Why Bridge Too Far attempt was doomed

[BillB]

Hmmmm. Remind me of the original capbadge of David Stirling? Or why G Squadron is so named? 

274880[/snapback]

Hmmm. And remind me how many woodentops that account for then, FoF? The exceptions that prove the rule at best, methinks. And I don't recall Stirling or G Squadron being in Holland for MARKET GARDEN, either.

 

BillB

[Kit Hildreth]

Alanbrooke claims this anyway.

 

Not all of WSC's ideas were so harebrained. He wasn't PM when Norway was launched, so that can't be considered all his fault.

 

Greece was a boner, but I think it was necessary to at least make an effort (which was made with two battalions of English tanks and a whole lot of Colonial infantry) or lose all credit in the diplomatic arena. In any case, AB wasn't CIGS at the time so I don't see how he could have "restrained Winston." He also wasn't CIGS during the Wavell-Churchill feud.

 

AB ridicules WSC's desire for an amphibious op to take the northwest end of Sumatra in 1944-5. IMHO, it had great possibilities. The area was not heavily defended, and CW forces based there could stop Japanese coastal traffic up the west side of the Malay peninsula - which was the prime supply route for the Japanese in Burma. There would be no more sorties of IJN ships and subs into the IO unless they made a detour all around Sumatra (not that there were a lot of sorties, but the Allies worried about them). Heavy bomber bases could have made Singapore much less tenable as a Japanese base.

270067[/snapback]

Winnie may not have been PM, but he had a big hand in the Norway op. To begin with it was his belicose trumpeting that triggered the Jerrys into a move into Scandinavia! Second he interfered in the planning(he was 1st Sea Lord at the time) to such an extent that it became a frightful muddle. Then there's Greece. It was pulling troops out of the WDF and transferring 'em that gave Rommel his opportunity, no matter how much Dick O'Connor tried to shoulder the blame-Wavell deserved that; he was running the show. Should have given Winnie another cigar, a double NEAT Brandy and sent him packing! Still, at least 2RTR made the furthest advance in Operation Compass(hull down & into cover! )

[Kit Hildreth]

I didn't know Guards Armoured Div served in the desert, Kit. And I think caution and business as usual was a large part of the problem.  But then the Guards have never been big on flexibility...

 

all the best

 

BillB

274697[/snapback]

No of course it didn't Bill, and as I recall was formed in UK before the Normandy show. But most of the Brigades, and especially Regiments which made up all the major AD's did. I'm sure you're more than aware that it is the Regiment, followed by the Brigade which is the most important unit in the British Army. Divisions were always tempy orgs. Even the 7th is back down to Brigade size these days I see. Actually I was taking a elephantine side swipe: some of those Parade Ground ponces referred to 5RTR as "The Shitty Fifth" after a less than scintillating performance doing for HM on one occasion. But spit'n polish never was a Tankie speciality: "....never WALK, old chap, when you can RIDE"! . Mind you, I hate to say it, but your comment on flexibility pretty much referred to the British Army as a whole - with the notable exception of The Bulls under Pip Roberts, who was the youngest MajGen. in the British Army. A Tankie OF COURSE! If by any chance you are detecting prejudice, guilty as charged m'lud. I was in 2RTR, my bro' in law in the 5th

[Kit Hildreth]

As I recall 11th AD were heavily engaged to the south east of the Neerpelt bridgehead fighting around Hechtel and Hasselt.  Not quite so sure where 7 AD were operating but I suspect it was either in reserve or supporting 15 Scottish Div around Gheel and Aart.  Guards Armoured were in position just to the south of the Neerpelt bridgehead (after their capture of Joe's bridge) and also had had the luxury of several days to rest and regroup.

 

The idea that 11 AD would have done better than Guards Armoured is fallacious in my opinion (they were, however, irrefutably a better unit - in leadership, experience, performance and tactical ability).  It is possible that they might have ignored the no advance at night order and reached Eindhoven on the first night but they would still have been delayed at the Zon bridge.  In addition they were still subject to the same logistical constraints and would still needed to have detached units to support 101st Airborne around Veghel and 82nd Airborne in Nijmegen/Groesbeek.  The fact is that no British armoured division had the infantry combat power to have fought its way through Nijmegen and then across the Island - especially when operating under the constraints mentioned above.

Not as far as I am aware.  He certainly makes no mention of it in his memoirs, which would be very odd had he been related.

 

Best regards

 

Tom

274261[/snapback]

 

Tom, can you give me some gen on Pip's memoirs? I've domiciled in the states since '83 and had no idea he'd written any. I saw in the Telegraph's website he'd gone west. Perhaps I can get a copy on Amazon or something. Thanks

Kit

[Kit Hildreth]

Tom, can you give me some gen on Pip's memoirs? I've domiciled in the states since '83 and had no idea he'd  written any. I saw in the Telegraph's website he'd gone west. Perhaps I can get a copy on Amazon or something. Thanks

Kit

276044[/snapback]

About face! Google to the Rescue! "From the Desert to the Baltic" is on it's way from Amazon.uk; can't wait!

[KingSargent]

Alanbrooke claims this anyway.

 

Not all of WSC's ideas were so harebrained. He wasn't PM when Norway was launched, so that can't be considered all his fault.

 

Greece was a boner, but I think it was necessary to at least make an effort (which was made with two battalions of English tanks and a whole lot of Colonial infantry) or lose all credit in the diplomatic arena. In any case, AB wasn't CIGS at the time so I don't see how he could have "restrained Winston." He also wasn't CIGS during the Wavell-Churchill feud.

 

AB ridicules WSC's desire for an amphibious op to take the northwest end of Sumatra in 1944-5. IMHO, it had great possibilities. The area was not heavily defended, and CW forces based there could stop Japanese coastal traffic up the west side of the Malay peninsula - which was the prime supply route for the Japanese in Burma. There would be no more sorties of IJN ships and subs into the IO unless they made a detour all around Sumatra (not that there were a lot of sorties, but the Allies worried about them). Heavy bomber bases could have made Singapore much less tenable as a Japanese base.

270067[/snapback]

KIT:

Winnie may not have been PM, but he had a big hand in the Norway op. To begin with it was his belicose trumpeting that triggered the Jerrys into a move into Scandinavia! Second he interfered in the planning(he was 1st Sea Lord at the time) to such an extent that it became a frightful muddle. Then there's Greece. It was pulling troops out of the WDF and transferring 'em that gave Rommel his opportunity, no matter how much Dick O'Connor tried to shoulder the blame-Wavell deserved that; he was running the show. Should have given Winnie another cigar, a double NEAT Brandy and sent him packing! Still, at least 2RTR made the furthest advance in Operation Compass(hull down & into cover! )

276032[/snapback]

=========================================================

 

re Norway, I am not sure that there is anything wrong with the First Sea Lord "interfering" with the planning for an amphibious op involving a good portion of the Royal Navy. WSC's original idea was to mine Norwegian coastal waters, which would have been a solely RN mission. Had that been done when he planned (ie, long before the German invasion), there probably would have been no major problem except the political fallout. The delays consequent to getting the Army and RAF involved meant the Germans made their move first - but not by much.

 

Regarding Greece, much is made of the "clear road to Tripoli" after COMPASS. Problem was, Wavell & O'Connor didn't have anything to put on that road. 7th Armoured was clapped out, the whole schmeer went back to Alex and all the vehicles went into the shops and The Old Professional Gang never resurfaced in its COMPASS organization and form.

 

From Agheila to Tripoli is about as far as from Alex to Agheila (no map handy - it's a long trek anyway), and no operating ports closer than Alex where enough supplies for an army could land. The Brits couldn't have supplied an advance to Tripoli even if they had any vehicles that weren't past their 'Rebuild By' mileage. So the myth that O'Connor could have taken Tripoli is just that - a myth.

 

As for 'letting Rommel in', what I suspect is that ULTRA backfired on WSC and Wavell. I know Wavell was reading Commado Supremo's mail and very probably London was reading Kesselring's and Rommel's.

 

If you will recall, 5th Light Division was supposed to be a defensive block force to protect Tripoli while the Italians built up again and 15th PzDiv arrived (and Tripoli's limited capacity made any buildup slow). A check of 5th Light's TOE confirms this: Two tank bns, two motor MG bns, a recce bn, two AT Bns (1SP, 1 towed), one arty Bn, and a Flak bn - this is block/counterattack force, not a long-range assault force.

 

Everybody above Rommel ordered him to sit tight for two months until 15th Pz arrived. I am almost positive that Wavell and WSC knew what those orders were and figured they had two months before they needed more than a 'tripwire' east of Agheila. Rommel disobeyed orders and caught everybody on both sides off guard with his offensive.

 

Now, if you knew that all the enemy had was a blocking force and that he had strict orders not to attack for two months, wouldn't you feel safe in withdrawing your clapped out vets and putting in green troops who would have two months to season before anything happened?

 

After all, before the extra sixty days were up WSC and Wavell could plan on 7th Armoured's vehicles and 7th RTR's Matildas being refitted, another Matilda bn (4RTR), and at least some of Cunningham's divisions from East Africa moving up to the WD, plus more planes for the RAF. Taranto had crippled the Italian Navy (which did zip to stop the troop movements to Greece), and the German blitz of the Balkans and Greece and the slaughter of the RN off Crete were in the unanticipated future.

 

If that damned Rommel had just obeyed orders like a good little German (or Brit), things would have been pretty rosy for the CW.

[Kit Hildreth]

This is the hypothesis that Robert Kershaw puts forward.  Unfortunately a closer examination of the XXX Corps and, more specifically, Irish Gds war diaries shows that it doesn't hold water for two reasons.  The first is that the Irish Gds got across the Nijmegen bridge with little more than an understrength tank squadron and three depeleted infantry platoons - an entirely inadequate force, especially when you consider that the tanks urgently needed refueling and rearming.  The second is that heavy fighting was still going on in Nijmegen that evening which made it almost impossible to bring up more troops, especially the light recce elements you suggest.  Finally it's worth noting that the only unit which might have broken through - the Coldstream Guards BG - had to turn around and head back down the highway to relieve the German attacks against Vegehel the following day.

 

A more reasonable criticism of XXX Corps is why it refused to allow its units to move at night, something which might have made all the difference in the critical first 24-48 hours.  Again, I suspect that this was a symptom of higher Allied command thinking that the war was essentially won.

 

Best regards

 

Tom

 

 

The latter point is partially why I believe The Bulls should have been given the job. As far as  I'm aware Pip Roberts was the only senior British commander that seriously tried ops at night. I'm pretty sure he would have done so in this case. I also think it would have been more prudent for XXX Corps to launch their attack prior to the Parachute drops. The German troops that would naturally have been sent to defend the Son and Nijmegen bridges once that attack got underway would have quite a shock being attacked from two directions almost simultaneously. Being Jerries, they'd have recovered quickly but would it have been enough? Just the confusion created...

269078[/snapback]

[Kit Hildreth]

=========================================================

 

re Norway, I am not sure that there is anything wrong with the First Sea Lord "interfering" with the planning for an amphibious op involving a good portion of the Royal Navy. WSC's original idea was to mine Norwegian coastal waters, which would have been a solely RN mission. Had that been done when he planned  (ie, long before the German invasion), there probably would have been no major problem except the political fallout. The delays consequent to getting the Army and RAF involved meant the Germans made their move first - but not by much.

 

Regarding Greece, much is made of the "clear road to Tripoli" after COMPASS. Problem was, Wavell & O'Connor didn't have anything to put on that road. 7th Armoured was clapped out, the whole schmeer went back to Alex and all the vehicles went into the shops and The Old Professional Gang never resurfaced in its COMPASS organization and form.

 

From Agheila to Tripoli is about as far as from Alex to Agheila (no map handy - it's a long trek anyway), and no operating ports closer than Alex where enough supplies for an army could land. The Brits couldn't have supplied an advance to Tripoli even if they had any vehicles that weren't past their 'Rebuild By' mileage. So the myth that O'Connor could have taken Tripoli is just that - a myth.

 

As for 'letting Rommel in', what I suspect is that ULTRA backfired on WSC and Wavell. I know Wavell was reading Commado Supremo's mail and very probably London was reading Kesselring's and Rommel's.

 

If you will recall, 5th Light Division was supposed to be a defensive block force to protect Tripoli while the Italians built up again and 15th PzDiv arrived (and Tripoli's limited capacity made any buildup slow). A check of 5th Light's TOE confirms this: Two tank bns, two motor MG bns, a recce bn, two AT Bns (1SP, 1 towed), one arty Bn, and a Flak bn - this is block/counterattack force, not a long-range assault force.

 

Everybody above Rommel ordered him to sit tight for two months until 15th Pz arrived. I am almost positive that Wavell and WSC knew what those orders were and figured they had two months before they needed more than a 'tripwire' east of Agheila. Rommel disobeyed orders and caught everybody on both sides off guard with his offensive.

 

Now, if you knew that all the enemy had was a blocking force and that he had strict orders not to attack for two months, wouldn't you feel safe in withdrawing your clapped out vets and putting in green troops who would have two months to season before anything happened?

 

After all, before the extra sixty days were up WSC and Wavell could plan on 7th Armoured's vehicles and 7th RTR's Matildas being refitted, another Matilda bn (4RTR), and at least some of Cunningham's divisions from East Africa moving up to the WD, plus more planes for the RAF. Taranto had crippled the Italian Navy (which did zip to stop the troop movements to Greece), and the German blitz of the Balkans and Greece and the slaughter of the RN off Crete were in the unanticipated future.

 

If that damned Rommel had just obeyed orders like a good little German (or Brit), things would have been pretty rosy for the CW.

276104[/snapback]

 

RATS! We're almost in agreement! Gnnng! Gnnng! No, just a mo'! Don't forget Tobruk which took Ro' a year to get(good old Aussies!); plus I don't think ULTRA was running that far back. As I understood it Alan Turing and the team at Bletchley Park didn't get Colossus fully operational 'til some time in '42 - but my library is not readily to hand: being banished to Garage #2 along with my HIFI rig and Morgan; so I'll respond tomorrow with either a 17pdr APDS or better still a 105....

[KingSargent]

The latter point is partially why I believe The Bulls should have been given the job. As far as  I'm aware Pip Roberts was the only senior British commander that seriously tried ops at night. I'm pretty sure he would have done so in this case. I also think it would have been more prudent for XXX Corps to launch their attack prior to the Parachute drops. The German troops that would naturally have been sent to defend the Son and Nijmegen bridges once that attack got underway would have quite a shock being attacked from two directions almost simultaneously. Being Jerries, they'd have recovered quickly but would it have been enough? Just the confusion created...

276106[/snapback]

 

Possibly this "Daylight Only" prejudice of the Brit High Command (thoroughly shared with their Yank Allies BTW) was responsible for the shock they received when the US 104th Division served with 21st AG. Terry Allen had specially trained the 104th to operate at night, and the "24-hour battle" won the 104th kudos from 21st AG, according to Mansur.

 

Incidentally, Terry Allen had printed special Night Operation manuals for the 104th in the US. An AG inspection demanded to know who had paid for the printing of Unauthorized Manuals! Allen told them he had put slot machines in the Officer's Mess and paid for the printing with the proceeds.....

 

Inside ref for BillB*: Can you imagine what an Airborne Force would have gestated if Louis Strange and Terry Allen had been in charge and left alone?....

 

* The rest of you read Paras if you want to get it !

[JohnB]

As far as  I'm aware Pip Roberts was the only senior British commander that seriously tried ops at night

276106[/snapback]

 

TOTALIZE? (presuming you're only reffering to armour ops.)

[Rick Griest]

I have a 800 kb "OPERATION MARKET-GARDEN ULTRA INTELLIGENCE IGNORED" pdf that is a 2002 CGSC master's thesis if anyone is interested. I am not qualified to judge how "new" its information or perpective might be. Drop me a PM with e-mail address if interested.

 

Rick

Edited January 27, 2006 by Rick Griest

[Colin Williams]

In considering the Guards' performance in Market-Garden, I think a little background on the fighting from September 6-10 (after the fall of Brussels) is in order, as it bears comparison to Remagen. Quoting freely from McKee's "Race for the Rhine Bridges" -

 

"...this was...to get a bridgehead over the Albert Canal north-east of Brussels...The CRE (Commander Royal Engineers) of Guards Armoured Division was Brigadier C.P. Jones (later General Sir Charles Jones, chief royal engineer of the British Army). His principal difficulty was that he did not have, and could not get immediately over the strained supply lines, anything like sufficient bridging material to span the Albert Canal at any point. The only possibility would be a partially demolished bridge capable of being repaired with the sparse amount of material he actually had. In order to improve the chances of getting such a repairable bridge, Brigadier Jones asked General Adair if he would spread out the reconnaisance troops of the 2nd Household Cavalry Regiment along the whole 20-mile front and to allow the Royal Engineer reconnaisance parties to go forward with each armoured car squadron.

 

This was agreed, and the armoured cars drove forward into what was obviously 'a deteriorating situation'. This was caused by the arrival of the German 719 Infantry Division...'I got a R.T. message from my reconnaisance party on the right that it was within sight of the Beeringen bride, which was blown but apparently not completely demolished; that the gap appeared to be 30 feet...I asked the Divisional Commander to chance his aim and go for Beeringen.'

 

32 Guards Brigade Group was ordered up to carry out the assault crossing, with the Royal Engineers and all the available bridging material of the division close behind them. The attack wen in at 1430 hours on September 6 and secured a foothold, about 200 yards in radius, on the far bank of the Albert Canal. By 1730 hours Brigadier Jones was on the blown bridge with his officers and glad that he had ordered up all the bridging material. There was one 30-foot gap, but there was also a 110-foot gap. Of the supporting piers, one was destroyed, another damaged.

 

The weather had broken and the rain poured down...there were also German mortar bombs, shells and bullets as the engineers worked through the night...by 0415 hours the next morning, September 7, a class-40 bridge spanned the Albert Canal at Beeringen. In the cold light of dawn that bridge looked 'shaky in the extreme'...however, the engineers made it strong enough not merely to take the Guards Armoured Division but the whole of British Second Army besides, plus General Corlett's XIX U.S. Corps...

 

It was still the morning of September 7...when the first heavy German counter-attack came in, getting to withing 300 yards of the bridge before being stopped...the equivalent of two divisions had been thrown in to attack the British bridgehead at Beeringen...Nevertheless, the British put 11 Armoured Division across the Albert and (the two British armoured divisions) began to push the Germans back to the next canal, the Escaut...

 

On September 10 the Irish Guards battle group were probing forward behind the armoured cars of the Household Cavalry...What happened that evening was not planned...the Household Cavalry wirelessed back that they had found a new German-built road, not shown on any map, which ran parallel to the Escaut Canal for a short distance before turning to cross it at a bridge over the De Groote Barrier. The bridge was...intact, but strongly held and eight miles away.

 

The Irish Guards approached the bridge from the side road parallel to the canal, and stopped to reconnoiter short of the crossroads about 400 yards south of the bridge...the bridge garrison, with three 88-mm guns covered by Spandaus, was on the north bank, and, further, a slight jink in the road would prevent their guns coming into action until an attacking force was close. The Irish had got too far ahead of their own guns to call up artillery support, and the only engineering officer with them, Captain R.D. Hutton, had lost contact during the day with the troops he was supposed to command.

 

Colonel "Joe" (Vandeleur) summoned him and said 'I am going to charge the bridge with a troop of tanks. I want you to go with them and make sure the thing's safe'...

 

The idea was to give the Germans so little time that they would not be able to blow the bridge until the Guards infantry were across. They would be covered by the fire of the tanks until just before charging the bridge, and two more tanks were to be ready to race across after them. As the tanks opened up with covering fire, they flushed an 88-mm gun and its tractor, which made a dash to escape over the bridge and was knocked out while crossing it. Its ammunition caught fire, lighting up the scene.

 

Up went a green Very light, a signal from the infantry that they had reached the jink in the road and that the tanks should lift their fire onto the bridge itself. For several minutes the tanks poured fire onto the bridge; then up went a red Very. The infantry were at the bridge and the two assault tanks could now race across. As they crashed through the burning wreckage around the disabled 88, the infantry dashed across the bridge after them under a hail of Spandau fire, and flung themselves into the ditches. One of the first Germans to surrender clapped a Guards officer on the back and shouted 'Well done, Tommy, well done!'...Now it was up to Captain Hutton and his ersatz engineers to 'delouse' the bridge. (Long description of wire and fuse cutting under fire.)

 

...the Irish were heavily counter-attacked during the day, but continued to hold onto what was now known as "Joe's bridge"...Next day, the corps commander, General Horrocks, arrived in person to tell them that their capture of the bridge had enable him to bring forward the date of the next great advance. They would have the honour of leading it. ' The last remark took the gilt off the gingerbread' the historian of the Irish Guards was to comment later."

 

Seems to me these gentlemen were pretty resourceful for tea drinkers.

[BillB]

In considering the Guards' performance in Market-Garden, I think a little background on the fighting from September 6-10 (after the fall of Brussels) is in order, as it bears comparison to Remagen. Quoting freely from McKee's "Race for the Rhine Bridges" -SNIP - Seems to me these gentlemen were pretty resourceful for tea drinkers. 

276494[/snapback]

That's all very well Colin, but it still doesn't really address the key points with ref to GARDEN, the two most salient of which are IMO:

 

- why they waited until the MARKET force were overhead before jumping off

 

- why the didn't keep pushing for Eindhoven on the night of 17/18 September, instead of stopping after dark. This has been discussed here before IIRC and a none Guards Armoured relief unit was held up as partially to blame, but that still does not explain why there was no attempt to think outside the box and ditch the "knock off at dark" attitude.

 

Neither of these were fatal in themselves, but they did start the ever lengthening list of minor delays (a sin also committed by 1st Airborne) that in total derailed the operation. I would also argue they are symptomatic of the lack of push and/or business as usual attitude displayed during MG.

[Conall]

The latter point is partially why I believe The Bulls should have been given the job. As far as  I'm aware Pip Roberts was the only senior British commander that seriously tried ops at night. I'm pretty sure he would have done so in this case.

276106[/snapback]

 

Kit,

Back and suitably jey-lagged from being over on your side of the pond. I think you need to look at the events of late August and early Sept '44 a bit more closely. Guards Arm'd also advanced at night on several occasions (look at either their respective war diaries in the National Archive or the post-war divisional histories, of which in some respects the most useful is the 2HCR history - can provide refs on demand).

 

 

That's all very well Colin, but it still doesn't really address the key points with ref to GARDEN, the two most salient of which are IMO:

 

- why they waited until the MARKET force were overhead before jumping off

 

Difficult question to answer and a crucial one I think. My personal opinion is that they felt an earlier H-Hour for the ground forces would negate the element of surprise for the airborne operation. I think this was both wrong and a huge mistake. Again I don't think the blame lies with Gds Arm'd or even XXX Corps (although you could reasonably argue that Horrocks should have tried to have had it changed) but with higher up command and probably originated from Brereton and Browning.

 

- why the didn't keep pushing for Eindhoven on the night of 17/18 September, instead of stopping after dark. This has been discussed here before IIRC and a none Guards Armoured relief unit was held up as partially to blame, but that still does not explain why there was no attempt to think outside the box and ditch the "knock off at dark" attitude.

Again Bill if you look at the documents in the National Archive - WO 171/846 which contains the XXX Corps General Movement Instructions for Operation 'Garden' see:

Ch 5.

© There will be NO movement on the main axis during the hours of darkness

 

Clearly the fault lies with XXX Corps and not Gds Arm'd. In that respect it is also useful to note that they did attempt to overrule this and press on in the evening of the 17th Sept from Valkenswaard, but were stymied by the refusal of Brigadier Stanier (231 Inf Bde) to relieve them. Instead he preferred to send one of his two infantry battalions back down the main axis to protect his divisional artillery. A fatal decision and one which cannot be blamed on Gds Arm'd. In addition contrary to a number of post-war accounts they set off from Valkenswaard at first light on the 18th Sept (approx 0600hrs). Hardly a tardy response.

 

I think your thesis that they displayed a lack of drive throughout the operation is more than a little overstated. Where possible they advanced with all expediency - the difficulty was the constraints they were forced to operate under and their relatively limited fighting power. For example on the 20th/21st, arguably the crisis point of the whole operation, they were forced to send the entire 32nd Gds Bde Gp to assist 101st Airborne around Veghel (at the direct request of 101st Airborne) while at the same time providing the Coldstream BG to assist 82nd Airborne in Groesbeek. This left them one understrength BG (Irish Gds) to try to force their way from Nijmegen to Arnhem. Clearly sufficient combat power was not available.

 

Time for you to get dirty in the archives again I think Bill, you nasty little history troll

 

Neither of these were fatal in themselves, but they did start the ever lengthening list of minor delays (a sin also committed by 1st Airborne) that in total derailed the operation. I would also argue they are symptomatic of the lack of push and/or business as usual attitude displayed during MG.

276614[/snapback]

 

In general I would agree but I would note that the lack of urgency was typical of nearly all Allied units involved in Market Garden (101st Airborne is the honourable exception along with 15/19 KRH and 44 RTR whose largely unsung contribution was immense), due to a misplaced belief that the German Army had been defeated and the war was essentially won.

 

Best regards

 

Tom

[KingSargent]

That's all very well Colin, but it still doesn't really address the key points with ref to GARDEN, the two most salient of which are IMO:

 

- why they waited until the MARKET force were overhead before jumping off

I thought we did this one before...

 

1. There had been many (9 or 10?) drops planned just weeks before that hadn't come off. Personally, I wouldn't have believed the M-G drop was going to happen until I saw the chutes open.

 

2. 30 Corps jumping off and the drop being scrubbed would have been a Royal Cluster Fucck(see it doesn't get censored by the software if you misspell it...).

 

3. Artillery shells and CAS going south-north while the ABN's transports were going west-east was not good traffic planning.

 

- why the didn't keep pushing for Eindhoven on the night of 17/18 September, instead of stopping after dark. This has been discussed here before IIRC and a none Guards Armoured relief unit was held up as partially to blame, but that still does not explain why there was no attempt to think outside the box and ditch the "knock off at dark" attitude.

1. Because ever since the Western Desert night had been the time for tanks to collect and get maintenance so they could run the next day. Even if they had 'old reliable' Shermans, trying to run a 24-hr battle would have left Gds Armoured trailing brokendown tanks across half of Holland.

 

2. It's hard to see anything from a tank in daylight, trying to operate at night with 1944-vintage NONsensors would have been a disaster, especially since NOBODY had trained for it.

 

Neither of these were fatal in themselves, but they did start the ever lengthening list of minor delays (a sin also committed by 1st Airborne) that in total derailed the operation. I would also argue they are symptomatic of the lack of push and/or business as usual attitude displayed during MG.

1. And I would argue that such simple realities as needing maintenance time and not being able to see at night SHOULD have been apparent to the planners and those (Monty and Ike) who approved the op.

 

2. The only way 30 Corps was going to keep on 'sheddyoule' was if they ran into absolutely NO resistance. A couple of weeks before the M-G drop when it appeared the German Army was collapsing, 'NO resistence' looked like a real possibility to the planners.

 

I would submit that the whole M-G operation plan was based on an assumption of 'NO resistance'. The "three spread-out routes" 1st Abn Bde took from their silly RAF-mandated Drop Zone to Arnhem Bridge (and the Deelen Heights) were what somebody trying to clean up scattered resistance in previously-occupied enemy territory would do, not what would be be planned by people expecting to meet serious resistance.

 

"Hey, these barstids are SHOOTING at us!!!" must have come as a distinct shock to people who had advanced 300 miles against minimal resistance in days shortly before M-G.

[BillB]

Difficult question to answer and a crucial one I think.  My personal opinion is that they felt an earlier H-Hour for the ground forces would negate the element of surprise for the airborne operation.  I think this was both wrong and a huge mistake.  Again I don't think the blame lies with Gds Arm'd or even XXX Corps (although you could reasonably argue that Horrocks should have tried to have had it changed) but with higher up command and probably originated from Brereton and Browning.

Fair one. I look to someone coming up with some definitive evidence on this. My suspicion, FWIW, is that XXX Corps was not ready to go much earlier, which may or may not have been addressable.

Again Bill if you look at the documents in the National Archive - WO 171/846 which contains the XXX Corps General Movement Instructions for Operation 'Garden' see:

Ch 5.

© There will be NO movement on the main axis during the hours of darkness

 

Clearly the fault lies with XXX Corps and not Gds Arm'd.  In that respect it is also useful to note that they did attempt to overrule this and press on in the evening of the 17th Sept from Valkenswaard, but were stymied by the refusal of Brigadier Stanier (231 Inf Bde) to relieve them.  Instead he preferred to send one of his two infantry battalions back down the main axis to protect his divisional artillery.  A fatal decision and one which cannot be blamed on Gds Arm'd.  In addition contrary to a number of post-war accounts they set off from Valkenswaard at first light on the 18th Sept (approx 0600hrs).  Hardly a tardy response.

 

I think your thesis that they displayed a lack of drive throughout the operation is more than a little overstated.  Where possible they advanced with all expediency - the difficulty was the constraints they were forced to operate under and their relatively limited fighting power.  For example on the 20th/21st, arguably the crisis point of the whole operation, they were forced to send the entire 32nd Gds Bde Gp to assist 101st Airborne around Veghel (at the direct request of 101st Airborne) while at the same time providing the Coldstream BG to assist 82nd Airborne in Groesbeek.  This left them one understrength BG (Irish Gds) to try to force their way from Nijmegen to Arnhem.  Clearly sufficient combat power was not available.

Again, fair one. I need to do more work on GARDEN as for the airborne bit, as I think I have a tendency to unconsciously conflate XXXCorps and its subordinate formations, and Guards Armoured perhaps gets some of the tar that should go elsewhere. Good point about the lack of combat power, which I suspect is the underlying problem - another case of trying to do too much with too little.

Time for you to get dirty in the archives again I think Bill, you nasty little history troll 

Indeed, altho my next trip will be to look at something else in April. Anyway, what about getting back into the discussion about the 82nd Airborne's performance you started above?

In general I would agree but I would note that the lack of urgency was typical of nearly all Allied units involved in Market Garden (101st Airborne is the honourable exception along with 15/19 KRH and 44 RTR whose largely unsung contribution was immense), due to a misplaced belief that the German Army had been defeated and the war was essentially won.

 

Best regards

 

Tom

276736[/snapback]

Again, can't really argue with that.

 

all the best

 

BillB

[BillB]

Boy, this topic has some legs...

 

- why they waited until the MARKET force were overhead before jumping off...I thought we did this one before...

 

1. There had been many (9 or 10?) drops planned just weeks before that hadn't come off. Personally, I wouldn't have believed the M-G drop was going to happen until I saw the chutes open.

 

2. 30 Corps jumping off and the drop being scrubbed would have been a Royal Cluster Fucck(see it doesn't get censored by the software if you misspell it...).

 

3. Artillery shells and CAS going south-north while the ABN's transports were going west-east was not good traffic planning.

Nope, we did it before but came to no conclusion IIRC. Anyway, how many of those ops were XXX Corps in on? Few if any IIRC, so the idea that XXX Corps was wary because of repeated cancellations doesn't hold water, I don't think. Besides, the aircraft started taking off from 09:45, and the pathfinders were on the ground in Holland by c.12:30, so XXX Corps could still have met your objection and started their advance between two and five hours earlier than they did. Which would also nullify the arty/flight path issue, I think.

 

- why the didn't keep pushing for Eindhoven on the night of 17/18 September, instead of stopping after dark. This has been discussed here before IIRC and a none Guards Armoured relief unit was held up as partially to blame, but that still does not explain why there was no attempt to think outside the box and ditch the "knock off at dark" attitude.

1. Because ever since the Western Desert night had been the time for tanks to collect and get maintenance so they could run the next day. Even if they had 'old reliable' Shermans, trying to run a 24-hr battle would have left Gds Armoured trailing brokendown tanks across half of Holland.

 

2. It's hard to see anything from a tank in daylight, trying to operate at night with 1944-vintage NONsensors would have been a disaster, especially since NOBODY had trained for it.

Again, I disagree. Ref point 1, reciting past practice doesn't really address the point, does it? I don't recall Guards Armoured or XXX Corps leaving a trail of breakdowns across northern France and Belgium during the Great Swan, or the units involved in Op TOTALIZE, or even Patton's swing north in arctic conditons in December 1944. Consequently I fail to see how a sustained burst of activity for the 48 hours MG was supposed to take would have been beyond the pale.

 

I also think you are overplaying the lack of training thing too. These were experienced wartime soldiers, not inexperienced peacetime ones, and should have been more than capable of working flexibly off the cuff if the circumstances demanded it. I'd point to TOTALIZE as a counterpoint to your contention, as well as the German and Soviet success with impromptu dark-o'clock armoured attacks. There was less opposition in the MG AO in the first 48 hours than was often the case where such attacks succeeded elsewhere, and IIRC the TOTALIZE training consisted mainly of having Sherman drivers practice watching the tail lights of the vehicle in front and staying between the Bofor tracer. The advance from Valkensward to Eindhoven ought to have been easier, given they had a road to follow rather than navigating cross country. Besides, tanks and inf were used to carrying out after dark reliefs, having done it for weeks on end in Normandy, so it shouldn't have been a major leap to expand the concept for a couple of successive nights.

Neither of these were fatal in themselves, but they did start the ever lengthening list of minor delays (a sin also committed by 1st Airborne) that in total derailed the operation. I would also argue they are symptomatic of the lack of push and/or business as usual attitude displayed during MG.

1. And I would argue that such simple realities as needing maintenance time and not being able to see at night SHOULD have been apparent to the planners and those (Monty and Ike) who approved the op.

 

2. The only way 30 Corps was going to keep on 'sheddyoule' was if they ran into absolutely NO resistance. A couple of weeks before the M-G drop when it appeared the German Army was collapsing, 'NO resistence' looked like a real possibility to the planners.

 

I would submit that the whole M-G operation plan was based on an assumption of 'NO resistance'. The "three spread-out routes" 1st Abn Bde took from their silly RAF-mandated Drop Zone to Arnhem Bridge (and the Deelen Heights) were what somebody trying to clean up scattered resistance in previously-occupied enemy territory would do, not what would be be planned by people expecting to meet serious resistance.

 

"Hey, these barstids are SHOOTING at us!!!" must have come as a distinct shock to people who had advanced 300 miles against minimal resistance in days shortly before M-G.[/b]

276749[/snapback]

And again, I disagree. Ref ther last point, you miss the fact that XXX Corps had been in some pretty heavy scrapping with the Germans (as cited by Kit above IIRC) in the gap between The Great Swan and start of MG. I also think you are overstating your case using hindsight from the nine day op that MG became as opposed to what was there during the first 48 hours, which was all it was supposed to take. I don't think Montgomery and Eisenhower were to blame for assuming that their subordinates capable of pulling off an attack that didn't involve knocking off as soon as it got dark. The most obvious counterpoint is how close they came to pulling it off only slightly overschedule despite the delays and errors. Your point 1 has been covered above, the 1st Parachute Brigade bit was more to do with their long standing practice of trying to do too much with too little, and you miss the point that the two thirds of the Brigade that were supposed to get the Arnhem road bridge *would* have got there in time under the existing plan if they hadn't stopped when it got dark. Tardiness was the primary reason for that specific failure followed by the speed and efficiency of German reaction, not the other way round. Finally, I suspect that there were very few among the blokes at the pointy end who thought there was going to be no resistance, whatever the planners said. IIRC some of the 1st Airborne commanders said as much in their briefing to the troops, and I don't think the 82nd and 101st Airborne thought that way either.

 

So there!

 

all the best

 

BillB

[DB]

Boy, this topic has some legs...

 

276777[/snapback]

But it's well worth the walking. Great stuff, IMHO.

 

David

[KingSargent]

Boy, this topic has some legs...

Nope, we did it before but came to no conclusion IIRC. Anyway, how many of those ops were XXX Corps in on? Few if any IIRC, so the idea that XXX Corps was wary because of repeated cancellations doesn't hold water, I don't think. Besides, the aircraft started taking off from 09:45, and the pathfinders were on the ground in Holland by c.12:30, so XXX Corps could still have met your objection and started their advance between two and five hours earlier than they did. Which would also nullify the arty/flight path issue, I think.

I agree with you about what should have been done, but I think the perceptions of the PLANNERS should be considered. 30 Corps's experience was immaterial, they got the op Handed Down From ON HIGH.

 

Again, I disagree. Ref point 1, reciting past practice doesn't really address the point, does it? I don't recall Guards Armoured or XXX Corps leaving a trail of breakdowns across northern France and Belgium during the Great Swan But they weren't running 24/7 now, were they? Werb and I made it from Antwerp to Normandy in less than a day, but you can't move a 1944 army that fast. , or the units involved in Op TOTALIZE, or even Patton's swing north in arctic conditons in December 1944. Consequently I fail to see how a sustained burst of activity for the 48 hours MG was supposed to take would have been beyond the pale.

Except nobody was used to it or expected it. I had a very hard time (and failed in instances) with convincing "experienced" officers that perhaps The Way It Was Always Done was NOT the Best Way To Go.

 

As for Patton's 'Swing North', he was working with a staff trained to "Inappropriate Measures" {thinking "Out Of he Box"} and an army that lacked an Ingrained Institutional Perception of "The Way Things Are Done, Old Boy...." Speaking from experience, it's a lot easier to teach 'Newbies' a new procedure than 'Oould Lags Who Knowitall'.

 

I also think you are overplaying the lack of training thing too. So did I, until I WUZ WON... These were experienced wartime soldiers, not inexperienced peacetime ones, Trust me, the 'experienced' people are the hardest to teach something "new and different" to... and should have been more than capable of working flexibly off the cuff if the circumstances demanded it. I'd point to TOTALIZE as a counterpoint to your contention, as well as the German and Soviet success with impromptu dark-o'clock armoured attacks. There was less opposition in the MG AO in the first 48 hours than was often the case where such attacks succeeded elsewhere, and IIRC the TOTALIZE training consisted mainly of having Sherman drivers practice watching the tail lights of the vehicle in front and staying between the Bofor tracer. The advance from Valkensward to Eindhoven ought to have been easier, given they had a road to follow rather than navigating cross country. Besides, tanks and inf were used to carrying out after dark reliefs, having done it for weeks on end in Normandy, so it shouldn't have been a major leap to expand the concept for a couple of successive nights. It SHOULDN'T have been, but it WAS! You are THE authority here, but I don't recall anything in writing (including yours) that says that 30 Corps was ever told to modify long-standing SOP and run up roads at night in the presence of an invisible enemy. A TC sticking his had out of a hatch has one Helluvalot less chance of seeing an AT gun concealed in woods than the AT gunner has of seeing a tank on a road he has already zeroed in...

 

And again, I disagree. Ref ther last point, you miss the fact that XXX Corps had been in some pretty heavy scrapping with the Germans (as cited by Kit above IIRC) in the gap between The Great Swan and start of MG. I also think you are overstating your case using hindsight from the nine day op that MG became as opposed to what was there during the first 48 hours, which was all it was supposed to take. I don't think Montgomery and Eisenhower were to blame for assuming that their subordinates capable of pulling off an attack that didn't involve knocking off as soon as it got dark. Why not? I find no instances in the previous four years where anybody except Commandos and Paras DIDN'T "knock off after dark"... The most obvious counterpoint is how close As the saying goes: "Close" counts in horseshoes and handgrenades... they came to pulling it off only slightly overschedule despite the delays and errors. Your point 1 has been covered above, the 1st Parachute Brigade bit was more to do with their long standing practice of trying to do too much with too little, and you miss the point that the two thirds of the Brigade that were supposed to get the Arnhem road bridge *would* have got there in time under the existing plan if they hadn't stopped when it got dark. Tardiness was the primary reason for that specific failure followed by the speed and efficiency of German reaction Which expectation was, IMHO, perfectly logical given recent operational evidence. not the other way round. Finally, I suspect that there were very few among the blokes at the pointy end who thought there was going to be no resistance, But they weren't giving the orders, were they? whatever the planners said. IIRC some of the 1st Airborne commanders said as much in their briefing to the troops, and I don't think the 82nd and 101st Airborne thought that way either.

 

So there!

 

all the best

 

BillB

 

Once again, the 'guys at the pointy end' are rarely consulted during planning. When I was writing P&P (AKA 'Op Orders') for Alaska's Dept of Corrections, I made it a point to take my drafts to the best officers I knew who would be affected by the change in regs for a "Reality Check." Having been 'at the pointy end' myself, I never needed to make many changes, but the fact that I 'vetted' the new regs with the troops made a HUGE impression and greatly facilitated CHANGE in the troops.

 

None of which is really germane, except to point out that expecting Ingrained Operational Habits to change overnight is silly.

 

To reiterate, pronouncing 'What SHOULD have been done' is great fun, but somewhat unrealistic if the training and conditions at the time would make it impossible for the 'pointy end' guys to absorb a change in a few hours.

 

Just like in the "FRANCE 1940" discussions, expecting the untrained reservists of 55th and 71st IDs to react to German crossings of the Meuse like NATO troops who have trained for years would do is simply unrealistic.

[Kit Hildreth]

TOTALIZE? (presuming you're only reffering to armour ops.)

276173[/snapback]

Is there anything else?! Tankies rule!

[BillB]

KingSargent,Fri 27 Jan 2006 2109

I agree with you about what should have been done, but I think the perceptions of the PLANNERS should be considered. 30 Corps's experience was immaterial, they got the op Handed Down From ON HIGH.

 

Not sure about that, as I've not seen the orders passed down to XXX Corps so I dunno how far the micro management went or indeed if it existed. But Tom has posted up a quote *from* XXX Corps orders to Guards Armoured that shows the stop at dark mentality emanated from there. Which fits with my growing suspicion that XXX Corps and Horrocks in particular was the root of the problem.

 

But they weren't running 24/7 now, were they? Werb and I made it from Antwerp to Normandy in less than a day, but you can't move a 1944 army that fast.

 

I've made it from Calais to Normandy in much less than a day several times, but we aren't talking about that speed or anything approaching that distance either. The whole GARDEN advance only tots up to c.60 miles, to be carried out over 48 hours, and I doubt with the same units at point either. And in any case, we are only talking about a few miles on the first night (which might have been uneccessary in any case had XXX Corps moved before mid to late afternoon!) to reach Eindhoven on schedule. The only major hold up after that was Nijmegen, which might have been avoided with the latter speed up as KG Euling only just got to the bridge before Lindquist's 508 PIR. And the Nijmegen delay as it happened was exacerbated by poor forward planning in not having assault boats to hand.

 

Except nobody was used to it or expected it. I had a very hard time (and failed in instances) with convincing "experienced" officers that perhaps The Way It Was Always Done was NOT the Best Way To Go.

 

I take your point, but think it is a bit of a stretch to compare personal experience in law enforcement or whatever with military practice in a foreign army over half a century ago, King. And in any case your contention is again refuted by TOTALIZE and indeed the seeing of the Neerpelt bridge by Guards Armoured as cited above by Colin. I think you are severely overplaying the British lack of flexibility line here, and ascribing things due to other causes to it.

 

As for Patton's 'Swing North', he was working with a staff trained to "Inappropriate Measures" {thinking "Out Of he Box"} and an army that lacked an Ingrained Institutional Perception of "The Way Things Are Done, Old Boy...." Speaking from experience, it's a lot easier to teach 'Newbies' a new procedure than 'Oould Lags Who Knowitall'.

 

I don't really know enough about Patton and his 3rd Army to judge, but I'd be interested to see some evidence about this thinking out of the box business, as from my reading the US Army was no less hidebound than the British in the ETO, and prolly moreso in some instances. I think the performance of the US landing forces on D-Day, and the 4th Infantry Division at UTAH in particular is a pretty good example that includes just about all the points you are making here against XXX Corps et al. If I didn't know you better I'd suspect your latent Brit baiting tendency was trying to get the better of you...

 

It SHOULDN'T have been, but it WAS! You are THE authority here, but I don't recall anything in writing (including yours) that says that 30 Corps was ever told to modify long-standing SOP and run up roads at night in the presence of an invisible enemy. A TC sticking his had out of a hatch has one Helluvalot less chance of seeing an AT gun concealed in woods than the AT gunner has of seeing a tank on a road he has already zeroed in...

 

Dunno about the "authority" bit, especially with ref to XXX Corps/Guards Armoured - there are folk here with better knowledge of that than I. I doubt, however, that anyone passing down stuff to XXX Corps bothered with SOPs at that level of detail. Ref the bit about the TC, your AT gunner wouldn't be able to see jack shit in a no-moon period without artificial illume, no matter how good his zeroing - and remember the Germans between Valkenswaard and Eindhoven didn't have the opportunity to do much zeroing as they were moved into position in the dark, and close to the road rather then hidden in woods because they lacked prime movers. IMO the Brits ought to have pushed aggressive infantry fighting patrols up the road in the dark, which would have interfered with or even prevented the Germans from emplacing and thus greatly assisted the armoured advance when it got going after first light.

 

Why not? I find no instances in the previous four years where anybody except Commandos and Paras DIDN'T "knock off after dark"...

 

I think you need to look a bit harder then, mate. John Foley refers to being sent out with his Churchill troop after dark to secure a group of farm buildings in his memoir, and Robert Boscawen from Guards Armoured mentions pushing his tanks across a bridge and up to the front line to support the infantry against a German night attack in Holland in October 1944, for example. The tone of these doesn't suggest this was out of the ordinary, just unwelcome, and I suspect there are lots of other examples. And again, there was TOTALIZE, and in many instances the tankies didn't actually pull out to rearm etc until well after dark to allow the inf to get sorted out too. I think you'll find there was also a lot of dark o'clock patrolling by Brit infantry. Ironically, prolly a holdover from the dominating no-man's land business from WW1.

 

As the saying goes: "Close" counts in horseshoes and handgrenades...

 

Yes, very droll, but that doesn't affect the essential point, does it? ie, that despite your flippant blowing off they still almost pulled it off in spite of your objections and apparent implication that it couldn't be done.

 

Which expectation was, IMHO, perfectly logical given recent operational evidence.

 

Sorry, you've lost me there. But if you mean what I think you mean then why did the two US airborne divs not act in a similar manner?

 

But they weren't giving the orders, were they?

 

And the ones giving the orders weren't carrying them out either, were they? See below.

 

Once again, the 'guys at the pointy end' are rarely consulted during planning. When I was writing P&P (AKA 'Op Orders') for Alaska's Dept of Corrections, I made it a point to take my drafts to the best officers I knew who would be affected by the change in regs for a "Reality Check." Having been 'at the pointy end' myself, I never needed to make many changes, but the fact that I 'vetted' the new regs with the troops made a HUGE impression and greatly facilitated CHANGE in the troops.

 

Fair comment, but how are you so certain that similar mods were not made by some of those at the pointy end in MG? 1st Para Battalion actually did this by repeatedly trying to sidestep enemy opposition rather than bash thru as ordered to minimise losses (altho this exacerbated rather than assisted matters) and abandoned its mission to head for the bridge on the commanders authority, and IIRC Hackett explicitly contradicted the official line from above when briefing his people. That said, despite protests to the contrary from elsewhere, I suspect that this was lacking from the pointy end of GARDEN but because it was the Guards doing it rather than as a widespead result of BA inflexibility per se. I can't help wondering how things might have gone had the 11 Armoured Div been given the job rather than Guards Armoured.

 

None of which is really germane, except to point out that expecting Ingrained Operational Habits to change overnight is silly.

 

No more silly than making assumptions based on little more than personal opinion, I'd say. Especially as we have evidence here that suggests that these "habits" were far less firmly ingrained than you are portraying them.

 

To reiterate, pronouncing 'What SHOULD have been done' is great fun, but somewhat unrealistic if the training and conditions at the time would make it impossible for the 'pointy end' guys to absorb a change in a few hours.

 

See previous comment. You are making some pretty sweeping assumptions based on not a lot here, as far as I can see. It is not a matter of doing anything in "a few hours", Guards Armoured had been exhibiting more tactical flexibility than you are crediting them with in the period immediately before MG kicked off.

 

Just like in the "FRANCE 1940" discussions, expecting the untrained reservists of 55th and 71st IDs to react to German crossings of the Meuse like NATO troops who have trained for years would do is simply unrealistic.

 

This is a pretty poor analogy, there was a world of difference between the 55th and 71st IDs and the XXX Corps of 1944, even allowing for your Ingrained Operational Habits and the Guards liking for the book. And the latter had behaved in exactly the manner you label as "unrealistic" in establishing their bridgehead at Neerpelt.

 

all the best,

 

BillB

 

[edited to add: F*ck knows what's up with the quote function here, had three goes and still no joy! ]

[KingSargent]

Not sure about that, as I've not seen the orders passed down to XXX Corps so I dunno how far the micro management went or indeed if it existed. But Tom has posted up a quote *from* XXX Corps orders to Guards Armoured that shows the stop at dark mentality emanated from there. Which fits with my growing suspicion that XXX Corps and Horrocks in particular was the root of the problem.

I don't really think that it is fair to 'blame' Horrocks and 30 Corps for what appears to be an Army-wide practice.

 

Yes, there was TOTALIZE and other night ops previously, but none of them expected things to keep running for a 60-mile advance. My point is that GARDEN was something totally new, was sprung on combat-weary troops at virtually the last minute, and that there just wasn't time to set up procedures that would make a 24-hour advance possible.

 

I've made it from Calais to Normandy in much less than a day several times, but we aren't talking about that speed or anything approaching that distance either. The whole GARDEN advance only tots up to c.60 miles, to be carried out over 48 hours, and I doubt with the same units at point either. And in any case, we are only talking about a few miles on the first night (which might have been uneccessary in any case had XXX Corps moved before mid to late afternoon!) As I said, I wouldn't have moved until I saw the parachutes bloom either. And arguing that 30 Corps was not involved in the previous cancelled drops is ignoring that modern communications make everyone at Corps level aware of what is happening at Army or Group Level. I mean, it's not like they were dependent on Mararton runners or horsed messengers for communication was it? to reach Eindhoven on schedule. Do you think they could have reached the Son bridge before it was blown? The only major hold up after that was Nijmegen, which might have been avoided with the latter speed up as KG Euling only just got to the bridge before Lindquist's 508 PIR. And the Nijmegen delay as it happened was exacerbated by poor forward planning in not having assault boats to hand.

I take your point, but think it is a bit of a stretch to compare personal experience in law enforcement or whatever with military practice in a foreign army over half a century ago, King. And in any case your contention is again refuted by TOTALIZE and indeed the seeing of the Neerpelt bridge by Guards Armoured as cited above by Colin. I think you are severely overplaying the British lack of flexibility line here, and ascribing things due to other causes to it. It's not BRITISH lack of flexibility, it's EVERYBODY'S lack of flexibility. As I mentioned, the only US officer (apparently) who used the 24-hour Battle as SOP was Terry Allen with his 104th Division

BTW, my military career was cut short by the US Army deciding my Inability To Run overshadowed my Ability To Think, but I went through a whole training regime and spent many hours on exercises. I am not a COMPLETE novice in military matters.

I don't really know enough about Patton and his 3rd Army to judge, but I'd be interested to see some evidence about this thinking out of the box business, as from my reading the US Army was no less hidebound than the British in the ETO, and prolly moreso in some instances. I agree in general about the US Army, but an Army raised virtually overnight from a very limited base has to depend on its manuals until it can gain actual combat experience. As for the 3rd Army, I suggest you find Lucky Forward (damn people who move my books - I can't give an author or ISBN right now) which is a nice little history of the 3rd Army STAFF. I think the performance of the US landing forces on D-Day, and the 4th Infantry Division at UTAH in particular is a pretty good example that includes just about all the points you are making here against XXX Corps et al. If I didn't know you better I'd suspect your latent Brit baiting tendency was trying to get the better of you...   For the zillionth time, I am not a Brit-basher, I'm a STUPID-basher. The US was stupid at times, the Brits were stupid at times, some people of Latin derivation were stupid most of the time (that's a joke, folk). The Brits were in the war longer and had more opportunities to be stupid, but we Yanks worked manfully to catch up...

Dunno about the "authority" bit, especially with ref to XXX Corps/Guards Armoured - there are folk here with better knowledge of that than I. Modesty, modesty... I doubt, however, that anyone passing down stuff to XXX Corps bothered with SOPs at that level of detail. Ref the bit about the TC, your AT gunner wouldn't be able to see jack shit in a no-moon period without artificial illume, no matter how good his zeroing Having played in dense woods on FTXs (and surveillance posts) many times, I'd agree, except even in the dark it's hard NOT to see something as big as a tank on a clear road. - and remember the Germans between Valkenswaard and Eindhoven didn't have the opportunity to do much zeroing as they were moved into position in the dark, and close to the road rather then hidden in woods because they lacked prime movers. IMO the Brits ought to have pushed aggressive infantry fighting patrols up the road in the dark, which would have interfered with or even prevented the Germans from emplacing and thus greatly assisted the armoured advance when it got going after first light. Righto, except the "This is a milk run" attitude was pervasive by that time. Infantry numb from their tailbones down after hours of being vibrated in 1/2tracks tend not to be really aggressive patrollers when they don't really expect to find anything. This is not a British Failing, it's a Human Failing, and I'm sure you don't want to suggest that Brits are not human...

I think you need to look a bit harder then, mate. John Foley refers to being sent out with his Churchill troop after dark to secure a group of farm buildings in his memoir, and Robert Boscawen from Guards Armoured mentions pushing his tanks across a bridge and up to the front line to support the infantry against a German night attack in Holland in October 1944, for example.  The tone of these doesn't suggest this was out of the ordinary, just unwelcome, and I suspect there are lots of other examples. And again, there was TOTALIZE, and in many instances the tankies didn't actually pull out to rearm etc until well after dark to allow the inf to get sorted out too. I think you'll find there was also a lot of dark o'clock patrolling by Brit infantry. Ironically, prolly a holdover from the dominating no-man's land business from WW1. Yes it happened, but it was unusual and as you say, apparently unwelcome. To expand a few lower-echelon level instances into suggesting that a whole Corps with limited operational planning time could do it on the fly is IMHO unreasonable.

Obviously I was not involved in planning DESERT STORM, but I know people who were, and people around the world planned that with an all-professional Army(ies) that had been in place on the "Go Line" for months. IMHO, it is simply unrealistic to expect ODS-level performance from 30 Corps.

Yes, very droll, but that doesn't affect the essential point, does it? ie, that despite your flippant blowing off they still almost pulled it off in spite of your objections and apparent implication that it couldn't be done.

Sorry, you've lost me there. But if you mean what I think you mean then why did the two US airborne divs not act in a similar manner? Because they were operating under real constraints imposed by their training and orders?

And the ones giving the orders weren't carrying them out either, were they? See below.

Fair comment, but how are you so certain that similar mods were not made by some of those at the pointy end in MG? 1st Para Battalion actually did this by repeatedly trying to sidestep enemy opposition rather than bash thru as ordered to minimise losses (altho this exacerbated rather than assisted matters) and abandoned its mission to head for the bridge on the commanders authority, and IIRC Hackett explicitly contradicted the official line from above when briefing his people. That said, despite protests to the contrary from elsewhere, I suspect that this was lacking from the pointy end of GARDEN but because it was the Guards doing it rather than as a widespead result of BA inflexibility per se. I  can't help wondering how things might have gone had the 11 Armoured Div been given the job rather than Guards Armoured.  'Pip' Roberts' boys were undoubtedly the elite, but you can't have an elite unit everywhere (that would negate the definition of elite). I really don't think Gds Armoured put up that bad a show, I can't think of any US (or German, FTM) unit that could have done better (unless Patton was riding their ass with a flamethrower... )

No moresilly than making assumptions based on little more than personal opinion, I'd say. Especially as we have evidence here that suggests that these "habits" were far less firmly ingrained than you are portraying them.

See previous comment. You are making some pretty sweeping assumptions based on not a lot here, as far as I can see. It is not a matter of doing anything in "a few hours", Guards Armoured had been exhibiting more tactical flexibility than you are crediting them with in the period immediately before MG kicked off.

This is a pretty poor analogy, there was a world of difference between the 55th and 71st IDs and the XXX Corps of 1944, even allowing for your Ingrained Operational Habits and the Guards liking for the book. And the latter had behaved in exactly the manner you label as "unrealistic" in establishing their bridgehead at Neerpelt. I mentioned the French divisions to  show that expecting perfect permormance from troops in unusual situations is silly, not equating them with any other nationality's personnel. The fact remains that the 55th and 71st DIs patently lacked the equipment, training, and skills to face the German crossing of the Meuse, and I would submit that GARDEN was so far out of normal British (and US) SOP that to expect perfection is unreasonable.

 

FTM, the German response to M-G was far out of their normal operational standards - especially their Autumn 1944 standards. Who, after the 'Great Swan', would have expected such a potent German reaction? Germans at every level "marched to the sound of the guns" and managed to put up a resistance that delayed the GARDEN advance until the operation bit the bullet. If anyone knows of a finer performance by the German (and LW and SS) Army in 1944, please enlighten me.

 

all the best,

 

BillB

 

[edited to add: F*ck knows what's up with the quote function here, had three goes and still no joy!  ]

276964[/snapback]

[swerve]

all the best,

 

BillB

 

[edited to add: F*ck knows what's up with the quote function here, had three goes and still no joy!  mad.gif ]

 

Too many embedded quotes? There's a limit.

[BillB]

King Sargent wrote: I don't really think that it is fair to 'blame' Horrocks and 30 Corps for what appears to be an Army-wide practice.

 

I think it goes deeper than that. Horrocks was ill and had been at it for too long I think, he was not on top of the situation and he certainly didn't grip his people as he ought and needed to do. There are lots of little incidents that I think will add up when examined closely, as with Urquhart. I suspect this is the root of XXX Corps problems, and another example of British commanders doing what they liked rather than what they were told when not gripped and supervised closely.

 

Yes, there was TOTALIZE and other night ops previously, but none of them expected things to keep running for a 60-mile advance. My point is that GARDEN was something totally new, was sprung on combat-weary troops at virtually the last minute, and that there just wasn't time to set up procedures that would make a 24-hour advance possible.

 

I take your point, but you seem to be suggesting that the folk who jumped off on the afternoon of 17 September were going to be going balls to the wall, non-stop until they got to Arnhem. That is an oversimplification IMO. With a bit of forward planning there is no reason why they couldn't have maintained their tempo *and* worked their reliefs and maintenance in and kept at least some forward movement while it was dark, even if only with infantry. From the participant accounts of NW Europe I've seen this kind of thing was by no means as unfamiliar or atypical as you seem to think. With ref to the bit about not having time to set up "procedures", how do you square that with the info Tom found in the official documentation showing that Guards Armoured wanted to keep moving from Valkenswaard and were overruled by higher authority?

 

As I said, I wouldn't have moved until I saw the parachutes bloom either. And arguing that 30 Corps was not involved in the previous cancelled drops is ignoring that modern communications make everyone at Corps level aware of what is happening at Army or Group Level. I mean, it's not like they were dependent on Mararton runners or horsed messengers for communication was it?

 

I know what you've said, and I think you (and they) were wrong because they thus sacrificed precious daylight. You are trying to have your cake and eat it mate. If they can't move after dark then they have to make the absolute best use of the daylight, and it cannot be acceptable to sit still for anywhere between the two and five hours after which it was absolutely the clear the operation was a go. I also disagree with your assumption that XXX Corps HQ would have been privy to any of the cancelled airborne ops. In part because of security, and in part because they were busy and didn't have time to sit around speculating on matters that didn't concern them. Again, precisely how many of the cancelled airborne ops would have involved XXX Corps if they hadn't been cancelled?

 

[quopte]Do you think they could have reached the Son bridge before it was blown?

 

Of course not, that's daft. The Son bridge was blown before the Guards Armoured had moved far from its start line, I think. However, the CRE of XXX Corps had put his bridging equipment up front in the advance, which means the faster they got to Son the faster they could have started erecting the Bailey stuff, and the closer to the schedule the advsance would have been, yes?

 

It's not BRITISH lack of flexibility, it's EVERYBODY'S lack of flexibility. As I mentioned, the only US officer (apparently) who used the 24-hour Battle as SOP was Terry Allen with his 104th Division

BTW, my military career was cut short by the US Army deciding my Inability To Run overshadowed my Ability To Think, but I went through a whole training regime and spent many hours on exercises. I am not a COMPLETE novice in military matters.

 

Ref the last bit, weren't suggesting you were or that it is much different at this end. But it was you who started throwing in the CO/LEO stuff... Ref the first bit, fair comment, but Terry Allen's previous command didn't do much 24 Hour battling after getting off OMAHA on D Day, whereas the totally green 175th Infantry did a creditable dark o'clock advance from Gruchy toward Isigny, and in company with tanks too. As I keep saying, I don't think all this inflexibility was as inflexible as yiu portray it. I suspect it's more a case of lack of faith by higher ups than lack of willingness or capability at the pointy end.

 

I agree in general about the US Army, but an Army raised virtually overnight from a very limited base has to depend on its manuals until it can gain actual combat experience. As for the 3rd Army, I suggest you find Lucky Forward (damn people who move my books - I can't give an author or ISBN right now) which is a nice little history of the 3rd Army STAFF.

 

Fair comment, but the same could be said of much of a fair bit of the BA in NW Europe too. Ref the book, thanks, I'll squirrel that away for future ref.

 

For the zillionth time, I am not a Brit-basher, I'm a STUPID-basher. The US was stupid at times, the Brits were stupid at times, some people of Latin derivation were stupid most of the time (that's a joke, folk). The Brits were in the war longer and had more opportunities to be stupid, but we Yanks worked manfully to catch up.

 

Fair comment and yes, I know - hence the razz. Didn't think you'd bite there...

 

Having played in dense woods on FTXs (and surveillance posts) many times, I'd agree, except even in the dark it's hard NOT to see something as big as a tank on a clear road.

 

Fair one. But IIRC it was also misty in the time period we're talking about, and I believe the Germans were busy manhandling their guns about too, as opposed to waiting patiently from prepared positions.

 

Righto, except the "This is a milk run" attitude was pervasive by that time. Infantry numb from their tailbones down after hours of being vibrated in 1/2tracks tend not to be really aggressive patrollers when they don't really expect to find anything. This is not a British Failing, it's a Human Failing, and I'm sure you don't want to suggest that Brits are not human...

 

Of course we're not human, we're superhuman. We have to be cos we keep having to hold the ring while you lot get your act together. That aside, you keep going on about this milk run attitude being pervasive, but where's your evidence it was present anywhere at the pointy end apart from the planners (on assumption rather than from evidence) and 1st Para Brigade? XXX Corp had been having some prety stiff scrapping against KG Walther for the Neerpelt Bridgehead and they didn't just switch off at Valkenswaard after dark either, hence the bit about 231 Inf Brigade or whoever dragging their feet. So I'm afraid I don't see them bimbling about in a complacent daze and think you are overstating your case based on little more than personal opinion again, mate.

 

Yes it happened, but it was unusual and as you say, apparently unwelcome. To expand a few lower-echelon level instances into suggesting that a whole Corps with limited operational planning time could do it on the fly is IMHO unreasonable.

Obviously I was not involved in planning DESERT STORM, but I know people who were, and people around the world planned that with an all-professional Army(ies) that had been in place on the "Go Line" for months. IMHO, it is simply unrealistic to expect ODS-level performance from 30 Corps.

 

I didn't say it was unusual, I suspect a dig around in the War Diaries would show it was a lot more common than is realised. And again, you are overstating the case. It is not a matter of a whole corps, is it? We are talking about battalion level stuff here, especially given the narrow frontage, and the fighting immediately before the MG kick off suggests that the units involved had been doing stuff like that already, so it was hardly a matter of doing it on the fly. And again, if that were the case why did Guards Armoured try to get permission to push on after dark? I also think it is extremely dodgy to draw parallels with the modern US Army and the BA of seventy years ago, not least because the former are doing a pretty good job of imitating the pre-Jena-Auerstadt Prussians. At least if the folk on here who have served with the former at the pointy end are to be believed.

 

Because they were operating under real constraints imposed by their training and orders?

 

I've really got no idea of what you are driving at here, King. You'll have to go back and start from the beginning...

 

'Pip' Roberts' boys were undoubtedly the elite, but you can't have an elite unit everywhere (that would negate the definition of elite). I really don't think Gds Armoured put up that bad a show, I can't think of any US (or German, FTM) unit that could have done better (unless Patton was riding their ass with a flamethrower... )

 

Not a big fan of the term elite, I'll settle for competent. Actually, I agree that the Guards didn't put up that bad a show, and it could have been worse. However, they could also have done a bit better in little ways that wouldn't have made much difference in isolation but added up in total, and I am still waiting to be convinced that the root of the problem there was not the Guards ethos.

 

I mentioned the French divisions to show that expecting perfect permormance from troops in unusual situations is silly, not equating them with any other nationality's personnel. The fact remains that the 55th and 71st DIs patently lacked the equipment, training, and skills to face the German crossing of the Meuse, and I would submit that GARDEN was so far out of normal British (and US) SOP that to expect perfection is unreasonable.

 

And I'd dispute you submission and repeat that it is a poor and inaccurate analogy. If you look at the detail rather than the sweeping big picture the British units involved were looking at nothing especially atypical from what they had done before and did again after MG. You could level your last charge at the big advance after Falaise, and that went ok. You seem to be suggesting that the soldiers involved at all levels were automatons incapable of displaying competence or initiative without having all the recommended training and equipment. I think this reflects a fundamental difference in the Brit and US way of doing things. Whichever, IMO that is a very skewed and inaccurate view that is simply contradicted by the evidence. And nobody is looking for perfection, merely for competence with the basics.

 

FTM, the German response to M-G was far out of their normal operational standards - especially their Autumn 1944 standards. Who, after the 'Great Swan', would have expected such a potent German reaction? Germans at every level "marched to the sound of the guns" and managed to put up a resistance that delayed the GARDEN advance until the operation bit the bullet. If anyone knows of a finer performance by the German (and LW and SS) Army in 1944, please enlighten me.

 

Fair comment, altho I'd argue that the Germans were merely acting within their normal operational standards rather than outside them. They had practised mission tactics rather than order tactics for a long time, and they also went out of their way to inculcate initiative and operational flexibilty. MG was just a particularly suitable environment for that operational method, and I think the Waffen SS deserve the lion's share of the credit. I'm not all that familiar with the Eastern Front but I suspect there are a fair few examples of this kind of reaction out there.

 

all the best

 

BillB

[BillB]

Too many embedded quotes? There's a limit.

277058[/snapback]

Prolly. Bloody annoying tho.

 

BillB