Screw the battleships, give me more cruisers

[Scott Cunningham]

Would like to open the discussion to a neglected class of ship that had a huge impact on WWII combat, especially in the pacific.

 

What would have been the impact had the USN or other great power ignored the battleship and concentrated instead on heavy and light cruisers.

 

What would the result have been in the numbers of cruisers available and their contribution to fighting.

[Guest pfcem]

Neglected? We built a lot more cruisers than battleships. We laid down enough cruisers during WW2 that nine Cleveland class CL & two Baltimore class CA were completed as CVLs.

[irregularmedic]

But @ the beginning of the war how many did the U.S. have?

 

And some of those weren't exactly new either...

 

Facing those excellent Japanese cruisers with their amazing torpedoes and practised in night fighting...

[Guest aevans]

But @ the beginning of the war how many did the U.S. have?

 

And some of those weren't exactly new either...

 

Facing those excellent Japanese cruisers with their amazing torpedoes and practised in night fighting...

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That lasted for all of three months (if you take the beginning of the Solomons campaign as the beginning of serious naval surface warfare in the South Pacific).

[Marek Tucan]

Had more to do with improper tactics and bad comms than with much technical advantage on the Jap side... True Japanese cruisers had torpedoes but OTOH this brought some problems as lighter armour or too high mass center.

 

As soon as the US commanders figure how to fight them, the torpedoes became not so important and the disadvantages began to show up.

[Nic240]

But @ the beginning of the war how many did the U.S. have?

 

And some of those weren't exactly new either...

 

Facing those excellent Japanese cruisers with their amazing torpedoes and practised in night fighting...

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If I did't miss any there were 29cruisers built by the U.S. from the end of WWI untill the start of WWII. All of these ships were from 9,050 to 9,950 tons except for the Omaha class of ten ships at 7,050 tons. 1946 strength 3CB's, 31 heavy and 48 light cruisers.

[irregularmedic]

I was always under the impression that it was US technical superiority in radar, not tactics that turned the tide at night...

I suppose one follows the other, once you have good long range radar, then you can use appropriate tactics to take advantage of that...

[Guest aevans]

I was always under the impression that it was US technical superiority in radar, not tactics that turned the tide at night...

I suppose one follows the other, once you have good long range radar, then you can use appropriate tactics to take advantage of that...

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Radar was very helpful, but in its first successes -- and in many of its subsequent ones -- it was mounted on platforms authorized or built pre-war. In a lot of ways radar and radio were the first really modular technologies. (In that you didn't design a new platform for it, as you might a more powerful gun or heavier bomb -- you just mounted it on platform that could make use of it and provide the operating power.)

[JOE BRENNAN]

I was always under the impression that it was US technical superiority in radar, not tactics that turned the tide at night...

I suppose one follows the other, once you have good long range radar, then you can use appropriate tactics to take advantage of that...

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Both. Radar was an advantage, improved and the USN used better tactics with it, and did more training and stable assignment of ships together, particularly some of the DD divisions that scored one side victories in the Northern Solomons in 1943 (Vella Gulf and Cape St. George).

 

But as far as cruisers, that's kind of the point, they had no such walkover victories, except Vila Stanmore which was a total force mismatch (3 CL's and 3 DD's v 2 IJN DD's). Empress Augusta Bay was a victory but very imperfect, and the IJN scored victories over US (and an RNZN) cruisers as late as Kula Gulf and Kolombangara, July 1943. The Allied force had radar, the Japanese had ESM which picked it up first (as physics say it generally will). That was less likely with all SG (centrimetric) radar outfit of the DD's, and the visual detection range against them was much shorter as well. Besides initial detection, the US cruisers by 1943 often had blindfire GFC capability, but the hit rates tended to be low (Empress Augusta Bay), and there was a tendency to concentrate on one target.

 

Also the Japanese night superiority played a role in the conquest of the NEI, Java Sea, and even secondary battles like Badung Strait where the Allies had the heavy force advantage but couldn't exploit, and Sunda Strait where it was the other way around and they were wiped out. The Japanese proved themselves quite qualitatively superior at night fighting to the pick-up ABDA forces with equipment outfits of that time.

 

Joe

Edited December 19, 2006 by JOE BRENNAN

[bigfngun]

What would have been the impact had the USN or other great power ignored the battleship and concentrated instead on heavy and light cruisers.

 

What would the result have been in the numbers of cruisers available and their contribution to fighting.

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I'm reading Eric Hammel's Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea about the Naval Battle Of Guadalcanal Nov. 13-15, 1942. The US crusiers and the attached destroyers (Friday the 13th) didn't exactly stand up well to heavy gunfire from the Hiei or Kirishima. Another point is the rather significant crew requirements for all cruiser types.

 

How about taking those resources into building more Iowa class BBs. This way you could attach a Batdiv to all surface task forces and you won't run into the problem of being outgunned as a cruiser/destroyer force would most certainly be if they ran into Kongo class equipped task forces. IIRC, pre-war the USN was concerned about Jap surface groups led by the Kongos hence one of the requirements for fast US BBs.

[Tiornu]

The US crusiers and the attached destroyers (Friday the 13th) didn't exactly stand up well to heavy gunfire from the Hiei or Kirishima.

I can't agree. San Francisco stood up extraordinarily well to Hiei's 14in gunfire. She took more than a dozen hits from 14in shells, and continued with two of her three turrets still in action. What more could you ask? The fact that none of these shells were AP or HE may have had something to do with it....

[KingSargent]

How about taking those resources into building more Iowa class BBs. This way you could attach a Batdiv to all surface task forces and you won't run into the problem of being outgunned as a cruiser/destroyer force would most certainly be if they ran into Kongo class equipped task forces.  IIRC, pre-war the USN was concerned about Jap surface groups led by the Kongos hence one of the requirements for fast US BBs.

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Except the 45K ton Iowas were illegal under the Treaties, as were ANY new BBs started before 1936. So was building any more cruisers, FTM. Not that the WW2-generation ship designs were even possible until the USN developed some pretty revolutionary propulsion systems (others did too but the US's actually worked) in the late 1930s.

So if you "move resources" you have absolutely NO surface forces before 1943, unless you completely abandon the Treaties.

 

As for "incomparable" IJN cruisers, the CAs required several rebuilds to get the designs to work, and they all ended up 30-40% over Treaty limits (I speak of the Treaty Cruiser designs, not the pre-Treaty Kakos). They had less range than contemporary US cruisers - not that that mattered when there was no oil.... The oxygen-fuelled torpedoes proved hazardous if the ships were hit (and possibly if they were not). The design flaws and extensive rebuilds made them considerably more expensive than other navies' CAs, and much less operational - the IJN only had 4 operational CAs at any one time through most of the '30s due to necessary rebuilding.

[irregularmedic]

the IJN only had 4 operational CAs at any one time through most of the '30s due to necessary rebuilding.

 

I thought part of the reason for that was the treaty itself. Didn't the Japanese partly circumvent the treaty by supposedly mothballing ships when they were actually rebuilding them, keeping the allowed number ships active?

[Guest pfcem]

Except the 45K ton Iowas were illegal under the Treaties, as were ANY new BBs started before 1936.

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Not true.

 

The 1922 Washington Naval Treaty & the 1930 London Naval Treaties had both ended on 31 December 1936.

 

Article 25 of the Second London Naval Treaty of 1936:

 

In the event of any vessel not in conformity with the limitations and restrictions as to standard displacement and armament prescribed by Articles 4, 5 and 7 of the present Treaty being authorised, constructed or acquired by a Power not a party to the present Treaty, each High Contracting Party reserves the right to depart if, and to the extent to which, he considers such departures necessary in order to meet the requirements of his national security

 

Plus...

 

The Second London Naval Treaty of 1936 had an escalator clause which allowed 16-inch guns on capital ships (this is the clause the US used to place 16" guns on the North Carolina class).

 

The 1938 revision of the Second London Naval Treaty (propted by reports of Japan constructing capital ships greater than 35,000 tons) allowed an increase in the standard displacement of capital ships to 45,000 tons.

 

And all treaties essentailly ceased with the opening of hostilities in 1939.

 

The Iowas were ordered in 12 July 1940.

[KingSargent]

Not true.

 

The 1922 Washington Naval Treaty & the 1930 London Naval Treaties had both ended on 31 December 1936.

And how is this different from what I said about no BBs could be ordered before 1937?

 

Article 25 of the Second London Naval Treaty of 1936:

 

In the event of any vessel not in conformity with the limitations and restrictions as to standard displacement and armament prescribed by Articles 4, 5 and 7 of the present Treaty being authorised, constructed or acquired by a Power not a party to the present Treaty, each High Contracting Party reserves the right to depart if, and to the extent to which, he considers such departures necessary in order to meet the requirements of his national security

Right. The Japanese pulling out was what freed the USN to start building up. US legislation still had to be changed to permit an increase in strength beyond Treaty limits.

 

 

Plus...

 

The Second London Naval Treaty of 1936 had an escalator clause which allowed 16-inch guns on capital ships (this is the clause the US used to place 16" guns on the North Carolina class).

Correct, but the NCs were designed for 14" guns. The USN managed to fit the 16" guns in, but the protection was only against 14" shells - doctrine at the time was that a new ship had to be armored against the guns it carried, since there was no sure way to know the performance of foreign guns.

It took some time to get the designs with protection against 16" fire in place (South Dakota class).

 

The 1938 revision of the Second London Naval Treaty (propted by reports of Japan constructing capital ships greater than 35,000 tons) allowed an increase in the standard displacement of capital ships to 45,000 tons.

 

And all treaties essentailly ceased with the opening of hostilities in 1939.

 

The Iowas were ordered in 12 July 1940.

Right. AFTER the passage of legislation permitting increases in the size of the Navy. So there was no LEGAL way to supply Iowas in place of Treaty CAs before then, as the post I was responding to suggested.

 

Thank you so much for confirming that everything I said was true.

[Tiornu]

Didn't the Japanese partly circumvent the treaty by supposedly mothballing ships when they were actually rebuilding them, keeping the allowed number ships active?

No, that's not how the Japanese weaseled around the treaties. They were allowed 108,400 tons of CAs--that's the four 7100-ton Furutaka types, and the eight 10,000-ton ships of the Myoko and Takao classes. Of course, none of the ships were at the listed tonnages, especially after their rebuilds. To build subsequent CAs, the Japanese fitted their new ships, the Mogamis with 155mm guns which technically made them CLs. Same for the Tones, except that the treaties lapsed in time to allow them to carry 8in guns from the start. To fit all the Tones and Mogamis into the permitted CL tonnage, they were listed as being ~8500 tons.

[Scott Cunningham]

Cruisers built to the 10,000 ton limitation usually attempted too much on a light hull. Light cruisers of this size (the US CL's at least) were an exception. I think the Japanese had to send the Mogamis back to the yard after their hulls cracked and warped on trials.

 

As the treaty expired cruiser displacement shot up until by the end of the war you get the massive Des Moines and Worchester classes, as well as the Alaskas.

 

One interesting thing I saw was that the anti-aircraft cruisers of the Atlanta class (several of which were lost) were actually pretty deadly in surface encounters due to the rapid fire capabilities of their smaller weapons.

 

Aside from the Japanes use of battleships in the Guadalcanal campaign (which cost them 2 Kongos) it seems to me that battleships were usually considered too valuable to risk, but cruisers were much more readily sent into harms way.

[Richard Lindquist]

Japanese didn't cheat on numbers of cruisers, but on tonnage. In fairness to them, they tried to get too much in a given tonnnage and after reconstruction to correct structural flaws were over tonnage.

 

CA and CL were pressed into action in BB type roles because BB were limited in number by the treaties.

[Guest pfcem]

And how is this different from what I said about no BBs could be ordered before 1937?

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You said the "45K ton Iowas were illegal under the Treaties". Which as I said & demonstrated is false.

 

Under Article 1 of the The London Treaty of 1930, France and Italy may, however, build the replacement tonnage which they were entitled to lay down in 1927 and 1929 in accordance with the provisions of the said Treaty.

 

Japan, Britain & the US did not lay down any BBs prior to 1937 and Germany was not subject the the limitations of the 1922 Washington or 1930 London Naval Treaties.

 

So you are incorrect about that as well.

 

 

 

Right. The Japanese pulling out was what freed the USN to start building up. US legislation still had to be changed to permit an increase in strength beyond Treaty limits.

405936[/snapback]

So you your where wrong in stating that "45K ton Iowas were illegal under the Treaties".

 

 

 

Correct, but the NCs were designed for 14" guns. The USN managed to fit the 16" guns in, but the protection was only against 14" shells - doctrine at the time was that a new ship had to be armored against the guns it carried, since there was no sure way to know the performance of foreign guns.

It took some time to get the designs with protection against 16" fire in place (South Dakota class).

 

Right. AFTER the passage of legislation permitting increases in the size of the Navy. So there was no LEGAL way to supply Iowas in place of Treaty CAs before then, as the post I was responding to suggested.

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And just how does that have ANYTHING to do the legality of any BBs?

 

 

 

Thank you so much for confirming that everything I said was true.

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Actually I did the opposite.

 

Note that bigfngun asked about using resources into building more Iowa class BBs, not building them prior to 1937.

[Tiornu]

One interesting thing I saw was that the anti-aircraft cruisers of the Atlanta class (several of which were lost) were actually pretty deadly in surface encounters due to the rapid fire capabilities of their smaller weapons.

Atlantas participated in only one surface battle, Friday the 13th, where both of the involved units were lost. I do not take this as indicative of any pronounced vulnerability on their part as neither went gentle. However, I don't see anything indicating they were especially deadly either. They did their bit and did figure prominently in sinkuing at least one DD.

 

Aside from the Japanes use of battleships in the Guadalcanal campaign (which cost them 2 Kongos) it seems to me that battleships were usually considered too valuable to risk

Halsey was prepared to send in battleships whenever the need arose, but this was considered a gutsy move for just the reasons you're making. Capital ships in confined waters--makes admirals queasy. It was logistical limitation that prevented the basing of battleships near Guadalcanal until rather late in the game.

[Marek Tucan]

Atlantas participated in only one surface battle, Friday the 13th, where both of the involved units were lost.

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To be fair just one was lost in the battle, the other later on in a sub attack.

[lucklucky]

The japanese cruisers until Takao Class were fixed for structural problems that a Typhoon showed. Mainly wave frequency and consequent hull flexing. The Tomodzuru Incident a destroyed that capcized due to heavy weather showed stability problesm that were corrected. The later Mogami Class also had to got to back to the yard because the new tech: soldering didnt worked

as expected; the last one 2 Tones worked well and didnt had any problem.

Testimony to Mogami resistance is the beating that Kumano received.

 

One interesting thing I saw was that the anti-aircraft cruisers of the Atlanta class (several of which were lost) were actually pretty deadly in surface encounters due to the rapid fire capabilities of their smaller weapons.

 

I always wondered that . The penetration of critical spaces can put a ship dead in water but it's more dificult to achieve than to put a ship out of fight or severely degraded by small(comparatively) fire. Bridge, Directors knocked out, fires etc

 

In case of Japanese i doubt that the change to 8" was for the better.

[JOE BRENNAN]

To be fair just one was lost in the battle, the other later on in a sub attack.

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Another small nitpick would be that the second Juneau (CL-119) participated in a minor surface combat, essentially the only one of the Korean War, claiming 3 Soviet built G-5 MTB's of the NK 2nd Torpedo Flotilla, July 2 1950, in company with light cruiser HMS Jamaica and frigate HMS Black Swan.

 

But, again what US cruiser had spectacular success in surface combat in the Pacific? The conventional statement is tactics, radar, the USN turned the night combat situation around. But there weren't actually any big victories by US (or Allied) cruiser/DD formations comparable to the Japanese successes against them at battles like Java Sea, Savo and Tassafaronga. There were 2 smashing DD only US victories in the Northern Solomons, and Surigao Strait all ship types, but cruiser/DD formations only achieved partial victories, narrower (than the worst 1942) losses and draws, with the minor exception noted above. It was an attrition situation the Japanese couldn't afford even when they won limited victories, but not smashing success for the US cruisers.

 

The USN concept of gun only cruiser, even with radar direction state of art 1942-43, in usual Pacific combat (where surface ships generally had to hide from planes in the darkness) was inferior to the Japanese one of cruiser as also major heavy caliber torpedo platform, IMO, and questionable whether the gun cruiser played an absolutely necessary role in those battles compared to DD's, especially if we were to imagine the latter equipped both with centimetric radar *and* long range torpedoes. I'm not claiming the Japanese cruisers were superior examples of the naval architect's, marine engineer's and weapons designer's crafts overall, but a superior practical concept for surface combat in that situation (and it proved difficult to overcome the big starting training advantage of the IJN in night combat, it's hard to separate that out).

 

Joe

Edited December 19, 2006 by JOE BRENNAN

[Tiornu]

But, again what US cruiser had spectacular success in surface combat in the Pacific?

The defeat of two Japanese battleships by a cruiser-led American force is at least as remarkable as Tassafaronga. Empress Augusta Bay and Cape Esperance were also worthy cap-feathers.

 

The USN concept of gun only cruiser, even with radar direction state of art 1942-43, in usual Pacific combat (where surface ships generally had to hide from planes in the darkness) was inferior to the Japanese one of cruiser as also major heavy caliber torpedo platform, IMO

My O strongly disagrees with your O. The Allied cruisers at Savo were defeated by gunfire, not by torpedoes. Two of the four ships lost were not hit by torpedoes at all, and the other two might have sunk anyway regardless of the CA torpedoes. CA torpedoes accomplished more at Java Sea and Sunda Strait (just ask the Japanese personnel victimized by Mogami and Mikuma), but never again at any time in the war did Japanese CA torpedoes hit anything. Well, all right, they hit an island in Surigao Strait, but the island was not damaged. If you look at British CAs in WWII, you will see again that CA torpedoes accomplished almost nothing. The British and Japanese would have done better by removing the torpedoes and installing more AA weaponry. Especially when we consider the amount of damage the Japanese cruisers suffered from their own torpeodes.

[Ken Estes]

Atlantas participated in only one surface battle, Friday the 13th, where both of the involved units were lost. I do not take this as indicative of any pronounced vulnerability on their part as neither went gentle. However, I don't see anything indicating they were especially deadly either. They did their bit and did figure prominently in sinkuing at least one DD.

 

Halsey was prepared to send in battleships whenever the need arose, but this was considered a gutsy move for just the reasons you're making. Capital ships in confined waters--makes admirals queasy. It was logistical limitation that prevented the basing of battleships near Guadalcanal until rather late in the game.

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I think it true for CAs, maybe also for CL/CLAA classes, but off the top of my head, no US cruiser sinks from IJN gunfire alone in WWII, always at least one 24" in the side. IJN BBs made no difference in this calculus.

 

Part of the problem that the cruiser line [incl Atlanta] was not able to generate its best forepower was RAdm Calaghan's order 'odd ships fire to starboard, even ships to port,' or some such. It was a melee from the beginning and it was everybody for himself!

 

Sending the WA and SD to Ironbottom Sound with only 4DD in company ranks as entirely gutsy, Tiornu; we could easily have lost SD, maybe both BB to IJN torpedo salvos, as the IJN moved in typical multiple divisions, guided by the able Kondo [tip of the hat to aevans for reminding me of him last year].