Why Bridge Too Far attempt was doomed

[KingSargent]

A glider assault on Deelen was eminently feasible IMO but it's value would be severely limited becuase it would be rapidly taken under fire from German artillery, which would more or less render it unseless as an airhead. What German artillery, where? OTH it would be a much better place to try and land the Hamilcars. I would have liked to see some Locusts in the Hamilcars. They aren't going to take big Panzers, but they could sure shake up people from training schools - not to mention making things extremely interesting for flak sites.

 

The problem as I see it was that 1st AD was not designed with excess and redundant support weapon capabilities. Very few airborne divisions are, especially when the op was supposed to be over in 72 hours. Given what they thought was German strength in the area, I'm surprised they took the 17pdrs along at all. Once the 17lbers wtc. were lost, they were gone.

 

Simon

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[erwinl]

Not saying that there was only one goal. As it was, there weren't enough supplies for Ike's vaunted broad front strategy. Ike could either authorize supplies to reinforce 3rd and 7th Armies success or send supplies to Monty to reinvigorate his all but stalled drive and get the V2 sites...a twofer. Hindsight suggests that Ike should have reinforced success in the south. Hindsight also suggests that politically Ike had to make the decision he did, however nonsensical.

 

Then it is strange that gen. Urquhart never mentions the V2 sites. He certainly never planned to make a quick access to germany for XXX Corps to pass through.

 

I'm glad I'm not the only one who thought of a different goal for operation Market Garden.

I will certainly pass it on to my father. He will really like to hear this

 

Greetings

 

Erwin

[BillB]

Then it is strange that gen. Urquhart never mentions the V2 sites. He certainly never planned to make a quick access to germany for XXX Corps to pass through.

 

I'm glad I'm not the only one who thought of a different goal for operation Market Garden.

I will certainly pass it on to my father. He will really like to hear this

 

Greetings

 

Erwin

271900[/snapback]

Erwin, I think you are putting far too much emphasis on Urquhart's memoir, you need to broaden your perspective. I've analysed it in detail and you cannot take it too seriously because like most high level memoirs it is more notable for what it leaves out rather then what it includes. Urquhart spends most of his time making special pleading for the performance of 1st Airborne Div, much of which does not stand up to objective analysis. Generally speaking, folk like him don't write their memoirs to give a straight account of events, but to promote their side of the story for reasons of their own.

 

I have looked at a lot of the official documentation for Market Garden and I know at least one of the posters in this thread has prolly looked at more, and I have never seen anything that supports or even hints at your theory. Also, so much has been written on MG that it would have cropped up somewhere. Ref the V2s, Urquhart may not have known about them, and there is no reason why he should have. That kind of thing was above his responsibility level, not least because I suspect there may have been some ULTRA involvement. However, V2s did crop up in comms between Churchill and Montgomery. No time now, I'll try and dig it out later.

 

Edited to add: Out of curiosity, what is your basis for stating Urquhart "certainly never planned to make a quick access to germany for XXX Corps to pass through". What else could the Arnhem portion of MARKET have been formulated for, albeit poorly? The plan was formulated as a component of a larger scheme, presented to the other particpants in an open forum, and executed as advertised. I suspect we would have heard something from the two American div commanders had they thought they were being lied to...

 

all the best

 

BillB

[erwinl]

Well,

 

My main point was the not mentioning of the Westervoort bridge as an important target for the succeeding of the operation.

If it was so important to make the righthook to the Ruhr area, why ignore the last river between you and said area?

Especially when it is only a few kilometers away from the main Arnhem bridge (the John Frost bridge). You have to pass this bridge to go to Germany, there is no other way, from north of Arnhem.

In fact you can almost see the last bridge from where Frost and his men defended the Arnhem bridge.

 

At the end of the Urquhart book he gives the entire operational orders for the british airbornedivision. No mention is made in there about the last bridge in front of Germany.

 

As I couldn't beleive the allies could miss such a river, I started to think about a different reason for the operation.

 

Greetings

 

Erwin

[JohnB]

Not saying that there was only one goal.  As it was, there weren't enough supplies for Ike's vaunted broad front strategy.  Ike could either authorize supplies to reinforce 3rd and 7th Armies success or send supplies to Monty to reinvigorate his all but stalled drive and get the V2 sites...a twofer.  Hindsight suggests that Ike should have reinforced success in the south.  Hindsight also suggests that politically Ike had to make the decision he did, however nonsensical.

271779[/snapback]

 

First there was no real success to the South; US Third Army began attacking Metz about the 5th of September, it was only finally taken on the 22nd of November.

Second it wasn't a case of giving 'Allied' supplies to Monty - there were two discrete supply chains, a British one and a US one - but of giving US First Army, on Montys right flank, absolute priority on US maintenance.

[JohnB]

Ref the V2s, Urquhart may not have known about them, and there is no reason why he should have. That kind of thing was above his responsibility level, not least because I suspect there may have been some ULTRA involvement. However, V2s did crop up in comms between Churchill and Montgomery. No time now, I'll try and dig it out later.

 

271936[/snapback]

 

Montys memoirs:

"On the 9th September I received information from London that on the previous day the first V2 rockets had landed in England; it was suspected that they came from areas near Rotterdam and Amsterdam and I was asked when I could rope off those general areas. So far as I was concerned that settled the direction of the thrust line of my operations to secure crossings over the Meuse and Rhine: it must be towards Arnhem."

[RETAC21]

I don't know how much value can be put into this, but Monty himself said that the purpose of Market Garden was:

 

"... to cross the Meuse and the Rhine, and to place Second Army in a suitable position for the subsequent development of operations towards the northern face of the Rurh and the North German plains. The thrust to Arnhem outflanked the northern extension of the West Wall, and came very near to complete success"

 

Suplement to the London Gazette, 4 Sept 1946, page 4443.

[erwinl]

Montys memoirs:

"On the 9th September I received information from London that on the previous day the first V2 rockets had landed in England; it was suspected that they came from areas near Rotterdam and Amsterdam and I was asked when I could rope off those general areas. So far as I was concerned that settled the direction of the thrust line of my operations to secure crossings over the Meuse and Rhine: it must be towards Arnhem."

 

Well, that confirms my idea's about the operation. Only not of the deception I first thought.

 

So first stage of the operation would be the cutting of of the german forces in the west of the Netherlands, thereby stopping the V2 attacks on London.

Second stage would be a deliberate attack across the IJssel to enter Germany itself.

If the Westervoort bridge would be conquered at stage one it would be a bonus but it was not a priority (that's why it is mentioned in a drawing as falling in the resposibility for the polish brigade, who would arrive on day three).

 

Greetings

 

Erwin

Edited January 17, 2006 by erwinl

[BillB]

Well,

 

My main point was the not mentioning of the Westervoort bridge as an important target for the succeeding of the operation.

If it was so important to make the righthook to the Ruhr area, why ignore the last river between you and said area?

Especially when it is only a few kilometers away from the main Arnhem bridge (the John Frost bridge). You have to pass this bridge to go to Germany, there is no other way, from north of Arnhem.

In fact you can almost see the last bridge from where Frost and his men defended the Arnhem bridge.

 

At the end of the Urquhart book he gives the entire operational orders for the british airbornedivision. No mention is made in there about the last bridge in front of Germany.

 

As I couldn't beleive the allies could miss such a river, I started to think about a different reason for the operation.

 

Greetings

 

Erwin

271944[/snapback]

Hello Erwin,

 

Fair comment and a perfectly logical deduction. However, I suspect the reason for "missing" the Westervoort bridge is a bit more mundane. As we've seen they didn't have enough men and/or airlift to cover the objectives they actually went after. Consequently there was nothing with which to take it; as you say in your reply to JohnB, it wasn't a priority and a successful MARKET GARDEN would have left them with a single watercourse to assault in the future.

 

all the best

[Rick Griest]

I find the argument by erwin: "My main point was the not mentioning of the Westervoort bridge as an important target for the succeeding of the operation.

If it was so important to make the righthook to the Ruhr area, why ignore the last river between you and said area?"....

 

absolutely terrifying.

 

Was Monty so cold blooded and calculating that he pulled off the greatest stunt of the western front just to steal supplies from the Americans? He never even cleared Walcheren island for pete's sake. Now Brownings famous quote takes on a different light. Maybe BillB and you guys can take a second look at it. I find it's prospect very depressing.

 

Rick

 

PS BillB I really want to read more by you. what is your book?

[ShotMagnet]

Monty believed absolutely and without reservation in Monty, for good or ill, but the diversion of supplies was not up to him.

 

SHAEF was ultimately responsible, and probably found themselves with their hands tied since Monty's plan looked like it had a reasonable chance at succeeding.

 

 

Shot

[JohnB]

Second stage would be a deliberate attack across the IJssel to enter Germany itself.

If the Westervoort bridge would be conquered at stage one it would be a bonus but it was not a priority (that's why it is mentioned in a drawing as falling in the resposibility for the polish brigade, who would arrive on day three).

 

Greetings

 

Erwin

271960[/snapback]

 

From Montys 'Operation Directive: M 525' written on the 14th September '44

Second British Army

15. The first task of the Army is to operate northwards and secure the crossings over the Rhine and Meuse in the general area Arnhem-Nijmegan-Grave. An airborne corps of three divisions is placed under command Second Army for these operations.

16. The Army will then establish itself in strength on the general line Zwolle-Deventer-Arnhem, facing east, with deep bridgeheads on the east side of the Ijssel river.

From this position it will be prepared to advance eastwards to the general area Rheine-Osnabruck-Hamm-Munster.

In this movement its weight will be on its right and directed towards Hamm, from which place a strong thrust will be made southwards along the eastern face of the Ruhr.

etc.

 

If MARKET GARDEN had gone successfully I think the Ijssel river could probably be crossed easily enough even without a bridge. I doubt if the Germans had many organized or even unorganised troops on the east bank of the Ijssel and the British 43rd Division had, not many weeks previously, successfully assaulted across the Seine against some pretty stiff resistance.

[erwinl]

From Montys 'Operation Directive: M 525' written on the 14th September '44

Second British Army

15. The first task of the Army is to operate northwards and secure the crossings over the Rhine and Meuse in the general area Arnhem-Nijmegan-Grave. An airborne corps of three divisions is placed under command Second Army for these operations.

16. The Army will then establish itself in strength on the general line Zwolle-Deventer-Arnhem, facing east, with deep bridgeheads on the east side of the Ijssel river.

From this position it will be prepared to advance eastwards to the general area Rheine-Osnabruck-Hamm-Munster.

In this movement its weight will be on its right and directed towards Hamm, from which place a strong thrust will be made southwards along the eastern face of the Ruhr.

etc.

 

Thanks!!

 

This is exactly what I wanted to know. Now it all at least makes sense to me.

I'm not so sure the IJssel would be so easy to cross, as it flows a bit faster than either the Rhein or the Waal (the river at Nijmegen), but then again I'm not an expert in this.

 

Any idea's why a second, more deliberate, attempt was never made to force a way across the Rhein to reach the objectives of Market garden?

Say a little bit more to the west, between Arnhem and Utrecht?

Ok the germans would have known the allies would come, but they would anyway when the IJssel would be stormed.

That way London could still be saved from the V2 rockets and the Ruhr area would still be threatened.

I know that you should never reinforce failure and there were those two SS divisions in Holland, but still.

 

Greetings

 

Erwin

[capt_starlight]

PS  BillB I really want to read more by you.  what is your book?

273136[/snapback]

 

I know of:

 

Arnhem 1944 William Buckingham (Tempus Paperback 2004 is ISBN: 0752431870)

D-day: The First 72 Hours William F. Buckingham (Tempus paperback is ISBN: 075242842X)

 

I see Amazon.co.uk have the pair for 13.98 stg plus postage (if applicable)

 

Any more Bill?

 

Frank

[KingSargent]

I know of:

 

Arnhem 1944  William Buckingham (Tempus Paperback 2004 is ISBN: 0752431870)

D-day: The First 72 Hours  William F. Buckingham (Tempus paperback is ISBN: 075242842X)

 

I see Amazon.co.uk have the pair for 13.98 stg plus postage (if applicable)

 

Any more Bill?

 

Frank

273630[/snapback]

Paras, (Tempus, 2005) ISBN: 0-7524-3530-2.

[Colin Williams]

With respect to the "Ike vs. Monty - Who's to blame for the Scheldt and Market-Garden?" controversy, I offer the following timeline, which makes clear that Monty was the source of the idea that the Ruhr could be reached without use of the port of Antwerp.

 

August -

 

23rd - Monty proposed 21st AG to clear Channel ports and Antwerp, 12th AG to advance north of the Ardennes towards the Ruhr. Bradley wants to send one corps north of Ardennes to support 21st AG and use the rest of 1st US Army to support 3rd US Army drive south of Ardennes. Ike replies positively to Monty's plan, adding the need to "secure Antwerp as a base" and eventually splits 12th AG, with 1st Army north of the Ardennes and 3rd Army south.

 

26th - Monty relays these orders to his army commanders.

 

29th - British 11th AD starts for the Somme from the Seine. 21st AG/12th AG boundary moved east to place Brussels in British zone and provide opening for northeastward drive by British 2nd Army.

 

31st - British armored units reach Amiens on the Somme.

 

September -

 

2nd - SHAEF Intel Staff - German army no longer a cohesive force.

 

3rd - Guards AD reaches Brussels. 11th AD crosses Belgian frontier and drives on Antwerp. Intelligence reports gap forming between German 15th Army along the coast and 7th Army retreating towards the Siegfried Line. Monty decides to drive on the Rhine between Wesel and Arnhem and then attack the Ruhr (Operation Comet).

 

4th - 11th AD enters Antwerp. Germans defend Albert Canal. Admiral Ramsay sends signal to SHAEF Tactical HQ and 21st AG from England emphasizing the need to clear the Scheldt before Antwerp can be used. Ike sends signal to Monty saying to secure Antwerp and seize the Ruhr.

 

6th - Horrocks orders 11th AD to redeploy from Antwerp to eastern flank of Guards AD for drive northeast as part of Operation Comet. Monty sends message to Crerar that Antwerp may be unusable for some time and that he will need Channel ports ASAP.

 

8th - Combined Chiefs of Staff Joint Intelligence Committee states that Germans are beaten and will surrender piecemeal before December 1st. Churchill warns against exaggerated optimism. Ike also becoming sceptical of quick victory.

 

9th - Monty decides he can reach Berlin with supplies from Le Havre and Channel ports.

 

10th - Monty and Ike meet to agree on Market-Garden. Gale (SHAEF admin) signals Ramsay that Monty "impressed with the need to open Antwerp quickly". About this time Monty admits in a letter (to Brooke) to having taken risk in going for Rhine and Ruhr before Scheldt.

 

Clearly, Ike agreed to let Monty try M-G, but with the clear understanding that Antwerp was the next immediate priority. Monty was the instigator of the idea of going for the Ruhr first. If he had expressed any other opinion, M-G would never have happened. Unbeknownst to Ike, Monty would not stop trying for the Ruhr once it was clear M-G had failed and would not place Antwerp at top priority until ordered to do so in early October. The only other option for Ike in early September was to tell Monty not to launch M-G and instead to focus on the Scheldt. This would almost certainly have him damned through history for calling off a war-winning exploitation by a skilled and aggressive commander, because no one would ever know the true chances of M-G success.

 

Personally, I don't blame Monty for launching a Market-Garden type attack. It was aggressive and risky, qualities that are usually praised in generals. I also believe that stopping the V2's was worth the risk. If the Ruhr was the objective, I agree with Dempsey's argument that the logical target for a major airborne assault was the left flank of US 1st Army rather than a round-about approach. I also think a careful study of the ground would have led Monty to push north from Antwerp first, blocking the Beveland peninsula, and then drive ENE towards Eindhoven. This would have placed 2nd Army past some of the canals that were crossed with difficulty in the run up to Market-Garden as well as accelerating the eventual clearing of the Scheldt. Another issue to ponder is whether Monty's enthusiasm for the Channel ports was misplaced and whether he should have ordered the bulk of 1st Canadian Army north to clear the Scheldt ASAP while leaving the rest to mask the Channel ports, as was later done with Dunkirk. Having Antwerp fully functional in early October rather than mid-November might have transformed the winter campaign.

[BillB]

I know of:

 

Arnhem 1944  William Buckingham (Tempus Paperback 2004 is ISBN: 0752431870)

D-day: The First 72 Hours  William F. Buckingham (Tempus paperback is ISBN: 075242842X)

 

I see Amazon.co.uk have the pair for 13.98 stg plus postage (if applicable)

 

Any more Bill?

 

Frank

273630[/snapback]

What King said. Just so you know what you are looking at, the full title is Paras: The Birth of British Airborne Forces from Churchill's Raiders to 1st Parachute Brigade It is a slightly cut down version of my PhD thesis.

 

Thank you all for the kind words about the other stuff, which are much appreciated. Doesn't alter the fact you are all a bunch of gobshite reprobates, of course, but there you go...

 

BillB

[bad-dice]

a bunch of gobshite reprobates, of course, but there you go...  

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The quality just shines thru....nice one Bill

[Kit Hildreth]

Crap!!!  When you look at how close it went to succeeding, and the balls up that Browning and others made of the planning and execution of the operation by their 1st Airborne Army, there is no way it can be laid at Montgomery's door.

Lots of people want to have their cake and eat it over their criticism of Montgomery - either he was too slow and cautious or he was over reaching with Market Garden.  They ignore that for a lot of the time Montgomery didn't, with very good reason, trust his armoured commanders, and when he did he turned them loose.  With MG he believed that a risky operation was doable because he supposedly had competent people running 1stAA.  If Matt Ridgway had had the command it would have come off.

268383[/snapback]

I'll tell you this: if Pip Roberts and his Bulls had been given the job of reaching Arnhem, instead of the parade ground poncers in the GAD, they'd have got to Johnnie Frost and his Paras - in time too! Pip told 'em "Goodwood" wouldn't work and he was right; best planner in the British army! A Tankie of course!

[Kit Hildreth]

I'll tell you this: if Pip Roberts and his Bulls had been given the job of reaching Arnhem, instead of the parade ground poncers in the GAD, they'd have got to Johnnie Frost and his Paras - in time too! Pip told 'em "Goodwood" wouldn't work and he was right; best planner in the British army! A Tankie of course!

274082[/snapback]

Follow-up: Monty DID trust Pip, but Jorrocks gave it to the Guards...

[KingSargent]

Follow-up: Monty DID trust Pip, but Jorrocks gave it to the Guards...

274083[/snapback]

Somebody clarify for me just where the ADs were. Could Monty/Dempsey have given it to anybody except XXX Corps (and 'XXX Corps' meant Gds AD)?

 

BTW, appparently nobody picked up theis question earlier, but was 'Pip' Roberts a descendant of Lord Roberts of the 19th Cent?

[Conall]

Somebody clarify for me just where the ADs were. Could Monty/Dempsey have given it to anybody except XXX Corps (and 'XXX Corps' meant Gds AD)?

 

As I recall 11th AD were heavily engaged to the south east of the Neerpelt bridgehead fighting around Hechtel and Hasselt. Not quite so sure where 7 AD were operating but I suspect it was either in reserve or supporting 15 Scottish Div around Gheel and Aart. Guards Armoured were in position just to the south of the Neerpelt bridgehead (after their capture of Joe's bridge) and also had had the luxury of several days to rest and regroup.

 

The idea that 11 AD would have done better than Guards Armoured is fallacious in my opinion (they were, however, irrefutably a better unit - in leadership, experience, performance and tactical ability). It is possible that they might have ignored the no advance at night order and reached Eindhoven on the first night but they would still have been delayed at the Zon bridge. In addition they were still subject to the same logistical constraints and would still needed to have detached units to support 101st Airborne around Veghel and 82nd Airborne in Nijmegen/Groesbeek. The fact is that no British armoured division had the infantry combat power to have fought its way through Nijmegen and then across the Island - especially when operating under the constraints mentioned above.

 

BTW, appparently nobody picked up theis question earlier, but was 'Pip' Roberts a descendant of Lord Roberts of the 19th Cent?

274117[/snapback]

 

Not as far as I am aware. He certainly makes no mention of it in his memoirs, which would be very odd had he been related.

 

Best regards

 

Tom

Edited January 21, 2006 by Conall

[Kit Hildreth]

Bill, saw the movie, read the book, but one thing has always bothered me: the possibly appocryphal tale of the Guards stopping to brew up tea.  Did this really happen, or is just Urban myth?

268428[/snapback]

Actually they didn't stop for a cuppa, they stopped for their ground pounders to come up. Might as well brew up while you're waiting nes ce pas(pardon my Frog!)?Their experience in the desert, when they didn't wait, taught 'em caution. Some of 'em had been fighting since 1940...Then Monty replaced the Auk...ICGO The Bulls should have been given the job and Pip Roberts the planning of the op. But no....

[BillB]

Actually they didn't stop for a cuppa, they stopped for their ground pounders to come up. Might as well brew up while you're waiting nes ce pas(pardon my Frog!)?Their experience in the desert, when they didn't wait, taught 'em caution. Some of 'em had been fighting since 1940...Then Monty replaced the Auk...ICGO The Bulls should have been given the job and Pip Roberts the planning of the op. But no....

274694[/snapback]

I didn't know Guards Armoured Div served in the desert, Kit. And I think caution and business as usual was a large part of the problem. But then the Guards have never been big on flexibility...

 

all the best

 

BillB

[FirstOfFoot]

But then the Guards have never been big on flexibility...

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Hmmmm. Remind me of the original capbadge of David Stirling? Or why G Squadron is so named?