Why Bridge Too Far attempt was doomed

[BillB]

Interesting, so the initial drops did not occur there due to the terrain (was it too soft or something)?, but then they changed their minds and that's where they dropped the Poles.

362592[/snapback]

No, the excuse was that the bridge had too much flak, and that a drop there would necessitate flying over or near German airfields north of Arnhem which were also claimed to be flak hotspots. The original plan was *always* to drop the Poles south of the Arnhem road bridge as a reinforcing lift once the ground forces had relieved the first two lifts holding the bridge(s). Note the place where the Poles were actually dropped was north-west of their original DZ. The RAF planners claimed the polder south of the bridges was too soft to support gliders but I have not yet seen any solid evidence to back up the contention. The root of the problem was that the RAF planners had total control over operational matters until the airborne troops were on the ground, and there was no machinery to force them to take any notice of the soldiers needs or concerns. so they didn't. The glider troops including their CO Chatterton lobbied hard to be allowed to do a Pegasus type coup de main, but to no avail, and they were badly let down by Browning who wanted the op to go ahead ASAP for reasons of his own and thus refused to support them as he ought to have done.

 

That said, the plan was doable as it stood, as shown by the fact that 1st parachute Battalion (-), part of the 3rd Parachute Battalion and a lot of Divisional attachments and detachments were able to reach the Arnhem road bridge within the first few hours of landing. However, it needed more haste and application by 1st Parachute Brigade, and the latter also needed a better and more focused plan. The one they had was little more than setting the Brigade's three battalions loose on a peacetime roadmarch apiece, and expecting them to secure a divisions worth of separate objectives on the way. This habit of trying to do far too much with too little was a hallmark of every live operation 1st Airborne Div or its constituent formations ever carried out. As it stood, 1st Para Brigade blew the operation within the first 16 hours or so because they moved much slower than the Germans, and paid the price.

 

BillB

[DwightPruitt]

If you mean after thay got across the Nijmegen Bridge, I think it's apocryphal but with a germ of truth, if that makes sense. The tanks that got across the bridge after the 82 Airborne's river crossing were out of fuel and ammo IIRC, and therefore stopped. The comment about them comes from Tucker who thought they ought to be pushing on. He acually used the phrase about brewing tea I think. Anyway, as it was SOP for Brit tankies to brew up at every opportunity I don't doubt Tucker and his men saw Guards tankies brewing tea, but that was not why they had stopped...

 

all the best

 

BillB

268549[/snapback]

 

 

Bill, there's a passage in one of Ernie Pyle's books-Brave Men I think- that describes American tankers making coffee at every halt, so it was hardly a British thing.

[capt_starlight]

......a lot of Divisional attachments and detachments were able to reach the Arnhem road bridge........

362643[/snapback]

 

"attachments and detachments" or "atts and dets" is a term with a specific meaning in the Army (including at that time). It is litterly those component parts that are attached to to a formation (sometimes for as little as "only for rations") or are removed from a formation (implied for other tasks) - they would therefore have not been at the Bridge. Is this a "slip of the keyboard" Bill ?

 

Frank

[BillB]

"attachments and detachments" or "atts and dets" is a term with a specific meaning in the Army (including at that time).  It is litterly those component parts that are attached to to a formation (sometimes for as little as "only for rations") or are removed from a formation (implied for other tasks) - they would therefore have not been at the Bridge.  Is this a "slip of the keyboard" Bill ?

 

Frank

362702[/snapback]

C'mon Frank, do give me some credit. No, my use of "atts and dets" is not a slip of the keyboard. Frost ended up commanding a force a little smaller than an inf battalion at the Arnhem road bridge. Only around half that force were infantrymen, most from Frost's 2nd Parachute Battalion (minus 2 rifle companies) and some of C Company, 3rd Parachute Battalion. The latter didn't get the word when the rest of the 3rd Battalion stopped for the night in Oosterbeek, pushed on along the riverside railway line and almost reached the road bridge before running into any Germans. There was also a group from 1st Parachute Brigade HQ, led by Brigade Major Hibbert.

 

The rest of the force defending the bridge was made up of men from the 1st Airborne Recce Squadron, 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery RA, a platoon from 9th Field Company RE, and a forward observer party from the 1st Airlanding Light Artillery Regiment RA attached to the Brigade HQ group. All the latter were Div assets which were attached in full or detached in part to 1st Parachute Brigade for the seizure of the Arnhem bridges, and parcelled out again to the 1st parachute Brigades' individual battalions and the 1st Airlanding brigade to defend the DZs/LZs. And hence my use of atts and dets.

 

all the best

 

BillB

[Murph]

Stop and to brew tea? Did that really happen?

[KingSargent]

Stop and to brew tea? Did that really happen?

Well yeah. But they didn't stop IN ORDER TO brew the tea, the men brewed the tea whenever they stopped.

[Guest Charles]

Well yeah. But they didn't stop IN ORDER TO brew the tea, the men brewed the tea whenever they stopped.

 

As mentioned by Bill in page 1 of this thread; they needed to refuel as well as Bomb up.

A mug of Darjeeling never goes amiss

 

Charles