Theory of Close Support Tanks

[John_Ford]

I am scratching my head over the employment of the CS Tank by GB. The Germans, Russian and US used weapons with duel purpose ammo. The Brits by contrast used a good AT gun with no HE and then added a close support tank to fire....smoke. Correct me but wouldn't a decent HE thrower have been a better choice. Just kinda wondering, interested in thoughts. This came out of the 95MM discussion.

[Wobbly Head]

Everybody makes mistakes. The exact same situation could be said for the Americian M1 the smoothbore is great at throwing SABOT but it hasn't got a good HE or smoke but the Brit CR2 has the rifled gun which is a lot better for smoke and HESH although the SABOT is not as powerfull as those fired by a smoothbore

. It all depends on the doctorin used at the time of tank construction and the opposition they come up against.

Edited December 15, 2006 by Wobbly Head

[On the way]

I am scratching my head over the employment of the CS Tank by GB.  The Germans,  Russian and US used weapons with duel purpose ammo.  The Brits by contrast used a good AT gun with no HE and then added a close support tank to fire....smoke.  Correct me  but wouldn't a decent HE thrower have been a better choice.  Just kinda wondering,  interested in thoughts.  This came out of the 95MM discussion.

404711[/snapback]

 

I am not aware of 95mm discussion, but in my opinion, a large calibre HE round is vital in CS. By CS, I mean tank infantry support in build up areas. The IDF tactics employed in Gaza appear to use a 105mm or 120mm HE round to knock a hole in the wall of a building the infantry want to assault. The IFV than backs up to the hole, and the infantry egress directly from the rear of the IFV/APC into the building with very little exposure in the open. In addition, HE round is effective for bringing down up to meduim size buildings, and for eliminating sniper threats by wiping out the suspect spot, eliminating fortified positions etc. I doubt if HESH has the same effect.

[BillB]

I am scratching my head over the employment of the CS Tank by GB.  The Germans,  Russian and US used weapons with duel purpose ammo.  The Brits by contrast used a good AT gun with no HE and then added a close support tank to fire....smoke.  Correct me  but wouldn't a decent HE thrower have been a better choice.  Just kinda wondering,  interested in thoughts.  This came out of the 95MM discussion.

404711[/snapback]

This is just a wild guess, but I wonder if it is a carry over from the original British view of the tank, which was as a landship. As there were/are various types of naval ship with different weapon fits for different jobs, and the all tank-Army theorising in the 1920s took a fleet approach complete with tracked resupply auxiliary vehiclesIIRC, I wonder if the CS tank was driven by the same logic.

 

Another possibility might be internal Army branch politics, in the same way thay that the German artillery branch maintained control of the StuG units?

 

Just a thought.

 

BillB

[KingSargent]

It was a decision by the Master General of the Ordnance (I am sure some Perfidious Albionese Pedant will correct me here) that the Royal Artillery fired HE (he made an exception for infantry mortars), and no one else. 3.7" mortars and 3" howitzers of CS tanks carried 90% Smoke and the MGO ungraciously granted them 10% loadout of HE. Since the CS tank carried 40 rounds, this meant 4 rds of inaccurate HE per CS tank, or eight HE rounds per squadron.

 

The MGO was a Gunner, BTW.

 

Typical British Army parochialism; the Royal Artillery was there to fire HE, so no one else could have any. The 40mm Bofors gun got HE ammo for AA work, but no AP; the 40mm 2pdr tank and AT guns got AP since they were supposed to shoot at tanks, but no HE (pre-war). Even the 2pdr AT gun in British use was a Royal Artillery (actually Royal Horse Artillery) weapon. The Infantry gor .55 Boys AT Rifles, and the BEF divisions got some French 25mm AT guns for the infantry BNs.

 

In a similar vein the German 88mm and US 90mm guns could shoot at ground targets and had sights and ammo for this. The British 3.7" guns shot at airplanes - period, full stop. They had no ground sights or AP ammunition - they usually had no sights at all, since the guns didn't aim, they just lined up on the bearing supplied by a central Fire Control station.

[Gerry Chester]

I am scratching my head over the employment of the CS Tank by GB.  The Germans,  Russian and US used weapons with duel purpose ammo.  The Brits by contrast used a good AT gun with no HE and then added a close support tank to fire....smoke.  Correct me  but wouldn't a decent HE thrower have been a better choice. 

 

Hi John,

 

My regiment, the North Irish Horse, used 6-pdr HE from our first action in Tunisia, and despite the introduction of the Churchills Na75 and Marks V and VII, in a lesser degree, was used until war's end.

 

Although the Churchill Mark 1 - Reworked (each of the six units in North Africa had two per squadron) is often called a CS vehicle, it was not until the introduction of the Mark Ics, with two 3 inch howitzers, was it truly deployed as such. Our six remained in inventory until November 1944 when the Mark Vs arrived. Interestingly enough, these six were the only Churchills fitted with PzFW III cupolas.

 

Cheers, Gerry

[John Gillman]

It was a decision by the Master General of the Ordnance (I am sure some Perfidious Albionese Pedant will correct me here) that the Royal Artillery fired HE (he made an exception for infantry mortars), and no one else. 3.7" mortars and 3" howitzers of CS tanks carried 90% Smoke and the MGO ungraciously granted them 10% loadout of HE. Since the CS tank carried 40 rounds, this meant 4 rds of inaccurate HE per CS tank, or eight HE rounds per squadron.

 

The MGO was a Gunner, BTW.

-------------------------------------------

Yes, my grandfather as MGO was a gunner. He was the first non-RASC MGO and had the task of mechanising the Army. Mind you he was a Horse-Gunner (I RHA) so was right of line, to the right of the Cavalry, not just a field gunner. His scrap book of his 3 years as MGO makes fascinating reading. His main priorities seemed to have been trying to get SP artillery fielded, with 18 pounders mounted in Vickers Medium chassis. He spent a lot of time persuading the RASC to harmonise contracts for spares, as the vehicle manufactureres often did not get the contracts to supply the spares for their vehicles. A lot of effort also went into fielding Dragons to tow guns. Don't forget that by 1940 the BEF in France was very well mechanised and reliance on horses minimal. If anyone wants to see his scrap book, give me a shout.

[Guest pfcem]

The "theory" of the Infantry Tank (a slow tank to support infantry) was in and of itself not a bad one. The implementation of the theory OTOH...

 

They incorrectly believed that MGs would be an adequite armament since the primary targets would be MG nests & infantry. They later realized that even an Infantry Tank needed to be able to defeat enemy tanks but the turret rings were too small for the 6pdr & they had to use the less effective 2pdr (still relying primarily on MGs vs MG nests & infantry). And they did not adequately armor them against anti-tank weapons (few early war tanks of any find were due to the rapid advancement in anti-tank guns).

 

Then when they finally got Infantry Tanks armed with 3" howitzers as they should have had to start with...

[KingSargent]

I am scratching my head over the employment of the CS Tank by GB.  The Germans,  Russian and US used weapons with duel purpose ammo.  The Brits by contrast used a good AT gun with no HE and then added a close support tank to fire....smoke.  Correct me  but wouldn't a decent HE thrower have been a better choice. 

 

Hi John,

 

My regiment, the North Irish Horse, used 6-pdr HE from our first action in Tunisia, and despite the introduction of the Churchills Na75 and Marks V and VII, in a lesser degree, was used until war's end.

 

Although the Churchill Mark 1 - Reworked (each of the six units in North Africa had two per squadron) is often called a CS vehicle, it was not until the introduction of the Mark Ics, with two 3 inch howitzers, was it truly deployed as such. Our six remained in inventory until November 1944 when the Mark Vs arrived. Interestingly enough, these six were the only Churchills fitted with PzFW III cupolas.

 

Cheers, Gerry

405154[/snapback]

Gerry, good to hear from you again!

 

Did the Churchill Is go to Italy with you as well? I saw a picture of a Churchill I in Italy and wondered if it wasn't a CS Tank. It seemed to have a 2pdr in the turret, though; did you still have any 2pdr Churchills in Italy? Might it have been a HQ or Artillery FO vehicle?

 

I assume your MkIs went through the rebuild program. Did they work OK after that? AIUI from Fletcher's book, some were rebuilt several times.

[KingSargent]

If anyone wants to see his scrap book, give me a shout.

405212[/snapback]

I would love to see it.

[Gerry Chester]

Did the Churchill Is go to Italy with you as well? I saw a picture of a Churchill I in Italy and wondered if it wasn't a CS Tank. It seemed to have a 2pdr in the turret, though; did you still have any 2pdr Churchills in Italy? Might it have been a HQ or Artillery FO vehicle?

 

I assume your MkIs went through the rebuild program. Did they work OK after that? AIUI from Fletcher's book, some were rebuilt several times.

 

Hi John,

 

The Mark Is we took to North Africa had all been through the rebuild programme and served well during the Tunisian Campaign. 'B' Squadron's 'Bushmills' is credited with the first enemy equipment kill by a howitzer.

 

The Mark I in Italy was probably one of 21st TB's as full delivery of the Cs Marks

was not completed prior to the brigade shipping to Italy. Unfortunately 8th Army Tank States does not differentiate between the two to pin-point which unit/s may still have had them. 25 TB was fully re-equipped.

 

Thank you for your greetings, it is appreciated. Presently, being on an extended stay in Bali with my elder daughter, my forum visits are somewhat spasmodic.

 

Warmest regards, Gerry

[Marek Tucan]

Hello!

 

My regiment, the North Irish Horse, used 6-pdr HE from our first action in Tunisia, and despite the introduction of the Churchills Na75 and Marks V and VII, in a lesser degree, was used until war's end.

405154[/snapback]

 

I gathered that the 6pdr guns were kept in Churchill and Cromwell units due to the British version of 75mm having significantly worse penetration, is that true?

Thanks

Marek

[capt_starlight]

It was a decision by the Master General of the Ordnance (I am sure some Perfidious Albionese Pedant will correct me here) that the Royal Artillery fired HE (he made an exception for infantry mortars), and no one else. 3.7" mortars and 3" howitzers of CS tanks carried 90% Smoke and the MGO ungraciously granted them 10% loadout of HE. Since the CS tank carried 40 rounds, this meant 4 rds of inaccurate HE per CS tank, or eight HE rounds per squadron.

 

The MGO was a Gunner, BTW.

 

Know which MGO made this decision and when ?

 

Typical British Army parochialism; the Royal Artillery was there to fire HE, so no one else could have any. The 40mm Bofors gun got HE ammo for AA work, but no AP; the 40mm 2pdr tank and AT guns got AP since they were supposed to shoot at tanks, but no HE (pre-war). Even the 2pdr AT gun in British use was a Royal Artillery (actually Royal Horse Artillery) weapon. The Infantry gor .55 Boys AT Rifles, and the BEF divisions got some French 25mm AT guns for the infantry BNs.

Interesting - why were most if not all Anti-tank Regiments RA not RHA? Actually most batteries of the RHA were equipped with the 25pdr at the outset of WW2.

 

In a similar vein the German 88mm and US 90mm guns could shoot at ground targets and had sights and ammo for this. The British 3.7" guns shot at airplanes - period, full stop. They had no ground sights or AP ammunition - they usually had no sights at all, since the guns didn't aim, they just lined up on the bearing supplied by a central Fire Control station.

405141[/snapback]

 

Interesting - goes against the reasoning and practice outlined in Nigel's page....

 

Frank

[capt_starlight]

Hello!

I gathered that the 6pdr guns were kept in Churchill and Cromwell units due to the British version of 75mm having significantly worse penetration, is that true?

Thanks

Marek

405463[/snapback]

 

 

IIRC correctly the performance of the 6 pdr in AT role was superior to all the Allied 75 mm weapons.

 

Frank

Edited December 18, 2006 by capt_starlight

[Richard Lindquist]

The Brits began with the 6pdr/57mm on their WWI rhomboidal tanks, moved to the 3pdr/47mm on the interwar tanks, then put the 2pdr/40mm on their production tanks. The original CS tanks were there to support the tank company with HE (not the supported infantry).

 

The first Infantry Support Tank (Matilda I) ionly had a machinegun. Matilda II had the 40mm.

 

In fairness to the Brits, the rest of the world had pretty much settled on 37mm as the medium tank main gun with machineguns for the lights.

 

The designs of US, German, and Russian tanks allowed a quick ramp up to 75mm. The Brits seemed to be pretty much stuck with designing a plethora of 2 pdr cruiser and infantry tanks before they were able to make the leap to 75/77mm.

[John_Ford]

Hi John,

 

My regiment, the North Irish Horse, used 6-pdr HE from our first action in Tunisia, and despite the introduction of the Churchills Na75 and Marks V and VII, in a lesser degree, was used until war's end.

 

Although the Churchill Mark 1 - Reworked (each of the six units in North Africa had two per squadron) is often called a CS vehicle, it was not until the introduction of the Mark Ics, with two 3 inch howitzers, was it truly deployed as such. Our six remained in inventory until November 1944 when the Mark Vs arrived. Interestingly enough, these six were the only Churchills fitted with PzFW III cupolas.

 

Cheers, Gerry

405154[/snapback]

 

 

Blessings to you , Gerry

 

Yes, I knew about the 6 PDR HE which you'all used. Somehow our Cannon Companies in the US Regiments didn't get the same memo and the ammo issued was strickly for hole punching. The Churchill was the quentisential Infantry Support Tank. Good armor, excellant mobility and armed with the 75MM just what the doctor ordered for going in with the PBI at the bloody end of the stick. My thoughts for the Close Support Tank like Rich alludes to is that they fired Smoke for the Crusers armed with the 2 PDR. The A9/10/13 had a coupla of MGS and a solid shot from the main Gun. They couldn't even get the Germans to flinch with the ammo they carried. At least if you lay a 57/75 MM HE/Smoke round on the gun target line, you might get lucky.

[artfull-bodger]

I am not aware of 95mm discussion, but in my opinion, a large calibre HE round is vital in CS. By CS, I mean tank infantry support in build up areas. The IDF tactics employed in Gaza appear to use a 105mm or 120mm HE round to knock a hole in the wall of a building the infantry want to assault. The IFV than backs up to the hole, and the infantry egress directly from the rear of the IFV/APC into the building with very little exposure in the open. In addition, HE round is effective for bringing down up to meduim size buildings, and for eliminating sniper threats by wiping out the suspect spot, eliminating fortified positions etc. I doubt if HESH has the same effect.

404906[/snapback]

 

HESH is perfect for the job, it has vastly greater destructive power against obstacles and walls etc than HE and functions like HE when used as an area fire weapon!

part of the reason the UK uses HESH is its versitality!

[larrikin]

Merry Christmas, Gerry, and thanks for your always fascinating information on Brit tanks at the regimental level during the war. I hope Bali treats you better over the next little while than we are treating your cricketers.

[Gerry Chester]

3.7" mortars and 3" howitzers of CS tanks carried 90% Smoke and the MGO ungraciously granted them 10% loadout of HE.

Hi KS,

 

The was no apparent shortage of 3 inch howitzer HE available for firing exercises at the Castle Martin and Brancaster ranges in the UK. The standard HE/Smoke inventory on our Mark Is was 75%/25%. Shortly after going into action in Tunisia it was 90% HE, 10% Smoke. On arrival of the Mark Ics (after war's end in Africa) it reverted to 75%/25%, however, not long after arrival in Italy the percentages became quite flexible. One of my Squadron's, 'Bushmills', was fully loaded with smoke for her last action - supporting a river crossing - every round was fired. I have a photograph of her taken just after the action with her weary crew - the crossing was successsful.

 

Cheers, Gerry

[KingSargent]

Know which MGO made this decision and when ?

Not offhand but if you look up a few posts, his grandson posted. My source for the statement was Smithers' Rude Mechanicals. I have seen mixed reviews on Smithers'reliability.

 

Interesting - why were most if not all Anti-tank Regiments RA not RHA? Actually most batteries of the RHA were equipped with the 25pdr at the outset of WW2.

if you say so. It was my impression that the AT regts deployed overseas were usually RHA, but it seems that whenever I try to figure out some consistent practice foranythng in the British Army it proves to be a mis-application of logic on my part.

 

Interesting - goes against the reasoning and practice outlined in Nigel's page....

Reasoning and practice changed as the war progressed and the BA absorbed combat lessons. I was speaking of the thinking when the weapons were specified, designed, and originally issued. Sights and controls for 3.7" ground fire were issued later, the AT guns got HE ammo eventually, etc. The 3.7" did not join the field Army overseas (after Dunkirk) until well into the war anyway, the limited production being reserved for AA defence of the UK and strategic points like Suez and Gib. The heavy AA units that accompanied the troops into positions where ground fire might become necessary were the older 3"/26cwt AA guns.

[capt_starlight]

Know which MGO made this decision and when ?

Not offhand but if you look up a few posts, his grandson posted. My source for the statement was Smithers' Rude Mechanicals. I have seen mixed reviews on Smithers'reliability.

 

As have I - and I had not encountered the sentiment until I found it here. Could you provide a pointer to the posts? I am unable to locate them am curious to find out more....

 

Interesting - why were most if not all Anti-tank Regiments RA not RHA?  Actually most batteries of the RHA were equipped with the 25pdr at the outset of WW2.

if you say so. It was my impression that the AT regts deployed overseas were usually RHA, but it seems that whenever I try to figure out some consistent practice for anythng in the British Army it proves to be a mis-application of logic on my part.

Like all forces they have their foibles.

 

The role of the RHA was support of the mobile (cavalry) elements of the British Army. They were supplied with field artillery (albeit of a lighter calibre) from their inception and this had not changed through both wars though they received the standard 25 pdr in the latter conflict.

 

Some, like 3 and 4 RHA (part of 7 Armd Div) were equipped with AT weapons.

 

Look at the garrison of Tobruk in APR41 - of the three RHA regiments all were equipped with 25 pdr while the field regiment RA was equipped with 4.5in how and 18 pdr field guns.

 

Interesting - goes against the reasoning and practice outlined in Nigel's page....

Reasoning and practice changed as the war progressed and the BA absorbed combat lessons. I was speaking of the thinking when the weapons were specified, designed, and originally issued. Sights and controls for 3.7" ground fire were issued later, the AT guns got HE ammo eventually, etc. The 3.7" did not join the field Army overseas (after Dunkirk) until well into the war anyway, the limited production being reserved for AA defence of the UK and strategic points like Suez and Gib. The heavy AA units that accompanied the troops into positions where ground fire might become necessary were the older 3"/26cwt AA guns.

405899[/snapback]

Well the garrison of Tobruk consisted of:

Tobruk April 1941

 

4 AA Bde

 

13 LAA regt (harbour defended area) - 151, 152 bty (51 LAA regt), 40 bty (14 LAA regt), 235 bty (89 HAA regt)

 

14 LAA regt (perimeter defended area) - 1 tp 38 bty, 39 bty (13 LAA regt), 57 bty (14 LAA regt), 8 Aust and 1 LAA btys.

 

Dets from Wilts Yeo SL regt.

 

Totals 24 x 3.7-in, 2 x 102mm (IT), 2 x 149mm (IT), 18 x 40mm, 42 x 20mm Breda (IT) 10 x SLs (IT) 2 x GL Mk rds)

 

Eventually 4 AA Bde comprised:

 

13 LAA regt (37, 38 & 39 LAA btys, 1 LAA bty attached)

14 LAA regt (40, 57 LAA bty, 8 Aust LAA dep sep 41, 5 LAA bty arrived sep 41)

51 HAA regt 152, 153 bty & 235 bty of 89 HAA regt

69 HAA regt one bty only from sep 41

306 bty 27 SL regt

 

(Courtesy nigelfe from another board)

 

So there were sufficient for them to be risked at Tobruk this early in the war (albeit as LoC or Corps troops). They had been released from the UK not later than Christmas 1940.

 

Frank

[KingSargent]

Not offhand but if you look up a few posts, his grandson posted. My source for the statement was Smithers' Rude Mechanicals. I have seen mixed reviews on Smithers'reliability.

 

As have I - and I had not encountered the sentiment until I found it here. Could you provide a pointer to the posts? I am unable to locate them am curious to find out more....

 

405968[/snapback]

I thought it was Smithers. It was some Brit with a hard-on for the screwed-up tank development system. I have several books like that. I know it wasn't David Fletcher.

 

I will see what I can dig up, but it might take a while. A helpful person re-organized my library for me, and I can't find anything.

 

I just found Smithers and it looks like it wasn't him. Sigh. I didn't make it up, though.

 

Frustratedly yours, King

[Gerry Chester]

I am scratching my head over the employment of the CS Tank by GB.

Hi John,

 

With the interest shown in this topic I hope the following may be of help.

 

When the Churchills Mark Ics were delivered to us in North Africa prior to going to Italy, the powers-that-be in the War Office having chosen to dub them as being ‘Close Support’ came somewhat as a surprise. During training it was constantly drummed into us that Churchills, regardless of the Mark, were considered to be Close Support vehicles.

 

The North Irish Horse was under command of Lieutenant Colonel (later Major-General Sir) David Dawnay from until his promotion at the conclusion of the Tunisian Campaign first as Deputy Commander 23rd Armoured then 6th Armoured , then Commander 21st Tank Brigade. He was, without doubt, the most experienced commander of I Tanks during WW II conveying to all of those who served under him his strategic concepts, which founded in the UK and honed to perfection in Tunisia, were well proven in actions in which Churchill tanks took part. The basic rules were clearly spelled out and understood by all ranks.

 

Infantry Co-operation

 

• 1. Never forget a Churchill unit’s role is to assist ground troops in every way possible.

• 2. Unless circumstances dictated otherwise, not to go into action without first conducting joint field training.

• 2. Explain straightforwardly to Infantry commanders what the Churchills could do or not do in a given situation.

• 3. All ranks, prior to and during training, to establish a rapport with their Infantry counterparts.

• 4. Never leave an Infantry unit hanging out to dry. Should the circumstances be such that 'A' Echelons are unable to reach tanks, then tanks may move back one (or in small groups) at a time and, when replenished return to enable the next tank/s to do the same.

• 5. If, for exigency reasons, the ground troops are be left alone, their commanders must be fully appraised as to the reasons why,

 

Tank Deployment.

• 1. Whenever possible, attack the enemy in a location where it is least expected.

[in the hills this was not without risk to crews, five tanks fell into wadis with loss of life]

• 2. Every endeavour must be made to engage enemy tanks within the "killing" range of available weaponry.

• 3. Use the Regiment's available firepower effectively.

3.1. APW known to be present: 6-pdr gunned Marks to take the van.

3.2. APW suspected to be present: A mix of 6-pdr, 75mm and 95mm gunned Churchills to take the van

3.3. APW definitely known not to be present: Marks Na75, V and VII to take the van.

[The Allies, essentially having control of the skies, were able to carry out reconnaissance flights removing much of the guesswork as to how the enemy's defensive forces were deployed. With such knowledge, the decision of which mix of Churchill Marks best to deploy could be pre-determined, when facing Armour Protected Weaponry (APW), tanks; permanently dug-in tanks (Eingebaute Panzeren); detached tank turrets (Pz Kw-Türme); self-propelled guns.

Churchills Mark I - Reworked (Tunisia) and Mark Ics (Italy) being only six in number (two per Squadron) had no specific role assigned to them.]

 

Unlike Sherman equipped units, which oft-times were deployed in roles for which they were not suited, Churchills in Tunisia and Italy were not. The following article is relevant: http://www.northirishhorse.org/nih/Articles/15.html

 

Here’s the photograph of ‘Bushmills’ mentioned in a previous posting:

Note the German cupola that can just be seen.

 

Regards,

Gerry

[Akhe100]

It's interesting that the british would refuse HE rounds yet again even after it cost them so dearly at El Alamein, for help look up the second battle of el alamein during WWII and the Brits had a terrible time with the german anti tank guns because they just had AP rounds, not HE, when in reality, HE rounds were the most fired. (figures from russian army)