1943 Invasion Of France? (Locked)

[Tim the Tank Nut]

Rich,

get back to work on some good book for us to read.

All this stuff is covered earlier in the thread

 

I can't tell you if this is the definitive thread on Invasion '43 but it is good enough

[Rich]

Rich,

get back to work on some good book for us to read.

All this stuff is covered earlier in the thread

 

I can't tell you if this is the definitive thread on Invasion '43 but it is good enough

 

I'm trying, but I can resist everything but temptation.

[Ken Estes]

 

 

Marshall originally scheduled Overlord for April 1943. It was Churchill, not US public opinion, that talked FDR out of it. Marshall was overruled, so it's a bit much for you to pretend that I'm expressing an opinion that did not have high level support in the US military. In terms of US divisions to the Pacific, I count about 16 committed there by the timeframe we are talking including a Marine amphibious corps sized formation of 3 divisions. On the sea, overwhelming Allied strength and artillery support that made throwing an invasion back impossible. In the air, the Anglo-Americans outproduced the LW about 110,000 to 25,000 in 1943 - the LW simply could not go toe to toe with the Allies in the air in 1943.

 

 

Nothing like rewriting history. Marshall did not "schedule" any such thing. He replied to Roosevelt's 25 March 1942 request for advice on future offensive operations on 2 April 1943 with a memorandum based upon an OPD outline of a 48-division, 5,800 aircraft assault on France with an earliest date of 1 April 1943. The landings would take place between Etretat and Cap Griz Nez on either side of the Somme. The British staff reply agreed, but noted the two glaring problems in the plan...the lack of landing craft and long-range fighter aircraft. The British War Cabinet, including Churchill, agreed to the American proposition.

 

However, within two months that agreement dissipated as it was pointed out, correctly, that current schedules of landing craft production, deferred to build escort vessels, could not meet requirements and that forecasts of available shipping indicated it would take 21 days to get the initial six divisions ashore. By July both Roosevelt and Churchill were wavering from the idea and searching for a way to get more immediate offensive action. The result was TORCH.

 

By 1 April 1943, there were three Marine divisions in the Pacific, but 1st was rebuilding after Guadalcanal and 3d was newly arrived. For the Army, there were ten divisions, including Americal. The tenth was the 7th ID, which staged for the Aleutians operations on 24 April 1943, the previous nine were, 24th, 25th, 27th, 32d, 41st, 37th, Americal, 40th, and 43d.

 

On the sea, the allies were focused on the Uboote problem and defeating the Japanese navy, something, BTW, which were major problems in April 1942 when these discussions began. As of then, there were two USAAF groups overseas in theaters facing Germany. By 1 April 1943 there were 50, about one-third the number that defeated the Luftwaffe in 1944. Production does not equal deployment and engagement.

 

 

One of my favorites for this period is to note that the US began planning for the military governments of occupied Germany and Japan in April 1942.

[Rich]

 

 

And how much bigger was the allied bomber force in 1944 compared to 1943?

 

 

Bomber Command was about 800 aircraft (Wellington, Stirling, Halifax, Lancaster, and Mosquito) by mid 1943. IIRC, the Desert Air Force had about 300 medium and light bombers. USAAF ETOUSA and MTOUSA heavy bomber strength was 1,308, medium bombers was 1,051, and light bombers was 203. About 3,700 bombers.

 

On 1 June 1944, there were 4,492 US heavy bombers, 1,749 medium bombers, and 557 light bombers. Bomber Command had grown to about 1,100 aircraft and the British Mediterranean Air Forces around 500 more. I should be able to glean some more accurate figures in a bit. About 9,400 bombers.

 

 

 

Corrections...BC as of 1 June 1944 was 1,776 aircraft on hand. 2d TAF had 216 Mitchell and Boston bombers. Coastal Command had 33 Mosquito, 100 Wellington, and 119 Liberator.

[Markus Becker]

 

 

Only a couple of battalions are equipped with Grants at Kasserine as I recall, and M4s and M10s are plentiful. You are kidding about drawbacks of the M3, right?

 

The US formations would be equipped with the Medium Tank M4 by a spring-summer landing, but 2 Canadian Armoured Brigade and 4 Canadian Armoured Division were equipped with RAM II until December 1943 when they began transitioning to Sherman tanks. I would have to double-check, but I believe a number of British formations would be in the same situation.

I'm not seeing the problem using Ram II against Pz.III/IV and very few Tigers. Ok, the HE capability could be better.

[Rich]

 

Politics dictating operations was not a military strategy, it was FDR treating WW2 grand strategy like an election campaign.

 

 

I missed this earlier...you are treating WW2 grand strategy like a board game.

[Rich]

I'm not seeing the problem using Ram II against Pz.III/IV and very few Tigers. Ok, the HE capability could be better.

 

 

The Canadian 1st Army Tank Brigade (its principal user overseas) evaluation was not as kind as you.

 

"The general suitability of the RAM II does NOT meet the requirements of a first line operational tk. Its disadvantages are much more numerous than its advantages in comparison with the SHERMAN." They then noted the superiority of the 75mm over the 6-pdr (as then viewed) and noted the Sherman was "superior on rough going or hill climbing and better for general cross country work". It was easier and much less fatiguing tk to handle" than the RAM. The Sherman traverse mechanism was considered better and it was remarked that the visibility from the Sherman was "infinitely better than from a RAM". Finally, protection and crew access was considered better as well. (CMHQ 113, quoting letter 31 May 1943 from BG Wyman, CO 1st Canadian Tank Bde).

[Rich]

Marshall wanted Overlord for April 1943, and Churchill talked FDR out of it. Marshall was overruled. Churchill talked the talk on potential casualties, but Churchill's agenda was also the interests of the British Empire in the post-war global balance. In terms of landing craft and fighters, this too was a question of prioritization between theatres as well as more improvisation with existing materials. (For example, by copying the German Seibel ferry, which was basically just a couple pontoon bridge spans with a deck on top).

 

Please stop with the falsification of history. Roosevelt wanted offensive action. The British agreed. Roosevelt asked for a plan. The War Department OPD assessed the best way to do it was a cross-channel attack. Marshall agreed and forwarded the outline to Roosevelt and Churchill, who agreed on it. From there the devil was in the details.

 

 

1st USMC is not 'rebuilding' because Watchtower never happened. 3rd Marines is operational and available for an assault landing in 1943. The divisions I see sent to the Pacific that could have gone to the Atlantic are 37th, 43rd, 33rd, 7th, 77th, 1st Cav, 6th. Divisions in the Pacific beforehand were 24th, 25thth, 27th, 31st, 32nd, Americal, ('if it got done right, its Americal') 40th, 41st. That's 3+7+8 = 18 divisions. On the latter group, the divisions already in theatre, the idea would not be to move the entire division, just shuffle the troops themselves.

 

The 1st MARDIV was enroute from San Francisco on 23 June 1942 and arrived Melbourne 16 July 1942. Your anti-history needs to begin before the strategic decisions are finalized...unless the major players just play your war game to reach their decision.

 

The 37th ID went as part of the emergency reinforcement, going to Fiji on 26 May and arriving 11 June 1942...four days after the "end" of the Battle of Midway..

The 33d ID was not ready for POM until 5 May 1943, too late for the 1 April start date of OPD and probably too late for staging to Britain for any cross-channel operation before 1 September and the end of the "desirable" weather season.

The 77th ID was not ready to POM until 19 March 1944...how it participates in operations in summer 1943 I will leave to the imagination.

The 6th ID was reorganized as an infantry division (it was a motorized infantry division) on 21 May 1943, was rated ready to POM on 1 July, and departed for Hawaii 21 July, arriving 29 July. The situation is similar to that of the 33d ID, but worse.

The 1st CavD departed San Francisco 26 June and arrived Australia 11 July 1943, without their horses, although their dismounted status was not officially recognized until 4 December 1943. Again, much the same situation as 6th and 33d ID, but somewhat worse, since MacArthur was the only theater commander at the time willing to take them, given the Army was still indecisive about the possible role of horse cavalry.

 

 

The Japanese can be left to the defensive after Midway. Let the US submarine service whittle down their merchant marine and have the British army of India and Australia cover the defenses. Keep the US equipment deployed in the Pacific there, but move the best trained officers and men to Europe for Roundup , replacing them in the Pacific with green troops from stateside that can continue their training in the Pacific. So, for example, with the Hawaii garrison, there might have been 80,000 well trained troops there in the summer of 1942, (the US Army didn't seem to get Brian Kennedy's memo about how Hawaii was invulnerable to invasion). So, keep 20,000 of them as a cadre and move the other 60,000 to Europe, replacing them with green troops from stateside straight out of boot camp. Leave the equipment in Hawaii. Send the new equipment direct from factory to the UK.

 

Planned like a true war gamer. Mind you, in practice it was precisely that kind of personnel upheaval that helped delay the deployment of the Army's divisions...

 

BTW, that is what they did, the 6th ID went to Hawaii and completed its retraining there 26 January 1944. Its arrival in the garrison enabled the 24th ID to depart for Australia. Earlier, the 25th ID was relieved of defensive missions on 2 November 1942 by the arrival of the 40th ID on 1 September 1942.

 

 

Taking the French Atlantic ports in 1943 defeats the U-boats. Two birds, one stone. Aircraft production rates are key to the matter of defeating the Luftwaffe in 1943; at best the LW can achieve about a 1:1 kill/loss rate vs. the RAF and USAAF in 1943, but the LW is getting 25,000 replacement aircraft, of which maybe 7,000 have to go east, and the Allies are getting, after deducting for the Pacific, about 90,000. The Germans can't win in the air being outproduced over 4:1.

 

Oh good grief. Please inform Williamson Murray, E.R. Hooten, Alfred Price, the British Air Staff, and the American Air Staff of your brilliant revelation. I'm done with this tale-spinning time-waster.

[Rick]

 

 

Marshall originally scheduled Overlord for April 1943. It was Churchill, not US public opinion, that talked FDR out of it. Marshall was overruled, so it's a bit much for you to pretend that I'm expressing an opinion that did not have high level support in the US military. In terms of US divisions to the Pacific, I count about 16 committed there by the timeframe we are talking including a Marine amphibious corps sized formation of 3 divisions. On the sea, overwhelming Allied strength and artillery support that made throwing an invasion back impossible. In the air, the Anglo-Americans outproduced the LW about 110,000 to 25,000 in 1943 - the LW simply could not go toe to toe with the Allies in the air in 1943.

 

 

Nothing like rewriting history. Marshall did not "schedule" any such thing. He replied to Roosevelt's 25 March 1942 request for advice on future offensive operations on 2 April 1943 with a memorandum based upon an OPD outline of a 48-division, 5,800 aircraft assault on France with an earliest date of 1 April 1943. The landings would take place between Etretat and Cap Griz Nez on either side of the Somme. The British staff reply agreed, but noted the two glaring problems in the plan...the lack of landing craft and long-range fighter aircraft. The British War Cabinet, including Churchill, agreed to the American proposition.

 

However, within two months that agreement dissipated as it was pointed out, correctly, that current schedules of landing craft production, deferred to build escort vessels, could not meet requirements and that forecasts of available shipping indicated it would take 21 days to get the initial six divisions ashore. By July both Roosevelt and Churchill were wavering from the idea and searching for a way to get more immediate offensive action. The result was TORCH.

 

By 1 April 1943, there were three Marine divisions in the Pacific, but 1st was rebuilding after Guadalcanal and 3d was newly arrived. For the Army, there were ten divisions, including Americal. The tenth was the 7th ID, which staged for the Aleutians operations on 24 April 1943, the previous nine were, 24th, 25th, 27th, 32d, 41st, 37th, Americal, 40th, and 43d.

 

On the sea, the allies were focused on the Uboote problem and defeating the Japanese navy, something, BTW, which were major problems in April 1942 when these discussions began. As of then, there were two USAAF groups overseas in theaters facing Germany. By 1 April 1943 there were 50, about one-third the number that defeated the Luftwaffe in 1944. Production does not equal deployment and engagement.

 

Excellent post, thank you.

[Rich]

Gee, I wonder who might be in Brittany during mid 1943?

 

Oh, 76. Inf.-Div., newly reformed after being destroyed at Stalingrad from the reinforced Grenadier Regiment 876 and 877. Fully re-equipped and sent in August to Savona. 371. Inf.-Div., ditto. Both were fully reformed and operational by early June. 384. Inf.-Div. also was reforming there, but was not fully operational until 15 June. 389. Inf.-Div. was also in Brittany, like the others a Stalingrad division. It was still reforming and was counted as a kampfgruppe until early July 1943. Oh, I nearly forgot, and 16. Panzer Division.

 

Nearby? 94. Inf.-Div. at Lorient, also a reformed Stalingrad Division, oh, and 14. Panzer Division at Angers, 21. Panzer Division at Rennes, 24. Panzer Division at Lisieux, and 26. Panzer Division at Amiens,

 

Meanwhile, since TORCH apparently doesn't happen, that means that the requirement to occupy Vichy goes away, but also takes away some sunny southern French climes were various other divisions organized or reformed, such as 1. and 2. FJD, Guess they'll need to move north too.

[R011]

 

 

 

Only a couple of battalions are equipped with Grants at Kasserine as I recall, and M4s and M10s are plentiful. You are kidding about drawbacks of the M3, right?

 

The US formations would be equipped with the Medium Tank M4 by a spring-summer landing, but 2 Canadian Armoured Brigade and 4 Canadian Armoured Division were equipped with RAM II until December 1943 when they began transitioning to Sherman tanks. I would have to double-check, but I believe a number of British formations would be in the same situation.

I'm not seeing the problem using Ram II against Pz.III/IV and very few Tigers. Ok, the HE capability could be better.

That's why they included a Sherman, formerly a Lee, in each troop.

[R011]

 

 

 

Only a couple of battalions are equipped with Grants at Kasserine as I recall, and M4s and M10s are plentiful. You are kidding about drawbacks of the M3, right?

 

The US formations would be equipped with the Medium Tank M4 by a spring-summer landing, but 2 Canadian Armoured Brigade and 4 Canadian Armoured Division were equipped with RAM II until December 1943 when they began transitioning to Sherman tanks. I would have to double-check, but I believe a number of British formations would be in the same situation.

I'm not seeing the problem using Ram II against Pz.III/IV and very few Tigers. Ok, the HE capability could be better.

That's why they included a Sherman, formerly a Lee, in each troop.

[Stuart Galbraith]

 

 

 

 

Yes that sounds right, I think 7th Armoured was about the only pure cruiser formation left by DDay (Cromwell). Im not sure about a universal tank, I think that kind of thinking only came through postwar with some of Monty's writings (I think that article written by him featured in 'The Universal Tank' by Fletcher was postwar wasnt it?). But there was certainly a drive towards homogeneity, I dont disagree.

 

Think the other divisions may have been using Cromwell in recce still. Its speed reputedly made it quite useful for that.

 

 

Um, no, I was thinking more Covenantor and Crusader (Cruisers Mark V and VI. Cavalier, Centaur, and Cromwell (Cruisers Mark VII and VIII) did not begin production until January 1943 and by 1 April only 186 were complete (15 Cavalier, 149 Centaur, and 22 Cromwell). Otherwise it was various I tanks.

 

 

Sorry, i think we are talking at cross purposes, and its my mistake. I was talking about what we had in 1944, not what we would have had in 1943. But yes, I dont disagree with any of that. From Fletcher I recall they spent most of 1943 debugging Cromwell.

[Markus Becker]

 

I'm not seeing the problem using Ram II against Pz.III/IV and very few Tigers. Ok, the HE capability could be better.

 

The Canadian 1st Army Tank Brigade (its principal user overseas) evaluation was not as kind as you.

 

"The general suitability of the RAM II does NOT meet the requirements of a first line operational tk. Its disadvantages are much more numerous than its advantages in comparison with the SHERMAN." They then noted the superiority of the 75mm over the 6-pdr (as then viewed) and noted the Sherman was "superior on rough going or hill climbing and better for general cross country work". It was easier and much less fatiguing tk to handle" than the RAM. The Sherman traverse mechanism was considered better and it was remarked that the visibility from the Sherman was "infinitely better than from a RAM". Finally, protection and crew access was considered better as well. (CMHQ 113, quoting letter 31 May 1943 from BG Wyman, CO 1st Canadian Tank Bde).

 

How did it compare to British tanks that were in service at the time?

[Stuart Galbraith]

Well as far as the 75mm gun, you could retrofit those into Churchill Tanks, as had been proven by the Mk4NA conversion using guns from the shermans destroyed in Kasserine pass. Im presuming the engine was an improvement (was that an American product?) but its a very tall machine compared to British tanks of that period. Well, other than Challenger anyway.

[glenn239]

 

 

Politics dictating operations was not a military strategy, it was FDR treating WW2 grand strategy like an election campaign.

 

 

I missed this earlier...you are treating WW2 grand strategy like a board game.

 

All military planning is a map exercise until it is executed for real. In this case, you're essentially saying that General Marshall didn't know what he was talking about with invading France in 1943, and that FDR was a better general for overruling him. I disagree. I think FDR was a political animal and when it came to strategy, he should have listened to his own general rather than the British, who had their own interests. When Marshall in 1942 said France in 1943, then FDR should have focused to make that happen rather than play politics with the British to make it not happen.

 

In terms of an invasion itself, the Germans could not possibly have prevented a bridgehead, (beach defenses in WW2 failed almost all the time), and Allied naval gunfire would have chopped up any counterattack. At best, the German army in France has contained the first landing. So the first invasion comes straight across the Channel and draws in the German reserves and airpower to a meatgrinder. The second and third invasions land on the Atlantic and Med coasts, the Germans have nothing to stop them, and the entire German position in France collapses west of the Belgian border. The U-boat war is over and Allied airpower is based right up on the German border by early 1944.

Edited July 16, 2019 by glenn239

[glenn239]

Rich Meanwhile, since TORCH apparently doesn't happen, that means that the requirement to occupy Vichy goes away, but also takes away some sunny southern French climes were various other divisions organized or reformed, such as 1. and 2. FJD, Guess they'll need to move north too.

 

 

If the Germans were to leave Vichy France intact it would be a catastrophe for the German defenses in France, because the Allied landings on the Southern French coast would be near to completely unopposed, the Vichy French forces would quickly see which way the wind was blowing and join the Allies, and Allies would have big ports - Toulon, Marsailles, etc. captured intact within days of landing. The Germans just lost the war.

 

Torch landed on November 8th. German forces reached the southern coast of France on November 11th. The reason why the reaction was so hair trigger was that the Germans understood that if the Allies got ashore in southern France, the war was over. So no, I sincerely doubt the Germans would have been dumb enough to forgo sending forces into Vichy, but the question remains whether the Allies could have defeated them in Southern France anyways - it would be a meeting engagement. Certainly, the Allied decision not to occupy Vichy Corsica in November when it was there for the taking should at least have been rectified.

 

Wait, don't tell me, let me guess; letting the Italians take Corsica in November 1942 was an act of Allied strategic genius? :^)

Edited July 16, 2019 by glenn239

[Rich]

All military planning is a map exercise until it is executed for real. In this case, you're essentially saying that General Marshall didn't know what he was talking about with invading France in 1943, and that FDR was a better general for overruling him. I disagree. I think FDR was a political animal and when it came to strategy, he should have listened to his own general rather than the British, who had their own interests. When Marshall in 1942 said France in 1943, then FDR should have focused to make that happen rather than play politics with the British to make it not happen.

 

 

In terms of an invasion itself, the Germans could not possibly have prevented a bridgehead, (beach defenses in WW2 failed almost all the time), and Allied naval gunfire would have chopped up any counterattack. At best, the German army in France has contained the first landing. So the first invasion comes straight across the Channel and draws in the German reserves and airpower to a meatgrinder. The second and third invasions land on the Atlantic and Med coasts, the Germans have nothing to stop them, and the entire German position in France collapses west of the Belgian border. The U-boat war is over and Allied airpower is based right up on the German border by early 1944.

 

 

No, I'm not saying anything of the sort. I'm saying you are a trolling war gamer seeking fodder for your fantasies. I'm not going to provide you with any source material for you to parade about your various fora as validation.

 

OPD did not execute a "map study", which is at the operational/tactical end of planning. They did a logistical outline to find what the troop and ship/craft requirements were. Marshall saw it as doable and convinced Roosevelt, who wanted offensive action ASAP that it was. However, its planning assumptions were infeasible in the time available. "Focusing more" on it was wishful thinking.

 

"Almost all the time" was a planning factor unknown to the Allies in April 1942. So was "the U-boat war is over". I can't think of better examples of hindsight bias.

[Rich]

Wait, don't tell me, let me guess; letting the Italians take Corsica in November 1942 was an act of Allied strategic genius? :^)

 

 

So now, TORCH is "ignoring" Tunisia, and instead landing in Algeria, French Morocco, the Spanish Balearic Islands, Corsica, and the Southern French coast? Didn't you forget about Sardinia? Why not Sicily as well? I know! Mont St. Michel! Walcheren! Texel! Borkum! Heligoland! Let's bring island hopping to Europe!

 

I bow to your superior trolling ability. Auf wiedersehen!

[Stuart Galbraith]

And Jersey! Dont forget Jersey!

[Delta tank 6]

 

Actually, there were very few Allied errors in strategy in WWII, 1942-45. The limited offensive in So Pacific, Torch and clearing No Africa gave the USN, Army/AAF much needed experience, Husky and the drive to seize Rome, the first Axis capital occupied; all were valid undertakings. The continuation of the offensive in N Italy was a likely error. Normandy and So France were required. Burma had to be saved to keep China active. Island-hopping the Central Pacific succeeded beyond estimates. That was about it. Remarkably few controversies. MacArthur avoided bogging in N Guinea and left the JA in self-managed POW camps, leaving a final feud about how to finish Japan, which had no way out in any case.

 

IMO, the order in the Pacific to victory was Marshalls, Marianas, Iwo Jima, Okinawa. Iwo Jima should have been taken off the hop even before the Marianas was secured - letting the IJA fortify it for 8 months afterwards cost nothing but Marine lives when the invasion was finally made. Okinawa also should have been done as quickly as possible in 1944. Everything else - including the Philippines/Luzon - was politics. Politics dictating operations was not a military strategy, it was FDR treating WW2 grand strategy like an election campaign.

https://history.army.mil/books/70-7_21.htm

 

Mike

[Markus Becker]

Well as far as the 75mm gun, you could retrofit those into Churchill Tanks, as had been proven by the Mk4NA conversion using guns from the shermans destroyed in Kasserine pass. Im presuming the engine was an improvement (was that an American product?) but its a very tall machine compared to British tanks of that period. Well, other than Challenger anyway.

 

In terms of ergonomics and mobilty. Not being as good as a Sherman in these regards doesn't mean the tanks is bad, just not as good as an excellent one.

[Stuart Galbraith]

 

Well as far as the 75mm gun, you could retrofit those into Churchill Tanks, as had been proven by the Mk4NA conversion using guns from the shermans destroyed in Kasserine pass. Im presuming the engine was an improvement (was that an American product?) but its a very tall machine compared to British tanks of that period. Well, other than Challenger anyway.

 

In terms of ergonomics and mobilty. Not being as good as a Sherman in these regards doesn't mean the tanks is bad, just not as good as an excellent one.

 

 

I dont disagree, but they made better infantry carriers.

[JWB]

 

Well as far as the 75mm gun, you could retrofit those into Churchill Tanks, as had been proven by the Mk4NA conversion using guns from the shermans destroyed in Kasserine pass. Im presuming the engine was an improvement (was that an American product?) but its a very tall machine compared to British tanks of that period. Well, other than Challenger anyway.

 

In terms of ergonomics and mobilty. Not being as good as a Sherman in these regards doesn't mean the tanks is bad, just not as good as an excellent one.

 

The excellent can be the enemy of the good enough. Which begs the question - would the 6pdr defeat the P3 and P4 armor?

[RETAC21]

Would it defeat the PaK which would be more common?