US Air Force buying F-35 vertical lift

[Gunguy]

What do you guys think about the Air Force thinking about buying some vertical lift F-35s? Seems Gen. Jumper realized that CAS was not what it should be for the Air Force. I think it is a great idea, and will give the Air force the CAS mission in a way they can really sink their teeth into and enjoy. I think it is all positive if it happens. Go Air Force Go!!

[Josh]

Originally posted by Gunguy:

What do you guys think about the Air Force thinking about buying some vertical lift F-35s? Seems Gen. Jumper realized that CAS was not what it should be for the Air Force. I think it is a great idea, and will give the Air force the CAS mission in a way they can really sink their teeth into and enjoy. I think it is all positive if it happens. Go Air Force Go!!  

 

I think it makes sense for USAF to have some kind of expeditionary force from improvised airstrips, assuming they want to retain the CAS role for the army. I'd be surprised if this actually went through though.

[Ol Paint]

I don't know that it will really make that much of a difference. Giving the AF a jump-jet isn't going to suddenly change the mentality or conduct of the mission. Getting the aircraft on scene isn't the main problem, it is coordinating operations with the grunts and providing close CAS. Now, if the AF adopts the USMC forward-basing strategies to operate with the Army, it would be a good thing, but if they stay with their current basing strategies, the lift fan would just be that much more weight and wasted space. After all, giving the Air Force the A-10 (or the army forcing them to buy it through the AH-56 program, whichever you prefer) hasn't stopped the criticism of the USAF in their performance of the CAS mission.

 

One other benefit is that it would allow the USAF to move TACAIR into theater along with the army sea-lift and to operate from either amphib ships, or other sea-based aviation ships, then transition quickly to shore basing once the Army has established a forward base.

 

Douglas

[Scott Cunningham]

Is the purchase of a small number of F-35's going to be used as a justification for retiring all the A-10's?

 

I hate to say it, but I just dont trust the USAF motives where it comes to CAS.

[Ivanhoe]

Well said, all of ya. Given the USAF's track record over the last 3 decades, skepticism is justified. Buying airframes is not enough to put capability in the field, they'd have to develop doctrine, training, and command structures to integrate CAS assets into a combined air/ground force. That's a lot to expect of the zoomies. Get all of that working with A-10s and F-16s, prove you mean it, then come to me with a purchase request for new airframes.

[Kenneth P. Katz]

We've been through this several times. What evidence is there that USAF CAS recently (let's say 2001 through today) is so bad?

[Ol Paint]

Originally posted by Kenneth P. Katz:

We've been through this several times. What evidence is there that USAF CAS recently (let's say 2001 through today) is so bad?

 

It was not my intention to state that the USAF was doing a poor job regarding CAS, although I can see how my earlier post implied that. The point I was trying to make was that the adoption of a jump-jet probably wouldn't change the manner in which the USAF employs its combat power. It would appear to me that an AF STOVL aircraft is a solution in search of a problem, unless the USAF intends to utilize forward basing much more aggressively (a possibility). Effective CAS appears to be tied more to effective doctrine (which may or may not be in place) than specific platform type. While I most certainly have personal biases towards certain airframes over others, I am forced to admit that proper training and doctrine can overcome platform limitations (within reason--I am not trying to say that a SE5a would be as effective as an A-10).

 

I do tend to think that forward-basing is a good idea as it relates to CAS as it reduces the scramble time to get support overhead and would increase the time on-station for the supporting aircraft. That said, however, close air support is more related to having the aircraft available and overhead when and where it is needed with a pilot who is trained and equipped appropriately to perform the mission. If forward-basing and specific mission focus helps the pilot support the troops on the ground better, that is fine, but I certainly don't look for the appearance of a "new" aircraft type to suddenly and drastically change the battlefield, unless said aircraft offers some wildly advanced performance.

 

The F-35 in the combat environment is an evolution of the current fast-movers and I would expect it to be employed as such. The STOVL ability is largely independent of its combat role and pertains to its basing. Kind of like having landing gear on aircraft--for equivalent maneuverability/performance, an airplane without any is going to be employed by its pilot in the same manner as one with landing gear--what is affected is the basing facility. Another way of looking at it would be to ask if trading the AH-64 airframe for the AH-1Z airframe (assuming the sensor and weapons fit for both aircraft is the same) would change the outlook of the aviators? My guess is not much. Hence, I don't think the USAF aviators are going to meander about the battlefield, hiding behind trees in hover mode, dropping in on the grunts for lunch, or otherwise utilizing the STOVL capability on the battlefield. They'll still whizz around at 300-600kts and 5,000-15,000ft (+30,000ft/-4,990ft), maneuvering in the same types of turns, loops, and what-have-you that they already do--they will just be landing vertically at some base in the "rear" that may (or may not) be closer to the action.

 

To me, STOVL makes a lot of sense for the USMC. The case isn't as clear for the USAF, unless the doctrine is changed. IF (BIG IF) the USAF decides to get into the sea-basing type of fight that the Army appears to be leaning towards (see USS Kitty Hawk as base for US Army heloes during Afghanistan), then there are advantages. However, if the USAF is going to pound the enemy into pulp with B-1s, B-52s, and B-2s until the Army captures them a nice concrete airport, the STOVL gear would just be that much volume and weight being used up in the F-35. Unfortunately, I am not as cognizant of the USAF plans as I am of the USN/USMC Sea Basing and the US Army's involvement in same/similar, so I don't know where the STOVL capability fits into the USAF future doctrine as currently envisaged.

 

Douglas

[Scott Cunningham]

Read "The Generals War" to see why CAS is a mission the USAF performs poorly. The USMC was a bit upset (to say the least) how all their CAS assets were scooped up by the USAF and dumped into the general ATO heap in exchange for vague, and usually unfulfilled promiss of B-52 support for CAS. The USAF grabbed ALL the A-6's, and half of the F-18's available to use in Horners air campaign.

 

I'm dont recall what happened once the ground war started, but there was a huge disagreement during the air campaign.

 

I think that it has gotten a bit better now that the USAF has a full dose of recent combat experience. I think most actual 'combat' is dropping things on people. I dont think we have shot down a plane in combat snce the first few nights of the Gulf War (aside from the two US Blackhawks the USAF blasted out of the sky in 1994).

[Smitty]

Originally posted by Scott Cunningham:

I dont think we have shot down a plane in combat snce the first few nights of the Gulf War (aside from the two US Blackhawks the USAF blasted out of the sky in 1994).

 

I believe there was at least one Mig-29 kill over Kosovo.

[Kenneth P. Katz]

Also some Yugoslavian Super Galobs and a few Iraqi airplanes which entered a no-fly zone.

 

The USAF has toyed with the idea of the F-35C for a while. The reason has as much to do with economical production quantities for the USMC and RAF/RN as any USAF hankering for VSTOL.

 

Responsive CAS requires aircraft that are already airborne. Cranking up a jet takes too long if you need CAS now.

 

Originally posted by Smitty:

I believe there was at least one Mig-29 kill over Kosovo.

[Kenneth P. Katz]

Agreed.

 

Originally posted by Ol Paint:

The point I was trying to make was that the adoption of a jump-jet probably wouldn't change the manner in which the USAF employs its combat power.  It would appear to me that an AF STOVL aircraft is a solution in search of a problem, unless the USAF intends to utilize forward basing much more aggressively (a possibility).  Effective CAS appears to be tied more to effective doctrine (which may or may not be in place) than specific platform type.  While I most certainly have personal biases towards certain airframes over others, I am forced to admit that proper training and doctrine can overcome platform limitations (within reason--I am not trying to say that a SE5a would be as effective as an A-10).

[JOE BRENNAN]

It makes more physically possible my idea that the US tacair force should all (or much more of it) be carrier capable. Now and if all USAF F-35's were A model perpetuates large short range USAF tac fighter force one hand, half empty carriers on the other. And to those who'd remind USMC fighters can augment USN on carriers I'd counter remind that now USN and MC are counting on doing that more in nornal ops with JSF (USMC F-35B STOVL's deployed on CVN's)just to stay at the half full mark. So I like this.

 

On Ken's point my nonpartisan comment is with his, I don't see much evidence of recent AF poor performance and bad faith on CAS. As in previous debates, I think it sometimes gets tied up in the almost mystical symbolism of the A-10 as opposed to what are all ways to get bombs to land relatively close in front of land forces but only where they are supposed to. At a point it gets obtuse to insist the A-10 is somehow the *only* way to do that (for the *AF* that is in some minds, whereas fast jets are a perfectly fine way for the MC) and pointing to changes in technology that allow multipurpose fast jets to do it as well are always automatically unrealistic "whiz kidism".

 

Joe

[Dan Robertson]

Originally posted by Gunguy:

What do you guys think about the Air Force thinking about buying some vertical lift F-35s? Seems Gen. Jumper realized that CAS was not what it should be for the Air Force. I think it is a great idea, and will give the Air force the CAS mission in a way they can really sink their teeth into and enjoy. I think it is all positive if it happens. Go Air Force Go!!    

 

I think this is an exceptionally good idea!

 

The US Army should buy VSTOL, the Navy should buy VSTOL can I interest another other countries/billionaires in VSTOL.

 

They should also use the superior F136 engine

 

 

 

[Edited by Dan Robertson (24 Feb 2004).]

[Gunguy]

Originally posted by Scott Cunningham:

Is the purchase of a small number of F-35's going to be used as a justification for retiring all the A-10's?  

 

I hate to say it, but I just dont trust the USAF motives where it comes to CAS.

 

Absolutely! The A-10 will be retired with F-35s. Gen. Jumper found out that the A-10 had unique abilities that were needed by the Air Force. The F-35 vertical lift is the only plane on the horizon that also had that same ability. He is talking about keeping a hard core group of planes dedicated to CAS like the A-10s are now. I think it is a very good idea. It gives CAS proponents a bigger voice in the Air Force as they will be flying a high tech new plane. Not a vintage aircraft. (I'm a big A-10 fan myself.)

[Guest Sargent]

Originally posted by Ol Paint:

It would appear to me that an AF STOVL aircraft is a solution in search of a problem, unless the USAF intends to utilize forward basing much more aggressively (a possibility).

Douglas

 

But - but - but... That would require a VTOL Officer's Club and Social Director's Office if they went to Forward Basing!!!

[Wolfman]

Originally posted by Scott Cunningham:

I dont think we have shot down a plane in combat snce the first few nights of the Gulf War (aside from the two US Blackhawks the USAF blasted out of the sky in 1994). [/i]

http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/afhra/wwwroot...eny_flight.html

http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/afhra/wwwroot...lied_force.html

 

Along with several post 1991 kills in Iraq: http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/afhra/wwwroot...c_swa_gulf.html

 

 

USAF does not want the V in STOVL: http://ubbxforums.ubi.com/6/ubb.x?q=Y&a=tp...m=115102732&p=1 Check out the posts by BTR12.

[Tony Williams]

I too am sceptical about the USAF's motives. All air forces prefer to stress the missions they can do by themselves rather than the ones in support of the other arms. The A-10 is loved by the Army and disliked by the USAF for exactly the same reason; it is specialised for close-support, so can't be switched to other operations which the USAF might consider more important.

 

The A-10 was, I believe, part of the price the USAF had to pay to persuade the Army to give up its plans for its own fixed-wing CAS. Since then, the USAF has tried to can the A-10 two or three times; once just before the 1991 conflict, and the last time only last year.

 

The USAF has tried to replace the A-10 with a multi-mission plane before now, in the A-16. This was an F-16 with various air-to-ground equipment including a 30mm GAU-13/A gunpod. It was tried in Iraq in 1991, proved to be unsatisfactory and last I heard they have been sitting in hangars ever since.

 

The technical advantages of the A-10 are a secondary issue; it has become the touchstone of the USAF's commitment to close support.

 

P.S. I love the fact that the chief proponent for the USAF's interest in jump-jets is a General Jumper

 

Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website and discussion

forum

[Archie Pellagio]

Originally posted by Tony Williams:

The USAF has tried to replace the A-10 with a multi-mission plane before now, in the A-16. This was an F-16 with various air-to-ground equipment including a 30mm GAU-13/A gunpod. It was tried in Iraq in 1991, proved to be unsatisfactory and last I heard they have been sitting in hangars ever since.

 

IIRC they were converted back to normal Block 10 standard in about '93/94, but don't quote me on it.

 

From what I've heard the gun was so inaccurate it was actually considered a good CBU alternative and used as such!

 

<font size=1>[Edited by Luke_Yaxley (25 Feb 2004).]

 

[Edited by Luke_Yaxley (25 Feb 2004).]

[Chris Werb]

Originally posted by Tony Williams:

The USAF has tried to replace the A-10 with a multi-mission plane before now, in the A-16. This was an F-16 with various air-to-ground equipment including a 30mm GAU-13/A gunpod. It was tried in Iraq in 1991, proved to be unsatisfactory and last I heard they have been sitting in hangars ever since.

 

Tony, a few years ago I read (in JDW IIRC) that the USN had bought the pods to fit to LCACs for suppressive fire. The plan was to fit each of a small number of LCAC with four of the pods (or guns thereof). I have no idea if anything came of it.

 

The story I heard about the use of the pods in Iraq was that the software to generate the aiming symbology in the HUD wasn't ballistically matched to the gun. This sounds like something that could be fixed relatively easily and cheaply but the will wasn't there to do it.

 

My recollection is that the planes used in Iraq were F-16As - not A-16s. A-16s would have been new builds - the competitor to the A-16 as A-10 replacement, believe it or not, was to have been a re-engined and upgraded ex ANG A-7E called the A-7F. Had this plane entered service the A-10 would have been replaced by the very airframes it had previously replaced in service.

 

 

[Edited by Chris Werb (25 Feb 2004).]

[Ol Paint]

Originally posted by Sargent:

But - but - but... That would require a VTOL Officer's Club and Social Director's Office if they went to Forward Basing!!!

 

Get with the times, Sargent! That's what the Quad Tilt-Rotor is for! Two of them might even get you a swimming pool and a tennis court.

 

Wolfman,

 

Interesting stuff on the forum. However, I agree with JOE BRENNAN, but for slightly different reasons. I have advocated in the past on this board that the USAF surrender the light tactical mission to the USN and concentrate on heavier aircraft with more range, sensors, and payload. However, reality says that will probably never happen, so JOE BRENNAN's suggestion of forward-basing with carrier/amphib capability is my very-close-second-best option. BTR12 on the LOMAC board indicates that Jumper is not interested in the "V" capability of the F-35B, but I seriously doubt he is going to get an STOL aircraft without the associated roll-control jets, etc., as the aircraft will still need control authority at the likely 50-60mph touchdown speeds required for a Short Landing. Kenneth Katz could probably speak to this better, but chances are that the conventional control surfaces are not going to have sufficient authority in this flight regime to do away with everything but the lift fan. If this is the case and the jet does have the necessary fixtures/equipment for VL, then there is probably going to be serious pressure to base some AF assets on amphibs or carriers, which will get into the debate of why we need three air forces operating off of a single carrier (they've already got two with USN/USMC air wing mixes). It is one thing to exchange officers as is done with the EA-6B, but another to put a complete USAF squadron aboard a CVN. Which is likely why BTR12 says CSAF is not interested in/doesn't want the VL capability.

 

Which begs the question I have had for a while: Why doesn't the USMC utilize a short landing instead of a vertical landing? It would appear that the aircraft should be able to recover at higher gross weights utilizing an approach in the transition speed range, while still recovering on a limited deck. It should also provide some additional aerodynamic stability (for safety/control) and a faster recovery time than the standard procedure of coming to a hover, translating over the deck, then landing vertically.

 

Douglas

[Chris Werb]

Originally posted by Ol Paint:

which will get into the debate of why we need three air forces operating off of a single carrier (they've already got two with USN/USMC air wing mixes).  

Douglas

 

You've already got FOUR with AFSOC MH-47s, and US Army OH-58Ds and MH-6s(?) operating off USN vessels operationally at one time or other. It might even be five if USCG aircraft have operated from USN platforms or the other way round (where is Garth when you need him? ).

 

The RAF/RN also have something called 'Joint Force Harrier':

http://homepages.force9.net/ffour/Hangar/2...2000/jf2000.htm

[swerve]

Originally posted by Ol Paint:

Which begs the question I have had for a while:  Why doesn't the USMC utilize a short landing instead of a vertical landing?  It would appear that the aircraft should be able to recover at higher gross weights utilizing an approach in the transition speed range, while still recovering on a limited deck.  It should also provide some additional aerodynamic stability (for safety/control) and a faster recovery time than the standard procedure of coming to a hover, translating over the deck, then landing vertically.

 

Douglas

 

I've been informed by an ex-RN aviation person (helicopter avionics, not pilot) that they have long enjoyed operating Harriers off their little ships in sea states at which much larger USN carriers are battened down (preferably within sight of said CTOL carriers) because conventional landing is not possible in the conditions, although T/O is. Hence the VL. He said they don't have to use it all the time, but train for it because often it's the only way to land. I presume the same is true for the USMC.

 

NB. This is hearsay. I have no personal knowledge of this matter.

[Archie Pellagio]

Originally posted by Chris Werb:

 

 

The story I heard about the use of the pods in Iraq was that the software to generate the aiming symbology in the HUD wasn't ballistically matched to the gun. This sounds like something that could be fixed relatively easily and cheaply but the will wasn't there to do it.

 

My recollection is that the planes used in Iraq were F-16As - not A-16s. A-16s would have been new builds - the competitor to the A-16 as A-10 replacement, believe it or not, was to have been a re-engined and upgraded ex ANG A-7E called the A-7F. Had this plane entered service the A-10 would have been replaced by the very airframes it had previously replaced in service.

 

There were Three projects for a ground pounding dedicated A-10 from the mid-80's to ODS IIRC.

 

The middle one was called A-16 IIRC, but the one we're talking about was the F/A-16 designation.

 

The problems were two fold.

 

1. The CCIP sights weren't correctly callibrated for the rounds - minor problem

 

2. The Cannon when fired would vibrate like all buggery and couldn't hit a barn door from two feet away, regardeless of software aiming - MAJOR problem.

 

As I said before, the fact they were considered aimable, sustained fire CBU's says enough.

[Josh]

Gun pods often have this problem AFAIK. Didn't the 20mm used in F-4's in Vietnam end up having accuracy problems as well?

[JOE BRENNAN]

Originally posted by Chris Werb:

 

My recollection is that the planes used in Iraq were F-16As - not A-16s.

 

Right. F-16A's of the 138th TFS, NY ANG, the only unit ever equipped with the GPU-5 pods [and to add was a specifically CAS focused unit as some other ANG' F-16 units]. A 1991 AW&ST article mentioned the gun not being incorporated in the continously computed point of impact program because it would have created a one-off version of the whole software relative to the rest of the fleet ("CCIP" is a bit confusing applied to the F-16, had me going at first, since it also stands for Common Configuration Implementation Program, avionics upgrade now ongoing for F-16C/D Block 40-52 ), . The pilots reported satisfactory accuracy manually aiming, but felt Rockeye dropping was just as effective with less risk. So the pod was only used on one day, third of the ground war. Vibration wasn't mentioned. An F-16 was damaged by an Sa-9 or -13 that day but it wasn't felt to be related to using the pod.

 

It seems there's some consensus, A-10's and perhaps gun CAS more generally is mainly symbolic. It may be true the AF has institutional issues re: CAS, but again recent clear evidence, besides turning away from *symbolically* important weapons like 30mm, is scant, IMO. What if prominently gun-based CAS really doesn't make a lot of sense anymore? (I don't see how it would as a main thing, not to say *no* role, don't get upset Tony ) should the AF still embrace it just to show its good will?

 

I could understand if from AF's point of view they would find that idea bs and not accept the need to prove themselves innocent adopting or maintaining obsolescent concepts. The Army's jointness attitude sucks worse than the AF's by some independent views (it's clearly Rumsfeld's view pre Schoomaker for example) among the services so why would it be their burden? (they might say, I'm neutral ).

 

Joe

 

<font size=1>[Edited by JOE BRENNAN (25 Feb 2004).]

 

[Edited by JOE BRENNAN (25 Feb 2004).]