Why Bridge Too Far attempt was doomed

[PONGO_7409]

found this.

 

http://www.mod.uk/linked_files/aboutus/his...rket_garden.pdf

[bad-dice]

Are we having a UK Great - US Bad Day... ugh?

 

Just what input did Bradley have? M-G was 21st Army Group's show, and the 82nd and 101st were under 1st Allied Abn Army, not 12th AG.

 

If Monty ever had the intention of reversing the DZs of the Abn,  I think that it would somebody who clued him in onto the traffic patterns involved that 'kiboshed' it.

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I'm about half way through Monty's memoirs. I bought the book on the strength of an earlier posting in this thread. I dont normally like this sort of thing because they tend to be self serving explanations. I must say though these were much better than I expected, with very clear writing and a typical no nonsense logic.

 

I have of course skipped forward to the Arnhem section and this is put into the context of the overall campaign plan of which MG was only a part. He gives a glowing description of Ike's integrity and honesty and doesnt mention any other commanders but implies by referring to Chester Wilmot's "The Struggle for Europe" and Bradley's "A Soldiers Story" that they did not carry out Ike's orders regarding the change of emphasis in their advance and supply distribution that Ike ordered.

 

At the end of the section a sense of bitter frustration comes through in that although he made mistakes the operation should have still succeeded, and the troops were let down by the allied supreme command. Also, Ike thought the Germans had one big defensive battle left in them in the West and Monty wanted this to be defending the Ruhr and not as it turned out, a counter attack in the Ardennes.

 

A summary of the reasons he gives for failure:

 

1. The op was not regarded by allied supreme command as the main thrust (supplies).

 

2. The drop at Arnhem was too far away from the bridge. Monty takes the blame for this and says he should have ordered one complete parachute brigade dropped near to the bridge.

 

3. Weather, this worked against the programme from the second day. but this was a risk they had accepted.

 

4. II SS Pz Corps. Although he new of its positioning it was thought to be burned out and its performance was far greater than anticipated.

 

He also says he made another mistake in that he badly underestimated the the difficulties of opening up Antwerp and thought the Canadians could do it while 2nd Army went for the Ruhr.

 

He sums up by saying "In my own prejudiced view, that if the op had been properly backed from its inception, and given the aircraft, ground forces, and administrative resources necessary for the job, it would have succeeded in spite of my mistakes, or the adverse weather, or the presence of II SS in the Arnhem area.".

Edited January 31, 2006 by bad-dice

[KingSargent]

I'm about half way through Monty's memoirs. I bought the book on the strength of an earlier posting in this thread.

I know what you mean, I recently choked down AlanBrooke's War Diaries just to see if he came came off as less insufferable. He didn't. The horrors we put ourselves through to be Fair and Unpredjudiced....

 

He sums up by saying "In my own prejudiced view, that if the op had been properly backed from its inception, and given the aircraft, ground forces, and administrative resources necessary for the job, it would have succeeded in spite of my mistakes, or the adverse weather, or the presence of II SS in the Arnhem area.".

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What does he mean, properly backed? Did he want the whole NWE war effort to cease to pander to his brainstorm? Of course he did, why even a rhetorical question.... ? He got the Yank advances shut down so he could waste fuel. He got every transport plane available. The RAF had more, but the RAF was notoriously uncooperative and they never listened to SHAEF except at gunpoint. The RAF gave him the SNAFUed DZs. The RAF shorted number of drops - well that is abit unfair the One Drop Per Day was Brereton's decision; but I can't recall the RAF arguing in favor of sending more on Day One.

 

The lack of supplies was his own fault for screwing up clearing the Scheldte (kudos for admitting that), but I don't recall 30 Corps lacking anything except the traffic control organization to get them moved. He had a whole Army Group, where were ground forces necessary? There wasn't room to deploy and use all of 30 Corps. If admin resources were lacking they came (or didn't come) from his AG and UK Services.

 

What he means of course is that, "If I had been given full command over the entire NWE ground effort, I could have had everything I wanted and M-G would have worked."

[Brad Sallows]

>What does he mean, properly backed? Did he want the whole NWE war effort to cease to pander to his brainstorm?

 

In effect, that was the administrative commitment he thought he had from Ike.

[DKTanker]

A summary of the reasons he gives for failure:

 

1. The op was not regarded by allied supreme command as the main thrust (supplies).

 

2. The drop at Arnhem was too far away from the bridge. Monty takes the blame for this and says he should have ordered one complete parachute brigade dropped near to the bridge.

 

3. Weather, this worked against the programme from the second day. but this was a risk they had accepted.

 

4. II SS Pz Corps. Although he new of its positioning it was thought to be burned out and its performance was far greater than anticipated.

 

He also says he made another mistake in that he badly underestimated the the difficulties of opening up Antwerp and thought the Canadians could do it while 2nd Army went for the Ruhr.

 

He sums up by saying "In my own prejudiced view, that if the op had been properly backed from its inception, and given the aircraft, ground forces, and administrative resources necessary for the job, it would have succeeded in spite of my mistakes, or the adverse weather, or the presence of II SS in the Arnhem area.".

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I think it illustrative that Monty denies that his mistakes, items 2, 3, 4, and not clearing Antwerp, are meaningless but the entire failure was because he didn't have enough supplies. HELLO, so much did Monty have at his disposal he couldn't move it all if he wanted to. Seems to me that Monty's admitted mistakes are exactly those issues that keep popping up in this thread. Odd, a lack of supplies has been mentioned once, by Monty's memoirs.

[Kit Hildreth]

Kit,

 

Yes, it is an excellent read and I would highly recommend it.  What is readily apparent is that part of Roberts' success is the consequence of his logistical and staff experience at a relatively junior level (Captain/Major) and not just his frontline combat experience.

 

My only caveat is that occasionally he comes across as a little priggish.  He is, however, honest about his mistakes and refreshingly self-critical.  Also he writes well and it is a pleasure to read.

 

Best regards

 

Tom

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Tom,

Yes, as I recall from "The Tanks" #2 plus talking to some RTR seniors as a fresh-faced sprog , most of Pip's experience was staff wallahing, and he had a knack of being in the right place at the right time when needed, to pick up the plums! But once he got there, few could match him. Quietly effective sums him up I'd wager. Certainly someone one well worth emulating I used to think. Only sad I never got to meet him, but he of course was long gone by my time. As for the priggish bit, well most public schoolboys - and I believe he was:St Pauls, Winchester, I'm not sure... - were like that, my own Dad included! Hurry up Amazon!

regards

Kit

[Kit Hildreth]

The problem with this (widely-held) view is that when you look at the primary sources - war diaries, operations orders etc it is quite difficult to find evidence for Gds AD being "lackadasical" in Operation Garden.  They were certainly willing to take casualties, even in prosecuting tactically disadvantageous attacks (for example the advance by the Irish Gds BG up the main Nijmegen - Arnhem road, despite its obvious tactical drawbacks).  I would agree that they were less tactically flexible than 11 AD and less inclined to ignore the book but that's about it.  Again it's useful to leave the last word to 'Pip' Roberts who wrote that:

I think BillB made that point rather than me about Horrocks and I think it is a good one.  Horrocks, himself, admits that he could have been more energetic in the prosecution of the battle with the benefit of hindsight.  This rather confirms my general hypothesis that the fault for the failure of Operation Garden lay more with XXX Corps & above than with Gds AD or the other divisional units.  Having said that I would still note that Horrocks made every effort to get around the battlefield and did apply personal leadership wherever necessary.  Even at sub-par performance he was still one of the best British Corps commanders in 2nd Army.

 

Best regards

 

Tom

 

 

Actually the lackadasical refers mainly to the jump off. Obviously Corps did the major planning, but to jump off in mid-afternoon and then stop at dusk...on a single road  facing an alert - if initially weak enemy...with time being of the essence and the effect of any delay on a single road advance. Well, I'm no military genius, but the earlier start the better. They should have been off before first light. The units involved should have insisted upon it too. Despite my prejudice I never doubted the "Parade Ground ponces" bravery or get up and go, for that matter. But one is left with the impression of little real sense of urgency considering the criteria under which they were to be fighting: a sixty plus mile advance on a single road where one road block with one skillfully sited 88 could wreak havoc etc, etc, ICGO&O to quote an old Tanker's inmate! Granted however, my reading is nowhere near as extensive as yours on the subject and is pretty out of date and limited to the general reading material: last thing I read on the subject was Kershaw's "It never rains in September" and it was clear the German's won the Battle; the Allies didn't lose it. The fact that General Christiansen had totally reorganised all ground forces in Holland such that if not in place, they were certainly on the way. That IISS Pz Kps reacted so swiftly to a complete surprise attack...more of course, but my feeling is if the Allies had done just a wee bit more on the ground beforehand they would have grasped the extent of the German recovery and made plans accordingly rather than going on wishful thinking and that ever-dangerous posture of underestimating their opponent. I would have that thought that 4 years fighting the Germans would have made it sink-in that one always had to be ready to fight hard against them no matter how on the ropes they appeared to be. But perhaps it was a matter of everyone being taken by surprise with "The great swan" and losing that edge that the vicious fighting in Normandy had created; a slackening of the guard as it were. Market Garden was hasty in the planning, but the whole op still came at least a week late. If the Germans weren't taken on the run, they wouldn't be at all. The examples illustrating this - particularly in Russia, are legion. I can only echo your sentiments about"Jorrocks"; certainly up with the best of the Br. Corps Commanders, although Dick O'Connor remains my preference for the #1 spot,

regards

Kit

 

 

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[JohnB]

Are we having a UK Great - US Bad Day... ugh?

 

Eh? By pencilling in the U.S. 82nd Airborne for Arnhem that is recognition that they were a more capable division than British 1st Airborne.

 

Just what input did Bradley have? M-G was 21st Army Group's show, and the 82nd and 101st were under 1st Allied Abn Army, not 12th AG.

 

Although not under his command I think Bradley made it clear he'd rather not have American troops doing the most dangerous job in what was mostly a British Operation. Monty as his sensitive self acquiesced.

[JohnB]

What does he mean, properly backed? Did he want the whole NWE war effort to cease to pander to his brainstorm? Of course he did, why even a rhetorical question.... ? He got the Yank advances shut down so he could waste fuel.

 

He means, again, US Third Army shut-down and all US resources given to US 1st Army. Take a look at a map, in hindsight, the most obvious priority should have been getting US XIX Corps to smash a way through Sittard-Roermond - it's something they had to do 5 months later anyway.

 

What he means of course is that, "If I had been given full command over the entire NWE ground effort, I could have had everything I wanted and M-G would have worked."

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Yep, and the war would have ended sooner

[bad-dice]

... What does he mean, properly backed? Did he want the whole NWE war effort to cease to pander to his brainstorm? Of course he did, why even a rhetorical question.... ? He got the Yank advances shut down so he could waste fuel. He got every transport plane available. The RAF had more, but the RAF was notoriously uncooperative and they never listened to SHAEF except at gunpoint. The RAF gave him the SNAFUed DZs. The RAF shorted number of drops - well that is abit unfair the One Drop Per Day was Brereton's decision; but I can't recall the RAF arguing in favor of sending more on Day One.

 

The lack of supplies was his own fault for screwing up clearing the Scheldte (kudos for admitting that), but I don't recall 30 Corps lacking anything except the traffic control organization to get them moved. He had a whole Army Group, where were ground forces necessary? There wasn't room to deploy and use all of 30 Corps. If admin resources were lacking they came (or didn't come) from his AG and UK Services.

 

What he means of course is that, "If I had been given full command over the entire NWE ground effort, I could have had everything I wanted and M-G would have worked."

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I think the answer is in Chester Wilmot who covers the supply arguments pretty thoroughly.

 

1. All the armies were still being supplied from Normandy mainly by road but with some assistance by air. In the pursuit phase after Normandy supplies could be mainly POL as ammo was not needed in large amounts until the Germans re-established a front that needed ammo to break. Even with that proviso there was not enough POL to keep every corps moving. Bradley had the impossible task of supplying 3rd army, 1st army and feeding Paris. 1st U.S. army was strung between 2nd British and 3rd U.S. and as these two diverged he had to lean 1st U.S. towards one of them. He chose the 3rd where as Monty was told by Ike (or so Monty believed) he would lean towards 2nd British.

 

2. To nourish XXX and XII corps advance from the Seine, VIII corps had been grounded at the Seine. For the advance to Arnhem the VIII corps would be brought forward so that together with XII corps they could drive forward on the flanks of XXX corps to stop by their own advance the German units that if not pressed would be used to attack the flanks of the deep corridor MG created. There were not supplies or transport to do this by the 17th therefore MG would have to be delayed until 23rd Sept. Bedell Smith (Ike's CoS) promised to divert supplies by air and road to enable this to happen. However having on the strength of this committed to a 17th Sept start for MG there was not sufficient supplies to get VIII corps forward in time and it didn’t join in until the 19th and then only with one division. In addition XII corps was unable in the build up period from the 10th to the 17th to secure more than one bridgehead over the M-E Canal so was limited in the force it could apply on its flank.

 

The bottom line is the flanking corps could not exert enough pressure along the flanks of the XXX corps corridor through lack of supplies, therefore allowing flanking German forces to keep cutting the single road.

Edited January 31, 2006 by bad-dice

[KingSargent]

Eh? By pencilling in the U.S. 82nd Airborne for Arnhem that is recognition that they were a more capable division than British 1st Airborne. No, I was referring to the knee-jerk "Monty wanted to do it right but was prevented by a dumb Yank."

In any case, much of 1st Abn's "incapability' was sheer lack of resources, and that could have been fixed by sh!t-canning Brereton.

 

Although not under his command I think Bradley made it clear he'd rather not have American troops doing the most dangerous job in what was mostly a British Operation. Monty as his sensitive self acquiesced. Source please. I'd like to see proof that Bradley was even consulted. The op certainly was nowhere in his command authority.

 

In any case, the DZs were directly linked to traffic patterns during approach flights from England. Swapping the 1st and 82nds' DZs could have resulted in massive mid-air collisions.

[KingSargent]

He means, again, US Third Army shut-down and all US resources given to US 1st Army. All of which would have resulted in no advance by either 1st or 3rd Armies, which is essentially what happened. If there was a supply problem the guy to shoot was JHC Lee, whose supply expenditures to move himself and his HQ to Paris could have fuelled practically everybody.

Take a look at a map, in hindsight, the most obvious priority should have been getting US XIX Corps to smash a way through Sittard-Roermond - it's something they had to do 5 months later anyway. There is a good point here. It is qute true that 3rd Army's advance was going nowhere immediately fatal to the Third Reich. I have long averred that Patton should have been on 21st AG's flank instead of haring off towards Metz and environs.

 

Yep, and the war would have ended sooner

And you believe in the Easter Bunny as well? Had Monty been in overall charge the Falais Gap would still be open.

[RETAC21]

Eh? By pencilling in the U.S. 82nd Airborne for Arnhem that is recognition that they were a more capable division than British 1st Airborne. No, I was referring to the knee-jerk "Monty wanted to do it right but was prevented by a dumb Yank."

In any case, much of 1st Abn's "incapability' was sheer lack of resources, and that could have been fixed by sh!t-canning Brereton.

 

Although not under his command I think Bradley made it clear he'd rather not have American troops doing the most dangerous job in what was mostly a British Operation. Monty as his sensitive self acquiesced. Source please. I'd like to see proof that Bradley was even consulted. The op certainly was nowhere in his command authority.

 

In any case, the DZs were directly linked to traffic patterns during approach flights from England. Swapping the 1st and 82nds' DZs could have resulted in massive mid-air collisions.

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Hey, King, this is the second time you have commented on traffic patterns, but in this case it could have been solved by having the streams flying at different altitudes.

[KingSargent]

I think the answer is in Chester Wilmot who covers the supply arguments pretty thoroughly.

 

1. All the armies were still being supplied from Normandy mainly by road but with some assistance by air. In the pursuit phase after Normandy supplies could be mainly POL as ammo was not needed in large amounts until the Germans re-established a front that needed ammo to break. Even with that proviso there was not enough POL to keep every corps moving. Bradley had the impossible task of supplying 3rd army, 1st army and feeding Paris. 1st U.S. army was strung between 2nd British and 3rd U.S. and as these two diverged he had to lean 1st U.S. towards one of them. He chose the 3rd where as Monty was told by Ike (or so Monty believed) he would lean towards 2nd British.

 

2. To nourish XXX and XII corps advance from the Seine, VIII corps had been grounded at the Seine. For the advance to Arnhem the VIII corps would be brought forward so that together with XII corps they could drive forward on the flanks of XXX corps to stop by their own advance the German units that if not pressed would be used to attack the flanks of the deep corridor MG created.  There were not supplies or transport to do this by the 17th therefore MG would have to be delayed until 23rd Sept. Bedell Smith (Ike's CoS) promised to divert supplies by air and road to enable this to happen. However having on the strength of this committed to a 17th Sept start for MG there was not sufficient supplies to get VIII corps forward in time and it didn’t join in until the 19th and then only with one division. In addition XII corps was unable in the build up period from the 10th to the 17th to secure more than one bridgehead over the M-E Canal so was limited in the force it could apply on its flank.

 

The bottom line is the flanking corps could not exert enough pressure along the flanks of the XXX corps corridor through lack of supplies, therefore allowing flanking German forces to keep cutting the single road. 

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And Bedell Smith was going to get all the supplies in the ETO diverted to Monty by air, was he? So what were the parachutists supposed to ride in, come M-G Day?

 

As for transport to move it all forward, perhaps if CW truck makers had learned to make truck engines that worked reliably, 21st AG could have moved its own supplies, AND moved VIII Corps.

 

Oh pardon me, I forgot the OSS missions to put sugar in the CW gas tanks. OF COURSE it was America's fault...

[KingSargent]

Hey, King, this is the second time you have commented on traffic patterns, but in this case it could have been solved by having the streams flying at different altitudes.

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And what altitude were they supposed to climb to, and when? The approach wasn't that long and the transports would have had to descend back down to drop height. A laden C-47 (or glider tug) doesn't climb that fast and the pilots were thought to lack skills in formation flying and navigation. Climbing and course deviation would have burned more fuel, resulting in lesser payloads. And besides the transports themselves there were flak-suppression CAS a/c milling around as well.

 

Just take a look at the photos and films of the planes flling the sky going to M-G and tell me they had room for fancy flying.

 

The 8thAAF had vertical room to stagger its Divisions, they didn't cross courses, and they had mid-air collisions. They were supposedly better trained than the transport guys.

[bad-dice]

And Bedell Smith was going to get all the supplies in the ETO diverted to Monty by air, was he? So what were the parachutists supposed to ride in, come M-G Day?

An extra 1000 tons per day by road or air. A division needed approx 400 a day. Since the Seine supplies to second army were cut from 16000 tons a day to 7000.

As for transport to move it all forward, perhaps if CW truck makers had learned to make truck engines that worked reliably, 21st AG could have moved its own supplies, AND moved VIII Corps.

1, 400 Brit 3-tonners and their replacement engines were found to be useless because of faulty pistons. These trucks could have lifted about 800 tons a day, enough for 2 divs. The mitigation for this was to reduce the daily supply to 1st Canadian, bring in fresh truck from Britain, and other expedients such as welding strips of airfield track to the side of tank transporters.

Oh pardon me, I forgot the OSS missions to put sugar in the CW gas tanks. OF COURSE it was America's fault...  

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What? If you say so

Edited January 31, 2006 by bad-dice

[RETAC21]

And what altitude were they supposed to climb to, and when? The approach wasn't that long and the transports would have had to descend back down to drop height. A laden C-47 (or glider tug) doesn't climb that fast and the pilots were thought to lack skills in formation flying and navigation. Climbing and course deviation would have burned more fuel, resulting in lesser payloads. And besides the transports themselves there were flak-suppression CAS a/c milling around as well.

 

Just take a look at the photos and films of the planes flling the sky going to M-G and tell me they had room for fancy flying.

 

The 8thAAF had vertical room to stagger its Divisions, they didn't cross courses, and they had mid-air collisions. They were supposedly better trained than the transport guys.

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Yeah, but you don't need to do the crossover in the DZ, it could be done over the Channel by assigning differing heights, and you won't miss that photos are over the DZs or while assembling, i.e., points in which inevitably there are a lot of aircraft in the same airspace, yet the possibility of a collision was statistically negligible.

[KingSargent]

Yeah, but you don't need to do the crossover in the DZ, it could be done over the Channel by assigning differing heights, and you won't miss that photos are over the DZs or while assembling, i.e., points in which inevitably there are a lot of aircraft in the same airspace, yet the possibility of a collision was statistically negligible.

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My whole point is that the Channel isn't that wide, nor is the run to the coast in Blighty, nor from Dutch coast to DZs.

 

The possibility of collision was statistically negligible because all the planes were flying at fixed altitiudes and on the same courses. They were not bobbing up and down and crossing courses.

[JohnB]

Yep, and the war would have ended sooner

And you believe in the Easter Bunny as well? Had Monty been in overall charge the Falais Gap would still be open.

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Monty was in overall charge ground forces until 1st September.

 

If successful Market Garden would not have prolonged the war ergo ...

 

Source please. I'd like to see proof that Bradley was even consulted

 

What he doesn't mention it in 'A Soldier's Story'?

[KingSargent]

Monty was in overall charge ground forces until 1st September.

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Yes, and during that time how many unsuccessful offensives were launched for how little gain? Why didn't he close the Falaise Gap? Was he sulking about not being Head Cheese anymore? US troops could have closed the gap, but stopped where they were told instead of advancing to meet 21st AG.

 

BTW, I read Soldier's Story so long ago that most of it escapes me.

[baboon6]

The direct responsibility for closing the Falaise gap lay with 2 Cdn Corps and more specifically the Polish and Canadian armoured divisions. Apparently the Poles played or even over-played their part, advancing too far without support. 4 Cdn Armoured Div had some serious problems (including losing a Brigadier and part of his Tac HQ), but significantly Guy Simonds sacked the GOC (George Kitching, a protege of his- I'm not sure Simonds had friends) straight afterwards.

 

This is not an attack on the Canucks- Simonds was probably the best corps commander in 21st Army Group, and the Canadian troops were as good as any.

[Rickshaw]

And what altitude were they supposed to climb to, and when? The approach wasn't that long and the transports would have had to descend back down to drop height. A laden C-47 (or glider tug) doesn't climb that fast and the pilots were thought to lack skills in formation flying and navigation. Climbing and course deviation would have burned more fuel, resulting in lesser payloads. And besides the transports themselves there were flak-suppression CAS a/c milling around as well.

 

Just take a look at the photos and films of the planes flling the sky going to M-G and tell me they had room for fancy flying.

 

The 8thAAF had vertical room to stagger its Divisions, they didn't cross courses, and they had mid-air collisions. They were supposedly better trained than the transport guys.

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Actually, I think with a little imagination the problem could have been overcome - dogleg courses with altitude differences would have allowed streams to cross without too many problems. Using radar control, fighters to act as guides and formation leaders, etc. would cut down on confusion.

[KingSargent]

Actually, I think with a little imagination the problem could have been overcome - dogleg courses with altitude differences would have allowed streams to cross without too many problems. Using radar control,  fighters to act as guides and formation leaders, etc. would cut down on confusion.

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I doubt it would be as simple as you think (in fact, I know it wouldn't), but why even bother?

 

The solution was to remove Brereton and fly two lifts on Day One. All the problems stemmed from the "My pilots will get TIIIIRED flying more than one lift" whining of Brereton.

 

For those who like to game things out, just put in two lifts on Day 1 and watch the Germans fall apart. If you really like onesided games, fly the 52nd ID into Arnhem on Day 2.

[Rickshaw]

I agree that Brererton was one of the problem players in the mix. Remove him and "Boy" and you get rid of two of the worst problems facing the Allies.

 

I've been wondering about the problems besetting XXX Corps and their advance after Nijmergan. I've always believed that Monty stepped too far outside his normal careful and meticulous planning with its associated massive application of firepower. What he should have done was use Bomber Command to bomb 1-2 ,000 metres each side of the road, using a mix of parafrag and smoke bombs on a continious shuttle basis. It would have disrupted any German defences and obscured XXX Corps as they made their dash up the road - provided they could make a dash.

[Kit Hildreth]

I agree that Brererton was one of the problem players in the mix. Remove him and "Boy" and you get rid of two of the worst problems facing the Allies.

 

I've been wondering about the problems besetting XXX Corps and their advance after Nijmergan. I've always believed that Monty stepped too far outside his normal careful and meticulous planning with its associated massive application of firepower.  What he should have done was use Bomber Command to bomb 1-2 ,000 metres each side of the road, using a mix of parafrag and smoke bombs on a continious shuttle basis.  It would have disrupted any German defences and obscured XXX Corps as they made their dash up the road - provided they could make a dash.

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Would have made a nice mess of the GdsAD forward elements too! 1-2000 meters? that would not have done much to the Dutch polders let me tell you! In any case, Blue on Blue was always a risk when bombers supported an opening offensive. I hate to say this but the USAF might have done a better job: certainly in the accuracy stakes from what I gather. Hull down, battening down hatches In any case, smoke always heralds an op and the Germans were past masters of pulling back at the psychological moment to re-emerge in the rear...