Chamberlain or Churchill

[Tim the Tank Nut]

In the FFZ where angels fear to tread a poster related an interesting theory which I am surely misunderstanding. That being that Chamberlain was the better man than Churchill. After picking up my jaw off of the floor and rechecking the post I am still sure that I am just confused. To be on the safe side, here is the quote:

 

"The adoration for Churchill continues to amaze, for he is certainly the posterboy for the right in the US. Curiously, he gave fits to serious military professionals in WWII [as well as WWI] and as a backbencher in the early 1930s opined on many occasions that no increase in armaments could be likely justified. In 1938, Chamberlain was working with the knowledge that his own armed forces chiefs had concluded that his country was not prepared for war and that nothing could be done to aid the Czechs. You are all such admirers of the French? Consider who would have done the fighting in 1938...not the British Army."

 

So I put it to Gen Mil where the political bull is less prevalent, was Churchill the man of the hour or not? I submit that Winston Churchill was a great man. A man of his time and the savior of England. The man wasn't perfect, who is? But he was there and got the job done.

Chamberlain on the other hand was a spineless POS.

[TankB0y]

Yes, he wasn't perfect, but he was the perfect man for that point in time.

 

To be honest, I've never researched Chamberlain's career or his thinking and policy. I would be suprised if were really the clueless boob his small part in history portrays him as. But in the end, he was wrong and nearly led the world to disaster.

 

Might be something to look into when time permits...

[Colin Williams]

Churchill War Time Speeches.

Upon the death of

NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN.

House of Commons.

12th November 1940.

 

Since we last met, the House has suffered a very grievous loss in the death of one of its most distinguished Members, and of a statesman and public servant who, during the best part of three memorable years, was first Minister of the Crown.

 

The fierce and bitter controversies which hung around him in recent times were hushed by the news of his illness and are silenced by his death. In paying a tribute of respect and of regard to an eminent man who has been taken from us, no one is obliged to alter the opinions which he has formed or expressed upon issues which have become a part of history; but at the Lychgate we may all pass our own conduct and our own judgments under a searching review. It is not given to human beings, happily for them, for otherwise life would be intolerable, to foresee or to predict to any large extent the unfolding course of events. In one phase men seem to have been right, in another they seem to have been wrong. Then again, a few years later, when the perspective of time has lengthened, all stands in a different setting. There is a new proportion. There is another scale of values. History with its flickering lamp stumbles along the trail of the past, trying to reconstruct its scenes, to revive its echoes, and kindle with pale gleams the passion of former days. What is the worth of all this? The only guide to a man is his conscience; the only shield to his memory is the rectitude and sincerity of his actions. It is very imprudent to walk through life without this shield, because we are so often mocked by the failure of our hopes and the upsetting of our calculations; but with this shield, however the fates may play, we march always in the ranks of honour.

 

It fell to Neville Chamberlain in one of the supreme crises of the world to be contradicted by events, to be disappointed in his hopes, and to be deceived and cheated by a wicked man. But what were these hopes in which he was disappointed? What were these wishes in which he was frustrated? What was that faith that was abused? They were surely among the most noble and benevolent instincts of the human heart-the love of peace, the toil for peace, the strife for peace, the pursuit of peace, even at great peril, and certainly to the utter disdain of popularity or clamour. Whatever else history may or may not say about these terrible, tremendous years, we can be sure that Neville Chamberlain acted with perfect sincerity according to his lights and strove to the utmost of his capacity and authority, which were powerful, to save the world from the awful, devastating struggle in which we are now engaged. This alone will stand him in good stead as far as what is called the verdict of history is concerned.

 

But it is also a help to our country and to our whole Empire, and to our decent faithful way of living that, however long the struggle may last, or however dark may be the clouds which overhang our path, no future generation of English-speaking folks-for that is the tribunal to which we appeal-will doubt that, even at a great cost to ourselves in technical preparation, we were guiltless of the bloodshed, terror and misery which have engulfed so many lands and peoples, and yet seek new victims still. Herr Hitler protests

with frantic words and gestures that he has only desired peace. What do these ravings and outpourings count before the silence of Neville Chamberlain's tomb? Long, hard, and hazardous years lie before us, but at least we entered upon them united and with clean hearts.

 

I do not propose to give an appreciation of Neville Chamberlain's life and character, but there were certain qualities always admired in these Islands which he possessed in an altogether exceptional degree. He had a physical and moral toughness of fibre which enabled him all through his varied career to endure misfortune and disappointment without being unduly discouraged or wearied. He had a precision of mind and an aptitude for business which raised him far above the ordinary levels of our generation. He had a firmness of spirit which was not often elated by success, seldom downcast by failure, and never swayed by panic. When, contrary to all his hopes, beliefs and exertions, the war came upon him, and when, as he himself said, all that he had worked for was shattered, there was no man more resolved to pursue the unsought quarrel to the death. The same qualities which made him one of the last to enter the war, made him one of the last who would quit it before the full victory of a righteous cause was won.

 

I had the singular experience of passing in a day from being one of his most prominent opponents and critics to being one of his principal lieutenants, and on another day of passing from serving under him to become the head of a Government of which, with perfect loyalty, he was content to be a member. Such relationships are unusual in our public life. I have before told the House how on the morrow of the Debate which in the early days of May challenged his position, he declared to me and a few other friends that only a National Government could face the storm about to break upon us, and that if he were an obstacle to the formation of such a Government, he would instantly retire. Thereafter, he acted with that singleness of purpose and simplicity of conduct which at all times, and especially in great times, ought to be the ideal of us all.

 

When he returned to duty a few weeks after a most severe operation, the bombardment of London and of the seat of Government had begun. I was a witness during that fortnight of his fortitude under the most grievous and painful bodily afflictions, and I can testify that, although physically only the wreck of a man, his nerve was unshaken and his remarkable mental faculties unimpaired.

 

After he left the Government he refused all honours. He would die like his father, plain Mr. Chamberlain. I sought permission of the King, however, to have him supplied with the Cabinet papers, and until a few days of his death he followed our affairs with keenness, interest and tenacity. He met the approach of death with a steady eye. If he grieved at all, it was that he could not be a spectator of our victory; but I think he died with the comfort of knowing that his country had, at least, turned the corner.

 

At this time our thoughts must pass to the gracious and charming lady who shared his days of triumph and adversity with a courage and quality the equal of his own. He was, like his father and his brother Austen before him, a famous Member of the House of Commons, and we here assembled this morning, Members of all parties, without a single exception, feel that we do ourselves and our country honour in saluting the memory of one whom Disraeli

would have called an "English worthy."

 

 

[Edited by Colin Williams (25 Oct 2004).]

[BillB]

Well as I think he served as an infantry officer on the Western Front, I don't think Chamberlain can have been all that spineless. I beleive he exchanged trench maps with Hitler at one point. I suspect he is the opposite of Churchill in the sense he was perhaps the right man at the wrong time. After all, if he had been dealing with a more rational individual than the amoral proto-terrorist Hitler, we might be hailing him as a hero for saving the world from a world war with his peace in our time thing.

 

all the best

 

BillB

[Tim the Tank Nut]

That Churchill would speak so well of Chamberlain shows the greatness of Churchill. Chamberlain had the chance to stand up to Hitler and did not. Churchill spoke against the dangers of Nazi Germany from the political "wilderness" all through the '30's. If he could see the danger then why couldn't the government? A recent article in MHQ points out that there was little that Chamberlain's government could do but I don't see it that way. The danger was coming and it was not disguised or hidden. The government of the UK had an obligation to protect its' people as best as it could. Chamberlain's government did not do this. The UK army may have been a wreck in '38 but the armies of Germany were not paramount as they would be in 1940. In any event a more agressive arms program may have kept England on the continent. Just a few hundred more fighters and tanks may have been enough.

I think Chamberlain had seen the run up to WW1 and did not want to be a part of the "guns of august" type disaster. The big difference being that Hitler wasn't going to stop until force or arms did it. Neville Chamberlain did back down (France gets no pass either) until it was too late. Once Germany had invaded Poland they had their final operational test and knew they could take the Western Allies with any luck at all and they did. Right up to the Channell and Churchill, and then they were turned away.

[Ken Estes]

Originally posted by Tim the Tank Nut:

In the FFZ where angels fear to tread a poster related an interesting theory which I am surely misunderstanding. That being that Chamberlain was the better man than Churchill. After picking up my jaw off of the floor and rechecking the post I am still sure that I am just confused. To be on the safe side, here is the quote:

 

"The adoration for Churchill continues to amaze, for he is certainly the posterboy for the right in the US. Curiously, he gave fits to serious military professionals in WWII [as well as WWI] and as a backbencher in the early 1930s opined on many occasions that no increase in armaments could be likely justified. In 1938, Chamberlain was working with the knowledge that his own armed forces chiefs had concluded that his country was not prepared for war and that nothing could be done to aid the Czechs. You are all such admirers of the French? Consider who would have done the fighting in 1938...not the British Army."

------------------

Nobody said Chamberlain was "the better man" so you are confused.

 

The context [missing in your post/quote] is that you were saying to one of your colleagues on FFZ that he would surely have voted for Chamberlain vs. Churchill in 1938, favoring diplomacy over action. My reply is to say once again, "IN 1938" there is not an 'action' choice for Britain: the service chiefs are saying to the govt that the forces are not prepared and nothing can be done to save the Czechs. Churchill has his share in the lack of preparedness to that point. He had almost been driven out of politics in 1936 over the affair of Edward VIII, by the way. It is also a matter of record that he gave the military fits.

 

In 1940, after rearmament is far enough along that the Brits are building more aircraft than the Germans, the fleet is more prepared [HMS King George V commissions in December], radar and Fighter Command is in being and an expeditionary army can be sent to France [Matilda II is in production], then you want to begin crediting the leadership of Churchill? OK, he's one of the great men of the 20th Century, along with Hitler, Ghandi, Roosevelt, etc. But the Brit historians have been having their due with him for a long time, and for many the record of Churchill is less esteemed than we appreciate in the US. Voted out in '45 right? Cheers, Ken

 

[Edited by Ken Estes (26 Oct 2004).]

[Redbeard]

I can to a very large degree follow the poster you quote. Chamberlain’s greatest fault was saying those silly words: “...peace in our time!”, especially as he probably knew well it would not hold for very long. As other posters has already said, his advisers had clearly stated that GB wasn’t ready for war, and the massive British rearmament carried through in the second half of the 30’s was actually carried through with Chamberlain as PM (from May 37) or Chancellor of the Excheuqer (31-37). The weapons Churchill stood up with were bought and paid for by Chamberlain. It is an open question if the allies in 1938 (when France didn’t even have the MS406 in service) could have militarily defeated Germany, but anyway allied intelligence had greatly exagerated German strength, especially in the air. You may of couse say that as PM Chamberlain was also responsible for intelligence, but that doesn’t bring us far in judging his abilities, that someone fairly well below him screwed up.

 

You often get the image that the allies before May 40 had no plans beyond phoney war, but it simply isn’t true. War was (had to be) declared in 39 because Hitler simply went too far, but the allies knew (or thought) they were still far from having the strength to defeat Germany in an offensive, and had no reason to believe they could be defeated themselves until then (offensive was planned for 41). It must also be remebered that it was Chamberlain that ordered the allied invasion of Norway – not exactly a spineless sissy ordering the breaking of a freindly country’s neutrality in order to relently pursue your countrys interests. That the operation in planning and execution was so thoroughly f..... up again doesn’t tell us much about Chamberlain, but perhaps about his staff.

 

Churchill no doubt made an important contribution to world history in keeping GB and the British up and together in 1940, his main asset being his talents as a communicator (he indeed made some good speeches). But I’ll also claim that he seriously prerequisited good and strongwilled advisers, and in the period until he got such (mainly Alanbrooke from December 41) he lost GB its Empire! He had no clue of strategy, logistics or operations and in 1941 poured resources in size comparable to the combined war production of Germany, Italy and Japan into uncoordinated and dazed operations in mainly the Mediterraean area, while insisting on neglecting the far eastern parts of the Empire. Sucessfully defending Malaya and Singapore in 41-42 would not have taken resources making at least as positive end results impossible in the Med., but perhaps a futile offensive less. In return the Japanese war scheme could effectively have been turned over in 1942, and the British Empire have had a much better chance of surviving after the war.

 

You can say that Churchill, paid with the Empire to fight Hitler, and whether that was intentional or not, it of course has a kind of heroic aura. But I’ll still claim that it wasn’t necessary and that in the context of British policy for centuries having one overiding theme – keeping together the Empire – Churchill was the ultimate failure!

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

 

BTW this is no post in any left-right debate over posterboys. Having views spanning from left of Karl to well right of Djengiz Khan, I do not fit into left-right scales

[Guest Sargent]

Originally posted by Redbeard:

But I’ll also claim that he seriously prerequisited good and strongwilled advisers, and in the period until he got such (mainly Alanbrooke from December 41) he lost GB its Empire! He had no clue of strategy, logistics or operations and in 1941 poured resources in size comparable to the combined war production of Germany, Italy and Japan into uncoordinated and dazed operations in mainly the Mediterraean area, while insisting on neglecting the far eastern parts of the Empire. Sucessfully defending Malaya and Singapore in 41-42 would not have taken resources making at least as positive end results impossible in the Med., but perhaps a futile offensive less. In return the Japanese war scheme could effectively have been turned over in 1942, and the British Empire have had a much better chance of surviving after the war.

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

 

Thus spaketh the man who has been warped by perusal of that self-serving tome of trash, Alanbrooke's diary. What Brookie-poo's diary comments (no, I haven't read the whole thing) show me is that he was an arrogant self-serving SOB with absolutely no loyalty to his superiors, and not any understanding of what Churchill was driving at throughout the war. Marshall may have disagreed with FDR during the war, but he never would have led a "staff revolt" against his nation's leader as Brooke did (see Wilmot, Grave of a Thousand Schemes - ?, I know you have it).

 

Churchill has been described as "having his military concepts formed as a subaltern in colonial war and never advancing." Much has been made that he "just didn't understand" the need for the massive staffs and tremendous numbers of rear area personnel required to fight a modern war.

Well, I think Churchill was right, and so do most of the soldiers here agree, that there is too much staff and tail in the services, as compared to the fighting men - and in Britain's case in WW2 sitting around with opposible digits firmly ensconced in anal sphincter*. Churchill could point to the success of the Germans and Japanese, who managed without the excessive tail, and whose troops didn't lie down and quit when they got a little tired**. Churchill wanted British troops to match the Axis, and he tended to regard explanations as excuses. The "professional soldiers" like Brooke were responsible for the mess the Army was in (at least they were in charge when it got into a mess), Churchill could see the mess - he was supposed to let the "professionals" keep f**king it up?

Accustomed to excuses and delay at home, Churchill thought that able men such as Wavell were cast in the same mold as Brooke. Wavell took his problems and solved them, even if not as fast as Churchill wanted. Brooke took problems and sat on them like a broody hen.

A lot of Churchill's strategic errors have to be seen in the context he was dealing with. He went to Greece and it proved a failure, but the UK was seen to at least try to honor its commitments (something Chamberlain did NOT do, BTW). Abandoning Greece very possibly would have pushed Turkey into the Axis - that possibility was considered highly probable at the time. An Axis Turkey could have wrecked the British position in the ME and wrecked the southern flank of the USSR. With the Axis sitting on Caucasian and Gulf oil, how long do you think the Allies would have lasted?

 

 

* No, this is not Anglophobic. The Brits weren't the only ones with problems. Jesus Christ Himself Lee is the epitome of excessive do-nothing staff and rear area overhead. However, we are dealing with Churchill and his relations with the British military, so I concentrate on the British failures here. You want Yankee failures I can come up with those too, just not in this thread.

Nor am I saying that the Brits did not have able people. But they seemed to have a lot more duds than was good for them, people who went golfing instead of training their troops, people who couldn't bother to keep salt water off equipment going 1/2-way around the world, etc. The people with ability kept the Brits "muddling through," but they had to fight the duds to do it.

 

** I run into countless tales of fighting where CW troops were "too exhausted to carry on" and "were too weakened by casualties to fight further" when the Axis troops facing them had been in movement and/or combat longer and had suffered as many or more casualties.

 

'Nuff fer now.

[Tim the Tank Nut]

The "ready for war" issue in '38 is it. Sometimes you fight ready or not. Germany was not "ready for war" in '38 either. The USA wasn't "ready for war" in '41 but the hammer dropped.

Take it to fantasy terms, how ready was Rohan when the army of Saruman atacked? The deal was going down in Czechoslovakia and the Czechs had some army of their own.

You are also right about the absurdity of "peace in our time". What was that, about 5 minutes? That is an almost American Politics level of grandstanding.

I think you sell the moral value of Churchill far short. Sometimes national moral is what sustains you through dark times and Churchill was the best at that. Out in '45, the war was over and people wanted it behind them. Churchill was worn out anyway and he was about the only person who did not know it.

 

PS: Hitler does not qualify as a "great" man. You can argue that he had the greatest effect of any one person in the 20th century but that doesn't make him great in the normal sense of the word.

[Ken Estes]

Not to hijack the thread, but there is interesting research showing that the Czech chances for survival were better than suspected, even by the pro-war side of 1938. Assuming that the Wehrmacht cannot fight for more than 30 days, the Czech forts, 650+ tank force, trained air force, adequate munitions and already mobilized army could have perhaps held them for that time, perhaps exhausting their resources. Extra defense problems, though, come from the more undefended frontier vs. Austria [now III Reich] and the Poles and Hungarians would likely have joined in on the kill.

 

For what it's worth, Hitler was really angry that he could not have his war in Sept38, when he saw the best chances.

 

Still no change for the French and Brits, though, and they had not yet taken Belgian neutrality under study. Too many ifs. For the Anglo-French, going to war in 1938 is voluntary, not like 1941 for the Yugos, Greeks, US, Rus. The govt has an entirely different responsibility, and the outcome was hardly clear then or now. History is really bunk if we fail to take into account what the people were thinking at the time, and just import our own presentday ideas to then.

 

[Edited by Ken Estes (26 Oct 2004).]

[Guest Sargent]

Originally posted by Ken Estes:

Not to hijack the thread, but there is interesting research showing that the Czech chances for survival were better than suspected, even by the pro-war side of 1938. Assuming that the Wehrmacht cannot fight for more than 30 days, the Czech forts, 650+ tank force, trained air force, adequate munitions and already mobilized army could have perhaps held them for that time, perhaps exhausting their resources. Extra defense problems, though, come from the more undefended frontier vs. Austria [now III Reich] and the Poles and Hungarians would likely have joined in on the kill.

 

Technically feasible, but I wonder what the outcome would have been considering that most of the defenses were in the Sudetenland, and a large portion of the army (I presume, dunno fershure) were ethnically German.

Germany was not ready for war by a long shot, but neither were Britain and France, and while Czechoslovakia was better off in equipment and munitions, I don't know how their doctrine, training, leadership, and morale would have stood up.

I haven't been able to find any info on the state of the Czech Army in the 'soft' categories, anybody have sources?

[Lev]

Originally posted by Tim the Tank Nut:

The "ready for war" issue in '38 is it.  Sometimes you fight ready or not.  Germany was not "ready for war" in '38 either.  The USA wasn't "ready for war" in '41 but the hammer dropped.

 

The difference of course being that Britain could try to put off war and try to get ready for it, I'm sure that had the germans bombed Londen in '38 Chamberlain would've declared war even if he was not ready for it.

 

Take it to fantasy terms, how ready was Rohan when the army of Saruman atacked?  The deal was going down in Czechoslovakia and the Czechs had some army of their own.

 

As stupid as selling out the Sudetenland was, it seemed a perfectly workable solution of selling land (someone else's at that) for time. And when the germans took over the rest of czechoslovakia it was too late.

It also begs the question of the feasability of fighting germany instead of bargaining with Hitler, how would a coalition work out? The weak Czechs are in an unre-enforceable position, the french are essentialy immobile and the soviets can't touch germany without invading it's neighbours. So that leaves the BEF to invade germany on it's own, either from France or by north sea invasion, at about a month after the germans have rolled up the Czechs.

[Ken Estes]

Originally posted by Sargent:

Technically feasible, but I wonder what the outcome would have been considering that most of the defenses were in the Sudetenland, and a large portion of the army (I presume, dunno fershure) were ethnically German.

Germany was not ready for war by a long shot, but neither were Britain and France, and while Czechoslovakia was better off in equipment and munitions, I don't know how their doctrine, training, leadership, and morale would have stood up.

I haven't been able to find any info on the state of the Czech Army in the 'soft' categories, anybody have sources?

 

 

Germans were kept relatively segregated in the Czech Army, and their numbers were not at all large. The gambit hinges on the Czechs stalling the Wehrmacht in front of the fortified zones [many not in the Sudeten Mts], the panzers and Luftwaffe are at least denied superiority by the Czech machines, no terror bombing of Prague, etc. occurs, hence morale soars as the German Blitz peters out. According to Guderian [not always reliable] and others, the German officers did not like the looks of Czech defensive works after they inspected them in March 1939.

[Tim the Tank Nut]

As fas as what people were thinking at the time goes, Churchill was warning of the dangers of Nazi govt in the early thirties and was roundly condemned for it. There was a group of military thinkers considering war against Germany from the early time on. In fact, it would have been criminal not to plan for war as that is what militaries are supposed to do. I wish I had that MHQ article handy as it made some very concise points. I'll look around for it.

You just can't excuse Neville Chamberlains' government and the way it handled the run up to the war and the beginning of the war itself. Think of it as a comparison to the current administration. Many people look at the President as a failure for his polices in the Middle East, not waiting for history to pass judgement. That's fine, if we apply the same criteria to Chamberlain and Churchill then Churchill's moving, motivational speeches when the Germans were at the doorstep far outshine Chamberlain's "peace in our time" statement.

[Ken Estes]

Originally posted by Tim the Tank Nut:

As fas as what people were thinking at the time goes, Churchill was warning of the dangers of Nazi govt in the early thirties and was roundly condemned for it.  There was a group of military thinkers considering war against Germany from the early time on.  In fact, it would have been criminal not to plan for war as that is what militaries are supposed to do.  I wish I had that MHQ article handy as it made some very concise points.  I'll look around for it.

You just can't excuse Neville Chamberlains' government and the way it handled the run up to the war and the beginning of the war itself. Think of it as a comparison to the current administration.  Many people look at the President as a failure for his polices in the Middle East, not waiting for history to pass judgement.  That's fine, if we apply the same criteria to Chamberlain and Churchill then Churchill's moving, motivational speeches when the Germans were at the doorstep far outshine Chamberlain's "peace in our time" statement.

 

------------------------------

Well, you are evidently swallowing a lot of Churchill's own version, as well as his advocates. As to the "early 30s," Hitler is not Chancellor until Jan 33 and Fuehrer in Aug 34. The German rearmament is not underway until mid-1934, and the Anglo-German Naval Treaty is 1935, so what is being warned about? Churchill still takes time in 1936 to initially support Franco against the Spanish Republic.

 

In any case, exactly what are your options at the height of the Depression in England? For the govt, the doctrine was, thanks to Chancellor of the Exchechor Chamberlain, the preservation of the British economy in the event of a long war. Hitler worked on a Blitzkrieg economy and lost that gamble. Thus the British were brought gradually to a war economy by 1939, after considerable planning done in the "early 1930s" and later by defense and comptroller staffs, in which Churchill had no part or knowledge. The industrial mobilization was planned, 'test' contracts let to firms lacking expertise in armaments, electronics, airframes, etc., and all was as ready as could be by late 1939.

 

Your last part is why I scorn Churchill as the apparent darling of the current US right wing. The legend of Churchill's bulldog tenacity of 1940-41 [and the Germans were at the wrong bank of the Channel, not the 'doorstep' then] is somehow warped back to the 'early 30s' to make him a prophet who could have saved the world, prevented Munich, etc. just as Dubya and the NeoCons are doing for us now. Really bad history from people who ignore it.

 

But keep up with your reading. You will arrive. Try Andrew Gordon "British Sea Power and Procurement Between the Wars."

 

 

[Edited by Ken Estes (26 Oct 2004).]

[Tim the Tank Nut]

The west coast of France and Belgium IS the doorstep to England. The Royal Navy has the key to the door. The RAF kept the Luftwaffe off the RN. A while back we had a fantastic thread about how far the RN would have gone to stop an invasion fleet if air superiority was completely lost. I think it was anear universal opinion that the King George V would have been firing broadsides at transports in the Channel until sunk, along with every other ship in the fleet.

Getting back to Churchill (who would have probably died fighting as well) I do think the bulldog tenacity is the right trait in a war for survival. Churchill was not a prophet but he was on the right track. He didn't like anything going on in Germany from 1933 on. The Nazi movement was visible and Churchill was its opponent from the beginning. I seem to recall a big blowup over Churchill having some fighter production figures that he wasn't supposed to have showing Luftwaffe rearmament.

I don't fully understand the parallel you draw with neocon. What I am saying is President Bush has the same tenacity as Winston Churchill. That is good to me but bad to you. You might say President Bush has the same tenacity as Hitler, that would be bad to me, I don't know what that would be to you. The reason I say the tenacity is good then and now is because I think both WW2 and the current terror wars both represent a fight to the finish. I think you have to draw a timeline all the way to the unification of Germany to decide the success or failure of the WW2 effort. I judge the effort a success despite the bumps in the road. I think it will take a similar effort to contain the Islamic militant threat and it takes a lot of guts to start on a fifty-seventy five year commitment. Everyone today is focusing on he next month or two and that is wrong.

[Guest SILL]

Interesting that one of our residents leftists is the first to compare President Bush to Mr Churchill (a great man).

 

Yes, they were/are both LEADERS. In contrast to the "loyal" opposition.

 

Rightwing/conservative is a badge of honor. Now why do the the leftists have a fit liberal/leftwing description is used?

[Ken Estes]

Originally posted by SILL:

Interesting that one of our residents leftists is the first to compare President Bush to Mr Churchill (a great man).

 

Are you insane or just a poor reader? It is the current Dubya crowd that invokes Churchill, as I confirm.

 

As to resident liberals, what's this:

http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/opinion/3857...searchdiff=1141

[Colin Williams]

Those who are determined to revise history to suit their own version of reality are on the path to relearning the lessons of history the hard way.

 

Winston Churchill's record during the 1930s -

 

1932 -

December 23 WSC spoke in House of his fears about what was happening in Germany

 

1933 -

January 30 Hitler became Chancellor of Germany

March 16 WSC attacked the "folly of disarmament" in the House of Commons

April 7 WSC warned the House of a militarized Germany

May 10 Nazi's burned the books in Berlin

October 6 WSC supported rearmament at the Conservative Party Conference in Birmingham.

October 23 Government decides to seek reduction of world armaments

November 7 WSC spoke in House on the need to unite small and threatened states in Europe

 

1934 -

March 14 WSC spoke in the House against arms limitation

March 21 WSC urged the creation of a Ministry of Defense

June 30 Night of the Long Knives in Germany

July WSC increased his public attacks on the weakness of Britain's air defenses

July 30 House debated Britain's air policy

August 2 Hitler became Chancellor and President of Germany

November 16 WSC made a BBC broadcast on the causes of war arguing that disarmament encourages a potential aggressor. Desmond Morton frequently visited Chartwell to provide WSC with secret intelligence reports

November 28 WSC speech to the House marked a climax in his campaign against Government defense policy

 

1935 -

February 14 WSC, Lindemann and Austen Chamberlain prevailed upon Ramsay MacDonald to consider setting up a committee to deal with air defense

March 4 Government published Defense White Paper

March 19 WSC spoke in the House on comparisons of British and German air strength

April 4 In the Daily Mail, WSC argued that the Government should regard rearmament as the first priority

April 7 Ralph Wigram visited Chartwell for the first time to tell WSC of Foreign Office concerns about German air strength

May 2 WSC criticized Government defense policy in the House.

May 22 In a major defense debate in the House, WSC said that the Government had no excuses for not acting

May 31 WSC told House that Britain should not trust Hitler's promises

June 7 Baldwin became Prime Minister. WSC spoke to House on slow pace of air defense research

July 6 WSC agreed to join Air Defense Research subcommittee of Committee of Imperial Defense but insisted on remaining free to debate all general issues of defense

July 11 WSC denounced Anglo-German Naval Agreement

July 23 WSC completed a detailed memorandum on air strategy for subcommittee

July 25 WSC attended first meeting on Air Defense Research subcommittee

August 24 Britain warned Mussolini not to attack Abyssinia

October 4 Italy attacked Abyssinia.

October 24 In House, WSC called Germany 'an armed camp'

November 17 Nancy Astor to Baldwin: "Don't put Winston in the Government - It will mean war at home and abroad". WSC was not included in Cabinet appointments

 

1936 -

February WSC's informants provided him with information of defense issues

March 10 WSC spoke of the need for industry to prepare for war production

March 14 Sir Thomas Inskip was appointed Minister for Coordination of Defense, a move which Lindemann called 'the most cynical thing since Caligula appointed his horse as consul'

March 26 WSC spoke in the House on the strength of German propaganda

March 31 WSC addressed backbench MP's on the need to support France

May 4 In the House WSC urged that the Admiralty have full control of the Fleet Air Arm

May 13 In a letter to The Times, WSC challenged those who wanted Russia excluded from anti-German alliances

May 21 WSC told the House that it was essential to set up a Ministry of Supply

July 7 At Birmingham, WSC said that England had only reached the planning stage which Germany had reached three years ago

July 20 WSC attacked the Minister of Coordination of Defense in the House

July 23 At Horsham, WSC warned the Labour Party of the folly of its refusal to support rearmament

October 19 WSC spoke at Chingford warning it was the last chance for collective security

October 27 WSC met Brig. Hobart, an expert on tanks, at Morpeth Mansions

November 8 WSC spoke in the House on the need for a precise plan in foreign policy

November 11 WSC participated in a debate on defense in the House

November 13 The usually hostile, The Times, called WSC's House performance 'brilliant'

November 25 Freddie Guest told WSC that Clement Attlee would support him on any rearmament program

 

1937 -

October 14 England's 'No' Man (Neville Chamberlain) was published in Collier's

 

1938 -

Early in January he left for a month's vacation in the south of France. While there working on Volume IV of Marlborough (Woods A40), he heard that the Chancellor of the Exchequer was requesting a total reduction of £12 million in Service estimates.

 

On 12 March Austria was incorporated into the German Reich, an event Churchill called a dastardly outrage. "Finally," he noted, "the scales of illusion have fallen from many eyes, especially in high quarters." He called on Britain and France to rally the second rank powers of Europe to collective defence. He predicted that the next state to be threatened by Germany would be Czechoslovakia.

 

Distressed by proGerman and anti-French propaganda in Britain, he flew to France to advocate an Anglo-French alliance. When he was received with full honours by the French, the Cabinet let it be known that he spoke only for himself and not the Government. He believed that "if France broke then everything would break, and the Nazi domination of Europe, and potentially of a large part of the world, would seem to be inevitable."

 

On 7 August the British Attaché in Berlin informed the Foreign Office that Hitler had decided to attack Czechoslovakia whatever concessions were made to the Sudetens. A critical Cabinet meeting on 30 August decided that no threats should be made and no attempts at international cooperation against Germany should be begun. The main objective was to deny Hitler any excuse for an attack on Czechoslovakia by persuading the President of Czechoslovakia to make enough concessions.

 

Chamberlain returned to inform his Cabinet colleagues that Hitler's objective was only the Sudetenland. When French Prime Minister Daladier arrived to explore the possibility of a united front against Germany, he was told by his British colleague that Britain had no army to march to Czechoslovakia and it was a long way to send an air force.

 

On 20 September Churchill flew to Paris with General Spears to converse with Paul Reynaud and Georges Mandel, members of the French Cabinet who wanted to resist Hitler. On his return to England, Churchill issued a press statement which charged that a surrender to the Nazi threat of force would bring, not peace or safety, but ever-increasing weakness and danger.

 

In the debate on the terms of the Munich Agreement Churchill noted that all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe would have to make the best terms they could with Nazi Germany.He also attacked Chamberlain's cherished dream of influencing Hitler because "there can never be a friendship between the British democracy and the Nazi Power."

 

1939 -

Churchill was frustrated by the Government's reluctance to enter into an alliance with the Soviet Union. He was also disturbed by the apparent desire of Chamberlain and Halifax to come to some accommodation with Hitler.

 

Clement Attlee spoke for many when he said: "It must be a melancholy satisfaction to see how right you were. "

 

Chamberlain, believed that Churchill's inclusion in the Cabinet would frustrate his efforts to appease Hitler. Chamberlain was still determined to reach some agreement with the German leader. He wrote his sister: "It is very difficult to see the way out of Danzig but I don't believe it is impossible to find, provided we are given a little time and also provided that Hitler doesn't really want war."

 

General Ironside recorded Chamberlain's views in his diary. "Neville Chamberlain is not a war Prime Minister. He is a pacifist at heart. He has a firm belief that God has chosen him as an instrument to prevent this threatened war. He can never get this out of his mind. He is not against Winston, but he believes that chances may still arrive for averting war, and he thinks that Winston might be so strong in a Cabinet that he would be prevented from acting."

 

After a bitter political battle in early August, Chamberlain invoked party discipline and forced a parliamentary adjournment for two months.

 

At 8:30 AM on 1 September he was awakened by telephone to be told that German armies had entered Poland. Later in the day he drove to London to meet the Prime Minister, who advised him that he would now like Churchill to enter the Government.

 

But the call did not come immediately. Despite his comments that "the die is cast, " Chamberlain still hoped for a peaceful settlement. Churchill thought the general mood was otherwise: "There was no doubt that the temper of the House was for war. I deemed it even more resolute and united then in a similar scene on August 3, 1914, in which I had also taken part."

 

Many politicians from all parties gathered at Churchill's home at Morpeth Mansions to express dismay at Chambelain's hesitation. Finally, at 11:15 AM on 3 September, Chamberlain broadcast that Britain was at war with Germany.

[Guest Sargent]

I just thought that Churchill's problem with his military "professionals" was that he want them to tell him HOW they could match Axis performance, not give him excuses as to why they couldn't do it.

 

The "pros" never understood that.

 

Churchill came up with some zany off-the-wall plans, but he was coming up with something when all the "pros" came up with were whines and excuses.

 

If Churchill had waited on Brooke & Co., the war would now be in its 65th year...

[Ken Estes]

Here is the Master at work with the pros:

 

Meeting on standardization of arms, 1951 --

 

PM (Churchill): "When I was at Omdurman, I rode with a sabre in one hand and a pistol in the other."

 

CIGS (FM Slim): "Not much standardization there, Prime Minister"

 

R.Lewin, Slim (1999), p.272.

 

-----------------

 

As to the early 30s, the British policy since 1920 was that no war was in the offing for 10 years, thus no new projects would be funded. This was extended in 1930 [economic crisis, you know], the London Conferences extended the naval holiday to 1935 and hopes continued for further restraints, at the Geneva continuations. As a backbencher, Churchill could make all kinds of speeches, which he did, variously warning of Germans, Italians, colonies, [not Japan], and also the contrary, confirming in committee various times that no new defense expenditures would be needed in the forseeable future. [Andrew Gordon is particularly critical of this 'variable' record of Churchill]

 

Indeed, what would have been the air defenses of 1932? None existed in terms of technology, but neither had the low-wing, all-metal bomber emerged as the new danger.

 

Not all visionaries are right, and not all conservatives [not Tories here] are wrong.

 

[Edited by Ken Estes (27 Oct 2004).]

[Guest Sargent]

Re Ken:

 

I am well aware of the budget constraints and the Ten-Year Rule.

 

However that should not have prevented the "pros" from thinking and training their men. Hobart showed what training could be accomplished with zippo budget by turning out the very professional 7th Armoured Division. A British general named Burnett-Stuart (retired in 1938) managed a lot of good training and inspired a lot of thought in junior officers. The General Staff loathed him, and the feeling was reciprocated.

 

The Bomber Barons of the RAF put all their eggs in Douhet's basket. Coastal Command was almost totally neglected, and Fighter Command and the Radar Direction network was almost the single-handed creation of Hugh Dowding - who was loathed by the Air Staff and retired after won the BoB.

 

Seemingly the only Brits who did good work were 'mavericks,' which leads to the conclusion that the mainstream system was flawed.

[Ken Estes]

Originally posted by Sargent:

Re Ken:

 

I am well aware of the budget constraints and the Ten-Year Rule.

 

However that should not have prevented the "pros" from thinking and training their men. Hobart showed what training could be accomplished with zippo budget by turning out the very professional 7th Armoured Division. A British general named Burnett-Stuart (retired in 1938) managed a lot of good training and inspired a lot of thought in junior officers. The General Staff loathed him, and the feeling was reciprocated.

 

The Bomber Barons of the RAF put all their eggs in Douhet's basket. Coastal Command was almost totally neglected, and Fighter Command and the Radar Direction network was almost the single-handed creation of Hugh Dowding - who was loathed by the Air Staff and retired after won the BoB.

 

Seemingly the only Brits who did good work were 'mavericks,' which leads to the conclusion that the mainstream system was flawed.

 

 

But several Mavericks have been outed for many years. Only looking at armor icons, Fuller's reputation is now far reduced, and his wackiness more highlighted; Hobart has been correctly praised and criticized as dogmatic and less original, respectively. He is responsible for training the Mobile Div/7th Armored to fire on the move, a most inadvised technique, especially if you have been inside those Limey tanks of the period, yoked like the US M2A4/M3 series. They had to learn the hard way, from the Afrika Korps about firing from the short halt. Just a sample of what we now know.

 

JP Harris, "Men, Ideas, and Tanks: British Military

Thought and Armoured Forces, 1903-1939" is a good counter to the hagiography Macksey did on Hobart.

 

[Edited by Ken Estes (27 Oct 2004).]

[JohnB]

Originally posted by Sargent:

Churchill could point to the success of the Germans and Japanese, who managed without the excessive tail, and whose troops didn't lie down and quit when they got a little tired**. Churchill wanted British troops to match the Axis, and he tended to regard explanations as excuses.

 

I've really heard it now, are you seriously suggesting the British should have imitated the Axis approach to logistics?

[JohnB]

Originally posted by Sargent:

Churchill came up with some zany off-the-wall plans, but he was coming up with something when all the "pros" came up with were whines and excuses.

 

If Churchill had waited on Brooke & Co., the war would now be in its 65th year...

 

If anything Brooke didn't do enough to rein Churchills fertile mind - the Dieppe disaster, the Aegean adventure and the Arakan abortion come to mind.

 

I presume your opinion of pusillanimity on the part of Brooke is related to the 43/44 invasion controversy, again.