WWI

[Colin Williams]

After the initial shocks of 1914, the Allies had something like a coherent strategy under the influence of Joffre in 1915 and 1916. Things fell apart in 1917 and only regained coherence under Foch in mid-1918. Basically, Joffre believed that simultaneous action by the French, British, Russians, Serbians and (later) Italians would be more than Germany and Austria-Hungary could bear, leading to defeat and collapse on one front or another. In 1915 Joffre aimed to either (1) drive the Germans out of France or (2) apply such pressure on the Germans in France that they would be unable to prop up Austria-Hungary against the fully mobilized Russian army. This was a reasonable strategy that fell apart because (1) the British were not yet ready for a major contribution, (2) the French did not have the equipment (particularly heavy guns and howitzers) or technology to pierce the German defenses, and (3) perhaps most important, the Russians were not only weaker than Joffre thought but also mismanaged their operations in a manner that let the Austrians survive. Even with all those problems, Falkenhayn nearly approved a request for large-scale withdrawl in the Champagne and Austria-Hungary teetered close to the edge.

 

In 1916 Joffre's plans were upset by Verdun, but IMHO the objective of a joint Anglo-French offensive along the Somme was sound. The combination of continued action at Verdun with the Brusilov offensive, the battles on the Italian front, and a powerful Somme offensive may well have been more than the Central Powers could have handled. Unfortunately, whether justified or not, the delays in launching the Somme offensive and its initial failure lost the Allies whatever momentum they may have gained from Brusilov's success. Continued Russian operational errors didn't help. Even a moderately successful July 1st followed by continued attacks rather than a failure followed by two weeks of down time before a series of local attacks, may well have presented the Germans with the insoluable problem of too many obligations for too few divisions.

 

For 1917, the less said about Nivelle, Lloyd George, and Haig's obsession with the muddy patch of ground called Paschendaele, the better. Allied strategy in 1918 boiled down to hanging on until the Germans spent their forces and then recognizing the moment when they could no longer stand against the Allied armies as strengthened by the Americans. IMHO Foch deserves far more credit than he normally receives for his operational management of the Western Front in 1918.

[KingSargent]

Not a place to use big warships for shelling ground positions. Read it in context!

 

The only access to Antwerp by sea is through Dutch territorial waters. Merchant shipping is allowed free passage, but the Dutch closed it to warships in 1914. The British marines went there by train, overland, & retreated overland. They were evacuated via Oostende, not the port of Antwerp. British & Belgian troops who retreated downriver because the Germans cut off the overland route were interned by the Dutch.

 

So to get your big ships to Antwerp, you have to fight the Dutch. You then find yourself fighting in narrow waters, with multiple channels & thousands of hiding places for torpedo boats & minelayers. It'd make forcing the Dardanelles look like simplicity itself. And you have to get deep into that tangle to get within range of Antwerp. Great way to lose a fleet.

 

See what I mean?

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I was thinking more along the lines of just getting transports to Antwerp, not naval gun support. Or did the Dutch block anything carrying troops, even if it wasn't a "warship"?

[superfractal]

For 1917, the less said about Nivelle, Lloyd George, and Haig's obsession with the muddy patch of ground called Paschendaele, the better. Allied strategy in 1918 boiled down to hanging on until the Germans spent their forces and then recognizing the moment when they could no longer stand against the Allied armies as strengthened by the Americans. IMHO Foch deserves far more credit than he normally receives for his operational management of the Western Front in 1918.

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This isnt true, Haig reasoned that in 1918 the germans were weak enough for the british to defeat them alone.

 

i will look through my books for a qoute if you like.

 

And remember the collapse of russia meant the germans could move about 40 divisions from the eastern front to the west. This new group of troops would have given the allies quite a shock, especialy as the british army had focus more on the offensive. Leaving there defensive trench networks somewhat more basic than maybe they should have been.

[larrikin]

This isnt true, Haig reasoned that in 1918 the germans were weak enough for the british to defeat them alone.

 

i will look through my books for a qoute if you like.

 

And remember the collapse of russia meant the germans could move about 40 divisions from the eastern front to the west. This new group of troops would have given the allies quite a shock, especialy as the british army had focus more on the offensive. Leaving there defensive trench networks somewhat more basic than maybe they should have been.

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Haig picking an allied victory in 1918 and claiming to be accurate is like backing every horse in the Melbourne Cup and claiming to be a smart punter when a horse you have money on wins. According to Haig, he was going to win it in 1916, and 1917, and 1918, and if it had gone to '21 or '22 before they finally won it Haig would have still been saying "I predicted victory this year".

Edited September 23, 2006 by larrikin

[Old Tanker]

Haig picking an allied victory in 1918 and claiming to be accurate is like backing every horse in the Melbourne Cup and claiming to be a smart punter when a horse you have money on wins.  According to Haig, he was going to win it in 1916, and 1917, and 1918, and if it had gone to '21 or '22 before they finally won it Haig would have still been saying "I predicted victory this year".

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I agree , Haig kept predicting break through in the next offensive for two years as thousands and thousands of Brits and CW troops were eaten up in his offensives to nowhere. It seems he refused to recognize the dominance of the mg in trench warfare and nearly wiped out a generation proving it.

[superfractal]

Haig picking an allied victory in 1918 and claiming to be accurate is like backing every horse in the Melbourne Cup and claiming to be a smart punter when a horse you have money on wins.  According to Haig, he was going to win it in 1916, and 1917, and 1918, and if it had gone to '21 or '22 before they finally won it Haig would have still been saying "I predicted victory this year".

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So whats your point?

 

would of it been better not to bother and tell everyone that the war would never end?

 

Hew strachan's the first world war claims the idea that the war would end soon actualy started from the troops on the ground.

He may have made all the claims that the war would end soon, to keep up morale as much as possible.

Edited September 23, 2006 by superfractal

[superfractal]

I agree , Haig kept predicting break through in the next offensive for two years as thousands and thousands of Brits and CW troops were eaten up in his offensives to nowhere. It seems he refused to recognize the dominance of the mg in trench warfare and nearly wiped out a generation proving it.

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Not true, you need to read Paddy Griffth's "Battle tactics of the western front the british army's art of attack 1916-1918"

 

The British Army was well aware of the dominance of the mg and saw the value of the Lmg to producing atleast 800 lewis guns a month from january 1916, infact they were seen as critical to the army's firepower.

The British army's tactical unit changed right the way down to the platoon, Across the army as a whole.

The german army did not do this until after the war.

It was standard army practise to sneak lewis gunner's and sniper's into no man's land in the night so that in the day during the attack they could quickly eliminate mg's and so on.

Rifle grenade's and mill's bomb's were issued and troops were trained in how to clear mg's with them.

 

The so called Stormtrooper training of the german army is not what it is cracked up to be, British trench raiding parties got similar training and this unlike the german army was moved across the army as a whole.

 

Command and control the british army's experience's 1914-1918 by various authour's.

 

Has a very good chapter by Niall Barr who explains that much of the casulties were caused by communication break downs. The technology simply did not exist and compromise's had to be made.

Despite of popular belief the british army was actual very active in attempting to find replacement's for runner's and pigeon's. Especialy in artillery cordination.

 

The british armies understanding actualy went beyond the dominance of the mg, and they began to fight what was understood as the deep battle.

 

The idea that whilst the initial "break in" is going on artillery can cause havok with second line units and the reserve's(shelling support tranch's and road's etc). Even as far as shelling locations of resting german troops far behind the front line.

[swerve]

I was thinking more along the lines of just getting transports to Antwerp, not naval gun support. Or did the Dutch block anything carrying troops, even if it wasn't a "warship"?

 

OK, but the original post was about naval fire support to ground forces.

 

I don't know what the Dutch would have done about civilian transports carrying troops. AFAIK the issue didn't arise: while Antwerp had a land connection the Channel ports, troops were moved in & out by rail. By the time the land connection was broken, the Allied command had already decided Antwerp was lost, & were attempting to withdraw what troops they could from it. Those cut-off troops who could, retreated across the border into Dutch internment in preference to German imprisonment. Trying to hold it as an enclave supplied & reinforced by ship through Dutch waters never seems to have been given a moments thought, & no attempt was made to ship troops in, as far as I have found. Perhaps that gives us the answer.

[KingSargent]

The idea that whilst the initial "break in" is going on artillery can cause havok with second line units and the reserve's(shelling support tranch's and road's etc). Even as far as shelling locations of resting german troops far behind the front line.

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The British problem on offense was that the Germans had very deep defensive zones, so that a British offensive could take two or three lines of trench, then they would be out of range of their artillery support (which could not easily move forward over trenched and shelled gound) and well within the range of German artillery deeper in the defensive zone where the British artillery couldn't reach it for counterbattery fire.

 

The British problem on defense against MICHAEL in March 1918 was that the troops had recently taken over that sector from the French*, the defensive zone consisted only of the first outpost line and the main ('second') line. When troops fell back to what was supposed to be the third line, it wasn't there. That and the Germans had something like a 58:12 advantage in divisions.

 

If the German defenses at Passchendaele and the Somme had been as weak as 5th Army's against MICHAEL, and if the British had had a 5:1 strength advantage, Haig would have broken through in 1916 or 1917. Also, please note that even with their advantages the Germans did not 'Break Through" in MICHAEL or any of their other 1918 offensives.

 

One German problem was the lack of mobile troops to keep the advance going - they had disbanded their cavalry (most of it) by 1918. At least Haig did keep a mobile reserve, and if ithe Cavalry Corps had been commanded by a Haig clone instead of the ass Kavanaugh (?) it probably could have accomplished somethng.

 

 

*Good old Lloyd George figured that if he kept the British replacements in Blighty and forced Haig to lengthen his lines taking over French sectors, Haig wouldn't be able to mass for an attack.

 

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As for Haig continuing offensives after they had lost steam, the placement and timing was set by the politicians, usually for political reasons ("Impress the allies"). Passchendaele was Haig's only shot where he picked the terrain, and when he picked the Passchendaele sector the ground was nice and dry and firm (and there were those nice mines dug under it....). Unseasonable rains turned the sector into a quagmire, so Haig stopped and regrouped and resupplied for a month - and during that month the weather was nice and clear and sunny and the ground dried. So the offensive was resumed and it started to rain again but even worse.

 

BUT Haig couldn't shut it down because he was told to "keep the pressure on so the Germans can't attack the French", since the French Army had mutinied. Basically, Haig had to keep going in terrible conditions at Passchendaele until the whole front had terrible conditions and the Germans couldn't attack either.

[larrikin]

So whats your point?

 

would of it been better not to bother and tell everyone that the war would never end?

 

Hew strachan's the first world war claims the idea that the war would end soon actualy started from the troops on the ground.

He may have made all the claims that the war would end soon, to keep up morale as much as possible.

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No, it was the reason he used for continually throwing his troops into breakthrough offensives with unattainable goals and inadequate artillery support and preparation. Haig had sufficient guns to continue to do bite and holds with a reasonable gap between them, but he wan't the big breakthrough so he could turn his cavalry loose. To justify the operations he kept telling everybody, including himself, that the Germans morale was going, that they were tired of the war, and that their casualites indefensive actions were lower than the slaughter he was inflicting on his own attacking troops.

[larrikin]

<snip>

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As for Haig continuing offensives after they had lost steam, the placement and timing was set by the politicians, usually for political reasons ("Impress the allies"). Passchendaele was Haig's only shot where he picked the terrain, and when he picked the Passchendaele sector the ground was nice and dry and firm (and there were those nice mines dug under it....). Unseasonable rains turned the sector into a quagmire, so Haig stopped and regrouped and resupplied for a month - and during that month the weather was nice and clear and sunny and the ground dried. So the offensive was resumed and it started to rain again but even worse.

 

BUT Haig couldn't shut it down because he was told to "keep the pressure on so the Germans can't attack the French", since the French Army had mutinied. Basically, Haig had to keep going in terrible conditions at Passchendaele until the whole front had terrible conditions and the Germans couldn't attack either.

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King, you need to read Prior and Wilson's 'Passcehendaele - The Untold Story'. there was no pressure on Haig to continually attack to take the pressure off the French, and in fact the French First Army attacked right alongside the British left all the way through 3 Ypres, and almost invariably achieved their objectives. 3rd Ypres was stupidity personified - attacking out of a salient that is overlooked completely by the enemy and is the most heavily fortified area of his front line is justifiably that.

[KingSargent]

King, you need to read Prior and Wilson's 'Passcehendaele  - The Untold Story'.  there was no pressure on Haig to continually attack to take the pressure off the French, and in fact the French First Army attacked right alongside the British left all the way through 3 Ypres, and almost invariably achieved their objectives.  3rd Ypres was stupidity personified - attacking out of a salient that is overlooked completely by the enemy and is the most heavily fortified area of his front line is justifiably that.

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If you ever get to Belgium, there is a nice battlefield tour of Ypres. Standing on one mound that I wouldn't call a hill at home I could see everything in the area the British were in. The Germans in the bunker I was standing beside couldn't miss.

 

True, it was a lousy place to attack, but was there a better one on the British front? I don't mean "ease of penetration better", I mean "accomplishing something" better. Had it worked and Bacon's amphib plans gone through, Passchendaele would have unlocked the west end of the trenches and left an open German flank in the prime (at least most popular) campaigning area in Europe. It was about the best chance of accomplishing something that was open to Haig. And if you know of a less fortified German defense system that covered a worthwhile objective, I'd love to hear about it.

 

As for the French 1st Army, IIRC they were not involved in the Nivelle Fiasco and were not among the "mutinous" troops. Besides, the French Army might not have needed bolstering, but the French politicians did.

[larrikin]

If you ever get to Belgium, there is a nice battlefield tour of Ypres. Standing on one mound that I wouldn't call a hill at home I could see everything in the area the British were in. The Germans in the bunker I was standing beside couldn't miss.

 

True, it was a lousy place to attack, but was there a better one on the British front? I don't mean "ease of penetration better", I mean "accomplishing something" better. Had it worked and Bacon's amphib plans gone through, Passchendaele would have unlocked the west end of the trenches and left an open German flank in the prime (at least most popular) campaigning area in Europe. It was about the best chance of accomplishing something that was open to Haig. And if you know of a less fortified German defense system that covered a worthwhile objective, I'd love to hear about it.

 

As for the French 1st Army, IIRC they were not involved in the Nivelle Fiasco and were not among the "mutinous" troops. Besides, the French Army might not have needed bolstering, but the French politicians did.

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Plumer and Rawlinson told him at the start of there year that it couldn't be done, but that bite and holds could. He didn't like that answer, so he put Gough in command of it. The only bit s that actually worked during 3 Ypres were the bite and holds.

 

He should also have insisted that the shoulders of the salient, in particualr the gheluvelt plateau be taken at the start, to at lest widen things for his artilley placements. I culd go on nad on, but you get my drift. It was poorly conceived, poorly executed, and whenever they managed to pull a successful bite and hold they got too eager and went o\for the next attack with inadequate preparations.

[JWB]

Plumer and Rawlinson told him at the start of there year that it couldn't be done, but that bite and holds could.  He didn't like that answer, so he put Gough in command of it.  The only bit s that actually worked during 3 Ypres were the bite and holds.

 

He should also have insisted that the shoulders of the salient, in particualr the gheluvelt plateau be taken at the start, to at lest widen things for his artilley placements.  I culd go on nad on, but you get my drift.  It was poorly conceived, poorly executed, and whenever they managed to pull a successful bite and hold they got too eager and went o\for the next attack with inadequate preparations.

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Yup. Bite and hold is how the Germans won during the first two years. It was how the French managed to make a few gains later. It is what I was trying to get at with my first post on this subject.

[KingSargent]

Yup. Bite and hold is how the Germans won during the first two years. It was how the French managed to make a few gains later. It is what I was trying to get at with my first post on this subject.

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But the Germans lost.....

 

Bite and hold is well and good if you want to nibble your way across a continent, and hindsight as to the problems involved makes it seem really a good idea. But how long do you think a general would last who told his civilian overhead "I'm going to nibble my way here for several years," in 1914, 15, or 16?

 

Politicians and public want quick endings, not nibbling.

 

Besides, 'bite and hold' just lets the enemy dig another line behind the bit you've nibbled, and you get to do it all over again. At 400 lbs of artillery shell per yard of trench, it costs the taxpayers quite a bit too. Looking []BACK[/i], they might say they'd have paid the taxes if it meant Johnnie came home in one piece, but has anybody ever heard of a wartime populace who has said, "We'll give you all the time and money you need to make it all work OK"?

[DB]

If you ever get to Belgium, there is a nice battlefield tour of Ypres. Standing on one mound that I wouldn't call a hill at home I could see everything in the area the British were in. The Germans in the bunker I was standing beside couldn't miss.

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Belgium isn't quite as flat as The Netherlands, but you'd be hard pressed to find many places along the Western edge of the line that would count as being "hilly". It's all farmland and wouldn't even be described as "rolling" in a tour guide.

 

(But, you'd know that, having been there.)

 

David

[JWB]

But the Germans lost.....

That's because the USA got involved.

 

Bite and hold is well and good if you want to nibble your way across a continent

Only way it could be done.

 

Politicians and public want quick endings, not nibbling.

Yes but this thread is about strategy which is what politicians and civilians are for.

 

At 400 lbs of artillery shell per yard of trench, it costs the taxpayers quite a bit too.

EXTREMELY misleading statistic.

 

....has anybody ever heard of a wartime populace who has said, "We'll give you all the time and money you need to make it all work OK"?

Not so much an issue of money as it is a matter of time. Patience that is. The politicians were telling the population fairy tales. Had the politicians been willing to tell the voters what the voters needed to hear rather then what the politicians wanted the voters to believe...............

[R011]

Had the politicians been willing to tell the voters what the voters needed to hear rather then what the politicians wanted the voters to believe...............

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They might have started to wonder if it was all going to be worth the price, especially in the UK.

[ink]

They might have started to wonder if it was all going to be worth the price, especially in the UK.

 

Probably true of every population whose country was involved in the war. I doubt anyone would have wanted the war if they knew how it would turn out ...We'd probably have had some kind of EU back in 1914.

Edited September 24, 2006 by ink

[KingSargent]

But the Germans lost.....

That's because the USA got involved.

They had lost before the US had troops in the line. They were done for after they blew the Spring 1918 offensives. US involvement was more of a psychological defeat - "We can't fight these new hordes, we have to quit."

 

Bite and hold is well and good if you want to nibble your way across a continent

Only way it could be done.

As it turned out, yes. But the breakthrough/manuever methods had always worked in the past. The situation was so unheard of that it took time and experiment to discover what worked. Nobody could have sold 'bite and hold' tactics to anybody in 1914-5.

 

Politicians and public want quick endings, not nibbling.

Yes but this thread is about strategy which is what politicians and civilians are for.

 

I'm not sure I follow this. If you are saying that civilians and politicians should have kept the Western Front in limbo and gone elsewhere, where else could they go? The Western Front HAD to be kept strong, it was the only theater where vital targets were in range of a breakthrough. The French were not about to risk losing Paris again, and they weren't letting the British get away with just being a sea power and bankrolling support. The fact that the Western Front was the only place where the war could be lost quickly meant that there wasn't much left for 'peripheral' strategies. Especially peripheral strategies where the "breakthrough" would be far from anything vital.

Forcing the Dardanelles accomplishes what exactly? Kicking the Austrians out of Serbia does what?

 

At 400 lbs of artillery shell per yard of trench, it costs the taxpayers quite a bit too.

EXTREMELY misleading statistic.

Beg to differ. The figure is from Griffith and is what the British artillery found necessary for a 'sure thing' battle. No attack with over 400lbs of shell per yard of trench failed, many with under 400#/yd did. True, there were attacks that succeeded with fewer lb/yd, but 400lb/yd was the place where success was assured. Of course all this was worked out in 1918 or after the war, so unknown to Haig, Joffre, et al.

 

....has anybody ever heard of a wartime populace who has said, "We'll give you all the time and money you need to make it all work OK"?

Not so much an issue of money as it is a matter of time. Patience that is. The politicians were telling the population fairy tales. Had the politicians been willing to tell the voters what the voters needed to hear rather then what the politicians wanted the voters to believe...............

I was under the impression that lying to the public was what politicians were for.....

[larrikin]

<snip>

 

At 400 lbs of artillery shell per yard of trench, it costs the taxpayers quite a bit too.

EXTREMELY misleading statistic.

Beg to differ. The figure is from Griffith and is what the British artillery found necessary for a 'sure thing' battle. No attack with over 400lbs of shell per yard of trench failed, many with under 400#/yd did. True, there were attacks that succeeded with fewer lb/yd, but 400lb/yd was the place where success was assured. Of course all this was worked out in 1918 or after the war, so unknown to Haig, Joffre, et al.

 

 

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By the end of 1916 the artillery boys had worked out how many shells, what weight of shell, what type of shell, how many guns were needed to get them on target in time, for all sorts of objectives. The story that they didn't know until later is another one of Haig's furphies. The technical experts knew, but the Cavalry weren't listening.

[Ken Estes]

Not to mention the chemical ordnance being readied for 1919 on the basis of several years' experience...it would have been most nightmarish for the Hun.

[KingSargent]

By the end of 1916 the artillery boys had worked out how many shells, what weight of shell, what type of shell, how many guns were needed to get them on target in time, for all sorts of objectives.  The story that they didn't know until later is another one of Haig's furphies.  The technical experts knew, but the Cavalry weren't listening.

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The artillery knowing in 1916 (if they actually did) what was needed did not mean the fire could be used. The 'non-registered fire' techniques hadn't been worked out yet.

 

But the big issue was still the amount of guns and ammo available. Knowing you need 600 6" howitzers and 100 rds/gun to achieve success means nothing if all you have is 300 6" howitzers and 30 rds/gun (or less) (or MUCH less). Not to mention about half the fieldgun shells expended through 1918 were still Shrapnel (HE shells were harder to make).

 

It wasn't until 1918 that the Allies had enough heavy guns and ammo (and ammo of the right sort) to cover the front. Also, as Ken points out, there were the chemical shells, both gas and smoke, that came off the production lines. During 1918 there were very sophisticated barrages fired combining gas and smoke, but the wherewithal to do that did not exist before mid-1918.

 

And just because Haig came from the Cavalry does not mean that he was a fuddy-duddy longing for lance and saber charges. He did keep a Cavalry reserve because mech/motorized forces were not yet reliable enough for use in exploitation roles. Cavalry was still the only thing that could be used for exploitation, and the British Cavalry might have done better earlier except for Kavanaugh - but it was hard to find good leaders for the line Armies, let alone the Cavalry Reserve.

 

And if the Germans had had a Cavalry Reserve the size of Haig's to exploit their MICHAEL penetrations in March 1918, they might have managed a true breakthrough.

 

Anyway, Haig pushed every new idea that came along; he pushed aeroplanes, he pushed tanks, he pushed gas, he pushed new artillery technique, he pushed more MGs and Lewis guns and grenades and mortars, he pushed new training for everybody. But it all took time to accomplish all this and in the meantime he had to fight with what was available since he couldn't just sit down and wait for the improvements to catch up.

 

YOU try to build a massive army from a limited base while incorporating rapidly-changing Technology, and see how far you get. The BEF had to incease 1000% BEFORE issues of anything to line units could increase - all the MG reserves and production in 1914-mid '16 went to covering losses and bringing new units up to TOE. That's just one example. The Shell Scandal is another.

 

Nor could Haig have told the politicians to STFU and wait. They wanted results NOW, so Haig told them "If 'A' works, then 'B' can happen, and the war will be won." The problem was that the polis and the people couldn't grasp that 'A' could NOT happen YET. Of course Haig's biggest problem was that he was totally inarticulate - he could draft a perfect OpOrder, but he got tongetied giving speeches or arguing with expert debaters like LG and WSC.

 

So castigating people (Haig and others) for not using techniques and equipment that only became available later is really a cheap shot. If Haig & Co Ltd had had the tools they had in 1918 in 1915, the Allies would have won by 1916. But they didn't have those tools, it took time to develop and produce them. In the meantime men died....

[JWB]

They had lost before the US had troops in the line. They were done for after they blew the Spring 1918 offensives. US involvement was more of a psychological defeat - "We can't fight these new hordes, we have to quit."

 

I am refering to the military aid the USA was sending to the UK almost from the beginning.

 

As it turned out, yes. But the breakthrough/manuever methods had always worked in the past. The situation was so unheard of that it took time and experiment to discover what worked. Nobody could have sold 'bite and hold' tactics to anybody in 1914-5.

 

Germany was doing the bite and hold from the beginning.

 

 

Politicians and public want quick endings, not nibbling.

Yes but this thread is about strategy which is what politicians and civilians are for.

 

I'm not sure I follow this. If you are saying that civilians and politicians should have kept the Western Front in limbo and gone elsewhere, where else could they go? The Western Front HAD to be kept strong, it was the only theater where...

No, I was talking about the politicians being honest with themselves and the public.

 

At 400 lbs of artillery shell per yard of trench, it costs the taxpayers quite a bit too.

EXTREMELY misleading statistic.

 

Beg to differ. The figure is from Griffith and is what the British artillery found necessary for a 'sure thing' battle. No attack with over 400lbs of shell per yard of trench failed, many with under 400#/yd did. True, there were attacks that succeeded with fewer lb/yd, but 400lb/yd was the place where success was assured. Of course all this was worked out in 1918 or after the war, so unknown to Haig, Joffre, et al.

 

Germay was successful in the first 2 years with far less expediture of ammo.

 

(Damn color codes aren't working!)

[Ssnake]

Germany was doing the bite and hold from the beginning.

Not quite - only after the initial offensive stalled at the Somme. From then on Germany went into the strategic defense mode in the west, but from a very compfortable position - all the front lines there were in occupied territory, not German homeland. It is much easier to use "grab & hold" tactics if you are in a comfortable situation. Imagine the Entente knowing of the Schlieffen plan and starting a preemptive invasion into Germany in August 1914, then occupying much of the left Rhine embankment.

It would have been much easier to sell a defensive posture to the public then.

 

No, I was talking about the politicians being honest with themselves and the public.

Judging from what I do know about politicians and their public is that

a: each country has the politicians that it deserves

b: voters are merciless towards honesty - in general.

Edited September 25, 2006 by Ssnake