Why Bridge Too Far attempt was doomed

[KingSargent]

You're only talking about the operations that occurred. There were many that WSC proposed but which Allan Brooke managed to prevent even reaching the planning stage. Then there were the ones that even he couldn't stop, of which Kos is the main example of. Kos and the later Greek intervention in 1944-5 were the darlings of Anthony Eden, who grossly underestimated the commitment necessary. AB was right on the mark about how many troops would eventually be tied up. AB didn't want to send British troops into the Balkans, he just wanted to drop lots of guns and ammo all over the country and let the "Noble Partisans" loose. He seems to have missed that they would spend more time shooting each other than Germans. Wingate's swans are another. At least Wingate was willing to DO something and get into the field with his men. And Wingate's ops didn't cost that much to the war effort. Considering lots of factors, I'd say Wingate was cost-effective.

Winston's problem was that he while he was willing to back innovative schemes and methods, he often couldn't sort the wheat from the chaff and didn't understand what was logistically and administratively impossible, as against what was only difficult. Very often things that Winston were told were impossible turned out to be possible, but I think that if he hadn't been constantly 'pooh-poohed' by the pros, he might have behaved a little more rationally. WSC just wanted somebody to do something, and all he got from the military was, 'Nope, can't be done.' Perhaps if his generals had displayed a little more enthusiasm and aggressiveness....

As BillB notes, the main contributions of Winnie to unusual forces either came or started while Dill was CIGS. I don't think AB ever told anybody anything but "NO!" unless the idea was his.

 

BTW, what British "colonial" infantry served in Greece?

6th Australian and 2nd New Zealand, of course. As an Antipodean Colonial, you should know that.

 

BTW, my "Colonial" crack was aimed at the British Army, which seemed to rely on non-English outfits for their heavy lifting* between Dunkirk and Alamein. "They're Colonials, who cares if they die as long as they do what we tell them..." This attitude carried over to the Americans (ex-Colonials, the lot of us) in lots of cases.

 

How many comments have you read by Brits who encountered Aussies and Yanks and came away to scribble in their diaries, "Appalling undisciplined rabble. They'll never be soldiers!"

 

*Except for the armour and most of the artillery of course. That was restricted to Englishmen who could operate complicated machinery....

[Conall]

BTW, my "Colonial" crack was aimed at the British Army, which seemed to rely on non-English outfits for their heavy lifting* between Dunkirk and Alamein. "They're Colonials, who cares if they die as long as they do what we tell them..." This attitude carried over to the Americans (ex-Colonials, the lot of us) in lots of cases.

 

How many comments have you read by Brits who encountered Aussies and Yanks and came away to scribble in their diaries, "Appalling undisciplined rabble. They'll never be soldiers!"

 

*Except for the armour and most of the artillery of course. That was restricted to Englishmen who could operate complicated machinery....

270515[/snapback]

 

Nice to see that your virulent anglophobia is as undiminished as ever. The comment about the heavy lifting between Dunkirk and Alamein is utterly contemptible, more than a little offensive and quite untrue. There were just as many British infantry units in the desert as their Commonwealth counterparts - otherwise what the f*ck was my grandfather doing crawling on his arse on Fort Dolgorodoc in 1941? Surely it should have been some "colonial" doing the heavy lifting. C*nt. If you've got nothing better to add on what has otherwise been an excellent thread I would kindly suggest that you f*ck off.

Edited January 14, 2006 by Conall

[cheese possessed]

As Conall said.

 

Submissions from the "Mel Gibson School of History" ruin otherwise informed and educated debate, and diminish the credibility of the submittor.

 

"Anglophobia first/ historical facts second" is about as balanced as Islamacists' pronouncements on America... see how it feels...

[cheese possessed]

As Conall said.

 

Submissions from the "Mel Gibson School of History" ruin otherwise informed and educated debate, and diminish the credibility of the submittor.

 

"Anglophobia first/ historical facts second" is about as balanced as Islamacists' pronouncements on America... see how it feels...

[Conall]

What I find interesting about Opertaion Market Garden and especially the post-war historiography (as evinced in what we have focussed on in this thread) is how the focus and opprobrium for the operation's failure is either always laid on events at Arnhem Bridge or XXX Corps' failure to reach Arnhem along with the associated planning mistakes and logistical failures. What is very rarely discussed is what happened at Nijmegen.

 

Nijmegen and control of the Nijmegen bridge was arguably the linchpin of the whole operation, something which the Germans recognised almost immediately. This then raises a number of interesting questions relating to why the bridge was not captured until the evening of the 20th:

1. Why was no attempt made to land troops to the north of the bridge allowing it to be captured from both ends?

2. Why despite citicising Urquhart for allowing his DZs for being so far from Arnhem bridge did General Gavin allow the same thing to happen to him and make no attempt to change it?

3. Why despite Nijmegen bridge being his stated main objective did Gavin allocate less than one battalion to its capture and instead focus of the Groesbeek heights?

4. Again why despite it being the nominal main objective did Gavin only press Colonel Lindquist to act with any urgency to capture the bridge at 2000hrs - seven hours after H-Hour?

5. Why did Gavin claim that the Reichswald contained more than 1,000 German tanks and subsequently claim that this information had come from British intelligence sources (quite untrue)?

6. Why did Browning not overrule Gavin and focus the effort on Nijmegen bridge rather than Groesbeek? It's also worth noting that the 36 gliders used to land Brownings HQ were taken from Urquhart and could have been used to seize the Arnhem bridge by coup-de-main.

7. Why did Gavin claim that XXX Corps were 36 hours behind schedule when they reached the 82nd Airborne? XXX Corps were tasked to reach Arnhem Bridge within 48 hours - they reached 82nd Airborne at 0830hrs on Sept 19, forty-two and a half hours after H-Hour. Had Nijmegen bridge have been secured then it is quite possible that they could have covered the 8 miles to Arnhem bridge in less than eight hours, especially considering the absence of significant German troops in the area.

8. Why did Gavin allow the myth that Colonel Tucker had accused the British tankers of the Grenadier Guards of being yellow-bellied bastards who were unwilling to press on to Arnhem? In fact both Sergeant Peter Robinson and Captain Peter Carrington both recall that the Americans they met were extremely friendly and grateful (one officer had to be dissuaded from either surrendering or pulling back). At no point that evening did Colonel Tucker suggest that they should continue up the road to Arnhem.

 

When considering the overall failure of the operation it is curious that the historiography seldom considers these questions and hard to avoid the conclusion that Gavin and Browning must bear a greater share of the blame for the failure, which has perhaps unfairly been heaped upon XXX Corps, Guards Armoured Division and General Horrocks. It is irrefutable that Nijmegen bridge should have been captured on the first day of the operation and with all expediency and in this respect General Gavin failed in his duty and in his subsequent account of the operation attempted to cover up his mistakes by passing the blame onto the British instead.

 

Food for thought.

 

Best regards

 

Tom

[larrikin]

Hmm, perhaps the Cavalry General in him coming out? Fair comment, though in his favor it is also cited he was the only Western General the Germans were afraid of.

 

 

270619[/snapback]

 

Which is interesting, considering he never really did anything that would bring that view about. I think the jury is always going to be out on Patton, no matter the hero worship that follows his memory, but the fact remains that he never fought a defensive battle, never had to fight on the back foot, never fought a meat grinder, and never hit a position that didn't have a reasonable flank option available.

 

Then again, maybe the Germans knew about his 'war face' and were scared of that.

[BillB]

What a fascinating thread!  So BillB, or anyone, what exactly was the air transport situation?  How many C-47s did we have?  Why were more not purchased and trained for?  Could gliders be pulled by bombers?  How did they night drop D-day but lost the ability 3 months later?  How many troops were dropped D-day vs first day of Market Garden?  And finally, what happened to 6th Para division after D-day and their astounding successes?

Thanks for the many new insights already.

Rick

268957[/snapback]

hey Rick, I bet you could have crammed a couple more questions in there if you'd tried a bit harder... I've amalgamated and mixed them a bit:

 

- In a nutshell, the air transport situation was that while there more than there had ever been, it was still not enough to meet all the demand placed upon it. AFAIK they were purchasing/producing and training at a rapid rate, but demand constantly outstripped supply. Hardly surprising when you consider there was virtually no air transport fleet before 1940ish, and thus nothing to build on, and what they did build up had to be spread globally across the Med, Europe, the Pacific and China-Burma-India.

 

- Ref exactly how many C47s were available for MG, I don't have a precise figure and I hven't the time to dig it out but I can give you a rough one I think. The first lift into Arnhem consisted of 1,534 aircraft and 491 gliders, and the vast majority of the aircraft were C47s, mostly USAAF.

 

- gliders could and were pulled by bombers, but only by the RAF. They had to be modified with cables, hooks etc. The RAF used Halifaxes and possibly Stirlings, especially for the big Hamilcars, and they used Albemarles to tow Horsas; the latter (Albemarles) were used as para transports too. Generally speaking using bombers was a stop-gap and were increasingly replaced by C47s. IIRC almost all the Brit gliders at Arnhem were towed by RAF C47s.

 

- Ref the night drop, they didn't lose the ability over three months. The night drop into Normandy was badly scattered, as were the night drops/landings into Sicily. The RAF put a lot more effort into night training and techniques, because they did not envisage a situation where the Luftwaffe was not a serious daylight threat. The US lack of such expertise was very noticeable in Normandy (altho the RAF were no better in some instances) and the US transport arm suffered because it was in competition with the bomber arm for navigators. The airborne forces themselve, and especially the Americans after were in favour of daylight jumps after their bad experiences in Sicily and D-Day. Besides MG was launched in a no-moon period, and you cannot do mass parachute drops without some form of illumination.

 

- ref comparison between MG and D-Day drops. The aircraft and glider figs for MG are above, and a total of c.18,000 troops wered delivered by parachute and glider. As far as I can make out somewhere between 15 and 16,000 men were delivered in the D-Day first lift; the shortfall is due to 6th Airlanding Brigade not coming in until the afternoon. In total the figure is therefore again in the region of 18,000 men. Note, incidentally, that this mirrored the deployment for MG exactly - the 82nd and 101st Airborne in full, and two thirds of the British division.

 

- ref what happened to 6th Airborne Division after D-Day, they were kept in the line defending the east shoulder of the D-Day beachhead and participated in the breakout up the coast after Falaise. They were not withdrawn until the end of August 1944, and lost 745 dead, 2,510 wounded and 886 missing. After reforming and rebuilding they were deployed in the ground role to block the northern shoulder of the Ardennes bulge, and spearheaded the Rhine Crossings in March 1945. Thereafter they were redeployed to Palestine where they remained until being withdrawn and disbanded in 1948 IIRC.

 

Hope this helps,

 

BillB

[BillB]

Connall, ref your lambasting of Gavin - no time for a full response now, but I think some of your criticisms are a bit off. As I understand it Gavin only went after the Groesbeek Heights because Browning insisted he did so, and the latter was constantly badgering him about it after landing. It was not therefore a matter of Browning overruling Gavin, he had already done so and drawn Gavin away from his preferred course of action and going after the bridges immediately. Ref seizing the Nijmegen bridges, where would you land anyone north of them and you omit to mention that they were the most northerly of the 82nds objectives, and there were five more to the south, notably at Grave, Honinghutie and Molenhoek. No point in holding the Nijmegen brodges without the others. I also fail to see what your point about Browning diverting the gliders has to do with the general thrust of your comment about Gavin; that was Brownings crap decision for purely personal PR reasons. I also suspect that Gavin was constrained by Brownings presence in his AO, as was the commander of the 3rd Para Batt by the presence of Lathbury and Urquhart.. Finally, if you look at Urquhart's dismal performance just up the road at the same time I think it's a bit rich to criticise Gavin, who was everywhere at once in his area despite having busted his back on landing...

 

More food for thought, eh? I'll get back to you about the larger perimter at Arnhem as soon as I get time. It's your fault, every time I come to answer something you jump in with another!

 

all the best

 

BillB

 

PS Good comeback at King.

[bad-dice]

I've jumped onto Arnhem at several of the anniversaries, and done the tab to the Bridge (its about the most emotive & emotional anniversary that takes place in NW Europe).

You must be 10 Para, right? I always wanted to do this one but only 10 Para got this jolly each year. Don't suppose it still takes place after all the cuts.

[bad-dice]

The crucial point is that they were much slower than they could afford to be, than the SS facing them, and even in comparison with the 101st Airborne. The Urquhart/Lathbury thing is a seperate issue, as 1st Para Brigade had already blown it before they dropped that particular bollock. IMO they were directly responsible for the failure of 3rd Para Battalion to get through to the bridge in the first twelve hours, though. Lathbury was micromanaging the battalion, it came to a dead stop to protect Urquhart as it got dark and sat there until dawnish on D+1. By then it was too late. One company that didn't stop because they didn't get the word got thru to the bridge with virtually no trouble, altho they ran into the Germans near the bridge and lost a lot of blokes.

268724[/snapback]

The 3 route approach would be the best method to get the whole brigade to the bridge area quickly, but would only work against very light opposition, which is what the plan assumed. However, if the opposition is higher than anticipated the plan needed to change to have the battalions working together. It is a good example of the inferiority of micro-managing a battle in a fluid situation. Probably would have done better using mission based orders allowing the battalion commanders latitude to react. But we didn't do that then.

[bad-dice]

BTW, what British "colonial" infantry served in Greece?

6th Australian and 2nd New Zealand, of course. As an Antipodean Colonial, you should know that.

 

BTW, my "Colonial" crack was aimed at the British Army, which seemed to rely on non-English outfits for their heavy lifting* between Dunkirk and Alamein. "They're Colonials, who cares if they die as long as they do what we tell them..." This attitude carried over to the Americans (ex-Colonials, the lot of us) in lots of cases.

 

I whole heartedly agree with Conall. Your view is very superficial, you present a very jaundiced view at times.

 

Hitler was not fighting Britain, he was fighting the Empire, which at that time was a real entity. If Hitler had succesfully invaded Britain Churchill stated the fleet, and government would move to the Empire and continue the fight from there. Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Canada were all self governing democracies and joined the struggle with the mother country as partners not vassals as you imply.

How many comments have you read by Brits who encountered Aussies and Yanks and came away to scribble in their diaries, "Appalling undisciplined rabble. They'll never be soldiers!"

If anyone criticises Aussies for lack of discipline this is usually followed by the caveat "...bloody good soldiers though".

[Old Tanker]

Nice to see that your virulent anglophobia is as undiminished as ever.

270603[/snapback]

 

Anglophobia: The hatred of English people , manners , customs amd institutions.

 

Is that you King ?

[Conall]

Connall, ref your lambasting of Gavin - no time for a full response now, but I think some of your criticisms are a bit off. As I understand it Gavin only went after the Groesbeek Heights because Browning insisted he did so, and the latter was constantly badgering him about it after landing. It was not therefore a matter of Browning overruling Gavin, he had already done so and drawn Gavin away from his preferred course of action and going after the bridges immediately.

 

This is not what either the US official history or General Gavin's memoirs suggest - they make it clear that it was Gavin's intent all along to focus on Groesbeek. Also you don't address why Gavin was at such pains to stress the fictious German armoured threat from the Reichswald and then disengenuously balme the source of the information on the British. I quite agree that Browning compounded the mistake, which was part of the point I was trying to make but obviously didn't get across very well.

 

Ref seizing the Nijmegen bridges, where would you land anyone north of them and you omit to mention that they were the most northerly of the 82nds objectives, and there were five more to the south, notably at Grave, Honinghutie and Molenhoek. No point in holding the Nijmegen brodges without the others.

Agreed re the other objectives, although with the exception of the Grave roadbridge the Nijmegen roadbridge was his main objective. I suspect the problem lay in his assumption that he would have time to secure the bridge prior to the arrival of XXX Corps. In this respect Gavin was also guilty of miscalculating the speed and efficacy of the German response and their identification of Nijmegen as the schwerepunkt.

 

I also fail to see what your point about Browning diverting the gliders has to do with the general thrust of your comment about Gavin; that was Brownings crap decision for purely personal PR reasons. I also suspect that Gavin was constrained by Brownings presence in his AO, as was the commander of the 3rd Para Batt by the presence of Lathbury and Urquhart..

 

My bad - the criticism was aimed solely at Browning - I just phrased it rather badly. In fact the point of my previous post was that both Browning and Gavin share much of the blame for the failure of Operation Market Garden - with, if anything, the former being much more culpable IMHO.

 

Finally, if you look at Urquhart's dismal performance just up the road at the same time I think it's a bit rich to criticise Gavin, who was everywhere at once in his area despite having busted his back on landing...

 

More food for thought, eh?   I'll get back to you about the larger perimter at Arnhem as soon as I get time. It's your fault, every time I come to answer something you jump in with another!

 

all the best

 

BillB

 

PS Good comeback at King. 

270629[/snapback]

 

I'm not convinced that Urquhart's performance was quite that dismal, not least given the undeniable comms problems and the loss of most of the recce jeeps. He was at least at the sharp end trying to guage the situation and urge 1st Para Brigade on. I would, however, agree with your assessment that his and Lathbury's presence was detrimental in keeping 3 Para in Arnhem on the night of D-Day rather than pressing on to the bridge during the night.

 

Look forward to your reply.

 

All the best,

 

Tom

 

ps Conall is from the Old Irish and is spelt with one 'n' and two 'l's. Confusingly the similar Old Irish name Conn is spelt with two 'n's The name is an old joke at my expense

[KingSargent]

Anglophobia: The hatred of English people , manners , customs amd institutions.

 

Is that you King ?

270669[/snapback]

No. Being of Anglican descent, I well recognize English (and CW) virtues. I also recognize failings.

 

My comments on the "Bloody Colonial" attitude of many British officers can be confirmed in many sources. I do not say ALL, but perhaps a majority of senior Brit officers. Their attitude towards Americans is well-recorded.

 

I am well aware that Australia, NZ, Canada, et al were not "Colonies" or vassals. But you cannot deny that they did not belong to the proper clubs to mix socially with British officers. If you doubt, just read AB on virtually every commander of CW troops he came into contact with.

 

As for the "Heavy Lifting" remark, as all Axis v. CW ground contact occurred in the Med beween Dunkirk and Alamein, shall we examine who served there? The only English infantry I can find are the Guards brigade of many names (22, 200, 201 IIRC) and the 70th Division which had been the old 6th garrisoning Palestine. Both had been in the ME pre-1940. 50th came fairly late, first action at Gazala. 51st and 44th got in at Alamein

 

As I mentioned, 6Aus and 2NZ went to Greece. 6thAus and 4thIndian were most of O'Connor's infantry troops in COMPASS. 4th and 5th Indian and a hodgepodge of largely African units fought in East Africa. 7th (1/3) and 9thAus, several Indian units, 2NZ, and 1&2South African served in the Western Desert. Several of the Indian units were 1/3 British.

 

As for the tanks and guns, no CW unit fought in armour between Dunkirk and Alamein. This technological bias led to my admittedly tongue-in-cheek crack about Englishmen handling the machinery. BTW, I am well aware that the UK couldn't keep its own armour up during this time and nothing was left to distribute to CW units, so it was not "anti-Colonial prejudice."

While OZ, NZ, and South Africa had their own divisional artillery the vast majority of artillery larger than field guns was British, as was almost (I can't think of one non-Brit, but there probably were some) all the AA units. I'm a little unclear as to the status of the Indian artillery at the time - after the 'Sepoy' Mutiny all Indian Army artillery was British, as were 1/3 of the infantry bns. This changed, but I don't know when or what the status of the "Desert Indian" units was in 1940-42.

 

I am also well-aware that in 1940-41 it made no sense to send infantry out from an understrength UK (the 6/70th Div and the Guards were already in the ME, and stayed there) when the Antipodean and Indian troops would have to go through or around Africa to get to the UK. So there was definite reason to "rely on Colonials for the heavy lifting," but the fact that it worked out that way is inescapable.

 

 

 

BTW and a little OT, but was 'Pip' Roberts of 11th AD a descendent of the famous 19th Century general Lord Roberts?

[DKTanker]

The problem lies earlier than that.  It lies with the failure of Eisenhower to provide command and direction at the critical moment because he was incommunicado, i.e. when Roberts was screaming for it while sitting in front of a smorgasbord of options in Antwerp.  The failure to exploit the Brits armoured drive into Belgium lies not with Roborts, Horrocks, Dempsey, or Montgomery, but squarely with Eisenhower.

270152[/snapback]

 

So Ike being out of the loop for 72 hours brings a timeout to the war? How does Monty get a pass? He is in communication and for all intents and purposes the senior commander. Either Monty knew Ike was alive and out of the loop, for whatever reason, and chose to play passive agrressive or Monty didn't know Ike's disposition and he merely sat on his ass waiting for somebody to tell him what to do. Other's have suggested that Monty was the superior general to Ike...perhaps so, but at the moment in time when his supposed superiority was needed, he himself was less than stellar.

[Rickshaw]

You're only talking about the operations that occurred.  There were many that WSC proposed but which Allan Brooke managed to prevent even reaching the planning stage.  Then there were the ones that even he couldn't stop, of which Kos is the main example of. 

Kos and the later Greek intervention in 1944-5 were the darlings of Anthony Eden, who grossly underestimated the commitment necessary. AB was right on the mark about how many troops would eventually be tied up. AB didn't want to send British troops into the Balkans, he just wanted to drop lots of guns and ammo all over the country and let the "Noble Partisans" loose. He seems to have missed that they would spend more time shooting each other than Germans. Wingate's swans are another. At least Wingate was willing to DO something and get into the field with his men. And Wingate's ops didn't cost that much to the war effort. Considering lots of factors, I'd say Wingate was cost-effective.

 

I've just been reading Julian Thompson's "Lifeblood of War" where he makes the point that Wingate achieved buggerall at the cost of the lives of a large number of mean and the wasting of a great deal of resources. As Slim pointed out, Wingate took valuable men and resources away from his campaign which achieved, even after those men and resources were removed, far more than Wingate ever did. Wingate was a fruitloop. Unfortunately he got the attention of WSC who was all too often attracted to fruitloops. If Wingate had been a genuine eccentric, it would have been OK in my opinion. The problem is, he wasn't. It was a studied eccentricity which was intended more for effect rather because he was really different.

 

Winston's problem was that he while he was willing to back innovative schemes and methods, he often couldn't sort the wheat from the chaff and didn't understand what was logistically and administratively impossible, as against what was only difficult.

Very often things that Winston were told were impossible turned out to be possible, but I think that if he hadn't been constantly 'pooh-poohed' by the pros, he might have behaved a little more rationally. WSC just wanted somebody to do something, and all he got from the military was, 'Nope, can't be done.' Perhaps if his generals had displayed a little more enthusiasm and aggressiveness....

 

You appear to believe aggressiveness for its own sake is a valuable attribute. Personally, at the operational and strategic level I'd rather have a cautious general than one who wastes men and and resources merely for the sake of doing so. The world saw that all too often in WWI, it didn't want to see it again in WWII. I don't believe the UK's leaders were overcautious, either. Its far too easy to say such things in hindsight but at the time, they were far more aware of what was the art of the possible as against what was impossible than you or I can say looking back.

 

As BillB notes, the main contributions of Winnie to unusual forces either came or started while Dill was CIGS. I don't think AB ever told anybody anything but "NO!" unless the idea was his.

 

If WSC hadn't AB around to stop him, you'd have had a British invasion of Norway in 1943, A British army fighting in Russia, massive over-commitment of forces into the Balkans and so on.

 

BTW, what British "colonial" infantry served in Greece?

6th Australian and 2nd New Zealand, of course. As an Antipodean Colonial, you should know that.

 

I'm sorry, I'm not a colonial and neither were my parents. Australia became a self-governing Dominion in 1901. We entered WWII as Allies of the UK, not as a colonial state. Our forces were deployed according to a formal written agreement between the UK and Australian governments.

 

BTW, my "Colonial" crack was aimed at the British Army, which seemed to rely on non-English outfits for their heavy lifting* between Dunkirk and Alamein. "They're Colonials, who cares if they die as long as they do what we tell them..." This attitude carried over to the Americans (ex-Colonials, the lot of us) in lots of cases.

 

How many comments have you read by Brits who encountered Aussies and Yanks and came away to scribble in their diaries, "Appalling undisciplined rabble. They'll never be soldiers!"

 

*Except for the armour and most of the artillery of course. That was restricted to Englishmen who could operate complicated machinery....

270515[/snapback]

 

Well, I can understand that sort of comment in regards to the US military of 1942, which is when it was more than likely made.

 

However, I will note that all the UK Commanders that the Australian Imperial Force served under were well aware of their status as an Ally, rather than a colonial force and even when forcibly reminded of it, as after Greece, by the contingent's command, acknowledged it and treated them as such. The really dismissive attitudes I've read tend to come from US commands, by the way, in the Pacific war, particularly Macarthur, King and Nimitz, let alone US politicians.

 

As others have noted, your ideas on how Imperial coalition warfare worked has more to do with your anglophobia than reality and is superficial and ridiculious. I'd suggest you give it up, before you dig yourself deeper into a hole of your own making.

 

I will also point you to the reported comment by Francis De Guingand, Montgomery's Chief of Staff just before D-Day, wishing that 9 Div AIF was part of the invasion force. Hardly the comment of someone who was dismissive of "colonial troops".

Edited January 15, 2006 by Baron Samedi

[Jim Martin]

Hell, even as a Sergeant in the Marine Corps, I knew that if you didn't have access to higher authority, DO SOMETHING. Sort it out later on, but in the absence of orders, subordinates need to take the initiative. What was Monty doing, diddling little French boys?

 

So Ike being out of the loop for 72 hours brings a timeout to the war?  How does Monty get a pass?  He is in communication and for all intents and purposes the senior commander.  Either Monty knew Ike was alive and out of the loop, for whatever reason, and chose to play passive agrressive or Monty didn't know Ike's disposition and he merely sat on his ass waiting for somebody to tell him what to do.  Other's have suggested that Monty was the superior general to Ike...perhaps so, but at the moment in time when his supposed superiority was needed, he himself was less than stellar.

270962[/snapback]

[Ken Estes]

The real culprit and one who must bear ultimate responsibility, as you have previously pointed out, is Eisenhower.  On the 4th Sept he set Montgomery three objectives:  Cross the Rhine, capture the Ruhr, and to secure the Scheldt.  Of these the focus was most clearly on capturing the Ruhr, which must therefore be taken as his primary aim (assuming he had one - arguable).  He then went incommunicado for three days.

 

270123[/snapback]

Not so fast Tom, I think those were precisely the kind of orders one gives generals commanding army groups. This is strategic direction, not operations. Ike set the objectives and left it to the commander how to do it, but expected all to be done, in sequence or otherwise. At his level, Ike was required to coordinate the overall effort [by setting mission tasks] and allocate resources.

 

Monty knew this and would have railed against any more detail in his orders. His passing up the Scheldt to close the Rhine first does not reveal to Ike that he was not taking action in the Scheldt operation. As already noted, all the AG and armies were out of resources and the timing of new efforts would depend on how soon they recovered and the coordinating of new efforts would be left to the planning staffs. I seriously doubt that Monty told Ike that he was going to GAF-off the Scheldt at any point. How that really happened must be uncovered elsewhere. Cheers, Ken

[Old Tanker]

As others have noted, your ideas on how Imperial coalition warfare worked has more to do with your anglophobia than reality and is superficial and ridiculious.  I'd suggest you give it up, before you dig yourself deeper into a hole of your own making.

 

270971[/snapback]

 

In reality it's more of a 400 year old extended family fight and arguement than Anglophobia . A lingering tinge of disagreement of Roundheads vs. Cavaliers more so than Anglophobia.

 

Republican vs. Royalist is more appropriate.

[Alexei McDonald]

Montgomery says that he thought on 4th September that 1st Canadian Army would be enough to clear the Scheldt estuary, and then notes "I was wrong".

 

Eisenhower told Montgomery on the 7th that it was most important to move on the Saar and the Ruhr "with the greatest possible speed" before the Germans had time to recover. By the time the Saar and the Ruhr operations were completed, Eisenhower continued, Le Havre and Antwerp would be available to support further operations.

 

In short, the priority is not to to clear the approaches to Antwerp in Eisenhower's view. It's something that must be done, but 21st AG's primary mission, the time critical one, is the Ruhr.

[BillB]

In reality it's more of a 400 year old extended family fight and arguement than  Anglophobia . A lingering tinge of disagreement of Roundheads vs. Cavaliers more so than Anglophobia.

 

Republican  vs. Royalist is more appropriate.

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Nicely put, OT. Altho I think tax-dodgers vs. Parliamentarians is nearer the mark for the last line...

 

BillB

[FlyingCanOpener]

Nicely put, OT. Altho I think tax-dodgers vs. Parliamentarians is nearer the mark for the last line...     

 

BillB

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You can't tax who you don't represent!

[Old Tanker]

Nicely put, OT. Altho I think tax-dodgers vs. Parliamentarians is nearer the mark for the last line...     

 

BillB

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Just trying to make sure this is kept in a nationalistic sense as opposed to a racial/ethnic pissin' contest.

 

As King said he is of Anglo descent and so am I .The comparision to Mel Gibson's attitude , with it's obvious messages is out of line.

 

This isn't Irish Catholic vs. English Protestant as some are assuming.

[SCFalken]

Republican  vs. Royalist is more appropriate.

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Otherwise known as: "Several dozen Rich White Guys vs. one Rich White Guy."

 

Rather have Liz II than Hilary I.

 

 

Falken

[capt_starlight]

I am also well-aware that in 1940-41 it made no sense to send infantry out from an understrength UK (the 6/70th Div and the Guards were already in the ME, and stayed there)  when the Antipodean and Indian troops would have to go through or around Africa to get to the UK. So there was definite reason to "rely on Colonials for the heavy lifting," but the fact that it worked out that way is inescapable.

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Actually the 2 NZ Inf Div and one Brigade + of AIF were in the UK for the period of the Invasion Scare of 1940 (2 NZ was one of the more completely equipped units in the UK at the time). There were so many AIF troops in the Uk at the time that the bulk of 9 Div AIF were formed from them (and later transferred to the Western Desert in time for the Siege of Tobruk). In 1940/41 there was much swapping of Brigades by the various AIF divisions as those originally intended for a particular division were diverted elsewhere - so none actually formed and faught as they had originally been designed....

 

The last formed Australian troops were withdrawn from the UK in SEP43 when 2/3 Forestry Coy AIF marched through New York on their way back to Australia.

 

Frank