Breaking the Blockade

[Brasidas]

Bras mate - you're alive? I waited there of Capre Henry for ages, an' when you didn't show I thought you'd drowned. 

 

Look around yourself ol boy, smell the smoke? See the flames? That's your stateroom.

 

The USN does not have anything that CAN deal with the local reserves, that's the whole bloody point

Seems the historical record disagrees with you there.

 

You're talking about fighting a conventional naval engagement in open water, which is directly matching the USN's greatest area of weakness to the RN/MN's greatest strength. The Anglo-French fleet can match every USN frigate with a ship of the line, every American sloop with a frigate. Those 'ace in the hole' coastal ironclads just don't count either, in the event they can get out to the offshore force, they still lack the speed and endurance to either force battle or  drive off the blockade.

 

But you see, then your force has to disperse, which allows the merchant ships to break out, which isn't a very effective blockade now, is it? Also, are you claiming all blockade ships are on station without a break 100% of the time? I find the RNs endurance quite daunting, on paper (so to speak).

 

If the USN tried to concentrate its warships in a single port, its actually making the blockades job easier, and still won't muster enough force to overpower the  blockade of that port, which will have been concentrating too.

A select few ports actually. I don't think it would take much to figure out which ones would be ideal.

 

 

 

The RN would also need to be stupid too woulnd't they?

 

Oh hum, I guess I shouldn't count on that, even if it happened somewhat frequently when they faced various opponents and followed certain doctrines.

 

The only local superiority the US can achieve requires the use of forts, ironclads and mines, perhaps we can throw Hunley type sub and spar torpedoes in too. There's no 'surprise' value in either the forts or the monitors. Forts don't move, although I suppose the US could put together some flying batteries. While the ironclads are not just known, they're ruddy famous. I dare say yankee enginuity would catch its share of success, but I recon the RN/MN will pick up enough wit before they run out of ships.

That depends I suppose, just how many people think the Development of Naval Warfare would stay static (IOW in accordance with historical development), and how many people think it would have changed based upon US survival imperatives?

 

As for spies, who can say? I certainly don't know the extent of the UK's survailance in this area OTL, or the French for that matter. I figure the Confederacy would have something to ay on the matter, and there's other means of intelligence gathering on a blockade - there's always fishermen, neutrals, newspapers and the horsemen of St.George.

 

shane

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Regardless, since the Brits are now concentrating on the US coast, the Yangui privateers are going to make a killing in prize ships.

[Argus]

Yeah, smoking in bed has its dangers, and I'm still waiting for your monitors to show up

 

As for the historical record, I don't see where it disagrees with me, or rather where I disagree with it. That shoe is on your foot as I far as I can tell, and I hope your 'one size fits both feet' brogan is nice and comfortable, 'cos you'll be wearing it until the USN get cruizers (note ye olde spelling) that can defeat an 80-120 gun SOL. Thats what is going to be the core strength of those off shore squadrons you belive wil be such a push over.

 

But you see, then your force has to disperse, which allows the merchant ships to break out, which isn't a very effective blockade now, is it? Also, are you claiming all blockade ships are on station without a break 100% of the time? I find the RNs endurance quite daunting, on paper (so to speak).

1/ But no I don't see. I can't recall any mention of anyone scattering for the hills. 'Your' monitor commands its effective artilery range, but unless it can catch or corner 'My' force thats all it can do, so long as I retain the advantage in mobility. You get to chase me around a few square miles of ocean untill you run out of coal or the chop gets too high. Anoying certainly, decisive no.

 

2/ Since when is ANY blockade 100% effective? When is any military exercise 100% effective short of nukes from space?

 

3/ Singleton merchies are hardly the point in any case. So long as the blockade disrupts the regular flow of trade and military traffic its doing most of its job.

 

4/ I agree spending years polishing some headland on blockade is a daunting prospect. It speaks volumes for the RN that they managed to pull it off so often and for so long - old Alfred Mahan's 'storm tossed ships upon which the Grande Armee never never laid eyes' etc. No, I'm not claiming a ship can remain on station 100% of the time - give my regards to Toto and the rest of the gang from Oz. Ships were rotated regularly as a matter of course, and the blockade could be drive off by foul weather. But properly supported - and I admit provision of this support is open to debate - a blockading squadron had no real limits to its endurance.

 

How many ports the USN chose to concentrate on would seem to depand as much on how much they had to concentrate. When you've only got five frigates (I belive that was Rich's number) as 'capitol units' its not much of a force to split up in the face of superior numbers.

 

Quote > The RN would also need to be stupid too wouldn't they?

 

Oh come on Bras, enough with the cheap shots. Next you'll be selectively quoting me out of context

 

That depends I suppose, just how many people think the Development of Naval Warfare would stay static (IOW in accordance with historical development), and how many people think it would have changed based upon US survival imperatives?

 

Well I can't really see how they could do more than my outline, I mean add locomotive torpedoes and aircraft to the mix and that list is basicly it until guided missiles come along. OK I missed ballons for observation. I recon the USN could do a damn sight better in these areas than the Confederacy managed, they have the resources. But the innovation has to be tactical, because the technology is evolutionary at this stage.

 

Of course the same thing applies on both sides, it'd be a game of move and counter move, and thats pretty much what I was addressing with my comment about RN stupidity. They're going to react too and come up with a few twists of their own.

 

out of time

 

shane

Edited August 5, 2006 by Argus

[KingSargent]

Sarge those gunboats were designed as you say for inshore coastal work, but they were a mixed bunch, some were crap, others went on to serve around the world, and if uncomfortable, they were sufficently seaworth for extended passages. US Monitors got steadily more seaworth with each new type, but everything is realitive. I'll happily agrree the best of the monitors was better then the worst of the Crimean gunboats, but where the line comes between.... <shurggs>

I wasn't talking about monitors (except in terms of seaworthiness). The "quickie" 90-day gunboats of the USN served many years and could go all over the world, something the Crimea gunboats couldn't. A USN 90-day GB should have no problem dealing with a Crimean GB. Of course a purpose-built sea-going RN sloop could easily dismantle a 90-day GB.

 

The only reason I bought them up (the Crimean boats) was to show the RN could build a large number of moderatly sized steamships in a tearing hurry if they felt the need.

Yes they could, but they hadn't. Nor had they put shell-busting armor on the SLOBs (Steam Line Of Battleships ). The RN could indeed have come up to the challenge given time and a lot of money forthcoming from an England not too thrilled with the idea of aiding slaveholders. What I am endeavoring to point out is that, contrary to what many here seem to believe, the RN as it existed in 1862-3 was NOT going to saunter across the Atlantic and sort the Yankees out instanter. An RN v. USN naval war was not going to be a doddle.

 

Yes and no mate. I agree technology was raceing ahead and messing up the neat equivilancy of previous times. But when we're talking about like and like, numbers still have a point. Look at the plain jane un armoured screw frigates as used by both sides, we can make a direct compariosn between them and that extends out in sloops and liners of the same base technology level. All the old metrics still apply, a steam frigate isn't going to want to mess with a steam SOL.

In general terms I agree, but the US ships' shell-gun armaments change the equations. I do not have my references to hand, but IIRC an RN 120gun SLOB had less than half the SHELL broadside of a Merrimac class frigate.

Again, it depends on whose theories were right; the USN had plumped heavily for the shell-gun theory, and the RN would slaughter them if combat didn't work out the way Dahlgren & Co. surmised it would.

But if Dahlgren et al were right, the RN ships were going to be punching small holes in the side of the USN ships with solid shot guns while the USN shellguns were turning the RN ships into blazing exploding wrecks.

 

I also agree the old sail fleet from reserve isn't much use on the North American Station, but as you say there's the rest of the world where they free up omre modern ships. Plus they do have a role as transports that can keep up with the fleet (under sail).

The USN had a sail reserve of its own, including ships on the stocks that could have been completed as SLOBS fairly quickly had the need arisen. SLOBS were not needed against the CSN.

 

Shell guns are a bit of a problem when it comes to drawing lines in the sand too. With smooth bores we're only really talking about the amunition stocks on hand, the 68pdr could fire shells just as well as any other 5" gun, and blow them off quicker than the bigger Dalgrhens for the usual quantity-quality debate.

I believe the 68pdr had an 8" bore. I don't know if there were shells for it (the 8" 64pdr was the RN's broadside shell gun). The point is that solid-shot guns could indeed fire shells, but those shells would be smaller and less effective than those fired by a Dahlgren of the same tube weight. The USN carried 8" shell-guns (the prime shell armament of RN SLOBs) as secondary armament on the upper decks of its big frigates.

 

I really do disagree with your point on US foundries being able to make more artillery. They DID make more artillery no question, but to compare American war time production with normal peace time routine in Europe is hardly fair. I don't know how many pieces British industry COULD make if the demand was there, or how quickly they could get cracking. But as a general principal I believe the UK had a larger aplicable industrial base to start from, so its expansded wartime output should be rather better than the historical numbers.

Once again, the Brits could surely have caught up but their intervention in the ACW as conditions existed in 1863 was by no means the sure and swift victory that some have proclaimed.

I also tend to doubt that the RN would commit all its prime ships to America when they were having visions of French invasions of the UK. The French Menace loomed large in England.

<snip>

 

Speaking of which, when were talking about armour in this period, I've always understood laminated plates to be inferior to slabs in wrought iron. Six layers of 1x6" plates, re rolled from railway iron rivet together is a long way from 4.5" slab tounge and grooved together.

True, but the quality of the armor per inch thickness wasn't important so long as the ships could carry the weight and the armor kept the enemy projectiles out. IOW 5" rolled armor might be equal to 8" laminate, but if neither were penetrated the protection was equal - and there were a lot more foundries capable of making laminated plates than thick rolled plates.

 

ACW politics isn't something I want to touch with a barge pole, amns gotta know his limits

Very wise of you.

[Rich]

Any raw 'average' of ships and guns is no basis for anything, one ship with 46 guns and four ships with 1 still leaves an average of 10. My lists are subject to the same inflation too, so I was (and am) trying to match apples with apples, failing that at least ships engaged in the same theater with some possiability of meeting.

 

Oh by all means I agree. So I have to note that in 1859 all those sailing ships of the RN you are counting on included:

 

29 SOL, of which 9 were considered effective, the rest actually being storeships or hulks. The remaining 9 were mostly hulked by 1863.

 

48 frigates, of which 10 were considered effective, the rest actually being storeships or hulks. The remaining 10 were mostly hulked by 1863.

 

57 sloops, of which 29 were considered effective, the rest actually being storeships or hulks. Most of the effective ships were assigned to coastguard or school duties.

 

13 brigs, of which 3 were considered effective, the rest actually being storeships or hulks.

 

It is also worth noting that while the RN had 1,014 ships in total on 1 January 1863, 790 had fewer than 20 guns.

 

It is also worth noting that of the 267 vessels actually in commission on 1 January 1859, 139 were serving on foreign stations, 26 were at home, but on Coast Guard service, 21 were on survey or packet service, were yachts, were fitting out, or were returning home from foreign station. So just 64 were available for service in home waters.

 

Finally, the bulk of the guns mounted in the British ships, sail and screw, were either obsolescent 32-pdr smoothbores (the common piece in the sailing SOL and frigates - those that still mounted any guns at all ), 10-inch smoothbore shell guns (howitzers in Army nomenclature), and 68-pdr smoothbore shell guns only capable of firing solid shot with reduced charges, about the only vessels carrying the modern heavy (95 cwt.) 68-pdr shot/shell guns were the ironclads and one or two new steam frigates, otherwise they were only mounted as pairs or singly on pivots in the screw SOL and a few frigates and sloops. Otherwise the only modern weapons comparable to those mounted on the USN vessels were the Armstrong rifles, which problems we have already noted. Also, most of the RN ships carries about 2/3 their rate in actual guns, since after the Crimea most top deck guns had been removed as excessive and dangerously exposed.

 

In other words virtually all of the RN vessels sent to the Americas would be outranged and outweighed in terms of individual gunpower by almost any USN vessel it encountered.

 

If we're talking about a blockade of northern ports, ships on the Mississipi (sp), Ohio etc, might contribute to the USN's list but hardly count against a force that they can/will never encounter. If we want to talk about the riverine side of the ACW and what contributions the RN/MN might make to the Confederacy, that's another kette of fish. I agree they are closely related fields, but some river monitor half way to the Rockies should be on a compleatly different ledger.

Uh, if you don't blockade the Gulf and Mississippi (easily spelt, M-I-SS-I-SS-I-PP-I is the old mnemonic ), then you don't blockade about one-third of the traffic. And you can only blockade the Mississippi if you control the passes, and to do that puts you in a position to be engaged by the Riverine Navy.

 

BTW, you may wish to consult a map, the Mississippi and its tributaries are not navigable to any point close to the Rockies. And the river monitirs were actually quite seaworthy, how do you think they got to Mobile Bay, flew?

 

This still leaves us with those 418 converted civilian craft, allowing that all of them were seagoing (although I figure some are probably riveirine craft too), we're left with the point that the USN IS already mobalised. Where the RN is on peacetime routine for both those lists I posted, and the RN is just as capable of taking ships up from trade, they have a bigger pool of civilian shipping to draw on too.

 

Actually, no, except for the half-dozen "timeberclads, the river fleet was made up of the ironclads and tinclads already accounted for (well it doesn't include the Ram Fleet vessels, butt hey were Army anyway and weren't counted in the Navy lists, nor were the Army River Transports ). The 418 converted vessels were all steamships of one type or another.

 

So for all our numbers, the RN can still roll up to the US coast with a blue water force superior in strength (all being dedicated sea going warships), if inferior in numbers (counting all the USN conversions).

You may wish to look at your numbers to. First, the Royal Navy has to maintain its foreign stations. And of the 139 vessels so assigned, only 21 were on the American station. Even more interesting, of the 8 3-Decker Screw SOL available in 1859, only 5 were in limited service at home, because the 1,000+man crews were so expensive to maintain. The 7 ships of the channel squadron had 4,697 crew, of which over 1,000 were in Royal Albert. The smaller two-decker steam SOL were in the same boat, they required big crews, essentially to put all 64 steam SOL into commision required nearly 60,000 men, when the entire Navy establishment, at sea and on shore, including marines, numbered only 56,048.

 

Then we get to ironclads, much depends on the timing I agree. But ironclads only count if they are on scene, and neither side has sufficent numbers of them (or of suitable types) to make them a general factor. The great weight of naval tonnage on both sides is in conventional ships and given the limitations on coastal monitors, the majority of action around our hyperthetical blockade would be down to wooden walls and iron men.

shane

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Actually, it comes down to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Navy budget in 1859 was 13-million Sterling, but it was reduced to just 10-million by 1865 as a cost savings measure. In 1858-59 the three three-decker steam SOL built (the others were all conversions), cost 150,000 Sterling each, and in 1862 when Royal Sovreign was taken in hand for conversion to an ironclad turret ship, the conversion cost 180,000 Sterling. Quite simply the idea that England would drain itself for a bunch of slaveholders in the Americas is pretty unlikely.

[Argus]

On the gunboats, some of the RN Crimea specials DID go on to have international careers by my source (Archibald Fighting Ships of the RN). But I say again my point was the RN had recent experience of mass production in minor ships of war. If they chose too,, I agree subject to political will and funding, they could also produce boats to a different specification for the ACW.

 

SLOB's - oh dear.

 

I don't mean to pick Sage, but the basis of this thread is a both Britain AND France get involved, which is why I've had no hesitation in useing the full weight of the RN. OK I've been lax in not counting the MN component, but then I don't have any readily available sources on it.

 

I thought 68lbrs were 8" too, but I thought to check and found a ref to them being 5". Late night folly blinded me to the point that this was for 68pdr RIFLES... mea culpa.

 

On the sail reserves for both the USN and RN, those available to the USN are beside the point, which was that the RN could fill some of its more distant stations with these ships. I agree the shells Vs shot is a valid point, but I don't get this idea that a 68lb roundshot is something to laugh about. It may or may not be as effective as a shell of the same or larger diameter, but its not something any un armoured ship is going to take lightly. If the 68's start firing shells, again they might not be as effective as 9" or larger gun, but then rate of fire enters the picture too. I'm not calling it a wash, but I can't see the differance as being night and day either.

 

 

True, but the quality of the armor per inch thickness wasn't important so long as the ships could carry the weight and the armor kept the enemy projectiles out. IOW 5" rolled armor might be equal to 8" laminate, but if neither were penetrated the protection was equal - and there were a lot more foundries capable of making laminated plates than thick rolled plates.

Agreed, but then 5" of rolled plate is a lot lighter than 8" of laminate so easier to 'carry' and the UK has more rolling mills capable of making both.

 

ACW politics isn't something I want to touch with a barge pole, amns gotta know his limits

Very wise of you.   

 

What good is wisdom if I can't spell?

 

Look I agree the RN/MN has its work cut out in blockading the Union. But if you don't buy 'Britania Rules the waves' I don't accept America uber allies (no Nazi reflection) either.

 

shane

[Argus]

Rich

 

I'm so glad we can agree on something at least.

 

I've made no bones about the numbers and sizes of the ships I listed, or that things cut both ways.

 

more tommorrow, its gone midnight here.

 

shane

[Rich]

Rich

 

I'm so glad we can agree on something at least.

 

I've made no bones about the numbers and sizes of the ships I listed, or that things cut both ways.

 

more tommorrow, its gone midnight here.

 

shane

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Wuss! I'm an old man and I was up until 2 AM composing that last reply and you wimp out like this! Course I was fair knackered by the time I was done, and my syntax, grammar and spelling were shot, and I'm not sure I really made my points all that well, but now I've had my 40 winks, so have at it.

 

The main points - partly addressing some of your response to King - was that:

 

The RN sailing vessels were not ready in any numbers as warships. Those that were ready were inadequately armed for any meaningful purpose, they could support squadrons on foreign stations, but they could not free them up for service in the Americas. And those that were not ready could not be made ready in any reasonable time, they were not "in ordinary" they were in full use as receiving ships, storeships and hulks, refitting them would take an extraordinary effort and cost and there was no confidence - well put BTW - that they were sound enough for service anyway.

 

In terms of steam ships, the bulk of those that will be usable on the American station will be the steam sloops, just like the USN the RN would have trouble finding and justifying the expensive for the crews needed for the SOL and even those for the frigates were large, roughly 600+ per, to put a single vessel on station and keep it there. To put the 38 available or building in 1859 into commission would require over 22,000 men. These were not Napoleonic blockade squadrons with 32 and 36-gun frigates with 200-man crews comprised of sailors. Then there were the large number od screw and paddle corvettes and sloops.

 

The screw sloops and corvettes typically mounted a single 10-inch pivot shell gun and 20 68-pdr shell guns. The comparable USN "2nd-class" screw steamer such as Hartford mounted two 100-pdr Parrott pivots, one 30-pdr Parrott pivot, and 18 IX-inch guns.

 

Unfortunately, the paddle sloops all were very lightly armed in terms of number and weight of guns, six or fewer - some had only one - was the norm. They usually consisted of a 68-pdr, 95cwt and/or a 10-inch pivot, and four broadside 32-pdr guns. A comparable USN "3rd-class" screw steamers such as Kearsarge, mounted two XI-inch pivots, one 30pdr Parrott pivot and four 32-pdr guns. In fact the converted USN "civilian" steamers were actually as well armed as these RN "warships" with one XI-inch pivot, one 20 or 30-pdr Parrott pivot, and two to four 32-pdr guns being typical.

 

The armament of the effective RN steamships was markedly inferior to the USN. The screw SOL "130s" were mostly armed with main gundecks comprised of 60-odd old 32-pdr, with the upper decks armed with 30-odd 68-pdr shell guns. These were not the modern 95. cwt. 68-pdr (8-inch) mounted on the Warrior and her sisters (and as single and dual pivots on older ships), these were Paixhans-style "howitzer" shell guns and could only fire shot with a reduced charge. Supplementing those were some 10-inch (98-pdr) shell guns with the same limitations. The Mv, range, penetration, and accuracy of the shell guns was notably less than that of their US equivalents.

 

And yes, if it comes to a contest between the two most common pieces, the IX-inch Dahlgren and the 68-pdr, 65 cwt. shell gun, the Dahlgren will win every time. It's firing rate is 40 seconds, the 68-pdr is 55 seconds. The shot/shell weight of the Dahlgren is 80/72, the 68-pdr is 68/56.

Edited August 6, 2006 by Rich

[Argus]

This wuss had just finished work at 10pm so is not feeling all that guilty.

 

Spelling, grammer and tone were one thing that put me of answering at length last night. I wasn't quite sure exactly how to reply and figured I'd make a mess of things what ever I did.

 

So in the spirit of coperation and good will, here goes nothing.

 

Your data point is for 1859 (yes?), and looks to be a good deal more accurate than anything I have to hand. Yet it precceds the ACW so takes no acount of the changes over three years of hightened tension - and by my lists there were substantial changes in the RN. Writing 200+hulls off the rolls over 5 years is not a small thing. I don't have better data, and if you don't have anyting more 'up to date' then we're both ignorant of the true state of trim the RN in 1863 in things like gun establishments and the like.

 

The state of the sail reserve is a secondry point, I listed it for compleatness not as a hinge point for the whole situation. I believe the greatest use of it would be in filling out distant stations which is not going to be a quick or perfect process, or as transports/auxilleries pretty much en-flute.

 

I don't think the RN would have any trouble justifying the crews for SOL's in this situation, quite the oposite. Taking what you posted circa 1859, and given the prospect of a blockade, then SOL's represent a major advantage, or at worst equalisation measure, that the RN would be stupid to ignore - even if armed with 32pdrs (I'll get to guns below).

 

'Wool for the Loom to Oo in the Loo' works quite well as a mnemonic Too...

 

I know where the Mississippi is and where it comes frm, probably better than the Murray-Darling. I was waxing lyrical, or is that laxing wyrical when I ment deep inland.

 

I've got quite a good study on the USN's manpower problems: Manning the New Navy by F.S Herrod, also much dammaged by mould (as I just found out ). If the background section of that is any indication, the USN's position in the ACW was very different from the RN's. A hot press might have been out of fashion, but the UK has a much larger pool of skilled manpower in both seagoing and shore trades to call upon. I've noticed a certain assumption that the UK would lack enthuasism for supporting slaveholders. I agree, but I'd not count on it playing too hard in this senario - if they went to war in the first place, there's obviously enough motive to support some effort. Then if they proceed to lose the opening moves.... well its the one constant in British military history, they only lose wars if they start by winning

 

Pulling in 22,000 men is a long way from impossiable IMHO, even if it would be a mix of reserve, merchant seaman and landsmen volunteers.

 

I'd say any blockading force would see a mixture of sloops, corvettes and frigates (SOL see above), with the bulk of the modern frigates used. The RN would cut their sails to suite their cloth, if the USN has an advantage in gun power then the RN would do all they could to compensate.

 

Guns.

I intend no slight, but I've no idea how 'practical' your figures are in regards to actually getting this performance on ships at sea, one thing at least doesn't add up. If a IX-inch Dahlgren weighs about 9200lb or 81cwt, firing an 80 or 72lb projo. How on earth can it be easier to handle than a less powerful 65cwt gun firing a lighter shot? To me it looks like different standards/conditions used to determin ROF in both cases.

 

1863 is the official YOI for the Palliser system in British service, so even those old 32pdrs could soon be 64pdr 58cwts and the 68pr 65cwts, 64pr rifles.

 

The Special Committee on Rifled Guns has been running since 1858. In my long held opinion the Armstrong BLR system got shafted by the Woolwich establishment, you've only got to read the objections from the BoO about the Whitworth shot ranging differently from the shell to know the knives were out for any new fangled rifled ordnance. But by the same token the 'evidence' cited against them was 'mixed' not the absolute negitive that gets bandied about. Most of negitive incidents come down to drill errors, the NZ experience shows this up quite well. When the users wanted them to fail - the results are little surprise. Those officers who took the time to drill their detachments to the new manual found good results with the Armstrong. Those who didn't want to 'spoil' their men for the ML's they'd be serving in their next posting (ie were too lazy to bother) struck problems and it was their reports that got the publicity.

 

Throw a war where the RN are at a disadvantage in artillery into this picture and things change. If the USN has an early lead, the RN has the industrial means and the technology to catch up pretty damn quick.

 

In the here and now, we would seem to be back in the caronade Vs cannon position just with different ordnance. The USN wanting to hold off and engage at range, with the RN wanting to close. Steam and shells only add vairables to the mix, the long range option is more destructive now, but steam enables manouver and closure/flight. I don't see a USN sloop as any more proof against 32pd round shot than any other un armoured ship,

 

I agree in the end, it all comes down to the Chancellor of the Exchequer being disposed to foot the bill. But I figure the purse stings would be losening, not contracting with the country at war.

 

I really am sorry, but time has caught up again (1am now).

 

shane

[Rich]

This wuss had just finished work at 10pm so is not feeling all that guilty.

 

Spelling, grammer and tone were one thing that put me of answering at length last night. I wasn't quite sure exactly how to reply and figured I'd make a mess of things what ever I did.

 

So in the spirit of coperation and good will, here goes nothing.

 

No problem, none of your replys have caused me any real angst, I hope none of mine have either.

 

But you're still a wuss!

 

Your data point is for 1859 (yes?), and looks to be a good deal more accurate than anything I have to hand. Yet it precceds the ACW so takes no acount of the changes over three years of hightened tension - and by my lists there were substantial changes in the RN. Writing 200+hulls off the rolls over 5 years is not a small thing. I don't have better data, and if you don't have anyting more 'up to date' then we're both ignorant of the true state of trim the RN in 1863 in things like gun establishments and the like.

 

The state of the sail reserve is a secondry point, I listed it for compleatness not as a hinge point for the whole situation. I believe the greatest use of it would be in filling out distant stations which is not going to be a quick or perfect process, or as transports/auxilleries pretty much en-flute.

Yes, the data is for 1859, but I'm not sure how it doesn't work as a good starting point. There is no doubt that the sailing "reserve" was anything but and it is unlikely that any of them could be used for anything other than what they were, coast guards, training vessels, hulks, and storeships. Even those chosen for conversion ad modernization as steamships were problematic, one of the SOL slated for conversion was discarded when the process began, when opened up she was found to be rotten and unrepairable, so another was substituted (which of course delayed the completion of the conversion). It is relatively simple to draw a line from 1859/1860 to 1865, 1863 falls just right of middle on that line.

 

And it is clear that the RN was modernizing, I don't dispute that, but then as now such a process was expensive and politically unpopular. So it was slow and steady. Further of course part of the process involved experimentation with new systems such as Warrior and the technologies associated with her, and just like in the USN there were missteps that affected overall progress. Some of the new engines developed didn't work as advertised and some of the decisions on gun design also didn't work well (more below).

 

I don't think the RN would have any trouble justifying the crews for SOL's in this situation, quite the oposite. Taking what you posted circa 1859, and given the prospect of a blockade, then SOL's represent a major advantage, or at worst equalisation measure, that the RN would be stupid to ignore - even if armed with 32pdrs (I'll get to guns below).

 

'Wool for the Loom to Oo in the Loo' works quite well as a mnemonic Too...

 

I know where the Mississippi is and where it comes frm, probably better than the Murray-Darling. I was waxing lyrical, or is that laxing wyrical when I ment deep inland.

 

I've got quite a good study on the USN's manpower problems: Manning the New Navy by F.S Herrod, also much dammaged by mould (as I just found out ). If the background section of that is any indication, the USN's position in the ACW was very different from the RN's. A hot press might have been out of fashion, but the UK has a much larger pool of skilled manpower in both seagoing and shore trades to call upon. I've noticed a certain assumption that the UK would lack enthuasism for supporting slaveholders. I agree, but I'd not count on it playing too hard in this senario - if they went to war in the first place, there's obviously enough motive to support some effort. Then if they proceed to lose the opening moves.... well its the one constant in British military history, they only lose wars if they start by winning

 

Pulling in 22,000 men is a long way from impossiable IMHO, even if it would be a mix of reserve, merchant seaman and landsmen volunteers.

 

Manpower may not be a problem, but I'd like a bit more evidence than opinion. BTW, what the heck is that mnemonic for? And also BTW, I figured you knew where the Mississippi was, but just needed reminding.

 

The population of the UK as of circa 1861 was 23,128,500-odd, not far different from that of the Union states at the same time. The merchant marine of the US was smaller than that of Great Britain (IIRC that of the US and France combined about equalled the British), but then it didn't have the commitments to emire that the British did. And, if the US from a similar numerical manpower pool was able to man a navy that peaked with about 58,000 in 1865 including about 6,600 Marines. During the Napoleonic Wars the Navy establishment peaked at 118,973, plus 31,400 Marines, from a population of about 11,970,200 (c. 1811), During the mobilization after 1803 the numbers of ordinary seamen in the RN increased from 65,143 (1803) to 78,000 (1804), 90,000 (1805), while the corps of officers and masters did not increase appreciably.

 

The problem is going from the 58,000 men in service with the RN in 1859, with about 5,000 already committed to the SOL in commission, and 27,000-odd to the rest of the SOL and frigates in commission, to manning a steamer fleet that requires about 140,000. We may presume that with a roughly comparable mobilization to that in the Napoleonic Wars - nine years - the Royal Navy could do so, by about 1872.

 

I'd say any blockading force would see a mixture of sloops, corvettes and frigates (SOL see above), with the bulk of the modern frigates used. The RN would cut their sails to suite their cloth, if the USN has an advantage in gun power then the RN would do all they could to compensate.

I do not argue that the RN would have a numerical advantage, but I'm uncertain that its' numerical advantage would be nearly as large as you believe. Mobilization would take time and it would require no little time to man, commission, and train the fleet, it is doubtful that it would be kept secret.

 

Guns.

I intend no slight, but I've no idea how 'practical' your figures are in regards to actually getting this performance on ships at sea, one thing at least doesn't add up. If a IX-inch Dahlgren weighs about 9200lb or 81cwt, firing an 80 or 72lb projo. How on earth can it be easier to handle than a less powerful 65cwt gun firing a lighter shot? To me it looks like different standards/conditions used to determin ROF in both cases.

 

That's why I quoted them as "nominal" along with the other figures. It is interesting to note that the older long 32-pdr also had a ROF longer than either the 68-pdr or the IX-inch, so I expect that carriage design, mechanical assistantance and other things came into play. I expect that the practical ROF for both was about a minute and certainly no more than the sustained ROF for the XI-inch I noted before, which were taken from actual operations.

 

1863 is the official YOI for the Palliser system in British service, so even those old 32pdrs could soon be 64pdr 58cwts and the 68pr 65cwts, 64pr rifles.

Year of introduction and "years" fitting out are two different things. Recall that Warrior was taken out of commission in 1864 to rearm under the new system and wasn't recommissioned until 1867. Like manning, rearming the navy isn't going to be accomplished overnight by a snap of the fingers.

 

The Special Committee on Rifled Guns has been running since 1858. In my long held opinion the Armstrong BLR system got shafted by the Woolwich establishment, you've only got to read the objections from the BoO about the Whitworth shot ranging differently from the shell to know the knives were out for any new fangled rifled ordnance. But by the same token the 'evidence' cited against them was 'mixed' not the absolute negitive that gets bandied about. Most of negitive incidents come down to drill errors, the NZ experience shows this up quite well. When the users wanted them to fail - the results are little surprise. Those officers who took the time to drill their detachments to the new manual found good results with the Armstrong. Those who didn't want to 'spoil' their men for the ML's they'd be serving in their next posting (ie were too lazy to bother) struck problems and it was their reports that got the publicity. 

 

Throw a war where the RN are at a disadvantage in artillery into this picture and things change. If the USN has an early lead, the RN has the industrial means and the technology to catch up pretty damn quick.   

 

In the here and now, we would seem to be back in the caronade Vs cannon position just with different ordnance. The USN wanting to hold off and engage at range, with the RN wanting to close. Steam and shells only add vairables to the mix, the long range option is more destructive now, but steam enables manouver and closure/flight. I don't see a USN sloop as any more proof against 32pd round shot than any other un armoured ship, 

 

I agree in the end, it all comes down to the Chancellor of the Exchequer being disposed to foot the bill. But I figure the purse stings would be losening, not contracting with the country at war.

 

I really am sorry, but time has caught up again (1am now).

 

shane

354264[/snapback]

 

I don't really argue that the Armstrong was discarded too early. But frankly the evidence is that it was a weapon that at the time wasn't what you could call "sailor proof". It required a well-trained and precise crew, which would require that much more of a mobilization to acquire. Further, its performance even at its best wasn't as good as the 68-pdr 95 cwt. gun or the US IX-inch Dahlgren and was far inferior to that of the 100 and 150-pdr Parrott. I must further note that it is evident that the Royal Navy had gone much further down the shell-gun route that had the USN, which had an effective dual-purpose arsenal.

 

And yes, it all comes down to money in the end, doesn't it?

 

Later.

Edited August 7, 2006 by Rich

[MarkLBailey]

Been watching this for a while, I do not post on too many forums (Bob Henneman's and a couple of others excepted), but this era is a special interest. Apologies in advance for the length of this post, but glitches have seen me writing this while being unable to post it here because of the glitches!

 

Meta-Answer

 

Fort Monroe (Answer to John Dudek)

 

SUMMARY: Fort Monroe was a position inferior to Kinburn, with a battery about 30-40% as powerful as Kinburn. Kinburn fell in a day. Monroe was rendered extremely vulnerable by being on a deep water channel. Therefore, steam ships-of-the-line could move very close to it, within 150 yards. Its guns were mostly small and very old, and RN Crimean War floating armoured batteries would quickly dominate them as their guns could not penetrate their armour.

 

Guns

 

Water Battery: 42 embrasures. The Water battery was made of brick (from photographs) and was lined externally with granite. The guns shown in the images are 10” Rodman SBML.

 

The fort was supposed to have ‘hundreds of guns’ and doubtless did. However, the images show that these were the then-standard 32 pdr in the old fort embrasures and on the parapet. The west-facing side of the fort had very few guns, only 4 embrasures at the postern gate, with none on the parapet above, which had a earthen berm. The south facing walls had about 20-24 guns in embrasures (probably 32 pdrs) with none on the parapet due to the presence there of an earthen berm.

 

Roughly 40 guns on the parapet faced ESE or NE. These were probably mostly 32 pdrs. A similar number covered the landward approach from Hampton

 

The water battery was formidable (42 embrasures, 40 apparently in use, with 10” Rodmans, but it could be enfiladed from the SW where there was very deep water. As the embrasures had open backs, shellfire from this direction would be very effective. No protective berm could be built there, as the water battery backed on to the moat.

 

The road to Hampton ran over a timber bridge about 200 yards long. The narrow isthmus NE of the fort was only about 200 yards wide at its narrowest.

 

The fort is of an obsolete design, being a standard, fairly small (by European standards) Vauban fortification of the type common in the 18th century. These forts were designed to defend themselves from infantry-artillery attack and were very effective at this. This one has been modified as a coastal fort with embrasured guns, which makes it quite vulnerable to infantry attack. Therefore the designers placed a wet moat around it, tidal, 75 to 100 yards wide and 8-12’ deep depending on the tide.

 

The fort has one outwork, a small fort on the Rip Rap rocks (Ft Wool), which could not be completed as designed due to subsidence, and which mounted only 10 guns. These were probably a mixture of standard 32 pdr and a few 10” Rodmans. This fort is apparently undefended from the south and SE, where the water allowed a ship with 15’ draft to get within a couple of hundred yards. Rosario class sloops, or any of the RN gunvessels, and any of the RN gunboats, would be able to approach and quickly overwhelm this work from this direction. The work itself masks Ft Monroe when it is attacked from the south.

 

Once taken, mounting modern heavy guns on this fort would be possible, and these guns would face the weaker southern flank of Ft Monroe, with no guns on the parapet and probably only 32 pdrs in the embrasures. At 2000 yards, mortars and 68pdr.65cwt guns mounted on this work would quickly be able to batter the southern walls of Ft Monroe. The heavy Water Battery cannot bear on Ft Wool.

 

There is no obstacle to RN coastal ironclads (8’6” draft) and gunboats and gunvessels of all types moving freely through the channel south of Ft Wool even if the work is still in US hands.

 

The vulnerabilities of this fort are so severe as to make it very vulnerable to an attack by a first class power. The preferred method would be a modification of the Kronstadt Plan. A number of smaller vessels (gunboats, gunvessels, small sloops and coastal ironclads) would be moved in to Hampton Roads. These would work the undefended western side of the fort, wreck the bridge and batter the fort in concert with the guns on Ft Wool. They would mostly disable the Water Battery by firing in to its rear from a point roughly 120 degrees 1500 yards. Once the western wall was breached (8-12 hours attack) and the water battery degraded, the main cannonade could commence. This would require 4-5 paddle frigates with their very heavy guns standing back at 2000 yards and using shell against the water battery. Four blockships would move to 700 yards from the water battery and attack it directly. One ironclad (HMS Terror, from Bermuda Station) would move to the NE of the battery out of gun arc and attack each embrasure from as close range as possible (probably about 300 yards). A seagoing ironclad (such as HMS Defence) could move to the fortress wharf and attack the southern end of the water battery (about 200 yards range), But I would delegate this to CSS Virginia, moored there on a warping moor. A number of liners (4-6) would move to 400-500 yards from the southern wall of the fort and attack it. Mortar boats and gunboats would lie in the sheltered waters west of the fort and attack the very weak western wall. Gunvessels and gunboats would lie NE of the fort and fire from there, using their short range guns to sweep the narrow sand spit and cut off any chances of escape.

 

The attacking force would possess about 300 heavy guns and 200 lighter guns, as well as 20 mortars. These would be opposed by perhaps 20 remaining heavy and 40 lighter guns. Numbers of these would drop rapidly as the bombardment went on, most would be disabled or have their crews driven from then within an hour.

 

Under such a weight of attack, the final attack should force a surrender within 6 hours.

 

What makes this fort especially vulnerable is its antique design, light guns, undefended western side, open-backed water battery, lack of outworks, and above all, very deep water within 200 yards of the southern and eastern walls. It is not a tenable position when opposed by a combined force as used at Kinburn, Bomarsund, or Sveaborg. Wooden warships alone would reduce this fort in a day or two, after a week of preparatory work. No amount of earthworks can help, as the land is very low.

 

AN HISTORICAL EXAMPLE OF THIS FORM OF ATTACK

 

Bomarsund

 

Source: Greenhill and Giffard The British Naval Assault on Finland 1854-1855: A Forgotten Naval War, Naval Institute press 1988 pp 233-267

 

After many tribulations about finding the passages thru the Aaland skerries to Ledsund, the British-French force attacked the Bomarsund forts on 15 Aug 1854.

 

The fortress complex was incomplete. Three towers (of 14 planned) and a large fort were complete. Preparatory work had been done for another of the major fortifications, which would have brought the fortified zone up to Sevastopol levels of strength, with 5000 men and 500 guns

 

The naval base had not been begun. The Russian had 2300 men and 120 guns in the fortifications, but only 66 were mounted. The fortifications were magnificently built of brick, faced with interlocking hexagonal slabs of the extremely hard local pink granite. These were first class works, ably manned by first class troops who were well led.

 

The three towers were the Brancklint, Notvik and Prasto. They had 15-18 heavy guns each. They guarded the deep water channels in to the sound. The main fort was the Bomarsund, with 7 staff officers, 27 other officers and 1628 men. Once the towers fell, the main fort was hopelessly compromised. However, it was well sited, with an arm of the sea protecting its rear (towers guarded this) and was on a narrow peninsula on the neck of which the Russians threw up earthworks once they realised a landing was to be made.

 

The Allies conducted a combined operation. They landed about 12000 men on 8 Aug, of whom 8000 were French troops, and 2000 British troops. The rest were marines and sailors. The RN sailors dragged 3 32 pdrs 4.5 miles over ploughed fields and forested broken rock scree in 7 hours – barefooted because the shoes supplied did not fit(!)

 

French troops took the Brancklint Tower on 10 and 11 August. They used mortars to drive Russian riflemen from the roof, then battered it with artillery and took it by assault. The French then looted it, setting some small fires, and for reasons still unknown it later blew up.

 

The British took the Notvik Tower after a 15 hour battering from a land battery (32 pdrs probably). The structure of the fort was beginning to break up.

 

The main fort was under attack by 10 ships. Firing to 16 Aug had been desultory, but a heavy bombardment by ships occurred on that day, with the land batteries firing in to the rear of the fort. The Commander realised that his position was untenable, and morale collapsed when the Russians realised that the Allies would not assault it with infantry (giving them a chance to get at Allied troops in hand-to-hand fighting inside the fort), but would simply batter it to pieces.

 

The fort therefore endured about 7-8 hours of heavy bombardment before surrendering.

 

Ignoring the landward firing, the damage caused to the fort was massive. The structure was on two levels, brick faced with pink granite hexagons about 4-5 feet thick, iron roof with several feet of sand over it to defeat mortar fire. It was semi-circular and mounted 80 guns. Much damage had been caused by their own guns, which had to engage the attacking ships at maximum elevation with overload powder charges. This had damaged the tops of the embrasure arches. The ships guns had brought down very considerable masses of stone from the walls and were shattering the brickwork thus exposed. Breaches had been opened where sections of the wall were entirely collapsed. Large sections of the iron roof had been collapsed and fires started.

 

This was no minor fort. The semi circular fort at Bomarsund was a very strong, very powerful structure, manned by a determined garrison who fought hard. It was rendered a ruin in one day of heavy, concentrated bombardment after about 6-8 days of light firing by ships. The liners were 2800 yards from the fort, the lighter ships about 100 yards closer (2700 yards).

 

The liners were:

Arrogant screw frigate 46 2025 tons launched 1848

Duperre (French) (I hold no info on her)

Ajax blockship 60 guns 1761 tons launched 1809

Edinburgh as Ajax, launched 1811

 

The lighter ships were:

Bulldog paddle sloop 6 guns 980 tons launched 1845

Sphinx paddle sloop 6 guns 1056 tons launched 1846

A French ship whose name I cannot make out

Driver paddle sloop 6 guns 1058 tons launched 840

Asmodee French paddle frigate 16 guns launched 1841

Valorous paddle frigate 16 guns 1257 tons launched 1851

Amphion screw frigate 34 guns 2025 tons launched 1846

 

The force was therefore not very powerful at all. The blockships were obsolete old sailers with small engines and reduced armament. They had little endurance as the engines removed most of their storage spaces. They also had obsolete guns.

 

All this said, Bomarsund succeeded because of the heavy LAND batteries which had been erected, and the incomplete nature of the works there. The RN conducted experiments against the fort and decided that to breach such works meant that a range of 500 yards was optimum. Low earthworks were more dangerous than large forts because they offered smaller targets (the earthworks at Sevastopol with 8 guns each were regarded by the Russians as more dangerous than the Constantine fort with 27 guns. At the end of the bombardment there (just a demonstration), Constantine had 22 of its 27 guns knocked out while the earthen Telegraph and Wasp batteries were still intact (8 guns each). But at 2000 yards the naval bombardment was not very effective.

 

At 500 yards, a 100 gun liner would bring 48 guns against a fort, and is a much smaller target. So several liners would overwhelm a fort in short order, as happened to Bomarsund if we count the land batteries (all landed from ships anyway) as accounting for about one liner close in at 500 yards, and supported by the other ships listed above at long range.

 

Bear in mind that the paddle frigates had heavy guns, and the liners lots of small guns

 

The Ajax class blockships had 28 x 32pdr/56cwt on the gundeck, 26 x 8”/52cwt on the Main deck and an upperdeck armament of 2 x 68pdr/95cwt and 4 x 10” 67cwt shell guns.

 

 

WARRIOR IMPERVIOUS TO USN GUNS/HANDLING

White Trash Hero of the South. (Seriously cool handle!) – hyperbole – not taking out forts with ships (addressed above)

Nitflegal – ‘warrior handled like a pig’ (not so, see Parkes)

Rich – Dahlgrens ‘powerful guns’: not so as firing tests showed

 

The actual issues we were looking at relate to the impact on the ACW of Anglo-French involvement on the side of the CSA. We have, I believe, agreement that the RN was so overwhelmingly powerful in this era that there would be no question of USN seagoing fleets challenging it for command of the Atlantic. Logically, then, the CSA and Anglo-French (called the Allies, here for shorthand convenience, even though they might not be formal allies) would be able to ship anything they pleased to anyone they pleased, with no more than nuisance level guerre de corse by the USN, at best. As the British possessed the bulk of the global merchant shipping fleet in this era, there could be little question that they could ship anything they wanted. The US coast would be closed by blockade.

 

We know that the RN (and French, if they chose to participate) possessed a very large force of oceangoing ironclads, but also possessed a large force of shallow-draft coastal ironclads (3 iron hulled and 4 wooden hulled RN ones alone) all individually superior to or equal to every USN ironclad of 1861 probably except USS New Ironsides (my analysis of this comparison is above). We know that one of these ironclads (HMS Terror) was at Bermuda, with Milne’s 9 battleships and 7 frigates. We know that the RN possessed a fleet of about 200 specialised coastal gunboats, of which about 150 could appear quite quickly in CSA ports for coastal operations. Same with the RN coastal ironclads We know that iron-hulled 8’ draft 5-6 knot RN ironclads took about 6 months from laying down to commissioning, and about another month to cross to a CSA port, under tow. We know that a wooden-hulled ironclad took about 12-18 months from start of conversion from a line-of-battle ship to being a commissioned ironclad. We know there was a very large pool of such ships available and actually retained for that exact purpose. We know that a new ironclad could be built by British yards in 18-24 months from laying down to commissioning.

 

We can therefore reliably assess that the USN would not be able to outbuild the RN in such ships, either coastal or ocean going.

 

The USA was as close to an autarky as it is possible to be. Nevertheless, much in the way of bulk goods moved by coastal shipping. As in 1814, there would be economic consequences to the US economy from blockade.

 

OK, we now need to know if the USN could build sufficient floating batteries of the monitor type to work with a coastal fortress/obstacle/minefield network to actually protect their major seaports. Sure as eggs they would very quickly lose the ability to put anything offshore. We already know that there is no possibility of them being able to maintain an offensive against the CSA coastline.

 

The USA could certainly build and man efficient fortifications on a sufficient scale. They exhibited great ingenuity in such coastal work. But the best such system will be unhinged if it is unable to control the waters immediately around the fortresses. Actual distances will vary with the width of the various sounds, coastal landforms, and estuaries.

 

The question then is “could the USN coastal floating batteries (monitors and broadside ironclads) and minor craft maintain an efficient defence against their RN and CSA equivalents and large numbers of efficient RN gunboats?” The Allied forces would have numerical superiority, but would be attacking a fort-floating battery combination probably including primitive minefields. This is a powerful defensive combination.

 

This question boils down to two parts.

 

In ports with deepwater channels and approaches, the USN defensive combination would face the Allied (mostly RN) oceangoing ironclads, supported by large numbers of wooden battleships which had massive firepower, but which were vulnerable to damage. These ships would normally be in addition to the Allied shallow water navy. Such a match should consistently be so much more powerful than the defences that they would probably stand little chance over an extended period of time.

 

In shallow water ports, the action would be between the shallow water USN and Allied navies. This is probably a far more even match.

 

Notably, in NEITHER scenario are the USN’s few oceangoing heavy surface ships of much use. They are universally slow wooden ships. The best use for them is guerre de corse if they can be got to sea, to disperse as many RN frigates and wooden steam battleships as possible. Their destruction is inevitable, but that is still the best use for them. If not able to get to sea, their best use is conversion in to heavy floating ironclad batteries to assist defence of the deepwater ports.

 

This situation therefore mandates that we know of the relative effectiveness of RN guns vs US armour, and of US guns vs RN armour. We can go no further without this data.

 

This is a fascinating topic, and little is known about it.

 

1857 plate tests

In tests between Dec 56 and Jun 57, the Admiralty commenced tests of 4” hammered and rolled plate. There was little to choose between them. Both resisted cast iron 68pdr shot at 600 yards, both were broken up by repeated hits on the same spot at a range of 400 yards.

Wrought iron shot was ‘far more effective’ than cast iron. Trials with 2” rolled steel showed little resistance (probably indicating excessive brittleness). These test were used to inform Admiralty decisions and knowledge about their requirements for armour on ships. Trials continued with cast steel and Whitworth elongated projectiles in 1858. Erebus and Meteor were used for these tests and demonstrated that heavy teak backing was most advantageous behind iron armour. The Meteor performed better than the iron hulled iron framed Erebus. Rubber and cotton backings were also trialled, and proved useless.

 

Cast iron shot cost £2 per shot, steel shot cost £12 per shot.

 

1859 Tests

In Jan 59 HMS Trusty (Crimean War ironclad) was used for trials with the new Armstrong guns. The 40 pdr had 6ld of propellant, and failed to do any significant damage between 50 and 450 yards.

 

HMS Undaunted was used for plate tests in 1859. Rolled iron of 4.5” was found to be much better than 4.5” hammered iron, and to cast steel as then made. All of these were superior to laminated armour.

 

Thus we can rank the quality from highest to lowest: rolled iron, hammered iron, cast steel, laminate. The US multi-layer laminate is essentially useless and was only used because it was all they could do, and because it worked against large bore low MV Dahlgren-type guns.

 

Further test of a 6” Armstrong against Trusty in 1859 (cast iron to steel shot from 78lb to 100lb, charges 12lb) but they proved unable to penetrate Trusty’s 4” of hammered iron. Trusty was later fitted with a Coles Turret for more tests (1861). Coles was Warrior’s first CO, and his trials aboard her showed that the old 68pdr was a superior armour piercer to the 110pdr Armstrong. This was a shocking discovery. Warrior had rolled armour, tongued and grooved.

 

Now, the 68pdr failed to penetrate the Warrior test target with CAST IRON shot, but easily pierced it with STEEL shot and guncotton propellant. SO there was actually no problem in the RN with a large supply of reliable and efficient guns – this is what made the ‘gun wars’ of the early 60s so vicious and public – but it also allowed plenty of time for R&D, testing and technological development.

 

Armour Qualities.

Warrior’s 4.5” rolled needed 33 foot-tons of energy per inch of the shot circumference to penetrate it. French 4.4” armour only needed 16 foot-tons, due to its inferior quality. SO French ironclads could easily be penetrated by RN smoothbore 68pdrs while the French rifled 55pdrs and 110pdrs could not penetrate Warrior!

 

Unlike the French and British, who were developing small diameter high velocity armour piercers, the USA had taken a different path, and was developing low velocity high-weight to achieve a battering effect instead of a punching effect. The 15” Dahlgren fired a massive 453lb shot using 60lb of powder (not of good quality, it was equivalent to 50lb of RN powder). This gun could not penetrate Warrior over 500 yards with steel shot, let alone with cast iron shot which was far less effective than steel. Basically, the US Dahlgren guns had a very inferior AP performance, which is only to be expected of a low MV large bore shot designed for armour wracking, vice armour penetration. The USN backed the wrong technological horse with that one – but it did not matter. It was a gun they could build with their inferior metallurgy and it was plenty good enough to deal with the CSN.

 

US laminated armour was vastly inferior. 6” of USN laminate was pierced by 68pdr shot stopped by 4” of solid RN armour.

 

Turrets

A Coles turret was fitted to HMS Trusty in early 1861 and subjected to severe trials. After being hit by 33 68pdr, 40pdr and 110pdr shot, it was undamaged and in perfect working order. The Monitor-Virginia duel had no effect on the RN. Monitor (firing every 7 minutes) and Virginia (every 15 via broadside) could not pierce each other’s armour on that day. The RN had 15 seagoing ironclads completed or building at this time.

 

So What?

 

So from this data we know that armour quality ran something like this in quality.

1. Rolled iron

2. Hammered iron

3. Cast steel

4. Laminate

 

British Armour was much superior to French. No RN ironclad post-Crimea had hammered iron armour. That the USN was still using hammered iron for New Ironsides, and laminate for their monitors indicates their relatively outdated technology.

 

We can now deduce that, at best, USN armour was, at best, on a par with French, but they were using rolled too, so it was probably a little inferior.

 

My best and conservative estimate of armour in 1861 from the info to hand is that:

 

4.5” RN rolled = 5.5-6.0” French rolled = 6.0-7.0” USN hammered = 8.5-10.5” USN laminate

 

I stress that this is nothing more than a first cut rule of thumb, at best. Better information gratefully received!

 

A 68pdr with guncotton charge and steel shot could penetrate ALL of these armours at normal battle range. No French gun could penetrate 4.5” of RN rolled. It is probably that a 15” Dahlgren would penetrate 4.5” RN rolled at very close range, but ONLY with steel shot. Any lesser Dahlgren stood no chance at any range. No Dahlgren stood a chance at normal battle ranges (500 yards and up) because velocity fell off so quickly. This is important. It means that US fortresses were essentially worthless against RN ironclads!

 

This completely decouples the USN defence system for their ports, especially the deep water ones where RN ironclads could get access. Only the 15” gunned monitors stood in their way, and RN seagoing ironclads were faster, mounted many more guns all of which had a much higher rate of fire, and which could pierce their turret armour. This is extremely bad news for the USN and USA.

 

The RN CRIMEAN FLEET

 

The issue of this fleet has been raised.

 

Liners: people like to laugh at the idea of wooden, 68pdr fitted, steam powered liners. You should not. These were the ships that routinely defeated massive, solid granite coastal forts such as the Constantine! Please consider what would happen to, say, the USS New Ironsides when faced with a more seaworthy, faster, much handier Liner with 48 68pdr guns on a broadside, every one of which can penetrate her armour. Not good.

 

The Coastal Fleet.

 

Folks, it already existed. The RN built an enormous coastal fleet for Crimea, building gunboats on a well oiled mass production basis and storing them in a huge shed complex at Haslar (it is still there) which included a shiplift system to move the stored hulls and place them in the water. See DK Brown’s ‘Before the ironclad’ pp. 135-160. There is a picture of the Haslar sheds on p.149. 156 gu7nboats were ordered from June 1854 to Dec 1856 and they all got built, many served for 30 years and they went all over the globe. They were easily able to make ocean passages unescorted – but nobody said it was comfortable! Oh, and the 118 Dappers and the 6 Gleaners had … 68pdrs!

 

Basically, within 6 months of the decision to go to war, the RN would have a fleet of about 130 specialised coastal gunboats operating on the US coast, 20-40 Mortar boats, and 8 armoured batteries, ALL of which were superior to Monitor and one of which was already at Bermuda with Milne.

 

British maritime/shipbuilding industry at this time was larger than the rest of Europe combined. The historical rates for ship construction were very leisurely, and could be very greatly accelerated (See Andrew Lambert’s Battleships in Transition: The Creation of a Steam Battlefleet 1815-1860. Also DK Brown again. Example: Warrior, a 9500 tons steam battleship of uniquely modern design, was laid down on 25 May 1859, launched on 29 December 1860 and steamed, fitted out, to Portsmouth on 8 August 1860. That is 27 months, and she was 8 months delayed, due entirely to debates over her armament. But if 68pdr are used, that reduces the time. Blockships and such could be quickly converted, as could big turret ships like Royal Oak. Also, 65% of the foreign going merchant ships in the world belonged to the British at this point.

 

Bottom line, for every thinly armoured, slow monitor the USN can build, the RN can build 2 superior, faster coastal ironclad batteries, and a seagoing ironclad.

 

 

Other issues noticed in the thread, much paraphrasing below:

 

‘As visually impressive as the British ironclads were (and we've had the debate over ordnance vs armor tests, and their pertinance to real world operational conditions etc) the reality is the RN's designs were never tested by combat and that even during the Trent Affair, they didn't leave the Eastern Atlantic. Milne, had he been ordered into action in the winter of 1861-62, would have been using wooden hulled steamers with guns arrayed in broadsides - not even as advanced as some of the Italian and Austrian ships at Lissa in 1866.’

COMMENT: This implies, for example, that “Milne did not have ironclads, they were not tested in battle, so implying that they could not be much good”. The reality seems to be that Milne did not need them for the assigned task, and the ironclads were not far away in steaming/sailing terms anyway. If Milne had been ordered in to action in the winter of 1861-62 for example, what possible need did he have for first class ironclads against a grossly inferior (in terms of numbers) USN bereft of anything larger than a wooden, broadside firing slow large frigate? As for coastal work, he actually had an ironclad there at Bermuda anyway. If Milne had arrived with his fleet off Charleston, towing a shallow-draft ironclad, the USN could not have done anything about it except leave the area if they could. So what more could he possibly need ?

 

‘Given the experience of the Austrians and Italians at the Battle of Lissa, one wonders if gunnery would have been that significant at all in this era - the same, to a degree, if one looks at the battles of the War of the Pacific. ‘

COMMENT: This implies that as gunnery was not overly important at Lissa and the War of the Pacific RN gunnery superiority would not be effective against the USN. This cuts both ways, and is a dubious proposition historically speaking. This leaves aside the issue that gunnery was significant during the ACW, and that Huascar was defeated and forced in to port by a RN force… with gunnery.

 

‘In 1862, some RN ironclads may sail west in the event of war in North America, some may not, but they are no more or less invulnerable to the fortunes of war and a deterimined opposition with a winning record than any other technologically advanced yet numerically limited type; the majority of whatever ships the British could sustain in the waters off the mid-Atlantic and New England coasts will be wooden-hulled steamers (unless they are the iron-hulled steamer the RN itself converted into transports because of concerns about how they would fare in battle), and a significant percentage of their "fleet train" would be sailing vessels.’

COMMENT: This does not really matter much and was common to all navies of the era.

 

‘Ocean-going ironclads were a very immature technology in 1862-3; expecting them to be wonder weapons at transoceanic distances is extremely "hopeful" at best.’

COMMENT: This mistakes a point. Milne was based at Bermuda. Hardly a trans-oceanic distance (although the transit to Bermuda was). In any involvement in 1861-63, his job would be to open Charleston and Confederate ports south of that (and in the Gulf). The RN would then base its ships forward at these bases, bringing in coal and other supplies from Europe and the colonies in their merchant ships (hardly a problem). This is not expecting them to be wonder weapons at all, but merely expects them to repeat, under simpler and easier circumstances, exactly what they had already done in 1855-56 in the Black Sea and Baltic. Ocean going ironclads may have been immature, but the thinking behind there use was certainly not.

 

‘Ironclads were not decisive in ANY of the 19th Century wars, at mid-century or elsewhere; it always came down to troops on the ground, whether in the Crimea, the Italo-Austrian conflicts, the Civil War, the Prussian conflicts, the War of the Triple Alliance, or the Anglo-Boer wars.’

COMMENT: Something of a motherhood statement (which ignores Alexandria, where they WERE decisive). All of modern military history shows that navies can stop a nation from losing a war where that nation is not a continental one, but that the PBI always win it.

 

‘British seapower would, presumably, have allowed the British to do the same thing in North America in 1783 and 1814, et the British did not pursue further trial by combat in either situation.’

COMMENT: The presumption here is inaccurate. Control of the sea allowed is what them to dictate the flow of reinforcements etc to the theatre.

 

‘The British and French, unlike the US, have to defend everything they have (against the Germans, Russians, Irish, Indians, etc.) The US has only to defend the north astern United States on the coasts - and while the coastal cities may be theoretically vulnerable to the RN but such inland industrial centers as Pittsburg, Springfield-Lowell (Mass), Upstate New York, Chicago, Gary, Indianapolis, Cleveland, Cincinatti etc are entirely invulnerable.’

COMMENT: If the British strategic intent is to blockade the US coast, protect Canada, and permit the Confederates open trade, while shipping them arms, ironclads, and industrial goods, and if the USA chooses ONLY “to defend the NE USA”, then the Confederates get a state, and the British strategic intent is fulfilled (ie, they win the war). I would suggest that nobody else is liable to jump in under these circumstances. Why would Prussia do so? They well understood that they had to deal with Austria first re France, and they wanted to negotiate with France rather than fight it. See Moltke the Elder’s strategic appreciations. Russia was also in no position to start a continental war at that date.

 

SHIP COMPARISON: USS NEW IRONSIDES TO RN CRIMEAN WAR FLOATING BATTERIES

 

The issue of comparative technology and the relative efficiency of 1860s era USN and RN ironclads has been raised here, so it is worth looking at it. The closest USN warship of the era in capability and technology terms is USS New Ironsides, a broadside ironclad, although she can also be considered to be a floating battery because she was designed to fulfil the same role as French and RN floating batteries of the Crimean War. New Ironsides was the first USN ironclad of this type, and the last. She had one important difference to the Crimean War RN ships, in that she was designed to be able to operate in offshore waters. The RN ships were not. They were designed for coastal operations.

 

New Ironsides was a successful ship in the American Civil War. She participated in more bombardments than any other US ship, and fired more shots in battle. She was conceived after a USN advertisement of 7 August 1861 for shallow draft ironclads. Three responses were received, one resulted in the building of the lightly armoured USS Galena. The second became the USS Monitor. The third became New Ironsides. The design was heavily based on the French Gloire, and was proposed by the engine builders Merrick and Sons. The hull was subcontracted to Cramp and Sons, Philadelphia.

 

New Ironsides Gloire Warrior Aetna

230’ 255’6’ 380’2’ 172’6” length

56’ 55’9’ 58’4” 43’11” beam

15’8” 27’10” 27’ 6’-8’6” draft

5.7-7kt 12.5-13kt 14.08kt 4.5-5.5 kt speed

4.5” 4.7” 4.5” 4” (8” WL) max armour

4015 5630 9137 1535 tons displacement

 

New Ironsides was wooden hulled with and was a belt-and-battery ship, with the belt extending from 4’ below to 3’ above the full load line. The belt was made of best scrap iron, in 15’ x 2’4” strakes, grooved on all sides with 1.5” thick tongue pieces connecting the plates. Her ends were unarmoured just as was HMS Warrior, and her bulkheads very lightly covered. As designed, she had no armoured pilot house. The iron was hammered and wrought. A pilothouse (weighing 18 tons) was added, abaft the huge funnel, which, being much wider than the pilot house, completely obscured the view ahead. She was laid down in late October 1861, launched on 10 May 1862, and commissioned on 21 August 1862. She went in to the line immediately, without builders trials. Her full sailing rig was removed when she went to join the forces due to attack Charleston, and little information is available on her sailing performance. Her CO stated (Turner to Welles, 27 Aug 62) that her rig was essential for ocean work, as she was “utterly unmanageable in a gale” without it. From her rig and hull form, she would probably have been quite handy, but very slow, and would have made much leeway.

 

The machinery was supposed to drive her at 9.5 kts. She had two horizontal pistons in each engine, connected to a single shaft, powered by four horizontal fire tube boilers rated to 50psi.

 

She was armed with 14 x 11” Dahlgren low velocity muzzle-loading smoothbores and two 150lb Parrott rifles. Her new-design, all-iron gun carriages gave great trouble as they could not properly control the recoil of the guns. This took until December 1862 to rectify, but the up-gunning of the ship (from 16 x 9” to 14 x 11” Dahlgrens and 2 Parrotts) had increased the crew by about 150 men, so she was very overcrowded. The galley was designed for only 200 in the crew.

 

New Ironsides proved to be very slow, and extremely difficult to control above 5 knots. Fortunately, perhaps, the engines could never propel her above 7 knots, and her normal speed was regarded as about 5.5-6 knots, the latter being usual when she was relatively clean.

 

Battle experience showed that the ship was a reasonable investment in the role of floating battery. Battle ranges between ships and batteries was rarely more than 2000 yards, her very low speed was not much of a hindrance, although she was unmanageable in a tideway and was always very difficult to steer. Her shutters were very vulnerable to shot. A hit would break them away from the ship.

 

Overall, the ship failed to make the offensive contributions expected of her, due to her slowness and poor steering. But when moored or in non-tidal waters, her gunnery proved fast and accurate. Her battery was enormous compared to the monitors, 8 guns, and they were much easier to serve than the guns in monitor turrets, which were much slower firing as a result. A serious problem during the attack on Charleston was that her ports limited her range to about 1,800 yards, as they only allowed 4.5 degrees of elevation. For bombardment of coastal forts, the monitors had an advantage. Their guns could bear all-round, and they drew less than 12’ of water. New Ironsides provides firepower under certain circumstances, and the rough weather and offshore security required. The monitors could not fight their guns in a seaway or a rough inshore chop. The broadside ironclad could. Together, they masked each other’s weaknesses in the tactical circumstances pertaining to the Charleston campaign.

 

The Crimean War Ironclads.

 

The RN built a number of ironclads for service in the Crimean War. These were based on the five French Congreve class ironclads built in 1854. The Congreve class were 174’ long, displaced 1400 tons, had 4” of armour and were armed with 16 x 50pdr smooth bores. The RN commenced five similar ships in 1854. They were flat bottomed

 

Aetna Class

 

All laid down 9 October 1854. Wooden hulled coastal broadside battery ironclads, referred to as ‘floating batteries’. They were specifically designed for coastal operations against fortifications in shallow to very shallow waters. They were built to be part of a balanced force, ocean going steam line-of-battle ships and frigates would deal with deep water problems and provide long range massed fire. The ironclads were designed to get very close to fortresses and fight them directly. They were supported by a cloud of small, nimble gunboats able to get under the guns and to engage from positions fortress guns would not bear. They were also responsible for direct support against the fortress field fortifications, with their own guns and mortars

 

The ironclads were 172’6”, 43’11” beam, draft 6’5” for shallow water, 7-8’ for normal operations. Designed displacement 1535 tons, 14 x 68pdr 95cwt smooth bore muzzle loaders. The second group had 16 guns. They were fitted with simple 2 cylinder gunboat engines of 600 IHP to 1,500 IHP, with four boilers. On trials, Glatton made 4.5 knots on 693 IHP and Meteor 5.7 knots on 530 IHP. Glatton’s screw was changed after her trials.

 

All are reported to have reliably made 5.5 knots and to have been easy to steer in calm coastal waters. However, they were impossible to handle at sea in a seaway, and difficult to handle in coastal waters in rougher coastal conditions. Speeds in such conditions also fell off rapidly, 4-4.5 knots should be considered average. They were designed to move close to a fortress, anchor, rig springs to the anchor, and direct their fire by warping on the springs.

 

Two armoured cupolas were fitted on the upper deck. These were connected to engine room and gun deck with gutta-percha speaking tubes. Their armour scheme was primitive. They use 4” thick forged plates (hammered wrought iron) over a 6” teak hull, 11’ down from the upper deck to 3’ under the normal waterline. There was an additional row of 4.5” plates along the waterline, giving them 8.5” of iron end to end along the waterline. All plates were tongue-and-grooved for additional strength. When Glatton was broken up, the plates were found to vary up to 0.5” in thickness, this being a characteristic of hammered wrought iron, and a primary reason why rolled wrought iron was used from Warrior onwards. As USS New Ironsides was armoured with hammered wrought iron, she probably had this same level of varying thickness.

 

They were fitted with a simple sailing rig which proved very useful in keeping the ships steady at sea. However, they were not designed for and were not capable of independent ocean passage. They were always towed on ocean passage and proved to be steady under tow with sails up, but their flat bottoms gave them no ‘grip’ on the water in a seaway.

 

Aetna (0) burned on the stocks 2 days before launch

Glatton launched 18 April 1855, ran trials in July, left for Crimea on 22 Sept. In reserve post war and broken up 1864

 

Meteor Launched 17 Apr 55. Trials in May, modified to triple screw in late May, to Crimea with Glatton, then to reserve, broken up late in 1861

 

Thunder Launched 17 Apr 55, in reserve until broken up in 1874

 

Trusty Launched 18 April 55. A Coles turret was added to her in 1859-60, and she was extensively used for gunnery trials. The ship and turret withstood fire very well. Broken up in 1864

 

Aetna (1) laid down as a replacement on 16 November 1855, launched 5 April 1855, completed and passed in to reserve. Sold 1873 Aetna (1) was 186’ x 44’ x 8’ max, 1588 tons and 16 guns.

 

The Second Class

 

The second class of ships was the Erebus class.

 

These were iron-hulled ships of the following characteristics:

186’ x 48’6” beam x 8’ draft. 1954 tons. All were slightly larger and slightly heavier (all dimensions differed a little). They were ported for 16 guns. Trial data is unavailable but they were so similar to their predecessors that we can confidently assume a speed of about 5 knots.

 

Erebus laid down 7 Jan 56, launched 19 Apr 56, fitted out by 23 Apr 56 sufficiently to attend the Spithead Naval Review. In reserve until sold in 1884. She was used to test resistance of iron ships to shot during the early 1860s.

 

Terror Laid down 31 Dec 55, launched 28 Apr 56, draft 8’10” on displacement of 1844 tons. Sent to Bermuda under tow on completion, as guard ship and station ship. Sold in Bermuda in 1903.

 

Thunderbolt Laid down 26 Dec 55, launched 22 Apr 56. Passed in to reserve on completion. Became a pier at Chatham in 1873 (machinery removed), sunk in collision with tug in 1948, raised and scrapped.

 

So that would be three iron hulled ironclads and four wooden hulled ones available immediately from reserve for participation in a putative conflict with the USA on the side of the CSA.

 

The Comparison.

 

With the previously mentioned data on armour and guns, it is apparent that the older Crimean War coastal ironclads were somewhat inferior to USS New Ironsides. She could go to sea, they could not. There is probably nothing between their armour. The US guns were certainly inferior to the 68pdr 95cwt RN SB ML when the latter used guncotton propellant and steel shot. But at close ranges, it is assessed that the USN 11” Dahlgrens, with steel shot (and possibly with best quality wrought iron shot) would also be able to pierce the hammered 4” armour of the RN ships – but only on the battery. The USN guns had no chance of piercing the doubled waterline plating at any range. The RN guns could penetrate New Ironsides waterline armour.

 

New Ironsides was faster than her RN counterparts, but only by a knot or so. This is not assessed to be very meaningful. She could break off action by steaming away, the RN ships by entering shallow water. Both designs had issues regarding their steering.

 

However, New Ironsides was one ship when she appeared in August 1862. Seven of the RN ships still existed at this time. Although individually a little inferior as combat ships (New Ironsides should win a one-on-won, but suffer serious damage doing it), the RN ships were more useful in coastal, protected water operations than USS New Ironsides. They were specially designed for it and there were seven of them. Their extremely shallow draft (4’6” to 2’ LESS than USS Monitor – the RN gunboats were only 6’9” draft) made them very useful in the shallowest water. They could not operate at sea, and New Ironsides could. There, the RN had overwhelming superiority in ironclads and liners, heavy frigates and all other ship types.

 

I have also done a comparison of Dunderberg vs Research, and Dunderberg is only marginally superior as a seagoing combatant to the little armoured sloop...

 

I have banged on for FAR too long, more later.

 

 

Cheers: Mark

[EchoFiveMike]

You ignore the 8" Parrot rifles, which would likely be using steel cored Hotchkiss shot when confronted by iron clads. Monitors commonly had one paired with an 11" or 15" Dahlgren. Seacoast batteries would have 10" (300 pdr) Parrots in addition to the 100pdr and 200 pdr's. S/F....Ken M

[MarkLBailey]

I have no data on that weapon, as the RN did not test it as they tested the Dahlgrens. However, the numbers are still not there for them to make much of a difference.

 

Is there any info on its operational use against ironclad targets?

 

Any data on tests using Parrotts would be welcome. Of very great importance is exactly who made the iron used as a target, and what sort it was. The differences in metallurgical properties in this era were very wide, as discussed.

 

Cheers: Mark

[EchoFiveMike]

Unfortunatey I have little data on the guns. From Peterson's Notes on Ordnance of the ACW it shows the 8" Parrot as having a tube weight of 16, 300lbs, bore length of 159", a 175 lb projo, used a charge of 16lbs and achieved a range of 2000yds at 5 degrees elevation. Contrasted with the 8" Blakely, which had 17000;b tube, length of 156inch, a 200lb projo and used a charge of 50lbs. No range given. S/F....Ken M

 

Addendum: Searching the web has proven fairly useless, I have only been able to find that the 300 pdr (10inch) Parrot was a US Army only ordnance, not actually fielded by the USN. It was fairly potent however, being able to send it's 250 lb shell to 9000yds at only 13.5 degrees elevation.

 

The 200pdr (8inch) rifle was used by the USN and US Army both, not much additional info to be had.

Edited August 8, 2006 by EchoFiveMike

[MarkLBailey]

KingSargent noted that:

 

 

'The RNs "steam sloops on the stocks" were not ocean-going naval vessels, they were small inshore gunboats of shallow draft intended for breaking into fortified harbors - Kronstadt/St. Petersburg specifically. They needed larger ships to serve as tenders and bases. . '

COMMENT: No. The GB acted as tenders to LARGER ships so that the complement and armament could be changed to suit whatever operation was needed at the time (DK Brown, Before the Ironclad, p.147)

 

'Crossing the North Atlantic would have been a feat to remember; USN monitors were more seaworthy.'

COMMENT: No. Dapper class GB (118 built) served literally everywhere on the planet well in to the 1870s. That said, the RN regarded them as best suited to coastal passages and tended to escort them (but not tow them) on oceanic passage.

 

In the event of hostilities with the US, those gunboats would have been of value in attacking US coast defenses, but not as blockading units.

COMMENT: No. These were craft superior in most cases to a lot of the mercantile conversions the USN used for this purpose. Their operations in the Sea of Azov are the case in point, whee they an their junior officers were turned loose to completely ravage the enemy coastline, which they did with remarkable success, burning stores, ships, wharves, farms, crops, wagons, barges, you name it. See Sir W Laird Clowes, A History of the Royal Navy, Vol.VI Samson Lowe, London, 1901 pp.453-466. Boy, did they have serious fun in the Sea of Azov and Gulf of Taganrog! And in vile weather in many cases.

 

When counting ships in the ACW period, numbers are meaningless. Technology was advancing so fast that ships were sometimes obsolete before they were launched. The RN's sailing line-of-battle ships were useless, except as port flagships and admirals' lounges. Ditto the sailing frigates and sloops. They retained a role in policing waters where steamers were not common (Africa, the Far East), but were worthless in fighting a steam navy like the USN's ACW fleet.

COMMENT: No. This is simply not borne out by Crimean experience. The Liners could and did routinely defeat the heaviest forts in carefully planned combined arms operations. The Liners were themselves steamers, see Napier's operations in teh Baltic (the main theattre of the CW). The Liners were mostly 10 knotters, and that was reliable. Silverstone (Civil War Navies) shows that about 95% of USN ships were SLOWER than the RN's Liners under steam. The last RN fleet to go to sea with any sailing liners in it was Graham's fleet assembled at Spithead in June 1853 (10 sailers and 10 steamers) and those still around in 1858 were laid up in storage for conversion to either blockships or turret ships.

 

Numbers of ships and numbers of guns were not as important as the armaments carried. The US had foundries during the ACW that could produce more big rifles and shell-guns than Woolwich could. {I leave Armstrong's flawed projects out of it.}

COMMENT: No. British manufactures in this era were over half the global total. In any case, they had this very large stock of existing 68pds (8-inch) with which to arms ships, and with guncotton/steel shot they could penetrate anything afloat.

 

The USN could arm a converted merchant ship with guns that could theoretically sink anything they hit; the RN couldn't. Note the THEORETICAL emphasis; USN predominance depended on the theories of the shell-gun enthusiasts being correct. If the shell-gun did not perform as advertised, navies with predominently shell-gun armaments (i.e., the USN) would be in a world of hurt. There just is not any historical data to prove who was correct.

COMMENT: Yes there is. The Russians used shell-guns against the Allied fleet at Sevastopol., 17 Oct 1854:

Albion - hit by 4 shells from the Constantine on the waterline, set on fire and retired from action as this was next to the magazine which was flooded to prevent danger, but deprived her of powder.

Arethusa Frigate - 4 shell hits, one dangerous one on the waterline which might have endagered her in a gale. But she was a frigate and not intended to fight forts.

Agamemnon - 214 hits of which3 shells anda rocket. 4 killed 25 wounded, ship's combat ability untouched but her rigging was cut up.

London - heavily hit by the Telegraph fort, set on fire 3 times in 2 hours. She won - she silenced the fort. Fit for action at all times

Queen - set afire by red hot shot and liquid-iron-filled shot, withdrew from action but fit for action next day

Ville de Paris (French) 41 hits in the hull, about half shell, and 40-50 aloft. No significant damage. One hit under the poop by a heavy mortar shell which caused extensive damage and forced her from action until next day

The Russians fired 16,000 rounds and suffered 138 casualties, the forts were mostly silenced

SO you are correct, the USN would be in severe straits, becuase the CW demonstrates that shells were not much of a problem to wooden steam-powered liners. They were also quite useless against ironclads.

 

I, for one, do not think the RN's steam liners superfluous. Even against heavy shell-guns, they were very tough as proved by the Austrian 91-gun liner that played a big role in Lissa (space the name and am away from library).

COMMENT: Correct.

 

About half of the RN's steam LOB ships were dogs due to crap engines, but if they had taken the good ones, given them a sheath of shell-resistant plate, and turned them loose the USN would have been introuble. But modifying the ships and finding crews would have taken time, and the Confederacy did not have a lot of time left in 1863.

COMMENT: No, they would be fine as they were, as all the experience of the CW showed.

 

Cheers: Mark

[MarkLBailey]

Thanks E5M. US historiography on the ACW is simply amazing, so I wonder if anyone did AP tests with them?

 

Cheers: Mark

 

Gotta run, car club meeting!

[EchoFiveMike]

I'm not sure about AP tests, I imagine the US did somewhere. While doing a quick search for info I discovered numerous references to the 100pdr Parrots being used as coastal artillery, so they must have been fairly common. 200pdr's less so.

 

Much of the defenses around Washington were wood reinforced earth and more resistant to naval fire than masonry or the 2nd and 3rd period forts. See Ft Fischer for an example of that. The forts would have to be carried by amphibious landing and that would be difficult staging from Canada at the nearest. S/F.....Ken M

[Rich]

I have no data on that weapon, as the RN did not test it as they tested the Dahlgrens. However, the numbers are still not there for them to make much of a difference.

 

Is there any info on its operational use against ironclad targets?

 

Any data on tests using Parrotts would be welcome. Of very great importance is exactly who made the iron used as a target, and what sort it was. The differences in metallurgical properties in this era were very wide, as discussed.

 

Cheers: Mark

354595[/snapback]

 

Thanks for the information Mark, although I still have a large number of questions. Mostly I think the problems are associated with poor/incomplete/conflicting data.

 

So a few points and questions that come to mind.

 

1) The data on firing trials seems to be highly suspect in many cases and I still tend to treat them with some caution. Part of it, as you note, is that we don't always know the quality or the type of armor tested. But I think part of it too is that in some cases the motives of the testers may have been suspect, be they gun designers/manufacturers or plate manufacturers.

 

For example we have the tests of the 68-pdr, did it penetrate 7 inches of armor at 1,000 yards as per the 1868 tests? Or did it fail to penetrate the Warriors 4.5-inch plate (at what range?) using cast iron shot and penetrate it (at what range?) using steel shot and guncotton?

 

BTW, which 68-pdr? The 68-pdr 56 cwt. "shell gun" seemed to be much more common that the 95 cwt. gun at this time. Or is the confusion confusing me? And which performed better? The 95 cwt. gun seems to be the culprit?

 

Also BTW, did the RN actually test "Dahlgren" guns? AFAIK the majority of those were cast for US service during the war? So which ones? And were they tested using steel-cored shot and prysmatic powder? Or guncotton?

 

2) You keep referring to British guns firing using guncotton. That may have been suitable in tests during the 1850s and 1860s, but I wouldn't have wanted to have been around. Nor would I would have wanted to have sailed on a vessel crossing the Atlantic with a powder room loaded with guncotton for use in penetrating Yankee armor. Aside from the corrosive effects on the guns the instability of the explosive, especially when stored, was an issue until the 1870s IIRC? For example, Marsh Works blew up shortly after opening in 1847 and then didn't manufacturer guncotton again until 1872.

 

3) You also ignore the development and use by the US military of Rodman's prysmatic powder. I always understood that it was far superior to the large-grain European powders in use at the time and was only adopted by the Russians? So how does the claim that 50-lb of RN powder was equal to 60-lb of USN powder work? Or is that 50-lb of unstable and highly dangerous RN guncotton?

 

4) A minor point, you refer to the 15-inch Dahlgren, but in fact the Dahlgren was usually referred to as the XV-inch and only 120 were produced, most of them in 1864. The piece that would likely be facing the RN would be the 15-inch Rodman of which 323 were cast (over 200 IIRC up to mid 1863). And which also acheived the penetration of 10 inches of plate (rolled, hammered, laminate? ) at 1,000 yards in 1868 (firing shell, iron, steel cored? ).

 

5) You pooh-pooh the USN philosophy of close-range smashing fire, implying that most of the fire would be at more than 500 yards. But firing tests in 1847 showed tha the 68-pdr firing 68 or 56-lb solid shot acheived 25% hits at 2,500 yards, firing at a stationary target from a stationary target (shore to HMS Leviathan/ screen targets and an anchored HMS Excellant to Leviathan and screens). All types of guns did acheive about 75% hits at 1,500 yards (albeit at all ranges it was noted that shells were 25% less accurate). But if we then interpolate later data we could assume that accuracy would fall off to at least one-third to one-quarter in a moderate sea state. This was born out in Civil War engagements where most of the firing was done at close ranges.

 

Of course if you assume stationary to stationary or nearly stationary, in sheltered waters then it might be different, but frankly I don't think so.

 

5) Data on the Parrotts as you note isn't readily available. What I put in earlier is about all I've found, the 100-pdr firing a 70-lb shell easily penetrated six 1-inch plates at 130 yards, while the 150-pdr firing a 155-lb iron shot "broke" a 4.5-inch plate (I would assume these were similar to the hammered plate used in New Ironsides?), presumably at the same range.

 

6) Data on Fortress Monroe is fascinating. However I will reserve judgment until I can explore a bit as to the state of the defenses around the fortress as of mid 1863, which is what we've been working with. Given the industry with which the Union - and Confederates - built earthwork batteries, I think a six-month lead time might be sufficient to make the planned attack on the fortress rather more perilous?

 

Anyway, got to go for now, thanks again for the info, I'll try to return with some other questions later.

 

Rich

[Grant Whitley]

Dunno about the abundant "very deep water". This is the same area in which the Minnesota ran aground.

[Rich]

Dunno about the abundant "very deep water".  This is the same area in which the Minnesota ran aground.

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Actually the main ship channel ran roughly northeast to southwest, directly between Monroe and Wool, with a narrower buoyed channel running to the town of Hampton.

 

The shallows in which Minnesota ran aground were outside the buoyed channel. However, AFAIK the approaches east and south of Wool were very shallow, especially at low tide. So to make the plan possible requires passing Wool and Monroe and then anchoring in the area southwest of Monroe and roughly west, northwest of Wool to acheive the enfilade posited by Mark. The rub of course is that any ships doing so of neccessity will expose themselves to batteries at Hampton and the headland southeast of Wool, which would put them at roughly 1,500-2,000 yards range.

[Grant Whitley]

Actually the main ship channel ran roughly northeast to southwest, directly between Monroe and Wool, with a narrower buoyed channel running to the town of Hampton.

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Well, yeah, that was my point. The James is brown because it's full of dirt, which means that there are all kinds of nasty shoals and stuff at its mouth.

[Rich]

Well, yeah, that was my point.  The James is brown because it's full of dirt, which means that there are all kinds of nasty shoals and stuff at its mouth.

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I understand what you meant, but the main ship channel was about 1,000 yards across, which does gives some room. The problem with the shallows was once you got out of the ship channel, not that it was that well marked. But because of its orientation it would be possible for an attacker to run the channel and then anchor in a position to enfilade the Water Battery and Monroe at roughly 2,000 yards range. But the problem for such an attacker then would be earthwork batteries covering that anchorage. Dealing with them requires the shallow-draft ironclad floating batteries. Of course if the Union mines the shallows then that again becomes problematic for an attacker. In any case, batteries supporting Monroe and Wool from the mainland would be highly resistant to shot and shell, much more so than the permanent fortifications and could then make life miserable for any liner attempting to do so. So they could use the ironclad ships such as Warrior, but again that would leave them exposed to fire at their relatively more vulnerable ends, possibly damaging the unprotected rudder?

 

Overall though, assuming they can transport a major army it would be possible for them to simply ignore the forts and batteries, take their lumps, and sail on to unload on the James and prosecute a land war to open up Hampton Roads. Overall, the record of coastal batteries versus ships just waving hello wasn't very good in this era.

 

It just keeps getting more complicated and full of what ifs.

[Grant Whitley]

I understand what you meant, but the main ship channel was about 1,000 yards across, which does gives some room. The problem with the shallows was once you got out of the ship channel, not that it was that well marked.

 

Perhaps. Just that in general, I find claims that the RN could have reduced these forts within hours to be quite fantastic, given the Union's experience with Fort Sumter at Charleston.

[Jim Martin]

I think we need to consider the war aims of Her Majesty's Governemnt in this case (I have no idea what eh French might have wanted, anyone care to guess).

 

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The French were at the time sponsoring Maximilian as Emperor of Mexico. An undivided USA would be less than pleased with such a blatant violation of the Monroe Doctrine, and the French had an interest in the success of a CSA which recognized the right of the French to meddle in Western Hemisphere affairs.

[Grant Whitley]

...and the French had an interest in the success of a CSA which recognized the right of the French to meddle in Western Hemisphere affairs.

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It's interesting to posit what might have happened had the Confederacy won, given that the South's idea of Manifest Destiny tended to incline more southwards than westwards. France and the Confederacy could end up squabbling over various bits of Latin America.

[Jim Martin]

It's interesting to posit what might have happened had the Confederacy won, given that the South's idea of Manifest Destiny tended to incline more southwards than westwards.  France and the Confederacy could end up squabbling over various bits of Latin America.

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I do believe that Cuba was firmly fixed in the gunsights of the Young Democrats....