Cold War Submarines

[Gorka L. Martinez-Mezo]

Toshiba sold the 9 axis milling machine while Kongsberg Vaapenfabrik sold the computers and software asociated to it.

 

The multi-axis milling machine for making screws was delivered to Admiralty Yards at Leningrad where Pr 671RTM(K) (Victor III mod) were being built. Severodinsk, Gorkiy and Komsomolsk who build the more advanced (and quiet) 945 and 971 Proects didn't get those machines. And they were way quiter than the improved Victor III.

 

I was under the impression the Toshiba affair did cover the real issue from the Konsberg side, that is, the Soviets getting access state of the art submarine combat systems as fitted to the then building ULA class (Type 210) for the Norwegian navy.

[jakec]

This is quite an interesting article on the subject..

 

http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87/usw/issue_27/asw.html

 

An interesting quote or two:

"In reality, by the mid-1950s the Soviets had discarded any intention of waging an anti-shipping campaign in a new Battle of the Atlantic. "

 

"Based on Walker’s data and other intelligence sources, the Soviets restructured their own naval war plans. The previous American perception was that the U.S. Navy would win “easily, overwhelmingly,” according to a senior U.S. intelligence official.5 “From the late 1970s . . . we obtained special intelligence sources. They were available for about five years, until destroyed by [Aldrich] Ames and others.” Based on those sources, “we learned that there would be more holes in our submarines than we originally thought-we had to rewrite the war plan.”6

[jakec]

Here is another excellent source:

 

http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/npapers/np16...portPaper16.pdf

[Scott Cunningham]

The US tried to stockpile a shitload of equipment in Europe for a war. I think there we 4 division sets in CEGE sites (although I can see them being attacked very early). The plan was for US troops to fly over and fall in on pre-po stocks, rather than load it all up and cross the ocean. Still, there would have been food, ammo, fuel, etc.... crossing the ocean. I give the russians a good shot at stopping it all. They had decent subs, good long range weapons, and NATO didn't have all that many merchant ships. It would have been up for grabs.

[gnocci]

“we learned that there would be more holes in our submarines than we originally thought”

I love this quote

[Christian Lupine]

Here is another excellent source:

 

http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/npapers/np16...portPaper16.pdf

 

That links ask for a password, can you copy it?

[gnocci]

That links ask for a password, can you copy it?

 

weird, i downloaded from that same link, it didn't ask for any password, as it does now.

[philgollin]

Here is another excellent source:

 

http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/npapers/np16...portPaper16.pdf

 

Unfortunately a very partial account - so whether one can depend on some of its claims, I don't know.

 

Certainly the summaries of the "first" and "second" battles are flawed, as are the early (up to mid-50s) ideas on strategy. Some sub details that are declassified (e.g. rafting) are wrong. Whether the overall picture can be counted as correct only those who know the classified details can say.

[Christian Lupine]

weird, i downloaded from that same link, it didn't ask for any password, as it does now.

 

Yes, now I got it with no password required, hmm.

[chico20854]

Most interesting... any chance I could secure an online copy of both papers?

I've finally got around to scanning the 1990 NATO Merchant Ship requirements study.

 

It's in 3 parts, located (hopefully) at:

part 1

part 2 and part 3.

 

Sorry about the advertising and hassle involved with the download, it's free...

[Guest Charles]

I've finally got around to scanning the 1990 NATO Merchant Ship requirements study.

 

It's in 3 parts, located (hopefully) at:

part 1

part 2 and part 3.

 

Sorry about the advertising and hassle involved with the download, it's free...

 

Hi Chico,

Thank you for the links and the information. Much appreciated.

 

Charles

[Richard Young]

Why, after learning at incredibly painful cost that convoys were the way to go in WWI -- and then relearning that lesson even more painfully in WWII -- would the US and Britain abandon it postwar? I mean, detection ranges etc. didn't go up _that_ much...

 

1 ship + cargo = probably not worth a nuke

 

30 - 100 ships + cargo = nuke target

[Guest Charles]

1 ship + cargo = probably not worth a nuke

 

30 - 100 ships + cargo = nuke target

 

Do we assume that by this time, most of Western Europe is glowing in the dark?.

When I was serving in the RN; it was always a moot point as to who would be lobbing the buckets of sunshine first. RN ASW assets at Soviet SSN's, or the Pongos at the Hordes of Soviet tanks bearing down on them. The RN thought it would be the Army, as they would only have 24 - 48 hrs to stop the Red Hordes reaching the Rhine. Us chaps in the GIUK gap would have a little more time to prepare our last telegrams .

 

Charles

[Josh]

1 ship + cargo = probably not worth a nuke

 

30 - 100 ships + cargo = nuke target

 

Good point. Though I think nuking 30+ ships, even in the open Atlantic, would result in nuclear depth charges going off at the slightest contact there on and almost certainly the nuking of the sub and bomber bases on the Kola. The nuclear game always turns WWIII into a poker game; who'd bluff the furthest and who's gonna go all in...

[Guest aevans]

A big problem up until the early 70s is trying to get some sensible idea of how good the homing torpedoes (air-dropped, ship-launched and submarine launched) were.

 

You will get lots of claims from people over detection ranges, but when you try to find out how the detected submarine would have been killed the details disappear in a cloud of either bravaro or quite mumblings.

 

The few people I've managed to actually talk to who I believe are telling the truth tend to indicate the weapons were extremely unreliable and a lot of shots were expected for few results.

 

I used to work with a reserve ASW weapons officer who flew in both P2s and P3s. He never went into any details, of course, but he did say that the only thing that ever really bothered his contemporaries about finding and sinking Soviet subs was the Toshiba affair. So, anecdotally, at least, the guys on the front line thought they had a winning hand, at least until the 1980s.

[PCallahan]

I've finally got around to scanning the 1990 NATO Merchant Ship requirements study.

 

It's in 3 parts, located (hopefully) at:

part 1

part 2 and part 3.

 

Sorry about the advertising and hassle involved with the download, it's free...

 

Thanks for posting these -- very, very interesting. I hadn't appreciated the immense increase in international shipping following the end of WWII.

 

From the looks of it, the Soviets would have had extreme difficulty interdicting a significant amount of NATO shipping. Losses would have to be in the high hundreds before it would have a severe impact on either NATO operations or the ability of the NATO civilian economies to continue to function. It looks like the best bet for the Soviets would be targeting tankers, for which there would have been the tightest demand. However, that may be much easier said than done...

 

Pat

[swerve]

...

 

It looks like the best bet for the Soviets would be targeting tankers, for which there would have been the tightest demand. However, that may be much easier said than done...

 

Pat

 

Might have been easier to target to target oil import terminals.

[Guest Charles]

Might have been easier to target to target oil import terminals.

 

Using SSM's, certainly; provided said oil terminal(s) are within range of Soviet Scuds, Frogs, etc etc. No doubt NATO would be doing the same to them. Using aircraft to bomb those oil facilities might prove a little problematical for the VVS.

 

Oil tankers make a huge amount of acoustic noise (trust me on this ). Not very difficult for Soviet SSN's & SSGN's to get a half decent firing solution (passively). Should there be no NATO ASW assets near by, fire your long range torpedoes or sub launched AsHM's. Then get the hell out of Dodge as quietly as you can.

 

During the late 80's, the RN had a good amount of respect for the top end Soviet sub drivers. They were no bodies fool.

 

Charles

[Corinthian]

I've finally got around to scanning the 1990 NATO Merchant Ship requirements study.

 

It's in 3 parts, located (hopefully) at:

part 1

part 2 and part 3.

 

Sorry about the advertising and hassle involved with the download, it's free...

 

 

Cool! Many thanks.

[chico20854]

Might have been easier to target to target oil import terminals.

 

I think that might have been the way to go, targetting oil infrastructure and ports in general. I imagine it would be a difficult task to identify an oil tanker underway at sea as a tanker (as opposed to a bulk carrier or large container ship) by any method other than visual, aerial or satellite observation - they all probably sound the same and have a similar sized radar return.

[Perun]

On 2/19/2007 at 1:07 AM, chico20854 said:

 

I've just been reading through a couple of books on the US/NATO maritime strategy in the '80s. As far as merchants, there had been several exercises where they tried the "defended sea lane" concept, which seemed to work well but there were nowhere near enough escorts to make it work across the Atlantic. The USN shipbuilding plan included seven military convoy escort groups, each with a Spruance-class DD as flagship and 9 frigates. I haven't found any more info on those convoy groups - where they were supposed to sail, escorting which ships, etc.

 

I also have a copy of a 1990 NATO study on merchant ship availability ("Merchant Shipping for NATO: An Assessment of the Supply and Demand for Merchant Shipping in Crisis and War"), which (in summary) states that projected 1995 peacetime civilian shipping requirements were for almost 12,000 cargo ships. During a period of tension before the outbreak of war, that requirement drops to 8,000 and stabilizes at around 5,500 after the outbreak of war, as rationing kicks in and economies convert to wartime production. The military shipping requirement is about 800 ships during tension, 610 during early war and 400 during an extended war. (The military shipping requirement drops as US forces complete deployment of equipment).

Do you have this in digital?

Links dont work

Edited March 22, 2022 by Perun

[Argus]

16 hours ago, Perun said:

Do you have this in digital?

Links dont work

The links are 14 years old

[Perun]

Did anyone saved / stored them