Cuban Missile Crisis

[Cromwell]

In the Cuban Missile Crisis:

 

1. Who was the US Journalist that acted as a back door neogiating conduit?

2. Did he ever speak or write about it later?

3. When was that part of the crisis made public?

4. In the film 13 Days, the Soviet TASS Journalist was a KGB offocer and personal friend of Kruschiev. Was that true?

5. Was it ever established why the Soviets pursued this rather reckless gambit?

[Richard Lindquist]

In the Cuban Missile Crisis:

 

1. Who was the US Journalist that acted as a back door neogiating conduit?

2. Did he ever speak or write about it later?

3. When was that part of the crisis made public?

4. In the film 13 Days, the Soviet TASS Journalist was a KGB offocer and personal friend of Kruschiev. Was that true?

5. Was it ever established why the Soviets pursued this rather reckless gambit?

 

 

5. Earlier at a "summit" meeting, Khruschev got the impression that John F. Kennedy could be pushed around. As a result, the Soviets tried to push the envelope a bit.

[RETAC21]

5. Earlier at a "summit" meeting, Khruschev got the impression that John F. Kennedy could be pushed around. As a result, the Soviets tried to push the envelope a bit.

 

And they needed to prop up Castro in the face of American interference.

[philgollin]

5. Was it ever established why the Soviets pursued this rather reckless gambit?

 

What was "reckless" about it ? It was perfectly legal and merely mirrored existing US missile systems.

[Ken Estes]

What was "reckless" about it ? It was perfectly legal and merely mirrored existing US missile systems.

Well, it was reckless in that an unspoken rule of the Cold War was never to confront directly; Berlin61 was a bit of a scare, but

Cuba came perhaps the closest, as both sides had sufficient nucs/delivery systems to make a mess of each other. Also, in

this case, both sides went to maximum alert a little too fast.

Remember Bedford Incident? I was always leary of navies being the first to have contact, as they tend to be naive about the consequences

of initiating actions, best left with soldiers, who can consider the prospects at closer quarters.

[Luckyorwhat]

Well, it was reckless in that an unspoken rule of the Cold War was never to confront directly; Berlin61 was a bit of a scare, but

Cuba came perhaps the closest, as both sides had sufficient nucs/delivery systems to make a mess of each other. Also, in

this case, both sides went to maximum alert a little too fast.

Remember Bedford Incident? I was always leary of navies being the first to have contact, as they tend to be naive about the consequences

of initiating actions, best left with soldiers, who can consider the prospects at closer quarters.

 

IRBMs in Turkey -> IRBMs in Cuba.

[Ken Estes]

IRBMs in Turkey -> IRBMs in Cuba.

That was an exchange adapted at the end, to save face. It had nothing to do with the

crisis and its origins.

 

Edit to add: there were also Thors in the UK, but all were being phased out as Polaris SLBN came on line.

Edited January 25, 2007 by Ken Estes

[philgollin]

Well, it was reckless in that an unspoken rule of the Cold War was never to confront directly; Berlin61 was a bit of a scare, but

Cuba came perhaps the closest, as both sides had sufficient nucs/delivery systems to make a mess of each other. Also, in

this case, both sides went to maximum alert a little too fast.

Remember Bedford Incident? I was always leary of navies being the first to have contact, as they tend to be naive about the consequences

of initiating actions, best left with soldiers, who can consider the prospects at closer quarters.

 

No. Depending on ones point of view it can be seen as the last gasp of US nuclear (as opposed to conventional) dominance or a first attempt at open Soviet nuclear deterrence "negotiating".

 

At the time of Cuba the US still had a massive advantage in nuclear bombers and the USSR's ICBMs were only just becoming available (the general opinion seems to be approx 6 available) The US had jupiters in Turkey and Italy and arguably in Britain (the political story of the UK/US Thors in the UK is complicated). Cuba was merely a way of the USSR getting missile parity earlier than waiting for more ICBMs.

 

It was really a point in the cold war when a new "dynamic" had to be found from a US strategic advantage to a more balanced nuclear stand-off.

 

It certainly was a dangerous moment, but don't mix up the reasons for it.

[Ken Estes]

....

 

It certainly was a dangerous moment, but don't mix up the reasons for it.

Well, I never gave any reasons for it, so what have I mixed up? I said it was reckless and

it certainly was, since both sides went to strategic alert.

 

Also, do not assume that we knew we had superiority in missiles, since space recce remained in its infancy,

& large tracts of the USSR were not covered.

[philgollin]

Well the legal thing is a bit debateable. it certainly didnt break any international rules, but it was the first (and last) time the Soviets ever based Nuclear weapons outside the Soviet union (I dont think they even officially based them in Pact countries). The irony is that if the Soviets had been honest about it, its likely the Kennedy administration would have let them do it, since they could have avoided taking a position on it. Ie the sovs say they are deploying 50 weapons, the Americans say ' Ok, but no more than 50'. By denying they were deploying, Kennedy could say 'Right, no nukes in Cuba' and take a strong position. It was taking stances like that which defined that period of the cold war, and part of the reason I think why Kennedy was so dead set against a military solution. He identified pretty early on that it was a Political problem with a Political solution.

 

I wouldnt overlook the fact that Khrushchev (Im sure I spelt that wrong, but I want to go to bed...) was influenced by the turkey missiles. He apparently raised the issue while on holiday at his black sea dacha, so it was obviously on his mind. I think his prioritisation was something like this.

1 Get nuclear parity with America which would open up all kinds of negotiating possiblities.

2 Prop up Castro. After the falling out with China, it was vital that he maintain his station as leader of the communist world, and that he wasnt willing to back off against the capitalists.

3 He was irked by the fact that he was encircled by lots of nuclear missiles, and he had limited ablity to point them at the Americans. Call it a fit of pique if you will.

 

There is an excellent biography of old Nikita (I can look it out if anyone is interested) that gives a good analysis of his mindset. In someways he mixed up his own belief of being slighted with that of his country, IE, make me look like a fool, you insult Russia. Not unlike De Gaulle in that respect. Therefore trivialities could frequently distract him from what was important and beset what was best for his country. The best example of that was the U2 incident. He already embaressed America, but played the card too hard. If he had been smart, he could have played the victim card at the summit, and perhaps even got some concessions for going easy on them. Just my view of course.

 

The Irony of all this, is that Khrushchev was terrified of nuclear weapons, and thought that no sane man would ever use them, ergo he saw it fit to sabre rattle with them to gain his own ends. There is a contradiction in there tha, reasonably intelligent man though he was, he wasnt smart enough to see it till it was almost too late.

 

Absolutely no doubt it was legal. No debate about that at all.

 

The only illegal activities were such things as overflights of Cuba and the Cuban "quarantine" / Blockade.

 

Both the Soviets and the US knew that the earliest Soviet ICBMs were being produced and installed and that improved versions were being produced, so the "crisis" was very much about sabre rattling from the US side as they knew their RELATIVE immunity was going to disappear.

 

With HINDSIGHT one can see how pointless he "crisis" was and how much the humiliation of Khruskov in front of his communist peers led to a worse cold war situation, but then hindsight is a wonderful thing.

[philgollin]

Legality in the cold war was really a bit meaningless. Putting up the Berlin wall was perfectly legal, but of course I dont think anyone would agree that it was a morally correct action. When the Soviets were told they were in a court of international opinion at the UN, that was perfectly true, and in that respect, the Soviets had a very poor case and the Americans had a flawed, yet rather better one. It helped that noone other than the Soviets or Cubans knew of the American sabotage efforts in Cuba for example, which had a very strong influence on the creation of the crisis.

 

The Americans at the time thought the Soviet Rocket forces were considerably stronger than they were numerically. Certainly Penkovsky gave good information on the quality of Soviet equipment, but I get the impression the Americans thought there was considerably more of it. So at the time, the Americans thought that even if the Cuban missiles stayed, it didnt actually change the balance of military power, since they already assumed they were very vulnerable. In hindsight I think the US before cuba was very hard for the Soviets to hit, though arguably if Washington and New York were destroyed (and highly likely the Sovs had the ablity to do just that), that would have been sufficient for Kennedy, clearly those 2 cities alone would have been unacceptable damage. Therefore, we can truthfully say that at the time it didnt change the ablity of the soviets to inflict unacceptable damage, and thats true even in hindsight.

 

Of course I would suggest that the excellent transcripts available from the Kennedy tapes suggest that Kennedy from the start was moved to make a deal. Clearly at the start he (almost alone) believed that it was a pointless crisis, and in all fairness, one that he, as much as Khruschev, was guilty of creating. In all credit to him though, he showed distinct creativity in solving it without firing a shot, which ironically may have contributed to his loosing his life the following year. Khrushchevs inablity to get a handle on it pretty much doomed the rest of his career.

 

The "missile gap" like the previous "bomber gap" are now considered to be deliberate mis-information campaigns which the White House and intelligence agencies knew to be false.

 

At the time of the Cuban Missile crisis the only threat to the majority of the continental USA was from a few sub launched IRBMs from diesel electric subs, the nominal 6 ICBMs and however many soviet bombers that would be commited to a one-way suicide mission (presumably most of them). It was only the north-west of the CONUS that was directly threatened by non-suicide bombers and IRBMs.

 

You ignore the overwhelming nuclear forces that the US had arrainged against the Soviet homeland and hence "forget" the political dynamics of the time. It was somewhat laughable for the US to be critical of the USSR trying to do what they had already done.

 

The crisis was a waste of time because the development of ICBMs was so far along, and the idea that the crisis was a Russian one is somewhat distorting of history.

 

Kennedy lied about the outcome (and background) to the crisis and came out of it relatively well. Khruschev got thrown to the dogs and the west suffered for it by getting Breshnev.

 

If you wish to ignore the actual missile (and bomber) deployment and development situation and the west's knowledge of same, then of course it will not be as real life.

[TSJ]

1. Who was the US Journalist that acted as a back door neogiating conduit?

2. Did he ever speak or write about it later?

3. When was that part of the crisis made public?

4. In the film 13 Days, the Soviet TASS Journalist was a KGB offocer and personal friend of Kruschiev. Was that true?

 

1. John Scali ABC news

 

2. Yes

 

3. !974-76? can't remember.

 

4. KGB officer yes. Personal friend, I don't think so.

[atst]

Chrustchov better then Breshnev? not an easy decision. On one side Chrustchov seeked closer relations with the west on the other side he was less predictable.

 

Soviets knew that US had giant advantage in strategic bombers and couldn't do anything about that. Then there were US-missiles in turkey, directly at soviet borders. Turkey isn't an island, soviets could hardly blockade it (they even hadn't a serious navy by this time) so couldn't do anything about that either. But unlike the bomber gap, in case of "missiles-at-borders"-issue they could at least reach parity what they tried in cuba. Now it's not certain if this was the main motive of Chrutschow, but it was certainly justified from objective point of view (if you expect us to tolerate missiles at our borders so you have too). Luckily the parity was reached by removing the missiles from Turkey and Cuba each. Surely better then having them permanently aimed at each other.

[philgollin]

The Bomber Gap was known to be false due to the U2 footage. Since that has ceased to be a viable source since 1960, by 1962 it was not known that the missile gap (which had occured in the interim) had also proven to be false.(I dont think Corona had come of age by this point) Consider that at the white house briefings, not once did someone say 'well this sure boosts his missile capablity', since it was already assumed that missile capablity was extensive enough to completely destroy CONUS. Kennedy said as much. Remember the famous remark about churning out missiles like sausages? The white house believed it.

 

Im a bit confused about your argument. You say the icbm was far advanced and it was, but also on both sides. Yet the soviets deployed to Cuba for many reasons (some of them perhaps even conflicting.) Yet the facts remain, the Americans did not identify the primary reasons for the deployment, the lack of extensive soviet icbms, and the need to protect castro. If anything, the white house assumed the reason was to create a pretext to take Berlin, or remove missiles from Turkey. Indeed, the lack of information about numbers of ICBMs in the USSR probably helped the crisis to a peaceful resolution. If it had been realised how weak the Soviets were, perhaps the White house would have been less reticent on the use of force. We shall never know. Suffice to say, its very odd that if the White house knew the soviets lacked missiles, they didnt actually say so on the tape. Who was going to listen?

 

Agreed, it was laughable. At one point in one of the meetings Kennedy makes the off the cuff remark comparing how Khruschev would feel if the US decided to deploy missiles in Turkey. 'Actually Mr President, we have already done that....' |Absurd crisis or not, both sides built it, and its a credit to the Americans they found a way out of it.

 

 

In short, the West knew the capblities of Soviet missiles, but there is no evidence that they thought that they were not extensive. I agree that SAC and other intelligence sources did distort data to achieve their own ends (a classic example was portarying the Crimean war memorial as a secret missile base). But there is no evidence that they did in this period. Indeed, it was something of an embaressment that they didnt note the missiles already in Cuba, despite a US senator noting in his unofficial sources they were already there some weeks previously.

 

IMHO Its too simple to say Brezhnev was bad, Khrushchev was good. The latter made some serious mistakes, and on one occasion precipitated a major riot due to starvation in some parts of the USSR. On the other hand, he was a reformer who wanted good relations, yet didnt know how to get them. Brezhnev was a corrupt tosser who didnt want reform. yet he agreed SALT with the west, and did get relations on an even keel and gave us Detente.

 

BTW, those 6 ICBMs. Even assuming they had a 50 percent dud rate, it was still good enough to take out Washington and New York, not to mention the IRBMs which would easily remove London and Paris. Thats unacceptable damage to anyone other than General Turgidson.

 

It was known that tthere were only 6 ICBMs operational (and at questionable availability rates) - the "missile gap" didn't exist. The White House didn't believe it.

 

The political situation was one where the US was looking ahead and seeing their overwhelming nuclear (as opposed to conventional) advantage disappearing. It was a last chance to be tough with the advantage on their side.

 

Remember the Soviets did not just face US IRBMS in Turkey, but also Italy and arguably the UK.

 

Breshnev was only content to go to the negotiating table once he felt he had sufficient missiles to have some to spare. He was hardly a soft-line soviet leader.

 

The nuclear advantage had always been with the US with the majority of the continental US only open to attack by bombers on one-way suicide missions and with long flights over US air defences.

 

Look at the nuclear brinkmanship and assess who was being "reckless" (as the original question mentioned)

 

 

 

(edit - sorry I realised that the way I phrased it would get some doubting thomases arguing, so here is one (of many, many links, which gives the story of the "missile gap"

 

http://www.thespacereview.com/article/523/1

 

- there are many more on the web )

Edited January 26, 2007 by philgollin

[Ken Estes]

Sorry, but your article only begs the Q. A single mission in 1961 'proved' that Siberia was not 'full of ICBMs?' OK, but what if there were a only dozen, or make that two dozen. Weather obscuration alone would make it impossible to determine. As long as we are depending on emulsion photography, ejected periodically to earth, there would remain a significant R factor and thus doubt as to what the other side really had. The missile gap eventually was recognized, but only in hindsight. Good history consists of finding out what the people thought at the time they were thinking it, not just saying, 'they should have known....'

 

As Stuart points out, we have had the transcripts for a long time; the participants had no reason to be performing or otherwise faking their fears. We also demonstrated late into the '80-'90s that we were willing to overestimate the military strength of the USSR, and it had long been a cottage industry in the US. After all, we thought the Red Navy was a burgeoning menace in the late 1950s, yet only its cranky, noisy sub force presented any sense of a problem.

[Ssnake]

In "The Fog of War" Robert McNamara states that one of the first things he did when he became Secretary of Defence to investigate the Bomber and Missile Gap, only to find out that if existed at all, it was for the Soviets. So McNamara told a couple of journalists that there was no Bomber or Missile Gap, which made the headlines the same day. This lead to demands from the republican party that president Kennedy would step back from office because his "bogus claim" on the Missile Gap won him the office.

 

Aside from the political hype of the day, to me this anecdote indicates that both Pentagon and White House were well aware in 1961 that the US still had significant superiority in their nuclear strike capacity. It may have been registered as a PR desaster caused by a newbie in politics, but the whole ruckus must have led at least to internal discussions that the factual basis of that assessment was irrefutable.

[Ken Estes]

In "The Fog of War" Robert McNamara states that one of the first things he did when he became Secretary of Defence to investigate the Bomber and Missile Gap, only to find out that if existed at all, it was for the Soviets. So McNamara told a couple of journalists that there was no Bomber or Missile Gap, which made the headlines the same day. This lead to demands from the republican party that president Kennedy would step back from office because his "bogus claim" on the Missile Gap won him the office.

 

Aside from the political hype of the day, to me this anecdote indicates that both Pentagon and White House were well aware in 1961 that the US still had significant superiority in their nuclear strike capacity. It may have been registered as a PR desaster caused by a newbie in politics, but the whole ruckus must have led at least to internal discussions that the factual basis of that assessment was irrefutable.

And where were said headlines? They may not have appeared and Mac's book may represent simply [as you say] political hype of the day. He is precisely imprecise in his sense of time: 'one of the first things' -- 'made the headlines the same day' -- 'This lead to...' Well, when was all this happening? Certainly, the message to the public in '62 is not that 'if existed at all, it was for the Soviets'

[philgollin]

Sorry, but your article only begs the Q. A single mission in 1961 'proved' that Siberia was not 'full of ICBMs?' OK, but what if there were a only dozen, or make that two dozen. Weather obscuration alone would make it impossible to determine. As long as we are depending on emulsion photography, ejected periodically to earth, there would remain a significant R factor and thus doubt as to what the other side really had. The missile gap eventually was recognized, but only in hindsight. Good history consists of finding out what the people thought at the time they were thinking it, not just saying, 'they should have known....'

 

As Stuart points out, we have had the transcripts for a long time; the participants had no reason to be performing or otherwise faking their fears. We also demonstrated late into the '80-'90s that we were willing to overestimate the military strength of the USSR, and it had long been a cottage industry in the US. After all, we thought the Red Navy was a burgeoning menace in the late 1950s, yet only its cranky, noisy sub force presented any sense of a problem.

 

No, the intelligence community and the White House's official assessments quite accurately predicted the Soviet's minimal missile abilities.

 

You are ignoring the basic misrepresentations that were going on within the White House and Military leadership in as much as they knew the assessments but publically described the opposite.

 

The reality (both the actual real world one and the facts as known to the US) was very different to the picture given out to public scrutiny. This is what makes the reality of the Cuban Missile Crisis so different to that normally portrayed, and the idea that the "recklessness" was on the Soviet side rather (hollowly) laughable.

 

I remember my father's attitude at the time when he was standing by and in retrospect it is hardly credible that the same old lies get traisped out in defence of the stand-off.

[Exel]

BTW, those 6 ICBMs. Even assuming they had a 50 percent dud rate, it was still good enough to take out Washington and New York, not to mention the IRBMs which would easily remove London and Paris. Thats unacceptable damage to anyone other than General Turgidson.

 

Probably yes. But on the other hand, and for the very same reason, once those cities would be gone after a Soviet first strike, would there then be anything to prevent an all-out nuclear holocaust? 'What have we got to lose anymore - launch all of them'.

 

The eventuality of losing those cities was undoubtedly a powerful deterrent, but would it have made the West to surrender? I doubt it.

[RETAC21]

No, the intelligence community and the White House's official assessments quite accurately predicted the Soviet's minimal missile abilities.

 

You are ignoring the basic misrepresentations that were going on within the White House and Military leadership in as much as they knew the assessments but publically described the opposite.

 

The reality (both the actual real world one and the facts as known to the US) was very different to the picture given out to public scrutiny. This is what makes the reality of the Cuban Missile Crisis so different to that normally portrayed, and the idea that the "recklessness" was on the Soviet side rather (hollowly) laughable.

 

I remember my father's attitude at the time when he was standing by and in retrospect it is hardly credible that the same old lies get traisped out in defence of the stand-off.

 

Phil, I think you are understating the threat that the missiles in Cuba posed to the continental US for the first time since 1945. Many moons ago I collated a short history of the Soviet strategic nuclear forces and at the time they comprised:

 

SS-6 or R-7 in the Soviet parlance:

 

Construction of the launch facilities was in advance of the missile testing. Delivery of equipment for four operational launch pads at Plesetsk began in early 1959. The first launch complex (LC41, code name 'Lesobaza') was essentially complete and accepted by the military in November 1959. During 1960 LC16 became the second R-7A ICBM launch complex to become operational. All four R-7A launch complexes at Plesetsk, with LC31 at Tyuratam as an emergency alternate launch pad, were accepted by the military in July 1961. The Plesetsk pads were manned by a Strategic Rocket Forces regiment, consisting of one launch station group and four launch units. A major test of the regiment came on 16 July 1960, when the regiment conducted an exercise with launch of two R-7A's, demonstrating the radio guidance system, within 8 hours of each other.

 

The missiles on the four pads were programmed to hit New York, Washington, Los Angeles, and Chicago. During the Cuban missile crisis (11 September to 21 November 1962), an R-7A with a live thermonuclear weapon was held in readiness on pad LC41 for launch on the United States with an 8 to 12 hour reaction time from the go order. This was the only time an R-7A was actually armed with a nuclear warhead during its service life (early Soviet doctrine was that the warheads be stored and controlled separately).

 

It's successor, the SS-7 was by then in production, though beset by problems, of which the West only got an inkling. On 24 October 1960 the first R-16 (SS-7 Saddler) prototype was fuelled and on the pad, awaiting launch. An electrical problem developed, leading to a hold. Marshal Nedelin, commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces, ordered the engineers and technicians to fix the problem without the long delay of defuelling and refurbishing the missile. He personally had a deck chair brought out to the pad so he could watch the work first-hand. At 18:45 local time a spurious radio signal ordered the second stage of the rocket to fire while workers swarmed around the missile in its gantry. The missile exploded, killing a good part of the Soviet Union's rocket engineering and management talent. Among the dead were Nedelin, Konopalev (designer of the missile's guidance system), Grishin (deputy chairman of GKOT), Nosov (chief of launch command at Baikonur), and OKB-586 engineers Kontsevsky and Lev Berlin. 74 people were killed immediately, and 48 died in the ensuing weeks from burns or contact with the toxic and corrosive propellants. The total included 38 civilian engineers and 84 officers and enlisted rocket technicians.

 

Nevertheless the programme was of such high priority that development continued. The next launch attempt, on 2 February 1961, was a failure, with the missile impacting only 520 km from the launch site. But a successful first launch was achieved 20 days later. The missile obtained preliminary acceptance for military use on 20 October 1961, in order to get production lines started. Following the first trials series the missile was fully accepted for military service on 15 June 1963. This first pad-launched version used the Sheksna-N launch complex. This consisted of two launch pads, a command point, a vehicle preparation base, and a propellant farm. In service an R-16 regiment consisted of three launch pads.

 

The air component would be provided by the 106th TBAD (Heavy Bombardment Air Division) and its subordinate 409th TBAP (Heavy bombardment Air regiment ) and the 1006th TBAP at Uzin near Kiev. The other Bear regiment was the 1223rd TBAP in Semipalatinsk (part of 79th Air Division). In 1962 the whole of the 106 TBAD was equipped with Bear-B missile carriers (Tu-95K with the Kh-20 missile system) which also equipped the 1228 TBAP at Semipalatinsk.

 

All other bombers could not reach CONUS.

 

But the more dangerous component where the submarines, which at the time couldn't be detected (and thus destroyed) reliably.

 

Project AV611 (NATO: Zulu V) equipped with two R-11FM missiles [sS-1b]: 5 boats of the 16th Submarine Division

Project 629 (NATO: Golf I), equipped with 3 R-13 missiles [sS-N-4]: 6 in the 16th Division, 9 in the 18th Division and 7 in the 29th Division, based in the Pacific.

Project 658 (NATO: Hotel I): equipped with 3 R-13 missiles [sS-N-4]: 5 boats, including the infamous K-19.

 

So the amount of missiles that could conceivably reach CONUS where 4 ICBMs+91 SLBMs in the best of the worlds, the actual number being much lower due to the combined unreliability of missiles and launch platforms.

 

And the along comes Khruschev and deploys 36 R-12's (SS-4 Sandal), with the three regiments of the 13th Rocket Division augmented by 2 regiments with 16 R-14 (SS-5 Skean) with a range of 3600 km in Cuba, increasing that number from 95 to 147, an increase of 54%, without taking into account the much better reliability of the IRBMs.

[philgollin]

Phil, I think you are understating the threat that the missiles in Cuba posed to the continental US for the first time since 1945. Many moons ago I collated a short history of the Soviet strategic nuclear forces and at the time they comprised: .......................................

 

No, that was the point I was making.

 

The Cuban Missile Crisis was the last gasp of US Nuclear Dominance, but is portrayed as some sort of Soviet agression.

 

The US wanted to stop the Soviets from fielding similar systems to those that the US already had but tried to say that this was agression !

 

The recklessness was the US's because they already knew that the proper Soviet ICBMs were already being designed and tested.

[philgollin]

Quite so. After all, when Mcnamara got into office, it was realised the Bomber (yes and missile gap) did NOT exist. Fair enough. However, after the U2 went down there was a relative dearth of information in the soviet union. Whilst it took time for a strategic bomber force to be built up, and train, it didnt necessarily take a long time to build up an long range missile force, as the cuban crisis proved, particularly as the Soviets were proving so adept (considerably more so than the US at the time) in their space programme. Ultimately, Im partly basing my opinion on Sheldon Sterns 'Averting the Final Failure' who pretty much has created the definative record of the Kennedy tapes' This is the footnote from page 155

 

' American intelligence had significantly overestimated the number of ICBMs in the USSR. The Cuban deployment was even more numerically signficant than Rusk knew at the time'

 

And the footnote from page 82

 

'Since Khrushchevs missile forces were considerably smaller than the west knew, the Soviet nuclear deployment in Cuba, Raymond Garthhoff wrote in 1962, did pose "An appreciably heightened threat to the US strategic retaliatory forces' and hence to our deterrent capability". By 1963, however, Khrushchev confided to his son Sergei (Now I believe a historian) that the USSR had enough ICBMs to prevent an American attack. It was, He said, no longer necessary to hide the true extent of Soviet forces from the Americans'.

 

So from that we can see the Soviets were building hard, but not necessarily hard enough to feel comfortable from American attack.(and its a 2 year gap from entering office to the crisis, that there was a black hole on intel, other than Penkovsky, who in the event was unable even to predict the onset of the crisis)

From these sources, whilst now it appears the Soviets had an inconsiderable missile force, it does appear very likely the Soviets had enough missiles to cause unacceptable damage to the US. Also, lets not forget, we talk about Western resolve, but thats a misnomer. In all honesty, despite informing DeGaulle and a few telephone conversations to Macmillan, there doesnt seem to be a lot of influence that NATO could bring to bear during the crisis. Aside from those long term concerns to stick by its allies, this was a Soviet/American crisis. Even the Cubans has little influence upon it. Ergo, those threats to US cities (and retaliatory forces) would have been the primary concern, without even beginning to consider the threat to the missile forces in Turkey (which was briefly touched upon) and the threats to Berlin and elsewhere. Indeed, its notable that people like Curtis Le May considered the crisis from the point of view of how it concerned the US, rather than its allies. To hear people like Le May and indeed some of the US Senators, we dont appear to have been a primary consideration.

So yes, when those cites were gone, the USSR got fried. Lets look at that however, the USSR AND China go down, (and probably Western Europe too) for the 2 most economically viable and populous cities in the US. Whilst the US would probably survive, its friends probably wouldnt. Doesnt strike me as a particularly good trade, and Kennedy would have realised that, even if he knew that was the only 2 cities the Sovs could hit, which he didnt.

 

My view, is that whilst the US intelligence service MAY have been hyping Soviet forces, it doesnt in reality make much difference to the crisis. Khruschev wasnted to protect Castro AND boost his missile force, which already was adequate to fry the 2 greatest US cities. Secondly, even if the US realised how weak Khruschev was, it didnt get to the White house (which is rather strange, if militaristic elements were trying to push the US into action). Lastly, Kennedy realised from very early on (when everyone else, including his brother) was pushing for military action, that primarily it was a political crisis. If the US had NOT taken the position that it would have no nuclear missiles in Cuba, Kennedy would not have been so set upon removing the missiles. If Khrushchev had been smart, he would have told Kennedy who would have had to have tolerated it. Because Kennedy took a position, he could not back away from it, without making suspect all the commitments the US had been obliged to defend. When described as a laughable crisis, I agree, but it doesnt mean that it couldnt have ended in war. Its for this reason I think Kennedy wanted a political solution, and contrary to his advisors, didnt not change his position thoughout. Like Khruschev he played a large part in precipitating the crisis, yet unlike him, played a very large part in defusing it. In reading the transripts, I can honestly say Ive found some respect for the man, he was one smooth political operator, in the best sense of the term.

 

Whats interesting to me, is that these tapes survived virtually unknown whilst the historical process of reducing the crisis to a purely American hysterical overreaction was well underway. Not only does it say something troubling about the political bias of many Historians, it also says something about how far away from the truth we can get by not relying on primary sources. The Stern book is not a primary source, but it is based upon the authors study of the tapes over many years (and considerably better than the book transcripts released some years ago). For anyone interested in the crisis, I would recommend getting a copy, as it certainly changed my mindset on how the Whitehouse at the time worked. It defies belief that most of the same individuals who got the world out of this crisis were the ones who led the US into Vietnam.

 

I think you are taking a rather rosy look at things.

 

First the US knew the missile gap, like the previous bomber gap was a fraud. They also had satellite coverage which although primative and certainly not comprehensive, didn't indicate any major missile build-up, but they knew that proper ICBMs were coming.

 

They knew they had the means to destroy much of the Soviet Union without much destruction of the continental US (but pity Europe Canada and Seattle - and probably the Soviets would get through some one-way bombers to such places as San Fransico and even possibly Chicago).

 

Was there any reason to illegally stop the missiles being shipped to Cuba - not in the medium (3 -4 years) term as by then the proper ICBMs (and reliable SLBMs) would be operational.

 

So why did the US decide to stop the Soviets from matching their own Turkish and Italian (and possibly UK) IRBM installations ?

 

Considering what was KNOWN (as opposed to stated in discussions) it was the US acting hypocritically from a position of nuclear strength looking purely at the short-term, rather than a considered look at the way the world was evolving.

 

As for the stories given out to the press, the less said the better.

[philgollin]

Im a professional cynic, so I doubt it.

 

Corona was on the way, but Im not convinced they had reliable coverage until the mid 60s. If you have any evidence to contradict that, Id like to see it, ive been wrong before. Suffice to say most of the US launch systems of that period were abject failures, and Ive no evidence Coronas systems were any different (or indeed the recovery systems). After all, if the US Satellite systems were working as well as advertised, why didnt they spot them putting the missiles on the boats? The US had an inkling that equipment was moving to Cuba but not what it was. Its also unlikely they would have risked U2s over Cuba looking for stuff they were not sure was there. If the US intelligence community KNEW the soviet missile gap was a myth, then they certainly were NOT telling the White House, as a glance at the transcripts were show. Therefore, whether the missile gap existed or not is academic, since it didnt not affect the crisis as far as Kennedys decision making is concerned. IF the White house HAD known, if anything it would surely play into the hands of the hardcore militarists (Ironically Bobby falls into that category) who assured that military action would not lead to escalation.

 

In the event, it doesnt change the central point of the crisis, which is that after American agression to Cuba the Soviets overreacted for a variety of reasons, and instead of putting the US on notice of putting missiles in, did it on the QT. It wasnt just arrogant, it was obviously dangerous, and contrary to every action the US had taken in emplacing its missiles and letting everyone know about. The soviets overreacted themselves in the 1980s when the US put cruise into the UK, despite giving the Soviets 5 years prior notice, and offering a deal not to deploy them! Compared to the Soviet actions in 1962, that looks positively reticent.

 

So the Western Seaboard and middle America survives, if the Eastern Seaboard (and Europe and Turkey) end up radioactive holes, it doesnt strike me as a particularly efficient policy to unnecessarly antagonise the Soviets. At the very least the Soviets could have used an attack on Cuba as a pretext to take Berlin, which again the US (and France and the UK) would have been obliged to challenge or risk loosing West Germany. It wasnt a nuclear attack on the US that so scared Kennedy, as putting the US in a position where it would have to betray its partners, or loose crediblity as a world power. The nuclear fear was of course the final failure as Kennedy put it, but it wasnt the only one. One outcome of the crisis would have been a complete removal of Cuba as a communist base, and a limited long range threat to the US, but the loss of Berlin, West Germany and Turkey attacked. Again, not much of a success, even without a single atomic weapon being used.

 

Again, I make the point that it was primarily a POLITICAL crisis, and not a military one, something that Kennedy identified early on, but the Joint Chiefs did not. Thats why the missiles couldnt stay, as to do so would be to destroy American crediblity, perhaps an additional Khrushchev aim. In the context of the cold war at the time, it makes perfect sense, if a little strange to our eyes who can now see how the cold war played out.

 

Nobody was stopping the Soviets deploying long range missiles in their own country, and when the opportunity arose, the US offered to withdraw the Turkish missiles (and had intended to offer to withdraw the Italian ones as well). If Khrushchev had told Kennedy what he was going to do, its not impossible Kennedy would have offered to do just that to stop Khrushchev playing silly buggers.

 

Cant comment on the stories given to the press, all my remarks are based on what ive read in books on the crisis, primarily based upon the transcripts. I would totally agree though that the Kennedys were experts at playing the press (and successfully kept the Sabotage efforts secret), but then, looking back on it so was Khrushchev, remember the shoe banged on the table in the UN?

 

If you look up any modern references you will find that intelligence and White House all believed that the "missile gap" both in 1960 and 1961 was a fiction. It was a PR scare put out for political reasons. (see for instance the previous link I put up). Kennedy was briefed about the non-existence of the "missile gap" before his election - and still campaigned upon the fiction.

 

It was a manufactured political crisis, one which depended upon a know (but disappearing) nuclear domination.

 

Why should the Soviets have to get permission from the US to base its missiles on Cuba ? Did the US seek Soviet approval before basing their missiles in Turkey, Italy (and arguably the UK ?)

 

The hypocrisy of the crisis screams out.

[philgollin]

It may scream to you but it falls shrill to my ears.

 

Ive looked up plenty for references, but ive not found any evidence that the WHITE HOUSE during the crisis believed anything other than the Soviets had a substantial nuclear capablity. If they had realised, they would have dealt with the crisis in a wholly different manner. Its significant that all through the transcripts, Kennedy says 'This is a play to make a grab for Berlin', not 'Gee, I wonder if this is because their deterrent capacity is not up to scratch'. In fact, I think it was Mcnamara who said he was surprised to wake up one morning after the crisis broke.Not something I would expect him (or another Whitehouse advisor) to say if they were aware the Soviet weapons program was under performing. The point was made in a meeting that it didnt change the balance of power militarily, and despite that fact that it did enhance deliverable Soviet nuclear weapons, they were quite right considering the Soviets already had the ablity to destroy the most significant countervalue targets in the US. So what changed?

 

You have appeared to misread what I said. They (the Soviets) didnt need permission to emplace their weapons on Cuba, on that point I totally agree with you. However, it was a great deal more than not just telling anyone. In fact, they deliberately LIED when asked by Kennedy if they were putting offensive weapons in. If Khrushchev had replied 'Sure, we are putting some SS4s in, what are you going to do about it sonny?' Kennedy would have given a response something like 'well ok, no more than 50' and accepted it. Not much else he COULD do without another bay of pigs.

The US gave prior notice of putting its missiles in bases outside CONUS, something Khrushchev failed to do twice. In 1959 he emplaced some MRBMs in East Germany for over a year before backing off, and didnt inform anyone in NATO. That wasnt just avoiding asking permission, which of course he didnt need to do. It was deliberately being reckless and confrontational. He got away with it in East Germany, he didnt in Cuba. Lying about it wasnt just a act of bad faith, in the context of the cold war (and only a couple of decades after Hitler did the same thing) it could easily be interpeted as hostile intent. That was just arrogant, it was just plain dumb.

 

If you want to blame the US for something, blame them for the sabotage efforts that drove Khrushchev to totally overreact. Dont blame them for not accepting a liars claim they were only for defensive purposes, when they had already been lied to about them being emplaced, and under a blanket of secrecy that make them look even more threatening than they were. Whether the US intelligence services understood the gravitas of the deployment I think is a red herring.The problem was central to a lack of faith and outright lying by Khrushchev. That was a poltical issue, and not a military one as the Pentagon believed.

 

You havent answered WHY was it manufactured. I cannot see anything that Kennedy or the adminsitration gained out of it aside from taking the world to the brink of nuclear war. Who could possibly gain from that, particularly as its by no means clear that Khrushchev would back off. Again the transcripts you pick up the question from Kennedy about whether Khrushchev was entirely rational. A very odd thing to say if he was pushing into a corner for purely (and to my eyes, utterly obscure) political reasons.

 

Lots of people want to beat the heads of the Americans over this, but I can tell you having read the transcripts, I cannot for the life of me believe the utter BS that is believed about Kennedy during the crisis. He comes across as calm, collected, and utterly driven from the start to make a deal. He does not remotely come across as someone who wants to make a crisis, or who does not believe his country is in grave danger. I can only make the point again, please read the book I recommend, and try to get hold of the transcripts. It puts an entirely different spin on the story that 40 years of mythmaking have done much to obscure. It certainly changed my position on the crisis, which admittedly at one point was not very far removed from your own.

 

You'll never make a politician (which is a compliment)

 

Why should the Soviets think the Cuban missiles were "agressive". They were purely reactive to the US missiles in Turkey, Italy and arguably the UK. Were they "agressive" ? I think you should consider the whole rather than just believing the rather slanted view peddled by the White House.

 

Why are the Soviets "reckless and confrontational" whereas the West aren't ?

 

I hear echos of those various cold war jokes;

 

"Our" forces are "defensive" - "their" forces are "agressive"

 

"Our" policy is measured - "their" policy is "confrontational"

 

"Our" overflights are - "oh dear, forget about that"

 

"Our" quarantine is - "oh dear, forget about that again"

 

 

I have already noted that the crisis was pointless in the medium (say 3 years) to long-term because the US already knew that proper ICBMs were being designed and about to be manufactured by the USSR. So why did the US use its last gasps of nuclear dominance to keep that advantage for a couple of more years ?

 

I have read the book and a couple of others, but have you read the intelligence reports that were given to the White House prior to the crisis ?

 

The question is why the US manufactured the crisis as opposed to any problems with the Soviets.

[jakec]

Hi Phil and Stuart,

 

it is with great trepidation that I insert myself into this conversation, but ...

 

Phil, would those intelligence reports be the infamous national intelligence assessment issued weeks before the missiles were discovered that assessed it well nigh inconceivable that the Soviets would introduce offensive missiles into Cuba? Or the reports from the backchannel secret link to Moscow that assured Kennedy nothing of the sort was planned?

 

I'd certainly be interested in your sources to back up the claim that: "They were purely reactive to the US missiles in Turkey, Italy and arguably the UK." You might also explain how the originally planned deployment of a division of seven Golf-class SSBs to Cuba along with the IRBMs fitted with this alleged dominant motivation.

 

One might try to argue that in fact the main motivation was to secure Cuba from future US military aggression, and be on safer ground, but one would still have to explain the Soviet assessment contained in none other than Foreign Minister Gromyko's own cable of 19 October 1962:

"It is not possible, of course, to be completely insured against USA surprises and adventures, even in the Cuba issue; all the same, taking into account the undeniable objective facts and the corresponding official public statements, and also the assurances given to us that the USA has no plans for intervention in Cuba (which undeniably commits them in many respects), it is possible to say that in these conditions a USA military adventure against Cuba is almost impossible to imagine."

 

Equally, Gromyko & Drobinyn had been arguing staunchly that there was no justification for any US intervention in Cuba because Cuba posed no threat to the security of the US or the Western hemisphere - a seemingly reasonable position (noting of course that the US administration had long maintained that Cuba was analogous to Hungary in their thinking) - if one was not at the same time secretly inserting offensive weapons into Cuba that would undoubtedly mean Cuba could only be perceived as a direct threat to the US.

 

It can be argued that Khrushchev was reckless. In response to Kennedy's public warning of 4 September, and numerous private warnings from US officials, of likely US reaction to offensive weapons in Cuba, he not only plowed ahead with the deployments, but tried to speed them up. He also added further tactical nuclear weapons to the package being deployed into Cuba (which had always included the FKR-1 tactical missiles), ensuring that in any confrontation relatively junior commanders might have the ability to ignite a nuclear conflagaration. The FKR-1 and the Beagles had the range to hit the southern US as well as any invasion fleet.