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No, but they help. With them what was a task that will take 3 years full time work (assuming he can shift 200 pages a day or so, possibly optimistic since he had a full time job teaching at RMAS at the time and did other things) becomes a few months tasking.

 

Are you assuming that developing a large sample not derived from the memoir of Gustavus Smith would require going though every page of the OR? Have you even seen the OR, or have you only used them as "searchable texts"?

 

He took an accepted approach and used a limited sample. Since he stated the limitations this is valid. Later research has shown this to be a ballpark figure at least. To do the task justice would be 4 years of a PhD's students life (break down all known ranges by various factors). Maybe someone will do it one day, until then Griffiths figures stand without any real challenge.
Who says you need to break down "all known ranges"? Or include "various factors"? Is it 3 years or 4 years? And have you tried?

 

Combat power could be generated with a spoon, although perhaps not a lot of it.

 

Hang on, I'll generate a TLI for it:

 

Range = 1m (my reach)

Accuracy = 1.0 (I rarely miss when stabbing someone with a spoon)

ROF = 60 rpm

Reliability = 1.0 (My spoons are good Sheffield Steel)

Lethality = 0.035 (3.5% derived from estimates "MV" at 15j, 100% lethality being 80j delivered (RMCS), and a square relationship)

 

TLI = 2.1

 

Thus I can declare that me, armed with a spoon is ca. 1% the combat power of VN era US rifleman (and if you believe that I'd like to sell you the Isle of Wight...)

 

Good dodge, be funny, and don't attempt to answer the question. BTW, how is 2.1 1 percent of 0.32?

 

I'm really thinking you haven't actually read the book, since all these things are discussed in various chapters.

 

I see, so you're actually saying I'm lying now? Cute, considering the number of times you've been caught with your hand in the cookie jar. In fact I haven't read the book....in about sixteen years now. Of course maybe I can turn up the review of it I started to write then, until I decided it was a waste of my time?

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Who says you need to break down "all known ranges"? Or include "various factors"? Is it 3 years or 4 years? And have you tried?

 

Nope, I haven't tried, although I wouldn't mind trying if I had the time.

 

 

Good dodge, be funny, and don't attempt to answer the question. BTW, how is 2.1 1 percent of 0.32?

 

QJM defines 3 terms, Operational Lethality Index (how lethal a weapon is supposed to be on the battlefield), Theoretical LI and Dispersion Factor. The relationship is OLI = TLI/DF.

 

In this case, I initially gave OLIs of the M-16 (taken from "If War Comes", the book that Dupuy predicted several thousand US casualties in GW1, he had worked out CEVs from the Iran-Iraq War and applied them incorrectly (or as correctly as he could)), and TLIs worked out as per Numbers, Predictions and War.

 

The DF is interesting for our case, as it relates to (percieved) lethality on the field, and thus to find out how modern or napoleon the ACW was we should look to figures for DF there.

 

In fact, Dupuy has already worked this out, and the 7YW, NW and ACW have no difference in the concentration of men (8-10,000 men per sq km). However, the ACW has a lower rate of casualty accumulation than the Napoleonic Wars (but not the 7YW or earlier FRW, which are about the same)

 

(http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/tndm/v1n3/fv1n3.htm pages 16-20)

 

Thus the ACW would seem to be a fairly typical age of musket war.

 

 

I see, so you're actually saying I'm lying now? Cute, considering the number of times you've been caught with your hand in the cookie jar. In fact I haven't read the book....in about sixteen years now. Of course maybe I can turn up the review of it I started to write then, until I decided it was a waste of my time?

 

Sir, I must appologise for an ill thought out and ungentlemanly comment.

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67th Tigers:

 

You seem to be missing the point that any modelling system is only an approximation of relative effectiveness of weapons systems and the forces that use them. I think Dupuy adequately demonstrated that his own modelling approach adequately predicted outcomes when applied to divisional or larger engagements where adequate data was available. He freely admitted these limitations. Try to stretch those methods beyond their intended application and recognized limitations, and you're on your own.

Edited by aevans
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Nope, I haven't tried, although I wouldn't mind trying if I had the time.

 

Exactly! And so would I, but I've been stuck with working insurgency issues while trying to plug away at two major World War II topics, so haven't the time either. But my point is that Griffith evidently did have the time and flubbed it.

 

BTW, I have to poke you a bit and remind you that you brought up the subject of the "range controversy" IIRC I said nothing about it. :) Nor did I ever say that I objected to the estimation, what I objected to was the methodology.

 

QJM defines 3 terms, Operational Lethality Index (how lethal a weapon is supposed to be on the battlefield), Theoretical LI and Dispersion Factor. The relationship is OLI = TLI/DF.

 

In this case, I initially gave OLIs of the M-16 (taken from "If War Comes", the book that Dupuy predicted several thousand US casualties in GW1, he had worked out CEVs from the Iran-Iraq War and applied them incorrectly (or as correctly as he could)), and TLIs worked out as per Numbers, Predictions and War.

 

The DF is interesting for our case, as it relates to (percieved) lethality on the field, and thus to find out how modern or napoleon the ACW was we should look to figures for DF there.

Er, yes, I sorta know that, I've been running the QJM and its successor the TNDM for around 19 years now. :rolleyes:

 

And if you actually read the scenarios in IWC and compare the ranges predicted to the other predictions made then, you will find that he was in fact closer than any other. And part of the reason that even the low scenario prediction was high was that none of them were run utilizing a month-long aerial attrition campaign as a precursor. If that is factored in the model is actually spot on (well, as spot on as these things ever get).

 

Which is part of the problem, models are only good predictors if they use the same "inputs" that eventually occur in the real world. ;) And of course, they are only models after all.

 

BTW, I see you have missed Trevor's most obvious error (well, not error really, more like circular reasoning :lol: ), but that's okay, pretty much everybody misses it. Hint: How is a OLI derived from a TLI?

 

In fact, Dupuy has already worked this out, and the 7YW, NW and ACW have no difference in the concentration of men (8-10,000 men per sq km). However, the ACW has a lower rate of casualty accumulation than the Napoleonic Wars (but not the 7YW or earlier FRW, which are about the same)

 

(http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/tndm/v1n3/fv1n3.htm pages 16-20)

 

Thus the ACW would seem to be a fairly typical age of musket war.

 

Yep and an interesting point there, since Trevor's basic assumption that the casualty pattern in the ACW was "different" from previous and succeeding wars was found - after further analysis - to be wrong. I think Chris wrote an article on that in one of the TNDM Newsletter issues?

 

Sir, I must appologise for an ill thought out and ungentlemanly comment.

 

Apology accepted, I'm sorry for getting hot under the collar as well. And sheesh, I thought that for once I wouldn't get drawn into a TND dispute?! Just goes to show how much I know. :rolleyes:

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  • 5 years later...

First of all, apologies for necromancing this quite interesting thread, which goes all over the place.

 

Second. Does anyone know where one can get an spreadsheet with weapons OLI's, please? I have found lot's of them as an annex on one DTIC document, but I'd rather not type them down if I can avoid it.

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Why is it that the germans have such a reputation for military prowess when the haven't won a war for over 130 years? Does anyone know what has purpetuated this myth for so long?

 

Well if you count the World Wars as just two big wars, then no. But if instead you count them as several wars between two nations then Germany won plenty: Poland, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Netherlands, France and Yugoslavia were all defeated by Germany. In Finland and Spain Germany troops got involved in civil wars and helped their side to win. They also damn near defeated the Brits and the Soviets, neither of which would have survived without American help.

 

That's a pretty impressive resume to me, even if they ultimately lost against the combined forces of three superpowers of the time.

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The Finns lost the Winter War. It's universally agreed that man for man, gun for gun, they were much better than the Soviet forces. There are many such examples.

 

If your politicians are so inept that they get you into two successive wars in which you're so outnumbered & outgunned that you'd need multiple miracles to win, the number of wars you win is not a good measure of military prowess. That's what happened to Germany.

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The Finns lost the Winter War. It's universally agreed that man for man, gun for gun, they were much better than the Soviet forces. There are many such examples.

 

If your politicians are so inept that they get you into two successive wars in which you're so outnumbered & outgunned that you'd need multiple miracles to win, the number of wars you win is not a good measure of military prowess. That's what happened to Germany.

 

The 20th century Germans: tactical (battlefield) and operational (theater) brilliance, strategically mixed, grand strategically inept.

 

 

Chinese military saying:

 

Strategy without tactics is the long, hard road to ultimate victory.

Tactics without strategy is the noise and spectacle preceding ultimate defeat.

 

You could say, with some caveats, that the Allies, and especially the Soviets, fought with good strategy but inferior tactics. It worked, but many Allied soldiers died who should have lived.

You could also say that the Germans fought with better tactics but inferior strategy, resulting in formidable combat performance. They conserved German lives on the battlefield, but lost the war and had peace terms dictated to them.

 

 

(I am uncomfortable with this saying. The second line, I feel, strikes too close to home if seen in the light of NATO conduct in the "Long War on Terror").

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Their worst errors, both times, were political & industrial. Politicians decided to fight too many enemies at once, & failed to run an effective war economy until too late. In WW1, agricultural policy was catastrophically inept. That worked better in WW2, but it's telling that the UK & USSR both built more aircraft than Germany, & the USSR built far more AFVs (& more of them tanks) & artillery pieces, although at the start of the war, both countries had smaller manufacturing industries than Germany.

 

The armed forces went along with this, I think mostly because the high command paid little attention to industrial & economic factors.

 

There were also strategic errors committed by the armed forces, e.g. the navy's love of pointless big ships until Doenitz managed to get it to change direction, but they pale into insignificance compared to what the politicians did.

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One thing worth noting is how the Germany army's acknowledged superiority in WWII (and to a lesser extent in WWI) encouraged Germany's leaders to make those really stupid grand-strategic decisions -- i.e., our army is so awesome that sure, no problem we can conquer Russia while our Western flank isn't secure yet, etc. I wonder if Hitler had been in charge of a German army with the capabilities, of say, the UKian army of the time, whether he would have made the same decisions.

Edited by Brian Kennedy
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I doubt a Hitler victorious from France would have a second thought invading Russia. If his armies were less competent he would have been defeated in France.

 

That's about what I'm saying too, though, right? I think the German army's superiority had the ironic effect of getting Hitler to bite off a lot more than he could chew. So maybe the iconic "Germans are great at tactics and suck at grand strategy" statement is more complicated than it at first seems, since those two factors kind of influence each other rather than existing in separate vacuums.

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I doubt a Hitler victorious from France would have a second thought invading Russia. If his armies were less competent he would have been defeated in France.

 

That's about what I'm saying too, though, right? I think the German army's superiority had the ironic effect of getting Hitler to bite off a lot more than he could chew. So maybe the iconic "Germans are great at tactics and suck at grand strategy" statement is more complicated than it at first seems, since those two factors kind of influence each other rather than existing in separate vacuums.

 

You have a good point.

 

A whole series of successful battles doesn't equal operational triumph. Operational triumphs don't equal strategic success (of all military means, as an instrument, serving the broader/deeper national interest). Strategic successes don't necessarily add up to grand strategic victory (meaning the nation/coalition per se, not merely the armed forces, attaining its over-all long-term ends).

 

Once you begin thinking that stringing together a huge number of tactical (battlefield) victories will eventually mean grand strategic (national/alliance/coalition) victory, you are in rather dubious territory.

 

Maybe the military had a disproportionate influence on German national decision-making in the last century?

Edited by Heirophant
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Maybe the military had a disproportionate influence on German national decision-making in the last century?

 

The military had pretty much zero influence on the national decision making from 1933 on.

 

In which case, the German military was used merely for their tactical and operational genius.

 

The government forgot that they were also the nation's experts on what was strategically (militarily) possible and likely; plus they should have had input on grand strategy as well (who do we antagonize/befriend, and to what degree; how do we mobilize the economy and the scientific community, etc).

 

Perhaps they got relegated to the role of an instrument or tool, rather than the brain trust they ought to have been.

 

Was this down to the Nazis being Nazis, or was it something else?

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You could say, with some caveats, that the Allies, and especially the Soviets, fought with good strategy but inferior tactics. It worked, but many Allied soldiers died who should have lived.

 

 

I don't see the Allied, and the Soviets in particular, that good at the strategic level. I think all powers entered in the war with the wrong strategy. And, specially, the Stalin strategic and diplomatic "scheme" in the 1939/1941 period had disastrous consequences for the SU, and actually, the whole Europe.

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You could say, with some caveats, that the Allies, and especially the Soviets, fought with good strategy but inferior tactics. It worked, but many Allied soldiers died who should have lived.

 

 

I don't see the Allied, and the Soviets in particular, that good at the strategic level. I think all powers entered in the war with the wrong strategy. And, specially, the Stalin strategic and diplomatic "scheme" in the 1939/1941 period had disastrous consequences for the SU, and actually, the whole Europe.

 

It wasn't so much that the Allies had better strategy, it was that they had less-bad ones...

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Chinese military saying:

 

Strategy without tactics is the long, hard road to ultimate victory.

Tactics without strategy is the noise and spectacle preceding ultimate defeat.

 

(I am uncomfortable with this saying. The second line, I feel, strikes too close to home if seen in the light of NATO conduct in the "Long War on Terror").

 

 

Well that's exactly what happened in Iraq and is still happening in Afghanistan. The US has basically made up its strategy as it went along, sometimes after the fact. They basically had no strategy for post-Saddam or post-Taleban after their early operational victories.

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Maybe the military had a disproportionate influence on German national decision-making in the last century?

 

The military had pretty much zero influence on the national decision making from 1933 on.

 

In which case, the German military was used merely for their tactical and operational genius.

 

The government forgot that they were also the nation's experts on what was strategically (militarily) possible and likely; plus they should have had input on grand strategy as well (who do we antagonize/befriend, and to what degree; how do we mobilize the economy and the scientific community, etc).

 

Perhaps they got relegated to the role of an instrument or tool, rather than the brain trust they ought to have been.

 

Was this down to the Nazis being Nazis, or was it something else?

 

 

What can you expect from leaders subscribing to a delusional ideology that in their minds replaces even science.

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When Germans were able to use their (mostly) good small-unit training and tactics vs. opponent who was not able to use their strengths, they prevailed. Same was with Finnish military during WW II.

 

But if it became "men vs. fire", latter usually won in long run.

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