Why Bridge Too Far attempt was doomed

[capt_starlight]

I'm sorry, I'm not a colonial and neither were my parents.  Australia became a self-governing Dominion in 1901.  We entered WWII as Allies of the UK, not as a colonial state. Our forces were deployed according to a formal written agreement between the UK and Australian governments.

 

If this true - how did Australia enter into a "stat of war" with Germany as a consequence of the UK on 3SEp39 - without any formal declaration of war ? Something to do with the (Australian) Decleration of Westminster Act 1942 methinks....

However, I will note that all the UK Commanders that the Australian Imperial Force served under were well aware of their status as an Ally, rather than a colonial force and even when forcibly reminded of it, as after Greece, by the contingent's command, acknowledged it and treated them as such.

 

Better example is the interplay between Morshead and Auchinleck at the time of First Alamein or Blamey/Menzies/Morsehead on one side and WSC/Wavell on the relief of the Tobruk Garrison but it reached its actual zenith in the Curtin versus WSC/Roosevelt over the return of the AIF convoys in 1942……

 

The really dismissive attitudes I've read tend to come from US commands, by the way, in the Pacific war, particularly Macarthur, King and Nimitz, let alone US politicians.

Yes – they were somewhat US-centric and in Mac’s case may almost have had ideas of a new empire….

 

As others have noted, your ideas on how Imperial coalition warfare worked has more to do with your anglophobia than reality and is superficial and ridiculious.  I'd suggest you give it up, before you dig yourself deeper into a hole of your own making.

 

I will also point you to the reported comment by Francis De Guingand, Montgomery's Chief of Staff just before D-Day, wishing that 9 Div AIF was part of the invasion force. Hardly the comment of someone who was dismissive of "colonial troops".

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I just wonder what audience “Freddy” was playing to with that quote ?

 

Frank

[Rickshaw]

I just wonder what audience “Freddy” was playing to with that quote ?

 

Frank

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It may be apocryphal but it is quoted in Hasting, if I recall correctly. One wonders though, what the reaction of the Diggers would have been returning to the soil their fathers had fought over? One can only imagine the welcome the people of Villiers Bretonneux would have put on.

Edited January 16, 2006 by Baron Samedi

[KingSargent]

You can't tax who you don't represent!

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You can too, just ask Alaskans!

 

All joking aside, can anyone present facts or contemporary writings to contest my assertion that British Army senior officers had a "Bloody Colonials" attitude? A reading of Alanbrooke's Diaries (minus Anglophilic gloss) certainly suggests that the British CIGS certainly felt that way. Although, to be fair, AB had an "AnyonebutABphobic" attitude. I don't know if Alexander ever revised his first opinion of Yanks after having commanded them for a while.

 

Brits (those here) like to point to Kasserine, ignoring that no Yanks ever ran as far as the Gazala Gallop. The Yanks in Tunisia screwed up (but came back and won, as did those CW personnel who survived the Gazala Gallop), but so did the equally-inexperienced Brits in 1st Army. The Yank positions at Kasserine were dictated by the Brit CO Anderson. (I shudder to think that he was once considered for the OVERLORD command.)

 

Can we PLEASE forget the nationalities and talk about who screwed up where? If people are to learn any lessons from history (not that anyone ever does) it behooves us to look at the personalities, the troops, their equipment, and the training involved, NOT what nation the COs and troops (and equipment) came from.

[KingSargent]

Otherwise known as: "Several dozen Rich White Guys vs. one Rich White Guy."

 

Rather have Liz II than Hilary I.

Falken

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AMEN!!!

[KingSargent]

The last formed Australian troops were withdrawn from the UK in SEP43 when  2/3 Forestry Coy AIF marched through New York on their way back to Australia.

 

Frank

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That's fascinating. Source? (not that I doubt you, I might want to use it in a paper someday... )

[KingSargent]

What I find interesting about Opertaion Market Garden and especially the post-war historiography (as evinced in what we have focussed on in this thread) is how the focus and opprobrium for the operation's failure is either always laid on events at Arnhem Bridge or XXX Corps' failure to reach Arnhem along with the associated planning mistakes and logistical failures. What is very rarely discussed is what happened at Nijmegen. Very true.

 

Nijmegen and control of the Nijmegen bridge was arguably the linchpin of the whole operation, something which the Germans recognised almost immediately. This then raises a number of interesting questions relating to why the bridge was not captured until the evening of the 20th:

1. Why was no attempt made to land troops to the north of the bridge allowing it to be captured from both ends? As I mentioned, this probably comes down to Brereton's decision to fly only on lift on Day One. I would have dropped the Poles at the north end of Nijmegen Bridge, given two lifts.

Note to those who say the pilots lacked training to do it - they said they were ready to go. Need I say more?

2. Why despite criticising Urquhart for allowing his DZs for being so far from Arnhem bridge did General Gavin allow the same thing to happen to him and make no attempt to change it? Gavin's primary objective (regardless of how right or wrong it was) was Groesbeek Heights. Lacking knowledge of possible German armored response in the area, I can see why he followed orders.

3. Why despite Nijmegen bridge being his stated main objective did Gavin allocate less than one battalion to its capture and instead focus of the Groesbeek heights? Because he ws told to?

4. Again why despite it being the nominal main objective did Gavin only press Colonel Lindquist to act with any urgency to capture the bridge at 2000hrs - seven hours after H-Hour? Because he was distracted by dealing his MAIN objective which was Groesbeek Heights? - and suffering from a baroken back, which I can testify IS a great distraction. {BTW, having been crapped on many times by Groesbeek birds, Ican sympathize with any mission to wipe them out...}

5. Why did Gavin claim that the Reichswald contained more than 1,000 German tanks and subsequently claim that this information had come from British intelligence sources (quite untrue)? It's called 'CYA.' No one (at least not me) has ever claimed that US generals were immune to the CYA Syndrome...

6. Why did Browning not overrule Gavin and focus the effort on Nijmegen bridge rather than Groesbeek? It's also worth noting that the 36 gliders used to land Brownings HQ were taken from Urquhart and could have been used to seize the Arnhem bridge by coup-de-main. Because Browning was an anus and had ordered Groesbeek Height be taken first?

Also, it should be remembered that that nobody really expected the drop to come off - none of the previously planned ops had...

7. Why did Gavin claim that XXX Corps were 36 hours behind schedule when they reached the 82nd Airborne? XXX Corps were tasked to reach Arnhem Bridge within 48 hours - they reached 82nd Airborne at 0830hrs on Sept 19, forty-two and a half hours after H-Hour. Had Nijmegen bridge have been secured then it is quite possible that they could have covered the 8 miles to Arnhem bridge in less than eight hours, especially considering the absence of significant German troops in the area. This is 'US vs. Brit' pleading. Gavin got his orders from two noted incompetents, Browning and Brereton (note: a US CO and a Brit 2CO). The "absence of significant German troops in the area" stems from the fact that the Germans were fighting in Nijmegen and Arnhem. Had the Nijmegen Bridge been captured on Day One (by the Poles, in my plan) the Germans would probably have appeared between Nijmegen and Arnhem. Net result - who knows?

8. Why did Gavin allow the myth that Colonel Tucker had accused the British tankers of the Grenadier Guards of being yellow-bellied bastards who were unwilling to press on to Arnhem? In fact both Sergeant Peter Robinson and Captain Peter Carrington both recall that the Americans they met were extremely friendly and grateful (one officer had to be dissuaded from either surrendering or pulling back). At no point that evening did Colonel Tucker suggest that they should continue up the road to Arnhem. Why would he? Gavin was nowhere near Tucker, nor is there evidence that Tucker ever communicated dissatisfaction with Gds AD to Gavin at the time. As for Gavin's "Allowing it," I hope you are not requiring every CO in command of an operation to vet and edit what his subordinates have to say in their memoires/history?

 

When considering the overall failure of the operation it is curious that the historiography seldom considers these questions and hard to avoid the conclusion that Gavin and Browning must bear a greater share of the blame for the failure, which has perhaps unfairly been heaped upon XXX Corps, Guards Armoured Division and General Horrocks. It is irrefutable that Nijmegen bridge should have been captured on the first day of the operation and with all expediency and in this respect General Gavin failed in his duty and in his subsequent account of the operation attempted to cover up his mistakes by passing the blame onto the British instead.

 

Food for thought.

 

Best regards

 

Tom

I agree that focussing on XXX Corps is silly, there was plenty of blame to pass around by nit-pickers. {I still have nightmares about my screwups in life-threatening situations.} What we should do is examine 'What Went Wrong And Why' instead of focussing on 'Who Is To Blame.'

 

M-G was a good plan, given what was known AT THE TIME. As I have said above, M-G was the finest example of German resilience and reaction seen in NWE during WW2 (possibly ANYWHERE). Even had the planners recognized that there were two understrength Panzer divisions in the area, previous experience had shown that the Panzers would sit on their asses until it was too late to respond effectively (see Normandy).

 

GEN Gavin did not "fail in his duty," he did what he was ORDERED to do, which was take Groesbeek Heights FIRST. Whether the orders came from Browning or a US general is immaterial, Gavin did what he was told to do.

 

Urquhart did what he was told to do - his orders and plan sucked, but he did what he was told to do. Had he deviated from his orders he could have been shot for Disobedience.

 

IMHO, the "Blame" rests on Brereton and Browning, for not realizing that an airborne operation hinges on the troops that GET TO THE GROUND, not whether the transport pilots get a wee bit tired. Brereton bears the chief responsiblity as CO 1st AAB, but Browning (supposely THE Allied Airborne General) gains 'Failure Points' for not insisting that the troops at the 'Sharp End' come first. Of course Browning The Political Climber was as ignorant of ACTUAL airborne operations as the newest Private that jumped into Holland. (And Brereton was such a nincompoop that blaming him is easy....)

[Rickshaw]

Can we PLEASE forget the nationalities and talk about who screwed up where? If people are to learn any lessons from history (not that anyone ever does)  it behooves us to look at the personalities, the troops, their equipment, and the training involved, NOT what nation the COs and troops (and equipment) came from.

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I'll merely point out, you brought it up, no one else, mate.

[larrikin]

That's fascinating. Source? (not that I doubt you, I might want to use it in a paper someday... )

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2/1st Forestry Coy didn't leave the UK until 1945, but by that time they only had an administrative HQ and the troops were scattered all over the UK attached to other units. This from having to dig the the ROs nearly 20 years ago to ascertain the service medal entitlements of one of their members.

[erwinl]

Hello all,

 

After years of lurking here is a subject where I can say, or ask a thing about.

First let me introduce myself a bit before I say something about operation Market Garden.

 

My name is Erwin and my father was one of 20 children born in Arnhem during operation Market Garden and one of only 4 surviving the war. During this time my grandfather was working as a slavelabourer in Rees (Germany)

As such the battle of Arnhem has allways been something special in my family of all the things that happened in WW2.

 

Anyway. Because of this I have been thinking about this operation for years now.

And especially about the stated purpose of it.

 

As I have allways understood is that the aim of operation Market Garden is to break through the german lines, cross all the rivers and after Arnhem turn right into the Ruhr area because everything would be wide open at this point.

The famous pictures also show this dash and following right hook.

 

What I don't understand is that when you've got the Arnhem bridge in your hand (the last bridge) there is still a further bridge between your forces and germany.

Just east of Arnhem there is the river IJssel flowing north to the IJsselmeer (IJssellake)(the IJssel is a bit less wide, but flows faster than the Rhein).

 

In the east of Arnhem there is a bridge across the IJssel, but according to the book written by general Urquhart (by the way, my early childhood years were in a sidestreet of the Zwarteweg, where gen. Urquhart was forced to hide himself) this bridge was only to be taken by the polish brigade when they would arrive.

In fact it is not mentioned at all in his orders, but there is one drawing where the area of this brigade encompasses this bridge.

 

This suggest to me that this bridge (the Westervoort bridge) was not high on the list of priorities. Which is strange, because without this bridge the entire operation would be in vain. Or was the expectation that the bridge would be intact after leaving it for three days in german hands?

 

Furthermore.

In the book of gen. Urquhart hem mentions the orders for the first brigade (I think it was the first) to take on advanced positions on the Apeldoornseweg in preperation for XXX corps to pas through.

But Apeldoorn is north of Arnhem, not east!

 

This in combination with the not mentioning of the Westervoort bridge suggests to me a different aim to this operation.

 

Here is my hypothisis.

 

The aim of operation Market Garden was not to drive east to the Ruhr after Arnhem (at least not immediately), but to cut of the german forces in the west part of the Netherlands.

When striking north from Arnhem, through Apeldoorn, you could reach the IJsselmeer and cut off all those forces and use the IJssel as a rightflank guard.

This would also explain the strange choice of landingplace by the british, just north west of Arnhem. In this place they would act as an initial guard for the left flank of XXX corps.

Why this action? Just about this time the first V2 rockets would land on London. If you cut off west Holland, the germans they would no longer be able to fire them from this place. The only way to reach this cut off forces by the germans would be by the Afsluitdijk (the 30+ km long dam which closes of the IJsselmeer from the Waddensea).

 

Why not give this as an official reason for the operation?

I don't know. Maybe it would not be accepted to stop the supplies to the southern US forces (gen. Patton) to be able to make this operation possible?

If on the other hand the opbjective would be to punch through te lines after which there would be no more german soldiers between XXX corps and the Ruhr Area and the war would be over by Christmas, then this operation could be sold to the politicians.

 

This would mean that Montgomery (and I think Churchill) would be able to persuade Eisenhower to go along with this operation. As I don't believe that Eisenhower couldn't read maps and thus not knowing there was an additional river between the allied forces and germany, he would be in on this deception.

 

Why this deception?

The allied forces were winning everywhere and especially Patton in the south was looking good to defeat the germans.

But to save London against the V2 rockets something quick had to be done.

Only, the (I imagine, but I could be wrong) US politicians would never condone stopping the supplies to Patton to give to Montgomery to save London.

So, why not save London but tell that you are trying to flank the germans and hope none of those politicians will look at a map?

Offcourse when it failed at the end, nobody was really interested in stating the real reason for this operation.

 

Anyway,

Maybe I'm just reading to much into this.

all I have is a very good knowledge of Arnhem and its surroundings and the book written bij gen. Urquhart (a translated copy, so that might explain something of my reasons about the intentions for the british paratroops at Arnhem).

 

Greetings

Erwin

(edit: some spelling issues)

Edited January 16, 2006 by erwinl

[PONGO_7409]

You can't tax who you don't represent!

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unless you are the UN . . .

[Rickshaw]

People may find this useful. I was sent this map by a friend sometime ago and it comes from the PRO in the UK:

 

 

As is obvious, according to it, the plan was to drive north, to the coast and thence, possibly east to the Ruhr.

[Rickshaw]

unless you are the UN  . .  .

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Except the UN doesn't levy taxes, it asks for contributions and of course, all member states are represented, in some cases in both governing bodies - the General Assembly and the Security Council.

[SCFalken]

You can't tax who you don't represent!

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Been to DC lately?

 

 

Falken

[FlyingCanOpener]

Been to DC lately?

Falken

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Well, we did fight a war with our Imperial Overlords over this. Should be begin it anew?

[SCFalken]

Except the UN doesn't levy taxes, it asks for contributions and of course, all member states are represented, in some cases in both governing bodies - the General Assembly and the Security Council.

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But they'd very much like to do more, and have said as much on several occasions.

 

 

Falken

[BillB]

The 3 route approach would be the best method to get the whole brigade to the bridge area quickly, but would only work against very light opposition, which is what the plan assumed. However, if the opposition is higher than anticipated the plan needed to change to have the battalions working together. It is a good example of the inferiority of micro-managing a battle in a fluid situation. Probably would have done better using mission based orders allowing the battalion commanders latitude to react. But we didn't do that then.

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Fair comment, bad-dice, but remember one of the routes was not to the bridge area but to the high ground north of the town. And the above was also exacerbated to a high degree by the brigade plan that treied to do far too much with the two-thirds of 1st Para Brigade that were heading for the bridge area.

 

all the best

 

BillB.

[Rickshaw]

But they'd very much like to do more, and have said as much on several occasions.

Falken

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So what? We're talking about what they do now. It was a throw-away comment which was factually incorrect. The UN is not the evil bogey-man many here portray it to be. It doesn't tax and it does allow representation to it's member states.

[KingSargent]

Fair comment, bad-dice, but remember one of the routes was not to the bridge area but to the high ground north of the town. And the above was also exacerbated to a high degree by the brigade plan that treied to do far too much with the two-thirds of 1st Para Brigade that were heading for the bridge area.

 

all the best

 

BillB.

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Bill, wasn't the "high ground" overlooking the airport that 52nd Division was supposed to fly into?

[capt_starlight]

2/1st Forestry Coy didn't leave the UK until 1945, but by that time they only had an administrative HQ and the troops were scattered all over the UK attached to other units.  This from having to dig the the ROs nearly 20 years ago to ascertain the service medal entitlements of one of their members.

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While 2/1 Forestry Coy RAE did stay in the UK until the end of the war with it appears New Zealand companies (3 ?), 2/3 Forestry Coy was on its way back to Oz in 1943 as it was in New Guinea in 1944 as was 2/2.

 

(There was also a depot for the AIF in London, a reception unit for personnel assigned to the British Army for D-Day and the NW Europe campaign and for returned POWs and probably a RHU for convelescent and reinforcement personnel).

 

My mistake.....

 

See the AWM photo 128420 at AWM Collections Search for a photo of the march through New York.

 

Frank

[DKTanker]

When striking north from Arnhem, through Apeldoorn, you could reach the IJsselmeer and cut off all those forces and use the IJssel as a rightflank guard.

This would also explain the strange choice of landingplace by the british, just north west of Arnhem. In this place they would act as an initial guard for the left flank of XXX corps.

Why this action? Just about this time the first V2 rockets would land on London. If you cut off west Holland, the germans they would no longer be able to fire them from this place. The only way to reach this cut off forces by the germans would be by the Afsluitdijk (the 30+ km long dam which closes of the IJsselmeer from the Waddensea).

Greetings

Erwin

(edit: some spelling issues)

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Not that one should use a movie as a source but, as I recall in the movie "Patton", it is suggested that the intent of Market Garden was to seize the V2 sites.

[KingSargent]

Not that one should use a movie as a source but, as I recall in the movie "Patton", it is suggested that the intent of  Market Garden was to seize the V2 sites.

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That was certainly one motivation, but not the whole story. Very few military operations have only one goal.

[DKTanker]

That was certainly one motivation, but not the whole story. Very few military operations have only one goal.

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Not saying that there was only one goal. As it was, there weren't enough supplies for Ike's vaunted broad front strategy. Ike could either authorize supplies to reinforce 3rd and 7th Armies success or send supplies to Monty to reinvigorate his all but stalled drive and get the V2 sites...a twofer. Hindsight suggests that Ike should have reinforced success in the south. Hindsight also suggests that politically Ike had to make the decision he did, however nonsensical.

[BillB]

Conall,

 

all that stuff aboiut Old Irish spelling is over my head mate - the extra "n" was merely a typo!

 

Sadly I don't have time for a point-by-point at the minute, hopefully later if I get enough time, so I'll restrict this to a defence of Gavin. For a start, a mea culpa - I have the relevant bits of Gavin's memoir here and you are quite right, he did intend to go after the Groesbeek Heights on his own account. That'll teach me to rely on memory....

 

With ref to the int about lots of Germans in the Reichswald, I haven't had time to read the memoir in detail (and I don't have the official US account to hand) but I can't see that bit. You've got me there if you've seen the int reports in the PRO, but do we actually know what int Gavin was given by Browning? I'm thinking of the way Brian Urquhart's recce pics were swept under the carpet, as with form like that it is quite possible Browning overegged the pudding to get Gavin to do what he wanted. Just a thought, as Gavin's account generally seems pretty straight down the middle before and after the MG bit. Plus, if you were in Gavin's jump boots, would you be willing to take a chance and ignore the matter, given the likely consequences if you called it wrong?

 

Now then, for a start IMO it doesn't make any difference whether Gavin intended to go after the Groesbeek Heights or not because Browing gave him specific instructions to do so at the planning stage: "I then outlined my plan, and in response General Browning particularly directed me not to attempt the seizure of the Nijmegen bridge until all the other missions had been successfully accomplished and the Groesbeek Heights/Berg-en-Dal high ground was firmly in our hands." (On To Berlin, 1979 edition, p.149). Gavin also made arrangements for a battalion of Lindquist's 508 PIR to be ready to go for the Nijmegen bridge should the situation allow.

 

Given this I also wonder whether Gavin originally intended to place so much emphasis on the Groesbeek Heights. I've not seen the scheme he outlined before Browning made his direction, but Gavin's account suggests this may have been the case as the next bit to the above suggests: "I could not have agreed with him [browning] more, but I was deeply troubled by the possibility of failing to accomplish some of my objectives." This could be post-event ass covering of course, but Gavin doesn't strike me as that sort.

 

IMO the root of the problem was that Gavin simply didn't have enough resources to do everything he was tasked to do. According to his memoir he was looking at a 25-mile perimeter, which looks about right from the maps. Within that he had to not only establish and maintain a perimeter of sorts but also to achieve eight objectives:

- seize the Grave bridge

- seize the four bridges over the Mass-Waal Canal

- seize the Groesbeek Heights

- protect the LZs for the glider landing and resupply

If you add in the Nijmegen road and rail bridges the total rises to ten. That was simply too much for three regiments/brigades dispersed over such a large area, and something had to give.

 

In that light, leaving the Nijmegen bridges until later made as much sense as leaving any of the other objectives, and arguably moreso. Grave had to be done to open the route for ground relief. Ditto the Maas-Waal bridges, for the same reason; no point holding the Nijmegen bridges if no-one can reach you. The glider LZs/resupply DZs had to be protected for the second lift, and the Groesbeek Heights had to be taken because they dominated the LZ/DZs, were necessary as a bulwark against attack from the east, and dominated all the approaches to Nijmegen bar the Honinghutie route. Plus the latter wasn't secured until midday on D+1 and the Germans put in a brigade size attack (2,300 and some light armour) toward the DZ and Groesbeek Heights from the Reichswald on D+1 as the second lift was coming in. Given all this, which bit was it possible to discard to free up the resources to seize the Nijmegen bridges? And what would the consequences have been whichever bit you discard? It appears to me that Gavin made the best of the poor hand he was dealt, and made a better job of it than Urquhart and 1st Airborne Div under similar but less severe constraints.

 

One way round it would have been as you or someone else suggested to put the 1st Polish Independent in north of Nijmegen, but the difficulties of getting Browning to sign up to that aside, the intractable problem there is that there wasn't enough air capacity to do that in the first lift, and leaving it until D+1 would still have been too late to stop Kampfgruppe Euling reaching the Nimegen bridge and doing a John Frost...

 

Sorry if this is a bit hard to follow, but it's stupid o'clock and I've got to be up early.

 

all the best

 

BillB

[Simon Tan]

The Deelen option. Given the problems with weather, would sezing Deelen have helped? I feel the protestations that there was heavy flak concentrations was a red herring. Any flak concentration that the RAF was destroyed or surpressed would be by tasking some Mosquitoes to the job.

 

A glider assault on Deelen was eminently feasible IMO but it's value would be severely limited becuase it would be rapidly taken under fire from German artillery, which would more or less render it unseless as an airhead. OTH it would be a much better place to try and land the Hamilcars.

 

The problem as I see it was that 1st AD was not designed with excess and redundant support weapon capabilities. Once the 17lbers wtc. were lost, they were gone.

 

Simon

[KingSargent]

Not saying that there was only one goal.  As it was, there weren't enough supplies for Ike's vaunted broad front strategy.  Ike could either authorize supplies to reinforce 3rd and 7th Armies success or send supplies to Monty to reinvigorate his all but stalled drive and get the V2 sites...a twofer.  Hindsight suggests that Ike should have reinforced success in the south.  Hindsight also suggests that politically Ike had to make the decision he did, however nonsensical.

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One serious problem with backing Patton's push is that it wasn't really going anywhere vital. He gets across the Rhine east of Metz... then what? There was nothing ahead of him that would make Germany give up if they lost it. Being "First Across The Rhine" means shit if there is nothing important on the east bank.

 

Going north at least gets you on the non-mountainous and open North German Plain once you get across the Rhine and opens the way to the Ruhr.

 

The "Broad Front Strategy" wasn't entirely Ike's, it was the plan from Planning Day One. Ike didn't impose it on anybody, it was already there, with the blessings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Being SHAEF did not mean Ike had a free hand as to how the war in NWE was run.