Cuban Missile Crisis

[Kensuke]

I'd be leery of anything Mac says in hindsight. He is, after all, trying to prop up his image after being correctly outed as the imbecile that engineered Vietnam. He's also trying to score points by bitching about the current war in Iraq.

 

Having Rummy and Les Aspin resign were probably big boosts to his morale.

 

Still the worst SecDef ever IMO.

 

- John

[philgollin]

Hi Phil and Stuart,

 

it is with great trepidation that I insert myself into this conversation, but ...

 

Phil, would those intelligence reports be the infamous national intelligence assessment issued weeks before the missiles were discovered that assessed it well nigh inconceivable that the Soviets would introduce offensive missiles into Cuba? Or the reports from the backchannel secret link to Moscow that assured Kennedy nothing of the sort was planned?

 

I'd certainly be interested in your sources to back up the claim that: "They were purely reactive to the US missiles in Turkey, Italy and arguably the UK." You might also explain how the originally planned deployment of a division of seven Golf-class SSBs to Cuba along with the IRBMs fitted with this alleged dominant motivation.

 

One might try to argue that in fact the main motivation was to secure Cuba from future US military aggression, and be on safer ground, but one would still have to explain the Soviet assessment contained in none other than Foreign Minister Gromyko's own cable of 19 October 1962:

"It is not possible, of course, to be completely insured against USA surprises and adventures, even in the Cuba issue; all the same, taking into account the undeniable objective facts and the corresponding official public statements, and also the assurances given to us that the USA has no plans for intervention in Cuba (which undeniably commits them in many respects), it is possible to say that in these conditions a USA military adventure against Cuba is almost impossible to imagine."

 

Equally, Gromyko & Drobinyn had been arguing staunchly that there was no justification for any US intervention in Cuba because Cuba posed no threat to the security of the US or the Western hemisphere - a seemingly reasonable position (noting of course that the US administration had long maintained that Cuba was analogous to Hungary in their thinking) - if one was not at the same time secretly inserting offensive weapons into Cuba that would undoubtedly mean Cuba could only be perceived as a direct threat to the US.

 

It can be argued that Khrushchev was reckless. In response to Kennedy's public warning of 4 September, and numerous private warnings from US officials, of likely US reaction to offensive weapons in Cuba, he not only plowed ahead with the deployments, but tried to speed them up. He also added further tactical nuclear weapons to the package being deployed into Cuba (which had always included the FKR-1 tactical missiles), ensuring that in any confrontation relatively junior commanders might have the ability to ignite a nuclear conflagaration. The FKR-1 and the Beagles had the range to hit the southern US as well as any invasion fleet.

 

No, sorry if I confused you. I am talking about the "missile gap" intelligence - those covering the supposed huge arsenal of Soviet long-ranged missiles which were known to be false and used publically to scare the western public.

 

And again I note the use of the word "agressive".

 

You seem to be ignoring the nuclear balance through the 50s into the early 60s was heavily in the US's favour with the US having large numbers of bombers able to target military and civil targets in the USSR whilst the Soviets had problems in getting any targets in CONUS other than the extreme north-west (and less reliably so down the west coast and across the northern areas. There were (as noted in my first post) 6 (generally accepted) ICBMs and some diesel-electric IRBM subs that threatened the rest of CONUS, but this did not approach the huge quantity of nuclear threats that the US could summon up against the USSR.

 

Cuba was no more of a threat than Turkey, Italy (and arguably the UK) - the double standard is rather obvious. It is o.k. for the US to place missiles on third-countries to "threaten" the USSR, but not o.k. for the Soviets to do it.

 

Why should the Soviets be "warned" by Kennedy ? What law were they breaking ? What were they doing that the US hadn't already done ? Why are the Soviets regarded as "reckless" ?

 

This is glossed over and ignored by people just blaming the soviets.

[swerve]

That was an exchange adapted at the end, to save face. It had nothing to do with the

crisis and its origins.

 

Edit to add: there were also Thors in the UK, but all were being phased out as Polaris SLBN came on line.

 

The Jupiters in Italy & Turkey pre-dated Soviet missiles in Cuba. Preparations began in 1958. The first Italian ones (Italian-crewed) were operational July 1960, those in Turkey were declared operational April 1962. The USSR was worried about them. In the circumstances, it wasn't exactly provocative to base either missiles or bombers in Cuba: it was exactly what the USA had already done.

[philgollin]

Cheers mate, you are right, that is a compliment.

 

If you can point out the intelligence report given to the White house prior to the crisis, I would be very interested to read it. Ive got an open enough mind to admt Im wrong. But even if Kennedy did know how poorly the soviets were armed, lets face it, they still had the ablity to destroy key american cities. In fact, even if the US had an accurate total on missiles, it could change fairly quickly. the R7 ICBM was based upon the same booster that put Gagarin into space. They only fielded something like 6 missiles, but it strikes me as highly possile considering the advanced state of their space program that they could quickly field more in an emergency but mating warheads to the missiles. And the SS7 ICBM appears to have begun delivery that years, so its evident that things were changing very quickly, as evidenced by Khruschevs statement the next year. You are right that US accendancy was receeding, If anything that may well be another reason why Kennedy was so keen to trade the missiles out as opposed to more agressive means of removing them. If anything, I think it quite clear that bearing in mind the speed Soviet weapons were being built up, the Soviets came out of the crisis with a damn good trade.

 

I do try to keep the them and us to a minimum, but its hard when you read something like Anna Funders Stasiland and realise what it was really like the other side of the curtain. Despite democracies evident flaws, there was true evil in communism, which to my mind coldwar US rhetoric does not disguise. OK, there were many decent people who were communists, and frankly despite his flaws, I do actually like Khrushchev for the simple reason that unlike his antecedents (up to Gorby anyway) he was a genuine reformer. I dont regard the US (or indeed ourselves) in the cold war as utterly blameless, but Im increasingly of the opinion that as the right side won, it was invariably due to the fact that were were more open, more honest and frankly less warmongering that the majority of those in the Kremlin. I dont recall the US making a single move with nuclear weapons that was not revealed to the Soviets first, and that goes all the way back to the dropping of the first one. That kind of openness was non existant in the Soviet union, and IMHO played a large part in the creation of the crisis.

 

I think we are always going to disagree on this, and thats fine. Like I say if you can pinpoint that briefing document I would like to see it.

 

Jakec I totally agree, Khrushchev was reckless, though in all fairness I can see WHY. The US was being agressive to cuba (im sorry, but thats how the Soviets would understandably have seen it) and Khrushchev, damaged by his inablity to stay friends with Mao, could not be seen to allow relations to ship with another comrade, particularly one so charismatic. If anything, he was more a prisoner of world events than Kennedy was. Good call on the Gromyko telegram, Id not seen that. In all fairness though, Khrushchev despite many excellent qualities were near totally unable to listen to advice that didnt agree with what he thought. So Im not surprised it made no impact.

The irony is, if he had ONLY deployed the Frogs and told the US he was deploying, the crisis would almost certainly have been avoided, and Khrushchev could boast in public that he had gain an important concession and protected Castro. As it was, he gained most of what he wanted, and made to look like he was forced to back down.

 

Kensuke, I totally agree. One should always be wary of any individual who was involved in the creation of the Ford Edsel, the F111 and early versions of the M16 rifle. In fairness to him, apparently very early on (1965) he saw the US would be very unlikely to win Vietnam, and told Johnson so. Curiously he didnt recommend the US should pull out. No, I still cant work that one out either....

If you want to read up on a really intelligent defence analyst, they only one really to my mind of any merit was Solly Zuckerman. Hell, there is a good case for suggesting that he actually invented the discipline. Not bad for someone I understand started life as a Zoologist...

 

See the link I posted on the "missile gap", or any of a number of similar.

 

You are easy to praise Kennedy on the "trading" issue, without noting that the crisis was of his making in the first place by his trying to stop the Soviets reacting to the existing US missiles.

 

I can't and won't defend the soviets, but it is wrong to use something like that to either ignore the facts of life at that time (the massive US nuclear dominance - with of course massive Soviet dominance on mainland Europe) or the timing of the various moves which showed the US was increasing its threat (whether "aggressive" or "defensive" against the USSR by placing IRBMs in third countries. Why do you think "revealing" nuclear weapons somehow doesn't make them a threat when the power "revealing" them has a huge advantage in such weapons ? Where is the logic there ?

 

You keep avoiding the basic issues that the US had already deployed massive effective nuclear forces against the USSR, including IRBMs in third countries and then promptly created a crisis when the USSR tried to do the same.

[Ken Estes]

Curiously, for all the strategic recklessness on both sides, the main winner was the Soviet Navy. It was conventional weakness that trumped the plans of the USSR, once both sides had gone to strategic alert. Such was not lost on K or his successors, Brezhnev-Kosygin. The strategic arms race by 1963 made any notions of missile and bomber gaps irrelevant. The rise of the Rus navy, already in the works, received a most powerful impetus.

[Jim Martin]

Right Phil, we come to the nub of the reason you started this whole thread. I'll say it for you--it was all the Americans' fault, victimizing those poor Soviets.

 

There, happy?

 

Let's move on to your next pet peeve against the US, shall we?

[jakec]

No, sorry if I confused you. I am talking about the "missile gap" intelligence - those covering the supposed huge arsenal of Soviet long-ranged missiles which were known to be false and used publically to scare the western public.

 

And again I note the use of the word "agressive".

 

You seem to be ignoring the nuclear balance through the 50s into the early 60s was heavily in the US's favour with the US having large numbers of bombers able to target military and civil targets in the USSR whilst the Soviets had problems in getting any targets in CONUS other than the extreme north-west (and less reliably so down the west coast and across the northern areas. There were (as noted in my first post) 6 (generally accepted) ICBMs and some diesel-electric IRBM subs that threatened the rest of CONUS, but this did not approach the huge quantity of nuclear threats that the US could summon up against the USSR.

 

Cuba was no more of a threat than Turkey, Italy (and arguably the UK) - the double standard is rather obvious. It is o.k. for the US to place missiles on third-countries to "threaten" the USSR, but not o.k. for the Soviets to do it.

 

Why should the Soviets be "warned" by Kennedy ? What law were they breaking ? What were they doing that the US hadn't already done ? Why are the Soviets regarded as "reckless" ?

 

This is glossed over and ignored by people just blaming the soviets.

 

Sorry Phil, but I'm wondering if it was really my post you replied to. I never used the word "aggressive" at all to describe Soviet actions so I'm not sure where you got that from??

 

You provide no evidence of Soviet motivations beyond assertions. Again, where is the evidence that US deployments in Turkey et al were the dominant factor driving the deployment in Cuba?

 

You seem to conflate the global strategic balance with the deployments in Cuba/Turkey/etc. Which is it? Surely the deployment in Cuba was, as Khrushchev is alleged to have said, primarily an attempt to shortcut the global strategic imbalance and put the USSR in a position of dominance (USSR being otherwise in a sorry position as all agree).

 

I'm at a loss to see what other response you would expect from the Americans on discovery of this sneak attempt to put the USSR in pole position. I very much doubt that any Western European allies would be happy for the US to simply respond by saying "Oh well, you got us now, we'll have to rethink some of our policies".

Edited January 31, 2007 by jakec

[philgollin]

Right Phil, we come to the nub of the reason you started this whole thread. I'll say it for you--it was all the Americans' fault, victimizing those poor Soviets.

 

There, happy?

 

Let's move on to your next pet peeve against the US, shall we?

 

Oh dear, more paranoid imaginings.

 

I did not start the thread, I merely objected to the question "Cromwell" poised :

 

"...... Was it ever established why the Soviets pursued this rather reckless gambit? " and particularly the use of the word "reckless"

 

Why do you wish to be seen as a victim instead of looking at the facts ?

Edited January 31, 2007 by philgollin

[Jim Martin]

"Victim"? Hah, I'd hardly feel subject to victimization by you, Phil. I am just recognizing and calling you out on a continued pattern in all your postings: the US/Western Civilization is wrong/bad/the aggressors/blah, blah, blah, while the enemies of civilization/forces of tyranny (USSR, terrorists, beheading Islamofascist savages) are all the victims/merely reacting to bad/illegal behavior on the part of the United States.

 

You're a cartoon of yourself. See my avatar, Phil.

[philgollin]

"Victim"? Hah, I'd hardly feel subject to victimization by you, Phil. I am just recognizing and calling you out on a continued pattern in all your postings: the US/Western Civilization is wrong/bad/the aggressors/blah, blah, blah, while the enemies of civilization/forces of tyranny (USSR, terrorists, beheading Islamofascist savages) are all the victims/merely reacting to bad/illegal behavior on the part of the United States.

 

You're a cartoon of yourself. See my avatar, Phil.

 

If you think imagining things is "calling" someone out, I think you had better examine you thought processes.

 

If you actually have some sort of facts to dispute those posted, then please feel free, but just raving about things is hardly sensible.

 

Your generalised claims about my pattern of posting also shows your inability to actually read and understand posts and your disire to blame others for your own imaginings. Why not try understanding what is posted instead of going off on a tangent having either not understood or actually imagined something. It might help you have something sensible to say.

[Jim Martin]

If you think imagining things is "calling" someone out, I think you had better examine you thought processes.

 

If you actually have some sort of facts to dispute those posted, then please feel free, but just raving about things is hardly sensible.

 

Your generalised claims about my pattern of posting also shows your inability to actually read and understand posts and your disire to blame others for your own imaginings. Why not try understanding what is posted instead of going off on a tangent having either not understood or actually imagined something. It might help you have something sensible to say.

 

I and quite a few others have been observing your patterns of posting and your political outlook for quite a while, and your agenda is pretty clear, Phil. You're not worth debating. Have fun.

[philgollin]

I made a rather long reply and are somewhat irritated by the fact that the internet seems to have eaten it. Suffice to say, I think comparing US and Soviet emplacements of nuclear weapons are a mistake. The US notified and made it clear of its deployments, the Soviets did not. Now whilst accepting that the soviets did it for defensive purproses (so did we for that matter) the fact the soviets told nobody of the deployment made it easy to interpret it as a hostile move. They denied deploying, and still denied it even when they were called out over it, and increased the speed of setting the weapons up! Can you believe the US would have behaved so recklessly? I sinceirely doubt it. It could easily be interpreted as a hostile act, particularly in the context of only a year after the Berlin wall going up, and continued threats over the security of Berlin. The US simply had to respond to that kind of apparent threat, or jeopardise their responsiblities around the world.

 

The link you posted Phil is interesting, but it is still only one mans opinion. I will have a look on the FOIA CIA website and see if there are any relievant documents. Suffice to say, you do raise an interesting point. But look at this link for a moment before passing judgement.

 

http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/imint/corona.htm

 

If this is correct (and lord knows fas have got it wrong before) it seems to indicate that the bulk of the corona footage came AFTER the crisis, and compared to what came later, the actual technical quality of the footage would appear to be relatively low. So whilst accepting that the US intelligence community may well have stirred the pot (I know SAC certainly did), it still doest change a great deal. The Soviets STILL could hit key US targets before and after the crisis. And the US concept of acceptable damage was a hell of a lot lower than what the Soviets would have put up with. Signifcantly Kennedy did NOT resond to taunts from hardline advisors the soviets could not respond, which to me indicates he was dead set on cutting a deal whatever his knowledge of soviet missile strength.

 

Let me look at this, im off with a bloody awful cold for the next couple of days so it should keep my mind off things at least.

 

If we do as you suggest and ignore the exsisting nuclear emplacements then what are we discussing - some sort of theoretical experiment ? The facts at the time were the basis upon which decisions were made, to ignore the US dominance and previously emplaced missiles just ignores the actual problem.

 

I note now that both sides missiles have become "defensive" which is interesting.

 

You give no reasons for the Soviets to need to make any preliminary announcement. There was no requirement. They were their missiles going to a third country that was happy to have them and broke no laws in their emplacement.

 

You seem to think that the US was totally open and honest about all things. Yes they were more open about things than the USSR (almost by definition) but that does not mean that the USSR had to do the same thing. The US had a nuclear dominance so the USSR had a severe problem on the nuclear front. In western Europe did the US announce where all the firing positions were for its tactical nuclear weapons ?

 

You, I think, are saying that the placing of the missiles on Cuba were a "hostile act" and "an apparent threat". If so, what were the previously installed missiles in Turkey, Italy (and arguably the UK) ? One cannot be that skewed.

 

Their "responsibilities around the World" means that they had nuclear dominance and that had an effect on the USSR which meant that they kicked back. (look at the arguments regarding GLCMs and Pershing versus the Soviet installation of SS.20s). Arguing only one way forms a crisis and also makes it difficult to acheive a sensible solution to a crisis.

 

Your point about "acceptable damage" is interesting and relevent, BUT the real problem is knowing what the military, intelligence and especially the politicians REALLY thought as opposed to the posturing, both public and private. There is no doubt that the "bomber gap" and "missile gap" were both highly provocative, both domestically and internationally. Whether, in a very cold-blooded way, they were good gambles or merely acts that led to escalation can be argued either way. The US had its hawks (and the Soviets sometimes seemed to have problems finding publically open doves - although they were more so behind the scenes). There is no doubt that both sides thought a nuclear war was possible even in the early 60s, but that died a few years later when the installation of ICBMs and SLBMs brought MAD to the fore and the philosophy (nay theology) of deterence was enshirned in political actions on both sides.

 

(Try brandy and honey for the cold)

[philgollin]

Sorry Phil, but I'm wondering if it was really my post you replied to. I never used the word "aggressive" at all to describe Soviet actions so I'm not sure where you got that from??

 

You provide no evidence of Soviet motivations beyond assertions. Again, where is the evidence that US deployments in Turkey et al were the dominant factor driving the deployment in Cuba?

 

You seem to conflate the global strategic balance with the deployments in Cuba/Turkey/etc. Which is it? Surely the deployment in Cuba was, as Khrushchev is alleged to have said, primarily an attempt to shortcut the global strategic imbalance and put the USSR in a position of dominance (USSR being otherwise in a sorry position as all agree).

 

I'm at a loss to see what other response you would expect from the Americans on discovery of this sneak attempt to put the USSR in pole position. I very much doubt that any Western European allies would be happy for the US to simply respond by saying "Oh well, you got us now, we'll have to rethink some of our policies".

 

(The word "aggressive" was used at the time and in previous posts as a description (and justification) for US actions.)

 

Your second and thrid paragraphs confuse me as you first claim that there is no evidence that the placing of missiles in Turkey (and Italy and arguably the UK) was a driving factor for the Soviets and then state that the placing of missiles in Cuba was part of an attempt at nuclear "dominance" (strange considering that the nuclear dominance both before the crisis and even afterwords if the missiles had been completely installed would be with the US. Likewise your statement that I am confabulating the IRBM with the global strategic balance when they actually were a major factor in the global balance as there were only 6 (general opinion) ICBMs in the world and that the only SLBMs the soviets could launch were a very limited number from diesel-electric subs. If you ignore the nuclear dominance of the US then of course the picture will be skewed.

 

There is no way that installing IRBMs would put the USSR "in pole position". The US had a massive bomber and IRBM advantage as well as nuclear capable carriers. The US wanted to stop the Soviets from doing what they already had done - emplace IRBMs that targetted the homeland from a friendly third country. Add in the fact that people knew that proper ICBM installations were only a few years away then the crisis seems a hell of a gamble

[philgollin]

I and quite a few others have been observing your patterns of posting and your political outlook for quite a while, and your agenda is pretty clear, Phil. You're not worth debating. Have fun.

 

So, instead of actually dealing with the facts or with your imaginings you wonder off in a huff, great.

[jakec]

(The word "aggressive" was used at the time and in previous posts as a description (and justification) for US actions.)

 

Your second and thrid paragraphs confuse me as you first claim that there is no evidence that the placing of missiles in Turkey (and Italy and arguably the UK) was a driving factor for the Soviets and then state that the placing of missiles in Cuba was part of an attempt at nuclear "dominance" (strange considering that the nuclear dominance both before the crisis and even afterwords if the missiles had been completely installed would be with the US. Likewise your statement that I am confabulating the IRBM with the global strategic balance when they actually were a major factor in the global balance as there were only 6 (general opinion) ICBMs in the world and that the only SLBMs the soviets could launch were a very limited number from diesel-electric subs. If you ignore the nuclear dominance of the US then of course the picture will be skewed.

 

There is no way that installing IRBMs would put the USSR "in pole position". The US had a massive bomber and IRBM advantage as well as nuclear capable carriers. The US wanted to stop the Soviets from doing what they already had done - emplace IRBMs that targetted the homeland from a friendly third country. Add in the fact that people knew that proper ICBM installations were only a few years away then the crisis seems a hell of a gamble

 

Still awaiting any evidence to support your view that specifically the US missiles in Turkey et al were the motivation for the deployments to Cuba.

 

Still awaiting your evidence why this was not a "reckless gambit". Soviets had been told time and again by US how they would respond to introduction of what US defined as offensive weapons into Cuba. Soviets not only ignored these warnings, but accelerated schedule to introduce the weapons in secret. (please note this is not an invitation for a rant about US hypocrisy - the issue is whether it is "reckless" to disregard plain warnings and continue with an action you should know will have grave consequences for international peace).

[philgollin]

Still awaiting any evidence to support your view that specifically the US missiles in Turkey et al were the motivation for the deployments to Cuba.

 

Still awaiting your evidence why this was not a "reckless gambit". Soviets had been told time and again by US how they would respond to introduction of what US defined as offensive weapons into Cuba. Soviets not only ignored these warnings, but accelerated schedule to introduce the weapons in secret. (please note this is not an invitation for a rant about US hypocrisy - the issue is whether it is "reckless" to disregard plain warnings and continue with an action you should know will have grave consequences for international peace).

 

 

Oh dear, please read your own post and my reply.

 

The fact that the US thought IRBMs in a third country which threatened the heartland of the "enemy" just shows the hypocrisy as the US had already done so and helps demonstrate my argument that the crisis was of US origin trying to keep hold of its nuclear dominance for two or three years longer than otherwise.

 

If you don't think it is "reckless" to play nuclear chicken by being hypocritical about nuclear basing and stopping another country from doing something it was perfectly entitled to, then I'm afraid I can't agree with you at all.

[philgollin]

Phil, Im not sure at what point I suggested the soviet emplacement was not defensive, but of course it was because

A it aimed to gain parity with the west in nuclear weapons more quickly. That arguably can be seen as defensive.

B It aimed to defend cuba. Again, that is a defensive response

 

The only problem with all that is that the way it was done could easily be misinterpreted. Indeed, going back to the tapes, its interesting to note how many times that it was concluded that it was a move to put pressure on Berlin. Of course Khrushchev saw Berlin in another light, as a mean to apply pressure on the west when he found it convienient. Or squeesing the balls of the west has he collequially put it.

 

Sure I can be that skewed, Im ill. But again, we are all down to perception. Whatever Khrushchevs motivations (and I think it fair to conclude he didnt wish to antagonise America to the brink of war) its all down to perception. Viewed in the prism of the cold war, actions by the Soviets looked hostile when in some ways they were not so far removed from American actions, and even in the White house, there was little ablity to view such moves in that light. Looked at another way, suppose Kennedy had put the number of missiles in Turkey (which had newly defected from the communist bloc) that was put in to Cuba (there was only 15 in Turkey, there were signficantly more in Cuba), and then didnt even have the grace to say 'Oh by the way, we are putting these in. But its defensive only' then I think the soviet would be very well placed to go a little ape, particularly if they had the means to do something about it. In fact, you could easily argue why the soviets put up with provocative actions like the U2 overflights was due to the fact they couldnt react to it.

In the event, its clear the UK missiles were a different issue, since we already had a nuclear capblity, and were already developing our own IRBMs.

 

In this round about fashion, I can only say Khrushchev in my opinion could have got away with his actions if he had

A been honest about it and told the Americans up front what he was doing. Even Mcnamara admits in that position the US would have had its hands tied.

B If he had got a lot of complaints about it, took it straight to the UN and point out that he was only doing what the US was doing.

C Have been really smart to have kept it to Frogs or even Scuds.

 

He didnt do any of that, and whilst admitting in hindsight that it could be argued to be similar to US actions, the US was considerably more open in its nuclear strategy than the Soviets. If it was a US trap (and I dont see that it was) he walked right into it with his eyes shut.

 

I would argue that that knowledge you mention of future Soviet intentions (future ICBM developments, which arguably would probably be known from Penkovskys information) would if anything be likely to persuade the US to be more cautious and take the action of a peaceful resolution. After all, much is made of the Jupiter missiles in Cuba, but they were very nearly withdrawn the previous year, and their removal if anything was an advantage, since they were replaced by Polaris. Why risk a nuclear war over inadequate weapons, particularly as even if successful in removing the cuban missiles, the long range soviet ICBMs would soon replace them. That I think is part of the reason for the successful resolution, there simply was no gain in a military removal of the missiles (or an invasion) if that would sour soviet relations just as weapons to replace them was coming online.

 

Jakec, there is evidence the jupiter missiles was on Khrushchevs mind, since he did mention to one of his marshals why at his Dacha on the Black sea about being unable to respond to them. Additionally, it was Khrushchev (who may have been responding to an idea mooted by the Austrian president) they they do a trade for the Turkish missiles by removing the Cuban ones. It was certainly on his mind, but I still think the Cuban issue and the ablility to gain nuclear parity that were the driving forces. Tweaking the nose of the Americans may have been another reason, but there is no real proof of that.

 

I wouldnt call the Soviet actions reckless, since there WAS a chance it could have succeeded if the CIA hadnt been on the ball. On the other hand, I think even th most ardent Khrushchev admirer would admit that it was poorly thought out, and lack of consideration had been given to what would happen if they got caught setting the missiles up. I really wonder if anyone suggest to Nikita to actually come clean about the operation, because if anything that would certainly made him (and Cuba) look victims in the UN, and probably boosted his popularity no end. Ill considered might be a better term for it then.

 

Sod the brandy mate, im hitting the whiskey.

 

 

If one only looks at things from ones own side then one can bend logic to any shape one wishes. Whilst it got more mature when the real age of deterrance came into effect, it has never been sensible to only look at a single side when looking at national policy (e.g. the Japanese rather weird ideas prior to WW2).

 

The Soviet actions were not "not so far removed from American actions", they were much less. Only one country having IRBMs aimed at the other country (not 3), no huge bomber fleet capable of hitting the heartland of the enemy and no nuclear capable task forces. The US weren't that so ill-informed !

 

You ignore the Italian missiles and the UK missiles I've always noted as "arguable" because one can argue either way due to the dual key and strategic nature of the weapons.

 

I don't think I can really agree with your ideas about prior notification as there is nothing that the Soviets didwhich would have changed if the prior notification had occured. The Soviets did everything legally, the US did not.

 

The Soviets had a jaded view of the UN and why should the USSR not counter IRBMs aimed at their heartland by emplacing similar missiles ?

 

Why do you only consider the Soviet actions to be similar to US ones only in hindsight ? Did the US not know of its nuclear bombers, aircraft carriers and missiles ?

 

Your views on the future growth of ICBMs and SLBMs versus the Jupiter missiles in (Cuba) Italy and Italy comes to the very reason for the crisis. The US knew what weapons systems were coming and the approximate timescale and yet still were willing to go to the line on Cuba despite their own arsenal and actions. Why ? That "why ?" is the big question that has not really ben addressed by the historian either then or now. The US would still have had a huge advantage in nuclear weapons, but MAD (or possibly more correctly "MAD-light") would have been around maybe 3 years earlier than in real life. The risk taken for those three years doesn't seem reasonable to me, but MAYBE was seen to be reasonable at the time, especially as the US were unaware that some warheads had already made it to Cuba.

 

No I wouldn't call the Soviet actions reckless, but I would call US actions reckless, hypocritical and most especially short-term for little return. It is strange how the bringing of the world to the brink of nuclear war for such poor reasons some how gets a "pass" from so many people.

 

(Brandy versus Whisky - well to each their own)

[Old Tanker]

Some other considerations.

* I've read where Castro pleaded for the missiles since JFK was out to get him.

Bay of Pigs , Alpha 66 raids , defoliant for his beard.

* The Missile Gap was a JFK issue in the '60 election , that's when Dems were for a strong military. But I don't know how much proof was known . The Russians had been quite good at heavy payloads into space. Nixon however wouldn't refute JFK's claim or debate it. I do believe a Col. Penkovsky in the USSR gave accurate info to the U.S. and was executed for doing it. So doubts did exist about the Missile Gap.

 

If the truth about 10-60 tactical nukes in Cuba had been known that really would of stirred the pot but the U.S. didn't find about them until 1990-1.

[Hellfish6]

Does anyone have a list or a link to a list of the US Army and Marine units earmarked for an invasion of Cuba in '62?

[Adam Peter]

https://www.youtube.com/post/UgyZ-PWZsIG_VK_OcWJ4AaABCQ

[Stuart Galbraith]

Thats amazing, ive never seen that photo before.

[Adam Peter]

On 11/6/2020 at 9:07 AM, Stuart Galbraith said:

Thats amazing, ive never seen that photo before.

An off photo from the era, tried to send via message but did not work: https://www.youtube.com/post/Ugy5wSg_119Mv3zFqjZ4AaABCQ

Quote

A KGB agent runs through the night to escape capture in Wellington, New Zealand in September 1974. KGB agent Dimitri Aleksandrovich Razgovorov runs through the night to escape capture in Wellington, New Zealand, after his source is arrested following a clandestine meeting in September 1974. New Zealand's Security Intelligence Service had surrounded the meeting site intent on capturing Razgovorov and his source, senior government official and economist William Sutch. However, a sudden burst of rain (pictured) obscured their view and caused the suspects to cut their meeting short, allowing Razgovorov to escape in the confusion. Sutch was tried in New Zealand's only espionage case in history, but was acquitted in 1975. Nearly 40 years later, unearthed KGB documents proved that Sutch had been a recruited asset since 1950, code name 'Maori'.

 

Edited November 9, 2020 by Adam Peter
Description of the photo to fight bit rust and link rot

[Ariete!]

All very informative, thanks.

did the two sides *actually* ever come close to launching?

[Stuart Galbraith]

October 27th 1962, the day they shot the U2 down. Even RAF Bomber Command was on ground alert ready to go if the call came.

https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/161480

[Roman Alymov]

On 11/6/2020 at 10:49 AM, Adam Peter said:

https://www.youtube.com/post/UgyZ-PWZsIG_VK_OcWJ4AaABCQ

Seems like their sources are frozen in time....According to this link, "The crisis had in large part been mitigated due to the placement of an incredible CIA source within the Soviet GRU; Colonel Oleg Penkovsky. He provided accurate intelligence on missile placement in Cuba. The CIA went to great lengths to protect his identity, including giving the impression that the information was coming from multiple sources, not just one.”

But in reality, “But it wasn’t until nearly thirty years afterward that we learned, from General Gribkov’s testimony at a January 1992 conference here in this room in Havana, that the nuclear warheads for both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons had already reached Cuba before the quarantine line was established—162 nuclear warheads in all. If the president had gone ahead with the air strike and invasion of Cuba, the invasion forces almost surely would have been met by nuclear fire, requiring a nuclear response from the United States.

At the January 1992 Havana conference, we on the U.S. Side were shocked by this information.” (http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_11/cubanmissile.asp )

So now we know that Colonel Oleg Penkovsky’s information was not accurate (or, another option, this information was manipulated by somebody in US Intelligence community to make US decision makers believe it is safe to attack Cuba). If information was not manipulated, then it makes fairytale story of “Penkovsky was cremated alive” look like perfect cover of successful disinformation campaign.