Why Bridge Too Far attempt was doomed

[Geoff Winnington-Ball]

[edited to add: F*ck knows what's up with the quote function here, had three goes and still no joy!  ]

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Use capital letters in your quote code. For some reason the system wants them.

[BillB]

Use capital letters in your quote code. For some reason the system wants them.

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Really? Thanks Geoff, I'll try that next time. Not had a problem with lower case before though, as I recall.

 

all the best

 

BillB

[Conall]

King,

 

Rather than repeat all your previous material I've just selected what I consider to be germane to the debate (I hope none of it appears to be taken out of context - please feel free to step in if that is the case and correct me).

 

It SHOULDN'T have been, but it WAS! You are THE authority here, but I don't recall anything in writing (including yours) that says that 30 Corps was ever told to modify long-standing SOP and run up roads at night in the presence of an invisible enemy. A TC sticking his had out of a hatch has one Helluvalot less chance of seeing an AT gun concealed in woods than the AT gunner has of seeing a tank on a road he has already zeroed in...

 

I think you are missing the point here - XXX Corps specifically issued orders (see ref in earlier post) that ops at night should not take place under any circumstances during Operation Garden rather than it being the other way around as you suggest. Under more usual conditions it was recognised that under certain circumstances a commander could use his discretion and continue operations at night. Furthermore such an order could come from Corps level (see below).

 

Why not? I find no instances in the previous four years where anybody except Commandos and Paras DIDN'T "knock off after dark"...

[snip]

Yes, there was TOTALIZE and other night ops previously, but none of them expected things to keep running for a 60-mile advance. My point is that GARDEN was something totally new, was sprung on combat-weary troops at virtually the last minute, and that there just wasn't time to set up procedures that would make a 24-hour advance possible.

 

Unfortunately you are wrong on both accounts here. In just the previous three weeks prior to Operation Market Garden there are several examples of British Armour being ordered to operate at night (not just moving up to the front but actually conducting combat operations) as entire formations (rather than just single tanks/troops/squadrons - not at all unusual as Bill pointed out). On the night of the 30th/31st August 11th Armoured Division was ordered directly by General Horrocks to seize Amiens in a night advance (in the course of which they surprised and captured General Eberbach, who was recceing defensive positions along the Somme). This was as part of a 50 mile advance; after having seized the Somme bridgehead they were immediately ordered to advance a similar distance into Belgium towards Antwerp. On both days this was indeed sprung on combat-weary troops at the last minute (on the 30th August they had already stopped for the night and begun routine maintenance, refuelling, rearming etc) and by rapidly bringing up their logistical elements they were able to make a subsequent 36 hour advance. In addition Guards Armoured and their attached formation recce unit, 2 HCR also operated at night not only to seize the Somme crossings but also in the first days of September in their advance to Brussels.

 

As an example to show that these were not one-off instances it is also worth noting that on the night of 3rd/4th September 15/19 HRH (part of 11th Armoured Division) were ordered to continue operations during the night to advance from Lille to the river Escaut at Oudenarde - a 50 mile move at night in combat conditions. 15/19 KRH then refueled/rearmed in the morning (when A Echelon caught up with them - having at one point overtaken the tanks during the night!) and pushed forward to Alost and Malines, the latter of which they reached in the dark on the night of the 4th/5th Sept. Finally, Brian Horrocks notes on page 74 of his book, Corps Commander: "This was the third time [as commander of XXX Corps] I had employed armoured troops at night and, strange as it may seem, each operation had been completely successful."

 

Yes it happened, but it was unusual and as you say, apparently unwelcome. To expand a few lower-echelon level instances into suggesting that a whole Corps with limited operational planning time could do it on the fly is IMHO unreasonable

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Again this is incorrect. The two separate night operations on the 30th/31st August (11 AD on the one hand & 2 HCR/Gds AD on the other) were a corps operation, instigated and planned by XXX Corps HQ to exploit the very fluid situation. The reason they were able to do this is that General Horrocks was commanding XXX Corps out of an artillery observation tank with a skeleton staff (plus an escort of three ordinary tanks) and was therefore right up with his lead elements - in true Blitzkrieg style. In addition both XXX Corps and the units involved (11 AD, Gds AD & 2 HCR) were able to bring up their logistical elements immediately behind the lead units, rearming/refuelling at dusk allowing an immediate night advance. They then followed the teeth units during the night and were able to resupply them the following morning once the Somme crossings were seized.

 

Unfortunately your hypothesis that it was unreasonable for a Corps to initiate night operation is quite incorrect and flatly contradicted by the events of late August/early Sept, which I have laid out above.

 

As to why XXX Corps didn't repeat this during Operation Garden is, I think, down to logistical constraints rather than a lack of desire. There simply wasn't space on the single axis to allow the movement of the point units' supply echelons so closely behind the tanks/infantry. I suspect that XXX Corps didn't wish to disrupt the very tightly scheduled movement of the remainder of the Corps (43 Div etc) taking place along the road behind the frontline.

 

Primary Sources:

WO 171/340 XXX Corps War diary, G., Aug 1944

WO 171/341 XXX Corps War diary, G., Sept 1944

WO 171/376 Guards Armoured Division War Diary, G., Jan-Sept 1944

WO 171/456 11 Armoured Division War Dairy, G., Jan-Dec 1944

WO 171/840 Royals War Diary 1944-45

WO 171/846 15/19 KRH War diary 1944-45

WO 171/852 2 F.F. Yeo War diary 1944-45

WO 171/866 3 R. Tks. War Diary 1944-45

[note I have the unfair advantage of living about 5 miles away from the National Archive in Kew - formerly known as the Public Records Office ]

 

Secondary Sources (abridged format):

Corps Commander, Sir Brian Horrocks

From the Desert to the Baltic, Major-General G.P.B. Roberts

The Story of the Guards Armoured Division, Captain, the Earl of Rosse & Colonel E.R. Hill

The History of 15/19 King's Royal Hussars 1939-45, Major G. Courage

The Household Cavalry at War, Roden Orde

 

Hope that helps. Will get back to you and Bill re 82nd Airborne once I've had the chance to do a bit more reading this weekend. Have been on the road (New York & Montreal) for the past week or so and today have just dispatched my girlfriend on holiday with her parents so I finally have some time to myself and the opportunity to do some research uninterrupted

 

Best regards

 

Tom

 

edited for spelling/clarity

Edited January 28, 2006 by Conall

[Colin Williams]

As to why XXX Corps didn't repeat this during Operation Garden is, I think, down to logistical constraints rather than a lack of desire.  There simply wasn't space on the single axis to allow the movement of the point units' supply echelons so closely behind the tanks/infantry.  I suspect that XXX Corps didn't wish to disrupt the very tightly scheduled movement of the remainder of the Corps (43 Div etc) taking place along the road behind the frontline.

 

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I think there is some truth here. As Conall's examples highlight, XXX Corps was well-versed in night ops, but the British Army as a whole, and desert veterans in particular such as Horrocks and his BGS Pyman, had learned since El Alamein that night attacks were not a cure-all and could go badly awry. Niall Barr has this quote from the 51st Highland Division after Sicily -

 

"Ever since El Alamein we have been very night attack minded - in fact, we have very seldom even thought of attacks except in terms of night attack. The reasons for this are obvious - El Alamein was probably the biggest night attack ever carried out: it was a great success: therefore night attack stock went very high. It is equally obvious however that there were very special conditions and considerations at El Alamein which do not exist now and are never likely to exist again."

 

Although the British continued to use night attacks and "Monty's moonlight", it's clear that by 1944 the experienced operational planners had a complete understanding of the potential advantages and disadvantages of attacking at night. I expect the reasons Conall suggests, along with issues regarding the loss of tactical air support, the peculiar nature of a constricted advance up a single road, the difficulty of street fighting at night in a place like Eindhoven, concerns about friendly fire incidents with the airborne forces, and the desire to limit losses in the Guards Armoured Division so it would retain fighting strength for Arnhem and Appeldorn (a recognition that mistakes during a nightime advance could decimate a battle group), all could have contributed to the decision to rule out night attacks.

[KingSargent]

"With a bit of forward planning there is no reason why they couldn't have maintained their tempo *and* worked their reliefs and maintenance in and kept at least some forward movement while it was dark, even if only with infantry."

 

Bill, my whole argument is that there WASN'T TIME for "a bit of forward planning" for 30 Corps at GARDEN. I agree that there should have been some plans (contingency sketch plans of long standing in Divisional SOP at least - didn't anybody THINK during the years of Calloused Assdom in Blighty?), but apparently there weren't. To MY mind, the 'slack time' is when you think about and make provision for all the possibilities that may occur during times of NON-SLACK. The Brit Army apparently didn't do this (nor did anyone else {as in Yankees} AFAIK).

[Kit Hildreth]

Fair comment, altho I'd argue that the Germans were merely acting within their normal operational standards rather than outside them. They had practised mission tactics rather than order tactics for a long time, and they also went out of their way to inculcate initiative and operational flexibilty. MG was just a particularly suitable environment for that operational method, and I think the Waffen SS deserve the lion's share of the credit.  I'm not all that familiar with the Eastern Front but I suspect there are a fair few examples of this kind of reaction out there.

 

all the best

 

BillB

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In fact Bill, it was just such an SOP that kept the Germans in Russia - not just the W-SS - AT ALL. Also the two divisions involved here: 9th & 10th SS, had performed a similar miracle @ Tarnopol in April'44( before Bagration kicked off and wiped the floor with what was left of the Wehrmacht) and restored a previous disaster inthe Korsun/Cherkassy pocket where the Germans were in a similar position to 2 Para at Arnhem ironically, but on a much larger scale. With much the same results I might add! Interesting to note that virtually all the elite Panzer Units of both the Heer & W-SS were then transferred to the West after the Tarnopol op. The difference thereafter being I think, that the W-SS never recovered from Normandy; their very poor showing in the Ardennes proving them a spent force on a large scale at least. Nvertheless, a lot of people tend to forget that the condition of the two W-SS formations at Arnhem would have - in the British army at least - rendered them ripe for disbandment as viable fighting divisions, which makes their performance all the more remarkable. Even more so that they looked upon the boys of 2 Para as great heroes: which of course they were indeed.

[Kit Hildreth]

"With a bit of forward planning there is no reason why they couldn't have maintained their tempo *and* worked their reliefs and maintenance in and kept at least some forward movement while it was dark, even if only with infantry."

 

Bill, my whole argument is that there WASN'T TIME for "a bit of forward planning" for 30 Corps at GARDEN. I agree that there should have been some plans (contingency sketch plans of long standing in Divisional SOP at least - didn't anybody THINK during the years of Calloused Assdom in Blighty?), but apparently there weren't. To MY mind, the 'slack time' is when you think about and make provision for all the possibilities that may occur during times of NON-SLACK. The Brit Army apparently didn't do this (nor did anyone else {as in Yankees} AFAIK).

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Good point King. Which brings up two things: b)Monty had NO experience at anything other than elaborate involved set-piece attacks with all the trimmings. b)When it came to in-field planning few were better at it in the British Army than Pip Roberts. It was such a pity he retired from the British Army to be with his family. Would have made a magnificent C.I.G.S. Not, being Pip, that anyone would have realised it until long afterwards...

[Conall]

"With a bit of forward planning there is no reason why they couldn't have maintained their tempo *and* worked their reliefs and maintenance in and kept at least some forward movement while it was dark, even if only with infantry."

 

Bill, my whole argument is that there WASN'T TIME for "a bit of forward planning" for 30 Corps at GARDEN. I agree that there should have been some plans (contingency sketch plans of long standing in Divisional SOP at least - didn't anybody THINK during the years of Calloused Assdom in Blighty?), but apparently there weren't. To MY mind, the 'slack time' is when you think about and make provision for all the possibilities that may occur during times of NON-SLACK. The Brit Army apparently didn't do this (nor did anyone else {as in Yankees} AFAIK).

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King,

 

I don't think your argument that there wasn't time holds water as XXX Corps and 11th Armoured Division had shown itself capable of conducting night ops at very short notice just three weeks before Operation Garden in the advance on Amiens on the night of the 30th/31st August. It's worth quoting at length from Roberts' memoirs to illustrate the degree of short notice and what was needed to be reorganised:

It was the afternoon of 30th August, and I got a signal that General Horrocks was on his way to see me.  He arrived at 1615 hours at a little village called St Germer; at that time our leading troops were 30 miles from Amiens and the burden of General Horrocks' visiy was that we should carry out a night march and take Amiens at dawn.  That sounds simple and straightforward, but there were problems.  First of all, if we have to take a large town like Amiens we must have infantry easily available; so the grouping of the brigades must be altered.  And then there was the question of petrol; there must be enough that we could get there and fight a battle.

 

The RASC echelons were some 50 miles back for they were drawing their supplies from west of the River Seine, but a special column of petrol lorries was ordered to be organised and moved as soon as possible.  In the meantime, having hastily summoned a conference, I ordered that the advance would continue at once and that we would continue until last light, when we would replenish and start again when the moon was well up, which was about 2300 hours.  At that moment it was a lovely fine warm evening and the moon was just nearing its fullness [note it was actually cloud and rained that night, so conditions were far from ideal].

 

Adjustments had to be made to the brigade organisation.  Instead of the armoured brigade leading on both routes with the infantry brigade following, brigades would be organised as follows: on the right route, which would be the main road from Crevecour to Amiens, would be 29 Amoured Brigade in the following order: 3rd Royal Tanks, 8th Rifle Brigade, 29th Armoured Brigade HQ, 13th RHA, 23rd Hussars, 4 KSLI, Main Division HQ, Medium Battery RA.  The left hand route was a winding country road through Conty and Taisnil to Amiens and on this route would be 2nd Fife and Forfar Yeomanry, 3rd Monmouths, HQ 159th Infantry Brigade, Ayrshire Yeomanry RA, 15.19th Hussars, 1st Herefords.  The leading troops on both routes would start moving at once, and adjustments in organisation would take place as the advance continued.  Pages 201-2, From the Desert to the Baltic, Major-General G.P.B. Roberts

 

This rather seems to contradict your assertion and suggests that not only was there the experience of night ops and what they required in the British Army (acquired from both previous experience and also training - see David French's Raising Churchill's Army and Timothy Harrison's Military Training in the British Army, 1940-1944) but also the ability to do so during times of "Non-slack". You're flogging a dead horse here. If you must continue digging, at least dig the poor nag a grave and let it rest in peace

 

All the best (tongue wedged firmly in cheek )

 

Tom

[Kit Hildreth]

I think there is some truth here. As Conall's examples highlight, XXX Corps was well-versed in night ops, but the British Army as a whole, and desert veterans in particular such as Horrocks and his BGS Pyman, had learned since El Alamein that night attacks were not a cure-all and could go badly awry. Niall Barr has this quote from the 51st Highland Division after Sicily -

 

"Ever since El Alamein we have been very night attack minded - in fact, we have very seldom even thought of attacks except in terms of night attack. The reasons for this are obvious - El Alamein was probably the biggest night attack ever carried out: it was a great success: therefore night attack stock went very high. It is equally obvious however that there were very special conditions and considerations at El Alamein which do not exist now and are never likely to exist again."

 

Although the British continued to use night attacks and "Monty's moonlight", it's clear that by 1944 the experienced operational planners had a complete understanding of the potential advantages and disadvantages of attacking at night. I expect the reasons Conall suggests, along with issues regarding the loss of tactical air support, the peculiar nature of a constricted advance up a single road, the difficulty of street fighting at night in a place like Eindhoven, concerns about friendly fire incidents with the airborne forces, and the desire to limit losses in the Guards Armoured Division so it would retain fighting strength for Arnhem and Appeldorn (a recognition that mistakes during a nightime advance could decimate a battle group), all could have contributed to the decision to rule out night attacks.

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I think you may have hit the nail on the head regarding Air Support Colin. After the experience in Normandy and the Cab Ranks, the British Army had become reliant on the Tiffy boys pulling it out of trouble. Conversly, ALL the Jerries knew what a Typhoon was and dreaded them. Although, when I joined up I was chatting with Maj. Jim Bingham @ 2RTR HQ and he said that in fact, air attacks with the unguided rockets didn't do anywhere the amount of damage to the German armour that everyone thought. The main thing was the psychological effect upon the Germans and the fact that the recovery teams upon which the Germans so relied were unable to operate as they had in the Desert and in Russia. On reading about Market Garden it always struck me that the Air Support for the op just wasn't in the same class as it had been in Normandy. In fact it was more like Russia...mind you FAC's being knocked out in the first clash didn't help....That's what you get for jumping off "after lunch"...

[Kit Hildreth]

King,

 

I don't think your argument that there wasn't time holds water as XXX Corps and 11th Armoured Division had shown itself capable of conducting night ops at very short notice just three weeks before Operation Garden in the advance on Amiens on the night of the 30th/31st August.  It's worth quoting at length from Roberts' memoirs to illustrate the degree of short notice and what was needed to be reorganised:

This rather seems to contradict your assertion and suggests that not only was there the experience of night ops and what they required in the British Army (acquired from both previous experience and also training - see David French's Raising Churchill's Army and Timothy Harrison's Military Training in the British Army, 1940-1944) but also the ability to do so during times of "Non-slack".  You're flogging a dead horse here.  If you must continue digging, at least dig the poor nag a grave and let it rest in peace 

 

All the best (tongue wedged firmly in cheek  )

 

Tom

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Thank's for the quote Conall! The Amazon people haven't delivered my copy yet, but looks like a damn good read - would you agree?

It's a small world, used to live in Twickers before banishment to the "Revolting Colonies"!

[KingSargent]

I think there is some truth here. As Conall's examples highlight, XXX Corps was well-versed in night ops, but the British Army as a whole, and desert veterans in particular such as Horrocks and his BGS Pyman, had learned since El Alamein that night attacks were not a cure-all and could go badly awry. Niall Barr has this quote from the 51st Highland Division after Sicily -

 

"Ever since El Alamein we have been very night attack minded - in fact, we have very seldom even thought of attacks except in terms of night attack. The reasons for this are obvious - El Alamein was probably the biggest night attack ever carried out: it was a great success: therefore night attack stock went very high. It is equally obvious however that there were very special conditions and considerations at El Alamein which do not exist now and are never likely to exist again."

 

Although the British continued to use night attacks and "Monty's moonlight", it's clear that by 1944 the experienced operational planners had a complete understanding of the potential advantages and disadvantages of attacking at night. I expect the reasons Conall suggests, along with issues regarding the loss of tactical air support, the peculiar nature of a constricted advance up a single road, the difficulty of street fighting at night in a place like Eindhoven, concerns about friendly fire incidents with the airborne forces, and the desire to limit losses in the Guards Armoured Division so it would retain fighting strength for Arnhem and Appeldorn (a recognition that mistakes during a nightime advance could decimate a battle group), all could have contributed to the decision to rule out night attacks.

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The problem here is that the Night Ops Doctrine was by no means Army-wide. The expereinced 8th Army could pull it off, Anderson's 1st Army in Tunisia showed no such signs of expertise. In fact one of My Main Bytches about Brit attitudes towards the US Army stems from Tunisia. The inexperienced US Army IMHO put up a better show than the equally-inexperienced Brits in 1st Army. Neither was up to 8th Army standards, as was to be expected. Yet Alexander and others judged the US Army against the 8th, rather than the fukkups of the equally-inexperienced 1st Army.

 

To Return To The Issue, night ops must be assiduously planned, OTW you get 'Blue on Blue' and People Wandering All Over (And Off Of) The Map. The British Army was capable of such planning, but IMHO they didn't have the TIME available to do it during GARDEN.

 

MARKET-GARDEN was as about an "off-the-cuff" operation as any I can think of. There was simply NO TIME for planning expertise to come into play. Especially since the planners had worked their butts off 9 or 10 times in the previous few weeks for Airborne Ops that hadn't come off. They dusted off (not that there had been time for the OpOrds to get very dusty) the work they had done for the cancelled ops and that was what 18th AbnArmy and 30 Corps went in with.

 

In re BillB's comment that German performance during M-G was what their doctrine called for, I agree, but I'm still waiting for anyone who can come up with info regarding an instance where that doctrine was applied as well as it was by the ill-assorted hodge-podge of people that caused MARKET-GARDEN to fail.

[Conall]

To Return To The Issue, night ops must be assiduously planned, OTW you get 'Blue on Blue' and People Wandering All Over (And Off Of) The Map. The British Army was capable of such planning, but IMHO they didn't have the TIME available to do it during GARDEN.

 

MARKET-GARDEN was as about an "off-the-cuff" operation as any I can think of. There was simply NO TIME for planning expertise to come into play. Especially since the planners had worked their butts off 9 or 10 times in the previous few weeks for Airborne Ops that hadn't come off. They dusted off (not that there had been time for the OpOrds to get very dusty) the work they had done for the cancelled ops and that was what 18th AbnArmy and 30 Corps went in with.

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I'm sorry King but if you're trying to suggest that XXX Corps were not able to plan/execute night ops off the cuff then you're wilfully ignoring the Amiens night operation which took place just three weeks earlier on the 30th August. This involved two armoured divisions (11 AD & Gds AD) plus corps recce (2 HCR) and was a complete success with no blue on blues and no "People wandering all over (& off of) the map". I think you're letting your bias against the British Army (which BTW Old Tanker is a British institution, thereby making the use of the word anglophobia in describing King's earlier attack not only relevant but also within the terms of your definition) get the better of you again

 

Best regards

 

Tom

[Kit Hildreth]

I'm sorry King but if you're trying to suggest that XXX Corps were not able to plan/execute night ops off the cuff then you're wilfully ignoring the Amiens night operation which took place just three weeks earlier on the 30th August.  This involved two armoured divisions (11 AD & Gds AD) plus corps recce (2 HCR) and was a complete success with no blue on blues and no "People wandering all over (& off of) the map".  I think you're letting your bias against the British Army (which BTW Old Tanker is a British institution, thereby making the use of the word anglophobia in describing King's earlier attack not only relevant but also within the terms of your definition) get the better of you again 

 

Best regards

 

Tom

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Not mention Pip Roberts having a major role in the planning for the Amiens show. Can't wait to read what he say's about it in his book.

[Kit Hildreth]

Kit,

Back and suitably jey-lagged from being over on your side of the pond.  I think you need to look at the events of late August and early Sept '44 a bit more closely.  Guards Arm'd also advanced at night on several occasions (look at either their respective war diaries in the National Archive or the post-war divisional histories, of which in some respects the most useful is the 2HCR history - can provide refs on demand).

 

 

Best regards

 

Tom

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Oh Dear, my Tankie-v-Hayburner prejudice showing again! Never really recovered from a snotty-nosed Cherry Picker 2-pipper suggesting I move my "carthorses"(Centurions) to one side to let his "Thoroughbreds"(Chieftains) through! The idea of reading anything by a Hayburner...but yoking aside, you're doubtless correct; one gets the impression that accuracy is something you pride yourself on. But for me despite the Guards being a proddy bunch, they were a wee bit lackadasical in approaching MG - or perhaps it was indeed the apocryphal "Oh Christ, not us again!" There comes a point where things get a little too much...perhaps here...as with 7AD in Normandy, where their van got eviscerated by a single Tiger...for the Guards. One finds it impossible to criticise the Paras of either Army on any major score, whereas with XXX Corps and Gds AD...but your point about "Jorrocks" is well taken; the severe Blighty one he picked up in the Desert doubtless took it's toll, and one may be sure his health suffered thereafter. As an interesting aside I discovered upon reading "The Day they almost bombed Moscow" that Jorrocks had been a Member of the 1918-20 intevention force in Russia and been wounded then also: for the 2nd time apparently.

[KingSargent]

I'm sorry King but if you're trying to suggest that XXX Corps were not able to plan/execute night ops off the cuff then you're wilfully ignoring the Amiens night operation which took place just three weeks earlier on the 30th August.  This involved two armoured divisions (11 AD & Gds AD) plus corps recce (2 HCR) and was a complete success with no blue on blues and no "People wandering all over (& off of) the map".  I think you're letting your bias against the British Army (which BTW Old Tanker is a British institution, thereby making the use of the word anglophobia in describing King's earlier attack not only relevant but also within the terms of your definition) get the better of you again 

 

Best regards

 

Tom

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Hey, did I ever say anybody (except maybe Terry Allen) could have done better? It is not "Anglophobia" to point out what went wrong in a British operation.

 

Am I "Yankophobic" when I aver that the whole Pacific War was fought using the wrong tactics?

 

Specifically, in re Amiens, I was not 'wilfully ignoring' it, I had never heard of it!

 

Basically, here I am trying to find excuses for perceived Anglican fukkups, and have a horde of UKkers telling me I'm fullashyte, the UKkers SANFUed all on their own! And this makes ME an Anglophobe?!! Reality Check!!!

 

Okay, enuff!!! Ennyhoo, we are in agreement that M-G did NOT meet Monty's usual "impeccably planned" standards. Understandable, given the dependence of Airborne ops on uncontrollable things like weather. MY point is that expecting perfection from tired troops in a hastily-planned operation is a Bit Beyond The Pale for ANYONE. Had 30 Corps had more time, had they been willing to grease their bogies with the blood and guts of Dutch civvies waving orange flags in Eindhoven, they might have been able to keep to the "sheddyoulle." M-G might have failed because of 30 Corps, but what I fail to see is that this "failing"is not perfectly undestandable, given the conditions at the time - which the planners SHOULD have been aware of.

[Geoff Winnington-Ball]

...mind you FAC's being knocked out in the first clash didn't help....That's what you get for jumping off "after lunch"...

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...never mind the dearth of experienced FOOs after the debacle in Normandy, and a road so cluttered and confused that the Field Regiments weren't there when you needed them.

[Conall]

Thank's for the quote Conall! The Amazon people haven't delivered my copy yet, but looks like a damn good read - would you agree?

It's a small world, used to live in Twickers before banishment to the "Revolting Colonies"! 

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Kit,

 

Yes, it is an excellent read and I would highly recommend it. What is readily apparent is that part of Roberts' success is the consequence of his logistical and staff experience at a relatively junior level (Captain/Major) and not just his frontline combat experience.

 

My only caveat is that occasionally he comes across as a little priggish. He is, however, honest about his mistakes and refreshingly self-critical. Also he writes well and it is a pleasure to read.

 

Best regards

 

Tom

[Conall]

But for me despite the Guards being a proddy bunch, they were a wee bit lackadasical in approaching MG - or perhaps it was indeed the apocryphal "Oh Christ, not us again!" There comes a point where things get a little too much...perhaps here...as with 7AD in Normandy, where their van got eviscerated by a single Tiger...for the Guards.

 

The problem with this (widely-held) view is that when you look at the primary sources - war diaries, operations orders etc it is quite difficult to find evidence for Gds AD being "lackadasical" in Operation Garden. They were certainly willing to take casualties, even in prosecuting tactically disadvantageous attacks (for example the advance by the Irish Gds BG up the main Nijmegen - Arnhem road, despite its obvious tactical drawbacks). I would agree that they were less tactically flexible than 11 AD and less inclined to ignore the book but that's about it. Again it's useful to leave the last word to 'Pip' Roberts who wrote that:

I have to admit to being a little disappointed that 11th Armoured Division had not been selected for this great but hazardous operation [Operation Garden], especially since I thought that we were a bit cleverer than the Guards Armoured Division!  General Horrocks came to visit me one day and said, 'I had to give this operation to Guards Armoured Division; after all, Joe Vandeleur (Irish Guards) got the bridge over the Escaut Canal which made the start that much easier.'

 

I could not but agree with him on that; besides the advance to Arnhme was straight up the main road and cannot be very clever with that.  A lot of bravery would be required and the Brigade of Guards cannot be faulted there.  After the operation there were many in 11th Armoured Division who said, 'We should have been given this task - we would have got there'; I doubted it myself but I did not disagree with them as I thought it was a sign of high morale and a fine divisional spirit! Page 213, From the Desert to the Baltic, G.P.B. Roberts

 

One finds it impossible to criticise the Paras of either Army on any major score, whereas with XXX Corps and Gds AD...but your point about "Jorrocks" is well taken; the severe Blighty one he picked up in the Desert doubtless took it's toll, and one may be sure his health suffered thereafter. As an interesting aside I discovered upon reading "The Day they almost bombed Moscow" that Jorrocks had been a Member of the 1918-20 intevention force in Russia and been wounded then also: for the 2nd time apparently.

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I think BillB made that point rather than me about Horrocks and I think it is a good one. Horrocks, himself, admits that he could have been more energetic in the prosecution of the battle with the benefit of hindsight. This rather confirms my general hypothesis that the fault for the failure of Operation Garden lay more with XXX Corps & above than with Gds AD or the other divisional units. Having said that I would still note that Horrocks made every effort to get around the battlefield and did apply personal leadership wherever necessary. Even at sub-par performance he was still one of the best British Corps commanders in 2nd Army.

 

Best regards

 

Tom

[Conall]

Hey, did I ever say anybody (except maybe Terry Allen) could have done better? It is not "Anglophobia" to point out what went wrong in a British operation.

 

Am I "Yankophobic" when I aver that the whole Pacific War was fought using the wrong tactics?

 

Specifically, in re Amiens, I was not 'wilfully ignoring' it, I had never heard of it!

 

Basically, here I am trying to find excuses for perceived Anglican fukkups, and  have a horde of UKkers telling me I'm fullashyte, the UKkers SANFUed all on their own! And this makes ME an Anglophobe?!! Reality Check!!!

 

Apologies, to some extent I was only pulling your leg (there was a smiley) and I would agree that usually you're very balanced in your approach - being generally critical of everyone. I was only genuinely irritated by your much earlier rather distasteful aside that the British deliberately used "Colonial" (actually volunteer Commonwealth forces) troops to do the brunt of the fighting for them in North Africa. Enough said about.

 

Incidentally I wasn't aware that the Anglican [Church] was responsible for the prosecution of Operation Market-Garden. If so it would explain a very great deal

 

Okay, enuff!!! Ennyhoo, we are in agreement that M-G did NOT meet Monty's usual "impeccably planned" standards. Understandable, given the dependence of Airborne ops on uncontrollable things like weather. MY point is that expecting perfection from tired troops in a hastily-planned operation is a Bit Beyond The Pale for ANYONE. Had 30 Corps had more time, had they been willing to grease their bogies with the blood and guts of Dutch civvies waving orange flags in Eindhoven, they might have been able to keep to the "sheddyoulle." M-G might have failed because of 30 Corps, but what I fail to see is that this "failing"is not perfectly undestandable, given the conditions at the time - which the planners SHOULD have been aware of.

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I agree about the hasty nature of the operation but I'm not sure about the issue of tired troops - Gds AD at least had been rested for several days prior to the 17th. I would agree that the failure is perfectly understandable given the conditions and constraints under which they had to operate.

 

My opinion, for what it is worth, is that the fault lay with the planners who assumed (in some cases despite growing intelligence and combat evidence to the contrary) that German resistance would be very limited - on a par with late August and early September. As a result they made a plan which grossly over-tasked the units involved (notably 1st Airborne, 82nd Airborne and Gds AD) in the event of anything other than token resistance by the Germans (not something for which they were well known). In addition, curiously for such a high risk operation, there was a marked degree of risk aversion. Most notably in the air planning with regard to the choice of DZs, the witholding of close air support for fear of aerial "blue on blues" and the explicit orders not to conduct ground operations at night. Again I think this emanated from higher command, who with their degree of distance from the realities of the front (many being based in the UK) considered the war to be already won. The irony is that, as BillB has already pointed out, such an inherently flawed operation came so close to success, which is I think an enormous tribute to the combat performance of the Allied Airborne troops in particular. It is especially sad given the subsequent suffering the Dutch people had to endure through the winter of 1944-45 as a result on not being liberated as a result of Operation Market-Garden's failure.

 

Best regards

 

Tom

Edited January 29, 2006 by Conall

[KingSargent]

Apologies, to some extent I was only pulling your leg (there was a smiley) and I would agree that usually you're very balanced in your approach - being generally critical of everyone. I was only genuinely irritated by your much earlier rather distasteful aside that the British deliberately used "Colonial" (actually volunteer Commonwealth forces) troops to do the brunt of the fighting for them in North Africa. Enough said about. I was doing a little leg-pulling there myself, although it is certainly true that the only British infantry in North Africa before 1942 were ones who had been there when the war started and the "British Third" of the Indian Divisions. Of course it would have made no sense at all to send the CWs to Blighty and ship Brits to Africa, now, would it? IIRC the first infantry division to be sent out from Blighty was the 18th that got diverted straight to a Japanese POW camp.

 

Incidentally I wasn't aware that the Anglican [Church] was responsible for the prosecution of Operation Market-Garden. If so it would explain a very great deal There were lots of chaplains along, you mean they weren't in command authority?

 

I agree about the hasty nature of the operation but I'm not sure about the issue of tired troops - Gds AD at least had been rested for several days prior to the 17th. I would agree that the failure is perfectly understandable given the conditions and constraints under which they had to operate.

 

My opinion, for what it is worth, is that the fault lay with the planners who assumed (in some cases despite growing intelligence and combat evidence to the contrary) that German resistance would be very limited - on a par with late August and early September. As a result they made a plan which grossly over-tasked the units involved (notably 1st Airborne, 82nd Airborne and Gds AD) in the event of anything other than token resistance by the Germans (not something for which they were well known). In addition, curiously for such a high risk operation, there was a marked degree of risk aversion. Most notably in the air planning with regard to the choice of DZs, the witholding of close air support for fear of aerial "blue on blues" and the explicit orders not to conduct ground operations at night. Again I think this emanated from higher command, who with their degree of distance from the realities of the front (many being based in the UK) considered the war to be already won. The irony is that, as BillB has already pointed out, such an inherently flawed operation came so close to success, which is I think an enormous tribute to the combat performance of the Allied Airborne troops in particular. It is especially sad given the subsequent suffering the Dutch people had to endure through the winter of 1944-45 as a result on not being liberated as a result of Operation Market-Garden's failure.

 

Best regards

 

Tom

 

I definitely agree that the planning was flawed, I think that if any cadet who came up with M-G as a solution in a Tactics Course would be flunked out.

 

As for the 'risk aversion,' I don't think anyone of the planners expected there to be any risk at all.[/b]

[Colin Williams]

M-G might have failed because of 30 Corps...

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Beg to differ old chap! If Browning had dropped 1st Airborne south of the Arnhem bridge (thereby gaining the bridge in force and blocking early German reinforcement of Nijmegen which allows Gavin to seize the Nijmegen bridge) and forces the 101st to drop closer to the bridge at Zon (thereby seizing the bridge intact), XXX Corps, without any changes of plan or aggressiveness, reaches Arnhem in two days.

[Jim Martin]

That's how my wargaming of it has worked. I've found it would have also helped had 1st Airborne (the weakest of the 3 divisions!) been dropped at Eindhoven, with the strongest division, the 82nd, dropped at Arnhem. Totally bass-ackwards, dropping the 1st AB at the last bridge. Of course, Browning's HQ should have stayed in Britain, freeing up assets to deliver more combat troops, as well.

 

Beg to differ old chap! If Browning had dropped 1st Airborne south of the Arnhem bridge (thereby gaining the bridge in force and blocking early German reinforcement of Nijmegen which allows Gavin to seize the Nijmegen bridge) and forces the 101st to drop closer to the bridge at Zon (thereby seizing the bridge intact), XXX Corps, without any changes of plan or aggressiveness, reaches Arnhem in two days.

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[KingSargent]

That's how my wargaming of it has worked.  I've found it would have also helped had 1st Airborne (the weakest of the 3 divisions!) been dropped at Eindhoven, with the strongest division, the 82nd, dropped at Arnhem.  Totally bass-ackwards, dropping the 1st AB at the last bridge.  Of course, Browning's HQ should have stayed in Britain, freeing up assets to deliver more combat troops, as well.

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Jim, AIUI, where the Abn divisions went was largely a feature of where they were based in England. 1st Abn was in the north, 101st was in the south, and 82nd was between them. All three had pretty much a straight eastward shot to their objectives, in three separate transport streams. Trying to swap objectives would have meant the transport streams crossing and very possibly colliding.

 

1st Airborne was only the weakest because the Poles were unable to join and if conditions had permitted 52nd Division would have flown in.

 

Dropping the weakest division at Eindhoven could have been a disaster. The Eindhoven objectives had to be taken first, or 30 Corps would never getto Nimegen and Arnhem; and the 101st had a hard enough time trying to seize all its objectives, and they barely missed the Zon bridge. Had 1st Abn gotten the task it's likely that 30 Corps would have had much more work to do. to get past Eindhoven. Besides, since they were planning on reinforcing 1st and they had twice as long to achieve objectives before 30 Corps was due to show up, a more gradual build-up of force in Arnhem made sense.

 

They still should have done two drops on Day One, and you are perfectly correct that Browning in Nijmgen was a complete waste of lift. Brereton should have sent to command the Coast Defences of Wyoming and Browning locked in the loo until M-G was over.

[JohnB]

  I've found it would have also helped had 1st Airborne (the weakest of the 3 divisions!) been dropped at Eindhoven, with the strongest division, the 82nd, dropped at Arnhem.  Totally bass-ackwards, dropping the 1st AB at the last bridge. 

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I think that was actually Montys intention ... It was Bradley, IIRC, who put the kibosh on that arrangement.

[KingSargent]

I think that was actually Montys intention ... It was Bradley, IIRC, who  put the kibosh on that arrangement.

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Are we having a UK Great - US Bad Day... ugh?

 

Just what input did Bradley have? M-G was 21st Army Group's show, and the 82nd and 101st were under 1st Allied Abn Army, not 12th AG.

 

If Monty ever had the intention of reversing the DZs of the Abn, I think that it would somebody who clued him in onto the traffic patterns involved that 'kiboshed' it.