902-1903, and at Fort Reno, 1903-1906

-was promoted to first lieutenant, March 1907

-at Fort Leavenworth, graduated from the Infantry and Cavalry School (1907) and was a student (1908) and instructor (1908-1910) at the Staff College

-was inspector-instructor of the Massachusetts National Guard, 1911-1912, then served with the 4th Infantry at Forts Logan H. Roots and Crocket, and the 13th Infantry in the Philippines, 1913-1916

-was promoted to captain, July 1917, and then to temporary major, August 1917, lieutenant colonel, January 1918, and colonel, August 1918

-served with the American Expeditionary Forces in France as operations officer of the 1st Division and the First Army, and chief of staff of the VIII Corps, 1917-1918, participating in the Cantigny, Aisne-Marne, St. Mihiel, and Meuse-Argonne operations

-was aide to General John J. Pershing, 1919-1924

-was promoted to permanent major, July 1920, and lieutenant colonel, August 1923

-commanded the 15th Infantry in China, 1924-1927

 

was instructor at the Army War College, 1927, and assistant commandant of the Infantry School at Fort Benning, 1927-1932

[Colin Williams]

I've done some background reading on this the past few days, and I haven't come up with anything to contradict the following.

 

1. Although there are arguments to support the appeasement route, most notably the idea that appeasement could buy time for rearmament, the record is clear that the Chamberlain government did not accelerate rearmament during the period when appeasement was threatening to fail (from the Anschluss through the occupation of Czechoslovakia).

 

2. The rearmament that was started during the Baldwin government and continued under Chamberlain was less than adequate, particularly with respect to the British Army.

 

3. The Chamberlain government failed to grasp any of the many opportunities to confront or isolate Hitler through multinational action.

 

4. Baldwin at least had the excuse of thinking that the Nazis might serve as a tool to oppose Bolshevism. Chamberlain seems to have been completely lacking in any interest in or aptitude for international power politics. He was a politician with a complete focus on domestic issues, something relatively unusual for the British PM. In addition, up to the very beginning of the war, he continued to believe that Hitler did not want war and could be dealt with through diplomacy.

 

5. The Chamberlain government failed to come up with a stategy for any potential war and consequently their rearmament program overlooked some important strategic realities. Perhaps the most egregious being that they spent years pretending that Britain would not need to send another BEF to the continent, of course ensuring that when war threatened and the need for a BEF became clear, Britain was unprepared to send one.

 

6. A critical examination of the Chamberlain government's war management from September, 1939 to May, 1940 reveals a sorry story of incoherence and incompetence at both the senior political and military levels.

 

7. Although Churchill had many faults, as PM he provided invaluable energy and determination to the war effort. He was also clear on the critical need to bring both the USSR and the USA into the war. He never overruled his professional military subordinates, and his worst ideas could always be turned aside by strong opposition. To his credit he appointed strong-willed, highly competent men to senior military positions. He badgered and criticized the service chiefs, but often for good reason. Churchill's active war leadership served to balance FDR's relatively ignorant, hands-off approach. Finally, Churchill's wartime leadership, for all its faults, stands head and shoulders above the performance of Asquith and Lloyd George during WW1.

[Ken Estes]

Originally posted by Ox:

Dumb question but why didn't the CW forces advance along it?

 

 

Not dumb; they did, but late.

 

Jon Latimer, Alamein, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004 [in hardback 2002], one of the better new books on the SWW shows that the 8th Army was muddled after Alamein, where several battle plans went badly and improvisation left many divisions across each others' LC. The infantry, sappers, antitank, artillery and tank units made epic contributions, but this was an army not yet capable of combined arms operations. So sorting out a new force for a pursuit took awhile.

 

There is also the problem of the Italians. They are almost always disparaged and the Germans promoted by Anglo and German writers, because it is utter Hell for the British Army to admit that several of their defeats came at the hands of Italian troops. So authors tend to emphasize the German successes and Italian misdeeds to excess. Sadly, no writers have returned to the original records, vice the official histories, to get to the bottom of this problem. Here as elsewhere, the reader will not learn of the rescue of the Afrika Korps by Italian divisions at Gazala or the sacrifice of the Ariete and Littorio Divisions holding the British at Fuka until late on 5 November 1942, enabling Rommel the ‘Fox’ to break contact with the cautious Monty at the end of the Alamein battle.

[BillB]

Originally posted by Ox:

  It was by Paxman and the other bloke who wrote A hihger Form of Killing but the book's and the coauthor's name escape me just now.

 

No, that must be a different one, Ox. I've just dug my copy out and Paxman is not involved, and the TV docu was not a BBC production either. Book details: Peter Williams and David Wallace, Unit 731: The Japanese Army's Secret of Secrets (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1989). The TV docu was put out by a regional independent network, TVS (TV South)

 

I saw an interesting programme on one of the satellite tely channes about German soldiers who were caught by the Japanese inWW1. They were treated very much as guests in Japan and a number settled in Japan after the war. this was due to a edict by the emporer in 1870 something telling Imperial forces to treat enemies with respect. I missed about half the programme looking at why the change post war. <font size=1>[Edited by Ox (28 Oct 2004).]

 

Yes, I saw that when it first came out and might have a copy kicking about somewhere. Can't remember much about it more than you say, which leads me to suspect that it did not contain anything earth shakingly original.

 

all the best

 

BillB

 

 

 

[Edited by BillB (28 Oct 2004).]

[Paul F Jungnitsch]

Originally posted by Ken Estes:

Here as elsewhere, the reader will not learn of the rescue of the Afrika Korps by Italian divisions at Gazala or the sacrifice of the Ariete and Littorio Divisions holding the British at Fuka until late on 5 November 1942, enabling Rommel the ‘Fox’ to break contact with the cautious Monty at the end of the Alamein battle.

 

The Italians do tend to get a raw deal, PR-wise, every once and a while something comes up where Italians units literally fight themselves to destruction.

 

Much like the French. We had a good thread on that a while ago. German casualities in the Battle of France were actually pretty high.

[BillB]

Originally posted by SILL:

????  Hardly Was age 45 in 1914

From:  http://www.bartleby.com/65/ch/ChamberlN.html

(Arthur Neville Chamberlain), 1869–1940, British statesman; son of Joseph Chamberlain and half brother of Sir Austen Chamberlain. The first half of his career was spent in business and, after 1911, in the city government of Birmingham, of which he became lord mayor in 1915. In 1917 he was director of national service, supervising conscription, and the following year, at the age of 50, he was elected to Parliament as a Conservative.

 

Good catch SILL, that will teach me to go on memory. I'm sure it was him that swapped trench maps with Hitler, alto I can't find the reference. I wonder if he visited the trenches in some capacity?

 

Trouble is you then spoiled it with this particularly dumb comparison:

 

Chamberlain = Kerry

Works for me

 

Your rather selective editing conveniently missed this bit from the on-line encyclopaedia entry:

 

During the 1930s, Chamberlain’s professed commitment to avoiding war with Hitler resulted in his controversial policy of “appeasement,” which culminated in the Munich Pact (1938). Although contemporaries and scholars during and after the war criticized Chamberlain for believing that Hitler could be appeased, recent research argues that Chamberlain was not so naive and that appeasement was a shrewd policy developed to buy time for an ill-prepared Britain to rearm. After Germany’s invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1939, he pledged military support to Poland and led Britain to war in September. After the British debacle in Norway, he was forced to resign in May, 1940. He was lord president of the council under Winston Churchill until Oct., 1940, and died a few weeks later.

 

Rather undermines your point, I think.

 

all the best

 

BillB

[Colin Williams]

Originally posted by Ken Estes:

There is also the problem of the Italians. They are almost always disparaged and the Germans promoted by Anglo and German writers, because it is utter Hell for the British Army to admit that several of their defeats came at the hands of Italian troops...Here as elsewhere, the reader will not learn of...the sacrifice of the Ariete and Littorio Divisions holding the British at Fuka until late on 5 November 1942, enabling Rommel the ‘Fox’ to break contact with the cautious Monty at the end of the Alamein battle.

 

Most of the "new" Alamein writing is simply recycled. From Carver's "El Alamein", published in 1962 -

 

"Soon after a large enemy column was sighted, to which Roberts gave chase...At one o'clock the opposition slackened and Roberts turned south a bit before making west again. Six miles further on more tanks and guns were met and the battle resumed. It went on until dark, by which time Ariete, to whose gallantry Rommel paid tribute, was completely encircled and totally destroyed. Roberts' brigade had destroyed 29 Italian tanks and taken 450 prisoners, losing only one light tank of its own and having practically no casualties....Custance had started off at six...After a brush with a fair-sized enemy column fleeing west, they reached Galal without opposition and took up a battle position astride the road and railway facing east. Soon afterwards a column came along which was dealt with by 3rd Royal Tanks. Just before mid-day enemy tanks were seen to be approaching from the east. As they came near more tanks, Italian M13s, several guns and a larger number of lorries were seen to be following. Unsuspecting they made no attempt to deploy and ran headlong into the devastating fire of the whole brigade. They were completely destroyed and it was all over within an hour; 29 Italian and 14 German tanks, 4 guns, 100 lorries and 1,000 prisoners were accounted for; 11 more tanks and many more vehicles were later found abandoned a little further south. This was a most satisfying haul, and it was probable that it was all that remained of de Stefani's XX Mobile Corps."

 

Carver, somewhat surprisingly for 1962, was also clear in setting blame for the botched pursuit in Monty's lap for upsetting command arrangements at the corps level just as the pursuit started. The chance to catch Rommel came and went before the rains bogged down the pursuit. Later studies reveal that Lumsden's difficult behavior played a role in Monty's mistaken decisions, but nonetheless Monty was responsible as Army commander. Finally, it should be noted that the Axis forces set several road blocks along the coast road. The only way to pursue effectively at first was by making flanking moves through the desert.

[Guest Sargent]

Originally posted by JohnB:

And how much experience did Brooke's US counterpart, George Marshall have of war? A brief stint as a staff officer at 1st US Division in 1918.

Remember the first time US forces fought the Germans on a large scale, they got their arses soundly kicked only being saved by Rommel's bungling.

 

You know, that's what I love about you. Resort to the attack on somebody irrelevant to deflect attention from your hopeless position and monomaniacal Anglophilia. What exactly does Marshall have to do with a discussion on Churchill and Brooke?

 

And somehow you UK types always crow about Kasserine - a battle US forces WON, even though they had been left in exposed positions by a British general, Anderson - who was always withdrawing troops from US units and loaning them to French and British units. I also love the Brit sneering ("they are in no way soldiers" - Alexander) about US performance in Tunisia when performance of British troops in 1st Army was worse. BTW, Kasserine is also irrelevant to the discussion at hand.

 

You really should try some sources besides "God is an Englishman."

[Ken Estes]

Originally posted by Colin Williams:

Most of the "new" Alamein writing is simply recycled. From Carver's "El Alamein", published in 1962 -

 

"Soon after a large enemy column was sighted, to which Roberts gave chase...At one o'clock the opposition slackened and Roberts turned south a bit before making west again. Six miles further on more tanks and guns were met and the battle resumed. It went on until dark, by which time Ariete, to whose gallantry Rommel paid tribute, was completely encircled and totally destroyed. Roberts' brigade had destroyed 29 Italian tanks and taken 450 prisoners, losing only one light tank of its own and having practically no casualties....Custance had started off at six...After a brush with a fair-sized enemy column fleeing west, they reached Galal without opposition and took up a battle position astride the road and railway facing east. Soon afterwards a column came along which was dealt with by 3rd Royal Tanks. Just before mid-day enemy tanks were seen to be approaching from the east. As they came near more tanks, Italian M13s, several guns and a larger number of lorries were seen to be following. Unsuspecting they made no attempt to deploy and ran headlong into the devastating fire of the whole brigade. They were completely destroyed and it was all over within an hour; 29 Italian and 14 German tanks, 4 guns, 100 lorries and 1,000 prisoners were accounted for; 11 more tanks and many more vehicles were later found abandoned a little further south. This was a most satisfying haul, and it was probable that it was all that remained of de Stefani's XX Mobile Corps."

i]

 

 

Yet, the part you cite was after the main engagement, as reported in the NZ official history:

 

"The first clash with the enemy's new line came in the middle of the morning when 22 Armoured Brigade, leading 7 Armoured Division, had travelled some miles down the Rahman Track from Aqqaqir and then turned to the west. At the turn it came under 88-millimetre fire. As the brigade halted to deal with this fire, the divisional commander, Harding, ordered the rest of his column to keep going further south and swing round 22 Brigade's left flank. However, it soon become clear that the division was up against an extensive line of tanks backed by numerous guns, too strong to rush and too dangerous to leave menacing the division's line of advance. Harding therefore called up his field and anti-tank guns and settled down to a long-range duel. This enemy force seems to have been mainly the 100 or so tanks of Ariete Division with 20 Corps' artillery, including some 88s, to back them up. There may also have been a few surviving tanks of Trieste, while the seventeen tanks left to Littorio and positioned on 15 Panzer Division's right flank were possibly drawn into the battle. Numerous parties of Italian infantry as well as some of 164 Division, in process of re-forming before being distributed among the panzer formations, were also caught up in the battle. When Ariete reported the engagement to Africa Corps, a battalion group was sent by 15 Panzer Division to fill the gap between its right flank and the Italians. The role of 20 Italian Corps was to guard the Panzer Army's right flank against encirclement and, according to the German records, Rommel was at first confident that, with over 100 tanks, the Italians would fulfil their task.

 

 

During this afternoon, 22 Armoured Brigade continued its action against the Italian 20 Corps until dark but it is hard to say how this battle really went. The German records, including Rommel's own account, give the impression that Ariete Division, fighting gallantly to the last tank, was completely surrounded and annihilated. Yet 22 Armoured Brigade claimed only 29 tanks destroyed and 450 prisoners, against a loss of one tank and a few casualties, while events next day indicate that quite a large part of the Italian force managed to disengage overnight. The Italian stand at least deterred 10 Corps from the encircling movement Lumsden had proposed and allowed Africa Corps an unimpeded withdrawal overnight."

 

So the muddled picture continues.

[Colin Williams]

Originally posted by Ken Estes:

Yet, the part you cite was after the main engagement, as reported in the NZ official history...

 

So the muddled picture continues.

 

True, althought that is part of the reason why I included the second engagement in my quote, as one has to wonder where the other 29+ Italian tanks came from if not Ariete. I think part of the answer lies in the definition of "destroyed". Presumably Ariete ceased to function as a division after the engagement with Roberts and the 22nd Armoured Brigade. An additional factor to take into consideration is the national (and possibly other) bias of the NZ official historian. The NZ point of view includes upholding the reputation (well-deserved) of the Kiwis as the shock troops of the Commonwealth armies, succeeding despite the limp-wristed ineffectiveness of accompanying British units (especially cavalry regiments) and the idiocy of senior British generals (at least when they failed to agree with Freyberg). The pursuit from El Alamein was not the finest hour for the NZ Division, and an overestimation of the size of the Axis rear guard would not be out of the question. Certainly the 100 Italian tank figure seems to have been pulled out of thin air.

[Grant Whitley]

Originally posted by swerve:

"Far from being a run of the mill dictatorship, Germany was in the throes of an immensely popular revolution. "

 

Define "immensely popular". The Nazis peak vote was 37%. With that, they started showing how they'd behave if they actually controlled the country, & in Germanys last free election their vote declined to 33%. The final election (with Hitler as Chancellor) was a farce, with several parties banned from taking part, the apparatus of the state turned over to getting out the vote for the Nazis, immense voter intimidation & as much fraud as they could manage. With all that, they got 44%. In  a free election they'd have been trounced. Hitler launched a constitutional coup on the back of a large minority vote. If the democratic parties had realised how dangerous he was & stopped fighting each other, he wouldn't have stood a chance.

 

True enough. But Nazism, as you show, had a solid base of support to expand from. By 1939-1940, Hitler has had more than half a decade in power, has expanded German territory, is ignoring Versailles, etc. I’d argue that by then, National Socialism had the support of the bulk of the population. Certainly Hitler never really faced any serious domestic opposition at this point.

 

My point was that dictatorships do not broadly produce more effective soldiers than democracies. In fact currently quite the opposite is true. Rather, at the time, fascism/Nazism were perceived as being ascendant ideologies, much like democracy is today. Germany, herself in the midst of a fascist revolution, benefitted militarily from this.

[JohnB]

Originally posted by Sargent:

You know, that's what I love about you. Resort to the attack on somebody irrelevant to deflect attention from your hopeless position and monomaniacal Anglophilia. What exactly does Marshall have to do with a discussion on Churchill and Brooke?

 

 

Sorry, Sargent but you started it by an provocative and unfair attack on a Great Soldier.

 

 

Strategy, Marshall Churchill and Brooke are linked by their differing approaches to military strategy.

[Guest SILL]

Originally posted by BillB:

Rather undermines your point, I think.

 

all the best

 

BillB

 

 

You got me. I quit when I got to the revisionist version of Chamberlain's role leading up to WWII and only included established facts regarding his history up to WWI (which was the original question).

[Guest Sargent]

Originally posted by JohnB:

Sorry, Sargent but you started it  by an provocative and unfair attack on a Great Soldier.

 

Excuse me, WHAT Great Soldier did I attack?

 

Somehow Brooke's name does not appear on ANY of the multitudinous "Great Commander's" lists that appear from time to time.

 

Dugout Doug MacArthur's (AKA Big Mac - a Yank you will note) DOES appear on "Great Commander's" lists, and please scroll back to the MacArthur thread to see how I savaged HIM.

 

Your point here is not an "attack on a Great Soldier," it is my "attack" (not hardly, you ain't seen what I do when I really attack) on a British soldier. In your eyes anyone British can do no wrong.

 

Me, I calls 'em as I sees 'em, regardless of who they worked for. Brooke was a cowardly backstabbing sniveler who did not have the ballz to resign and take his feelings about Churchill to Parliament (or wherever one goes in the UK). Instead he worked behind the scenes to F**K with his boss.

 

I just LOATHE people who backstab the people they work for.

[RETAC21]

Originally posted by Ken Estes:

Yet, the part you cite was after the main engagement, as reported in the NZ official history:

 

"The first clash with the enemy's new line came in the middle of the morning when 22 Armoured Brigade, leading 7 Armoured Division, had travelled some miles down the Rahman Track from Aqqaqir and then turned to the west. At the turn it came under 88-millimetre fire. As the brigade halted to deal with this fire, the divisional commander, Harding, ordered the rest of his column to keep going further south and swing round 22 Brigade's left flank. However, it soon become clear that the division was up against an extensive line of tanks backed by numerous guns, too strong to rush and too dangerous to leave menacing the division's line of advance. Harding therefore called up his field and anti-tank guns and settled down to a long-range duel. This enemy force seems to have been mainly the 100 or so tanks of Ariete Division with 20 Corps' artillery, including some 88s, to back them up. There may also have been a few surviving tanks of Trieste, while the seventeen tanks left to Littorio and positioned on 15 Panzer Division's right flank were possibly drawn into the battle. Numerous parties of Italian infantry as well as some of 164 Division, in process of re-forming before being distributed among the panzer formations, were also caught up in the battle. When Ariete reported the engagement to Africa Corps, a battalion group was sent by 15 Panzer Division to fill the gap between its right flank and the Italians. The role of 20 Italian Corps was to guard the Panzer Army's right flank against encirclement and, according to the German records, Rommel was at first confident that, with over 100 tanks, the Italians would fulfil their task.

 

 

During this afternoon, 22 Armoured Brigade continued its action against the Italian 20 Corps until dark but it is hard to say how this battle really went. The German records, including Rommel's own account, give the impression that Ariete Division, fighting gallantly to the last tank, was completely surrounded and annihilated. Yet 22 Armoured Brigade claimed only 29 tanks destroyed and 450 prisoners, against a loss of one tank and a few casualties, while events next day indicate that quite a large part of the Italian force managed to disengage overnight. The Italian stand at least deterred 10 Corps from the encircling movement Lumsden had proposed and allowed Africa Corps an unimpeded withdrawal overnight."

 

So the muddled picture continues.

 

Fuller in 1956 mentioned a last radio transmission from Ariete which IIRC included being surrounded, which may be the reason of the disparity between Rommel's account and and the Italians pulling out.

[BillB]

Originally posted by SILL:

You got me.  I quit when I got to the revisionist version of Chamberlain's role leading up to WWII and only included established facts regarding his history up to WWI (which was the original question).

 

Yes, well it is far easier to make the "established facts" (I prefer the term evidence myself) sit up and dance to your chosen tune if you remove important bits of the background context, isn't it. As you did in this instance. And spare me the "revisionist" bit. IMO merely taking a look at the whole picture as opposed to a narrow segment of it does not come into that category.

 

Oh, and as you appear to hold the "established facts" in such esteem, I'm curious how your idea that "Chamberlain = Kerry" fits into that philosophy...

 

all the best

 

BillB

[BillB]

Originally posted by Sargent:

Excuse me, WHAT Great Soldier did I attack?

 

Somehow Brooke's name does not appear on ANY of the multitudinous "Great Commander's" lists that appear from time to time.

 

Dugout Doug MacArthur's (AKA Big Mac - a Yank you will note) DOES appear on "Great Commander's" lists, and please scroll back to the MacArthur thread to see how I savaged HIM.

 

Your point here is not an "attack on a Great Soldier," it is my "attack" (not hardly, you ain't seen what I do when I really attack) on a British soldier. In your eyes anyone British can do no wrong.

 

Me, I calls 'em as I sees 'em, regardless of who they worked for. Brooke was a cowardly backstabbing sniveler who did not have the ballz to resign and take his feelings about Churchill to Parliament (or wherever one goes in the UK). Instead he worked behind the scenes to F**K with his boss.

 

I just LOATHE people who backstab the people they work for. 

 

I'm sorry, Sargent, but in light of this I am curious to know on exactly what you base it. Largely because it seems widely at variance with my understanding of Brooke and his work under Churchill after Dunkirk.

 

all the best

 

BillB

[JohnB]

Originally posted by Sargent:

Excuse me, WHAT Great Soldier did I attack?

 

Somehow Brooke's name does not appear on ANY of the multitudinous "Great Commander's" lists that appear from time to time.

 

Errr.. notice I said great soldier, not great commander However if General Brookes brilliant performance in command of II Corps of the BEF is an indicator there is no doubt he would have gone on to be known as a great commander as well.

FWIW in the Great War Alan Brooke was six times mentioned-in-dispatches, as brigade Major Royal Artillery in the elite 18th Division his fire plan ensured the divsion captured its 1st July 1916 objectives, was credited with creating the first 'creeping barrage', as Staff Officer Royal Artillery attached to the Canadian Corps helped design the successful plan to take Vimy Ridge and by 1918 was the chief artillery officer of 1st British Army, at the age of 35.

 

Your point here is not an "attack on a Great Soldier," it is my "attack" (not hardly, you ain't seen what I do when I really attack) on a British soldier. In your eyes anyone British can do no wrong.

 

Not at all, feel free to have a pop at the likes of Auchinleck, Percival & Co.

[JohnB]

Originally posted by Ken Estes:

There is also the problem of the Italians. They are almost always disparaged and the Germans promoted by Anglo and German writers, because it is utter Hell for the British Army to admit that several of their defeats came at the hands of Italian troops. So authors tend to emphasize the German successes and Italian misdeeds to excess. Sadly, no writers have returned to the original records, vice the official histories, to get to the bottom of this problem.

 

'Iron Hulls Iron Hearts' by Ian W. Walker published 2003 by The Crowood Press goes some way to dispelling these myths.

 

On the action between 22nd Armoured Brigade and Ariete on the 4th November is included a passage by tank driver Antonio Tomba (Walker confirms that Ariete started the day with a 100 M14s):

 

...we spotted about sixty enemy tanks that, seeing us advancing furiously, had a moment of disorientation. Our poor M13s with their 47mm guns could never be effective against them - we could only hope to hit their tracks in order to immobilize them at least; our shells just bounced off when we hit their armour. In addition, while they numbered sixty, we had little over half of that. We did everything possible, givin our very best, ... We had no chance, but we proved a difficult opponent for the English: the secret lay in manoeuvring the tank properly. Our tactics were simple: always keep moving, never expose your flank to their guns, don't let them fire first, all the crew must act as a single unit: everyone must know what to do and when to do it, in complete harmony with each other. We managed to hold off the enemy that day, but they replaced their losses again while we could only count how many of us were left alive. We could never had resisted for another day. Everyone was good, really good, that day, everyone fought an unequal battle that day without complaint and without yielding, even when there was no water and no food. We were lucky when it started to rain as this slowed the English advance, and we, the last survivors of the Ariete were able to escape their pursuit.