Why Bridge Too Far attempt was doomed

[BillB]

Question about the Glider units:

 

Did the gliders (troops onboard as well as aircraft) really take such disproportionate casualties?  Enough to justify how fast Glider units got dropped, postwar?

Falken

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I'm not sure what disprortionate casualties you mean, Falken. The only casualties suffered by 1st Airlanding Brigade in their landing on 17 September were from landing accidents, AFAIK they were minimal and there was no flak or ground opposition. There was flak and ground opposion when the second lift came in on 18 September, but while the Germans shot up at least three Horsas on landing according to my info only eight men were killed during the glider part of the operation. The third lift on 19 September met lots of flak, were strafed by German fighters after landing, and then Kampfgruppe Krafft overran the northern edge of the LZ. However, there were only 28 Horsas and a single Hamilcar and IIRC they were carrying 1 Polish Independent's heavy gear rather than troops.

 

Ref the glider arm being disbanded, that is something I have yet to investigate in the official records, but at the moment I suspect it was a combination of the cost and the clout of the parachute lobby.

 

all the best

 

BillB

[BillB]

At some point during several days of fighting, someone is going to stop and eat - and it's quite likely that they had been stopped for some tactical or logistical reason and were taking advantage of a rare moment.

 

I've also heard a story that when one of the airborne force criticized a XXX Corps soldier for not moving fast enough, the response was to the effect that "You've been here since Thursday.  We've been here since D-Day."

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Ref the first part, absolutely. Ref the second para, nice one! OTOH the 82nd and 101st could have responded by pointing out they were both on the ground on D-Day well before XXX Corps, and prolly spent at least as long if not longer at the absolute pointy end thereafter too....

 

all the best,

 

BillB

[BillB]

Fair comment but a couple of points:

 

having been to Arnhem from Neimagen I can gaurentee one thing, the fight from the canal to Neimagen was going to be rough but possible, the advance from Neimagen to Arnhem by XXX corps was practically impossible, the road was single carriageway raised approx six feet above the surrounding fields and had a ten foot wide water filled ditch on either side! anything on that road is a sitting duck that cant defend itself!

 

there is a killing ground on both sides  and observation of the road is easy, one tank knocked out blocks that road entirely with no way to pass and no way round!

 

Yes, but that is not the only road, just the most direct one. XXXCorps reached the Nether Rhine at Driel by hooking west from Nijmegen, and the Germans pushed some Tiger tanks across that way from Arnhem. This suggests they could have gotten thru, and remember that when they finally got across the Nijmegen bridges there was almost literally nothing between there and Arnhem.

 

in the dutch military college before the war there was a field excersise to plan an advance to Arnhem from Neimagen, if you went up the road you failed the exam!!!

Fair one. But then the Germans did it fine in reverse in 1940...

 

and gaurds armoured stopped after the capture of the Neimagen bridge for two simple reasons-

1, after fighting thier way through the city suppoerting the US paras especially around the approach to the bridge ammo and fuel was low!

 

2, the germans had cut the road behind them, the tankers wanted to try to press on but noone would have followed it up!

 

(I know this from chats with a guy who was gunner in one of the tanks that followed up the bridge siezure)

 

the attack was doomed at the start  because they simply underestimated the speed with which the germans could shift forces against the single thrust and failed to heed resistance reports of german forces in tha areas!

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Again, I think the resistance thing has been proven a red herring for reasons cited elsewhere.

 

all the best

 

BillB

[BillB]

I understand what you mean about 1st Para Bde waiting around for anti-tank guns, supplies etc, but if they hadn't they might never have seen that kit again. Yes they moved slower than the 101st but they had a lot further to go to their objectives. I agree switching one of the other battalions to the river route could have helped a lot. I'm still not convinced the operation would have succeeded.

 

Fair one, but by hanging around they ended up with all the kit but failed to achieve their objectives and, more importantly, gifted the Germans the time they needed to get into position and erect blocking positions. Surely if 1st Para Brigade had further to go they should have been moving faster, not slower, and in addition, the 101st had a lot more objectives - seven bridges in all. The crucial difference there was that the 101st had done this before and fully appreciated the need for speed, whereas 1st Airborne/1st Para Brigade hadn't and consequently squandered their main advantage by dithering.

 

Ref the speed thing from your earlier post, the 506 PIR expressly had its men move off the LZ after a partial post-drop reorg in the interests of speed. Some were on the move within 20 minutes of the drop ending, and the whole lot were well on their way within 45 minutes. By contrast, the 1st and 2nd Para Batts didn't start to move off the LZ until at least 50 minutes after landing, 3rd Batt and Brigade HQ after an hour and a half, and 1st Airborne Recce Squadron after an hiour and 45 minutes.

 

Ref the river route bit, if they had moved faster there were few if any Germans on any of the routes until a while after, because they deliberately avoided Arnhem because they were worried about resistance attacks. Thus the river route only stayed stayed open longest because it was furthest south, there was nothing between the 3rd Battalion and Arnhem when they stopped for the night at around 18:30. The Germans who interfered with them were located to the north. The 1st Para Batt on the northern route had the bulk of the trouble, but even they could have avoided this by moving faster. Regarding not being convinced the op could have succeeded, dunno about that because of how close they came even allowing for the ridiculous "plan" and tardy execution. Consider how long it took the Germans to dig out the blokes who actually reached the bridge and fought from an unsuitable perimeter dictated by their numbers. Triple the men or more would have allowed them to establish a properly defensible perimeter and I think they could have held out long enough for XXX Corps to reach them

 

I just looked up Tunisia in Peter Harclerode's book Para! and yes, 1700 casualties, a massive casualty rate. But surely quite a lot of those would have returned to duty, not all with their original units, but certainly some. Frost was the only original  battalion commander who was at Arnhem, and even some of the successors, such as Alastair Pearson, had gone by then. I'm aware the term "2 Para" wasn't used during the war, I'm just lazy.! Re Sicily- a big part of the problem there was the majorly stuffed-up drop.

Harclerode has just lifted that figure from Otway's official history, which unfortunately doesn't break down into WIA and KIA. Given the severity of the fighting thru the winter of 1942-3 I dunno how many might have returned, but that aside, spending five months in a hole isn't very good practice for airborne ops, and the drops at Bone, Souk el Arba and Depienne weren't much use except as examples of how not to do things. Same goes for Sicily. The stuffed up drop was only part of the problem. Have a look at the plan for the Primasole Bridge drop - 4 DZs and three seperate objectives for a single brigade is too complicated and divided up the formations combat power on perpheral objectives. Just like they did at Arnhem.

 

Ref the batt commanders bit, I dunno if you are aware of it, Frost was the only original batt commander but the others had served in Africa too and they got the job when their predecessors were relieved. When Pearson (who was better than Frost IMO) was cross posted from 1st Para Batt to 6th Airborne Div for D-Day he was replaced by a North Africa veteran with a Guards background called Cleasby Thompson. His introduction of Guards bull resulted in the batt going on strike or mutiny depending on how you look at it. Lathbury heard the men's grievances and Cleasby Thompson and his RSM were posted elsewher. He was replaced by Dobie, who had been a company OC in Africa. The commander of the 3rd Battalion was sacked when the batt failed a speed march test. He was replaced by another Africa veteran called Fitch.

 

What training did Hicks give 1st Airlanding Bde that was different from the parachute brigades? Which brings up another point. Maybe Hackett was a better brigadier than Lathbury, but I'm sure Hicks was better than either. He was certainly more experienced, being at 49 just about the oldest man in the division. Arnhem was Hackett's first airborne operation, and if you discount Italy, his last combat command had been a tank squadron in the desert. Not trying to put the guy down, he was certainly a hell of an officer.

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It wasn't so much what Hicks did as the amount of time the glider troops spent doing tactical training, live firing etc in comparison with the parachute battalions, which spent an inordinate amount of time doing nothing very much . The para training facility could only handle increments of 400, which meant splitting batts and dragging the process out for a month or more. In the period 1 January - end of May 1944, the average member of 1st and 4th Parachute Brigades spent between 12 and 14 days doing battalion and brigade level training, usually involving a jump, and between 5 and 8 days doing parachute training. This took up one fifth of the available training time, and the rest was spent in routine platoon and company training or preparing for VIP visits. The airlanding brigade spent around twice as long in batt and brigade training, and did more landings, FIBUA training and live firing. Simply put, the glider soldiers did a lot more with the limited time available than their partachute counterparts. Fair one about Hicks and Hackett, you may well be right.

 

all the best

 

BillB

[SCFalken]

I'm not sure what disprortionate casualties you mean, Falken.

[snip]

 

Ref the glider arm being disbanded, that is something I have yet to investigate in the official records, but at the moment I suspect it was a combination of the cost and the clout of the parachute lobby.

 

 

BillB

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Bill,

I was under the impression that, over the course of the War (OVERLORD, MARKET-GARDEN, VARSITY), Glider units took heavy casualties just landing. Crashes, etc. Much higher than the Parchute units, statistically. Was this in fact the case?

 

Falken

[Simon Tan]

With Major Knaust and his KING TIGERS at Elms.....there was NO way to push up the highway which was the only negotiable route across the mass of polder. They didn't have either arty or the TACAIR to pound the Germans out of Elms and they could not manouevre.

 

One problem with CAS apart from weather was the interspersal of friendly paras along the way. The tactics that served the US so well in France where fighter-bombers essentially raced along the route of advance in front of the US columns and bombed and shot up EVERYTHING that twitched would have resulted in fratricide.

 

Simon

[Rick Griest]

What a fascinating thread! So BillB, or anyone, what exactly was the air transport situation? How many C-47s did we have? Why were more not purchased and trained for? Could gliders be pulled by bombers? How did they night drop D-day but lost the ability 3 months later? How many troops were dropped D-day vs first day of Market Garden? And finally, what happened to 6th Para division after D-day and their astounding successes?

Thanks for the many new insights already.

Rick

[hojutsuka]

Ref the glider arm being disbanded, that is something I have yet to investigate in the official records, but at the moment I suspect it was a combination of the cost and the clout of the parachute lobby.

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You are undoubtedly right in that cost and parachute lobby were factors, but gliders basically had lots of disadvantages IMHO.

 

First, for the equivalent number of men delivered, a glider assault took much more airspace than a parachute assault. Clearly more space would be needed at staging airfields, and takeoffs and assembly of formations would take much longer too. This would mostly be of importance for large operations, and there were few of even regimental size after World War II, but those responsible for planning the post-war airborne forces couldn't know that, and probably planned for division-size drops.

 

Second, LZ for gliders were probably harder to find than DZ for paratroopers. Gliders need little distance to land in compared to normal aircraft, but they do need some. And a few logs or a ditch across the field (which could be invisible under tall grass or crops unless you inspect it on the ground beforehand) can make it very hazardous or impossible for a glider to land on an LZ, while the equivalent in a DZ would only mean somewhat higher jump casualties. And a DZ can be used again almost immediately; drop a battalion into a DZ, and if they are on the ball, they should have cleared the DZ in 30 minutes or less, and the DZ can take another battaion drop. Land a battalion by glider, and the LZ is useless until the empty gliders can be cleared away. Since the troops carried by the gliders need to get on with their mission and airlanded troops are always short of heavy mechanical equipment like bulldozers and cranes, it will take a lot longer to clear an LZ than to clear a DZ.

 

The above two disadvantages affected operations during World War II, but gliders had two major advantages during World War II.

 

First and foremost, gliders provided a means of bringing in heavy equipment like anti-tank guns, artillery, and their prime movers. While some of the lighter equipment could have been dropped by parachute (there were parachute pack artillery battalions), the thought of trying to get the gun crew, the gun, and the prime mover together after a scattered drop is somewhat daunting IMHO.

 

Second, gliders were a means by which regular infantry without parachute training could be used in airlanding operations. Balanced against this must be the fact that glider operations needed large number of trained glider pilots, who would end up stranded in the ground battle and might suffer heavy casualties, so needed a large replacement organization.

 

During World War II, the advantages were felt to outweigh the disadvantages, so glider operations were a part of large-scale Allied airlanding operations in Europe. But after World War II, developments reduced the advantages while accentuating the disadvantages of gliders.

 

First, the size of armed forces, including airborne forces and the aircraft that supported them, shrunk after the war ended. So the advantage of using regular infantry was no longer significant.

 

Second, specialized military air transports with capability for short landing and takeoff were developed. In some cases (Fairchild C-123) they were powered versions of large assault gliders developed for World War II (the Germans had done this during World War II by adding powerplants to the Me 321 glider to produce the Me 323 heavy transport). This provided an alternative to gliders for landing heavy equipment in an airlanding operation. And improvements in parachutes and the development of specialized transport aircraft with rear doors that could be used for airdropping meant that much heavier loads (say gun and prime mover on a single load platform) could be dropped from low altitude (hence more accurately).

 

Thus, the advantages that the glider offered in World War II appeared in the post-war period to be no longer so significant.

 

The disadvantages remained, and were accentuated by improvements in aircraft. Post-war military cargo aircraft flew faster and higher, often with pressurization to allow operation at altitudes that maximized performance. Assault gliders were by nature expendable, so had few amenities and were uncomfortable for long flights. And the low wing loading meant that gliders were limited to relatively slow speeds even when towed. Hence parachute troops could take advantage of the improvements in aircraft to project themselves over longer distances. The glider troops could not take a similar advantage.

 

IMHO, the factors outlined above would have led to a decrease in importance of glider troops versus parachute troops, even without the cost of maintaining another separate category of troops and equipment (including gliders which would suffer losses even in training) and the pressure from the parachute lobby.

 

Hojutsuka

[ShotMagnet]

Gliders could and were pulled by bombers.

 

I found a site giving a figure of 1000 C-47s being used for D-Day; regarding the question of why more weren't used for Market-Garden, it may have been a question of availability. C-47s were used for every manner of transport task, there may have been plenty of airframes around but they would likely have been tasked to perform logistical functions from which they couldn't have been easily re-purposed.

 

The D-Day night drop was made at night because the Allies were looking to sieze key road junctions for use by troops coming from the beaches. Since the troops were coming ashore first thing in the morning, the air-assault forces had to be dropped earlier in order to give them some time to get to and fight for their various objectives. Hence the night drop.

 

Market-Garden didn't suffer from the same restrictions, so a night-drop wasn't deemed necessary for the first sets of drops. The ability wasn't 'lost' therefore, it was deemed unnecessary. Night drops are also a lot riskier than day-drops; if there's no compelling reason to drop at night you go with the safer day-drop.

 

For D-Day, 3 divisions (American 82nd and 101st, and British 6th Airborne) were dropped, for M-G 3 divisions were also involved (this time calling themselves the 1st Air Army) and involved both of the American division which had dropped on D-Day, and the British 1st Airborne division. The 82nd and 101st made it over in two drops, the British also dropped a Polish brigade later in the battle.

 

 

Shot

[Von Richter]

The Glider Pilot Regiment suffered such high losses at Arnhem that RAF pilots 'volunteered' to take some of the gliders in on Operation Varsity.

http://www.gliderpilotregiment.org.uk/

Edited January 11, 2006 by Von Richter

[capt_starlight]

The Glider Pilot Regiment suffered such high losses at Arnhem that RAF pilots 'volunteered' to take some of the gliders in on Operation Varsity.

http://www.gliderpilotregiment.org.uk/

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These were re-mustered aircrew that were basically surplus to RAF requirements. They wore battledress with RAF and army embellishments and were armed with small arms but had not undergone training as ground troops to any degree (unlike their army counterparts who were first and foremost soldiers). They were and remained members of the RAF and, at best, were "honorary" members of the Glider Pilot Regiment. I must presume that discipline and pay were the responsibility of the RAF.

 

They performed admirably as pilots and were enthusiastic in participating in the ground fighting (though substituting enthusiasm for training).

 

My main source was a glider pilot who did NA (including the ferry flights - just about the hairiest thing he said he did), Sicily, Normandy, MG, Varsity and was training Indian pilots for Malaya (as well as preparing himself for that operation) at the war's end. Much of what he has said has been confirmed up by books including BillB's excellent one. I must do a formal oral history on him one day.....

 

Frank

[baboon6]

BillB- I'm aware the other COs in 1st Para Bde were also Africa veterans, what I meant was that Frost was the only one still in his original job. I agree with you about Pearson- undoubtedly the outstanding parachute battalion commander of the war (4 DSOs and an MC isn't exactly to be sniffed at).

 

If the airlanding brigade's training was better than that of the parachute brigades then Hicks must take the credit, for who else would have made up or at least approved the brigade's training plan? I suppose the argument between youth and experience will go on forever and in most cases I would favour youth (guys like Roberts, or Hull or Carver) but maybe in this case not. Hicks was indeed older than most divisional commanders in the British Army by this stage. By contrast most American div commanders were in their 50s, which has always surprised me, since the US Army expanded to a much larger force off a smaller initial base.

Edited January 11, 2006 by baboon6

[Marek Tucan]

IIRC the road through Elst was clear in the evening the Nijmegen bridge was taken, the roadblock was established by the morning of next day. In hindsight, sending even some ligh recon force to probe both roads (the highway and the other one used later) might atleast discover passage or slow down the roadblock establishment. As for the CAS, any car or armoured vehicle around Arnhem had to be German, no?

[JohnB]

With Major Knaust and his KING TIGERS at Elms.....there was NO way to push up the highway which was the only negotiable route across the mass of polder.

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Colonel Taylor's 5th DCLI did take out five a them in an ambush though.

[Conall]

IIRC the road through Elst was clear in the evening the Nijmegen bridge was taken, the roadblock was established by the morning of next day. In hindsight, sending even some ligh recon force to probe both roads (the highway and the other one used later) might atleast discover passage or slow down the roadblock establishment. As for the CAS, any car or armoured vehicle around Arnhem had to be German, no?

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This is the hypothesis that Robert Kershaw puts forward. Unfortunately a closer examination of the XXX Corps and, more specifically, Irish Gds war diaries shows that it doesn't hold water for two reasons. The first is that the Irish Gds got across the Nijmegen bridge with little more than an understrength tank squadron and three depeleted infantry platoons - an entirely inadequate force, especially when you consider that the tanks urgently needed refueling and rearming. The second is that heavy fighting was still going on in Nijmegen that evening which made it almost impossible to bring up more troops, especially the light recce elements you suggest. Finally it's worth noting that the only unit which might have broken through - the Coldstream Guards BG - had to turn around and head back down the highway to relieve the German attacks against Vegehel the following day.

 

A more reasonable criticism of XXX Corps is why it refused to allow its units to move at night, something which might have made all the difference in the critical first 24-48 hours. Again, I suspect that this was a symptom of higher Allied command thinking that the war was essentially won.

 

Best regards

 

Tom

Edited January 11, 2006 by Conall

[Conall]

I've jumped onto Arnhem at several of the anniversaries, and done the tab to the Bridge (its about the most emotive & emotional anniversary that takes place in NW Europe).

 

When were you there? I went in 1990 (as part of the Para 90 celebrations) and again in 1994. Sadly I couldn't make it in 2004, although I did get to the Normandy commorative services and saw the Raneville drop and the service at Pegasus Bridge. It was both very impressive and extremely moving.

 

 

"My" plan would have been to make mass glider landings on the southern approaches to Arnhem bridge, and maybe even a para drop onto the town itself - both regardless of the calculated drop casualties. I'd have still used the Ginkel Heath DZs for the build up of forces and HQs, but used them to keep flanking pressure on the Germans, rather than to necessarily link up with the bridge forces right away.

The problem with this is that you dilute you main effort and divert troops away from the principal objective. In addition the Ginkel Heath DZ would still need to be defended - something which proved very difficult even against fairly light initial opposition.

 

As far as the "corridor" goes, I'd have also dropped US/British/Polish paras along both sides of the Nijmegan-Arnhem corridor, and tasked them to do what paras do best: form ad hoc groupings and seize whatever they could as defensible features (woods, houses, dykes), with the aim of disrupting the german defence long emough to allow the passage of XXX Corps elements.

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This has two problems - the first that it again diverts precious airlift assets away from the primary objectives; while the second is that it would have achieved relatively little for a large expenditure of troops and resources. The Germans had the luxury of chosing when and where along the Highway they attacked, so that penny-packets of airborne troops would have made very little difference. In addition despite their superb combat record neither the British or American airborne troops could resist German armoured formations without their own armoured support. 101st Airborne's defence of the corridor around Eindhoven and Veghel was very dependent on the impressive and largely ignored efforts of 15/19th KRH and 44 RTR and still required assistance from the Coldstream BG as well.

 

Best regards

 

Tom

Edited January 11, 2006 by Conall

[Conall]

Ref the river route bit, if they had moved faster there were few if any Germans on any of the routes until a while after, because they deliberately avoided Arnhem because they were worried about resistance attacks. Thus the river route only stayed stayed open longest because it was furthest south, there was nothing between the 3rd Battalion and Arnhem when they stopped for the night at around 18:30. The Germans who interfered with them were located to the north. The 1st Para Batt on the northern route had the bulk of the trouble, but even they could have avoided this by moving faster. Regarding not being convinced the op could have succeeded, dunno about that because of how close they came even allowing for the ridiculous "plan" and tardy execution. Consider how long it took the Germans to dig out the blokes who actually reached the bridge and fought from an unsuitable perimeter dictated by their numbers. Triple the men or more would have allowed them to establish a properly defensible perimeter and I think they could have held out long enough for XXX Corps to reach them

all the best

 

BillB

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Fair point re more troops getting to the Bridge but I think it would have made little difference unless the other end of the bridge had been seized as well in addition to a nearby/immediate and defensible DZ to allow aerial resupply (which most obviously would have been the polder to the south west of the bridge - the Driel DZ). Without those two elements I suspect that all that would have been achieved was a marginally longer resistance and ultimately more troops going into captivity.

 

Best regards

 

Tom

Edited January 11, 2006 by Conall

[baboon6]

Just saw a documentary on Arnhem that I hadn't seen before, part of the "Battlefield Detectives" series. I don't know if this was the one BillB mentioned above. While it wasn't the greatest, it did have some interesting points.

 

1) They actually tested some of the No. 68 radio sets used by the signallers, at Arnhem, Oosterbeek and Ginkel Heath. While they worked fine over 1.5-2km in open country, as soon as they moved into wooded or urban terrain and extended the range a bit, communication was difficult to impossible. I don't know whether the age of the sets or climatic conditions played a part. Tony Deane-Drummond (2IC 1st Airborne Div Signals at Arnhem) confirmed there were serious problems. The 68 was a manpacked set, what sets were used in jeeps? Was it possible for the various battalions in Arnhem to talk to each other and/or brigade HQ? I know there was a link from the bridge to div HQ (on the artillery FOO net).

 

2) As BillB mentioned (I didn't know he had written a book on Arnhem before this) there was a lack of training in OBUA by 1st Airborne Division. Maybe the "detectives" read the book.

 

3) Firing comparison between Sten and MP40- difference in performance was negligible. Okay they weren't comprehensive trials but still the way the Sten is derided... Of course the real infantryweapons the Germans had which were superior were the MG42 and

 

4) The Panzerfaust- trial of this against steel plating. Certainly would have been lethal against the side of a Sherman.

 

To go from documentaries to movies: There was much complaint at the time about the way the character of Lt. Gen "Boy" Browning (played by Dirk Bogarde) was portrayed in "A Bridge Too Far", particularly by his widow, the novelist Daphne du Maurier. I suspect it was probably pretty accurate.

[PONGO_7409]

just read the book

 

Armageddon: the Battle for Germany, 1944-1945

by Max Hastings (Author) (Paperback - October 18, 2005)

 

 

Covers the the topic nicely.

 

First point that even if the Op had succeeded it was a strategic dead end - road network in Holland wouldn't support a Corp let alone an Army or Army Group.

 

Montgomery needs to be fingered - his ego got in the way of his judgement. He had taken so much heat over Normandy & the Gap, he was trying to prove what a great Filed Marshal he was - he should never have made FM, he didn't have the capability asociated with that rank - it was Churchill who did it to appease Monty & the British jingoistic press after Ike took over . . .

 

 

Op MG delayed the opening of Antwerp and gave the Germans six + weeks to fortify the Scheldt, Waklchern & Northern Holland.

 

The late opening of Antwerp was a hugge strategic mistake -and it was 100% Monty's

[Colin Williams]

just read the book

 

  Armageddon: the Battle for Germany, 1944-1945

by Max Hastings (Author) (Paperback - October 18, 2005)

Covers the the topic nicely.

 

First point that even if the Op had succeeded it was a strategic dead end - road network in Holland wouldn't support a Corp let alone an Army or Army Group.

 

Montgomery needs to be fingered - his ego got in the way of his judgement.  He had taken so much heat over Normandy & the Gap, he was trying to prove what a great Filed Marshal he was - he should never have made FM, he didn't have the capability asociated with that rank - it was Churchill who did it to appease Monty & the British jingoistic press after Ike took over . . .

Op MG delayed the opening of Antwerp and gave the Germans six + weeks to fortify the Scheldt, Waklchern & Northern Holland.

 

The late opening of Antwerp was a hugge strategic mistake -and it was 100% Monty's

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I've been wondering when someone was going to bring this up! You are absolutely right in terms of the larger strategic picture. A successful Market-Garden ends with elements of the Guards Armoured Division and 52nd Lowland Division (without transport!) around Appeldorn, about 100 miles from the Ruhr, with the Ijssel and other barriers still to cross, and supply for approximately 6 divisions coming up a single road that is under nearly continuous attack. A single German battle group could (and would) have stopped British progress there. Market-Garden was not a operation capable of defeating Germany in the West. It was an operation capable of success against collapsing opposition, but German defensive capabilities were still too strong. At best Monty would have been able to reach the Zuider Zee and thereby eliminate the V2 threat to England. I have always thought this was one of his objectives. Setting the V2 issue aside, his best option would have been to follow Dempsey's advice and aim his airborne assault at Xanten along the left flank of US 1st Army.

[BillB]

Fair point re more troops getting to the Bridge but I think it would have made little difference unless the other end of the bridge had been seized as well in addition to a nearby/immediate and defensible DZ to allow aerial resupply (which most obviously would have been the polder to the south west of the bridge - the Driel DZ).  Without those two elements I suspect that all that would have been achieved was a marginally longer resistance and ultimately more troops going into captivity.

 

Best regards

 

Tom

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Fair comment, but I dunno. There is nowhere for blokes to hid on the south side of the bridge, and putting folk there would surely have exposed them to the same stuff that destroyed the bits of the Oosterbeek pocket not anchored in buildings in short order. Plus Frost et al showed nobody was coming across that bridge from the south even if they didn't have the other end. I also still thing that all or most of 1st Para Brigadewith all its atts and dets and especially the AT guns would have been able to put up a lot more than marginally longer resistance. Ref the resupply etc, I think you are assuming that the battle would have run for the same 9 day span with the above, but I'm not so sure that would have been the case. If not then there would have been less need for air resupply. Also, if the bridge had been held for another day the situation would have been very different, as the Germans would not have been able to push over reinforcements to face the advance from NIjmegen or the Polish drop at Driel.

 

Sorry if the above in unintelligible, in a hurry and gotta go. To all, I will address all your points as best I can as soon as i get time.

 

all the best

 

BillB

[BillB]

I've been wondering when someone was going to bring this up! You are absolutely right in terms of the larger strategic picture. A successful Market-Garden ends with elements of the Guards Armoured Division and 52nd Lowland Division (without transport!) around Appeldorn, about 100 miles from the Ruhr, with the Ijssel and other barriers still to cross, and supply for approximately 6 divisions coming up a single road that is under nearly continuous attack. A single German battle group could (and would) have stopped British progress there. Market-Garden was not a operation capable of defeating Germany in the West. It was an operation capable of success against collapsing opposition, but German defensive capabilities were still too strong. At best Monty would have been able to reach the Zuider Zee and thereby eliminate the V2 threat to England. I have always thought this was one of his objectives. Setting the V2 issue aside, his best option would have been to follow Dempsey's advice and aim his airborne assault at Xanten along the left flank of US 1st Army.

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Fair one, but wouldn't a successful MG have allowed them to avoid fighting through the Reichswald as they had to in 1945?

 

BillB

[Von Richter]

Bill,

just been wondering wot the title of your book was?

[larrikin]

just read the book

 

  Armageddon: the Battle for Germany, 1944-1945

by Max Hastings (Author) (Paperback - October 18, 2005)

Covers the the topic nicely.

 

First point that even if the Op had succeeded it was a strategic dead end - road network in Holland wouldn't support a Corp let alone an Army or Army Group.

 

Montgomery needs to be fingered - his ego got in the way of his judgement.  He had taken so much heat over Normandy & the Gap, he was trying to prove what a great Filed Marshal he was - he should never have made FM, he didn't have the capability asociated with that rank - it was Churchill who did it to appease Monty & the British jingoistic press after Ike took over . . .

Op MG delayed the opening of Antwerp and gave the Germans six + weeks to fortify the Scheldt, Waklchern & Northern Holland.

 

The late opening of Antwerp was a hugge strategic mistake -and it was 100% Monty's

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The delay in opening Antwerp was down to Eisenhower, not Montgomery. When Roberts got to Antwerp he asked for further instructions - whether to go up the north bank of the Scheldt, help the White Army on the docks, make a run to Arnhem, or head south towards the Ruhr. Problem was Eisenhower had just taken over land command and was incommunicado for 3 days, and hadn't actually made any plans beyond his tactically naive broadfront strategy.

 

As for Montgomery not deserving to be a Field Marshall, he had a lot more right to it than to the US officers who got 5 stars. Eisenhower was out of his depth as an operatational commander, Patton never commanded anything larger than an Army, and MacArthur was a self aggrandizing incompetent who should have been pensioned off in California after screwing up the defence of the Phillipines.

[Ken Estes]

Op MG delayed the opening of Antwerp and gave the Germans six + weeks to fortify the Scheldt, Waklchern & Northern Holland.

 

The late opening of Antwerp was a hugge strategic mistake -and it was 100% Monty's

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I certainly agree that this is perhaps the sole black mark that can be laid almost unconditionally on Monty's career, who was uncharacteristically incautious on MG.

 

These days, of course, he could be saying 'I got bad intelligence,' but history is not so forgiving.