Why Bridge Too Far attempt was doomed

[JohnB]

Some puzzle over the good David Frasers comments

 

Then there is the question of why the operation was aimed at Nijmegen and Arnhem - at two rivers - in the first place. To aim - if there was to be such an attempt at all - further upstream, at somewhere like Wesel, or Rees, where the Rhine was ultimately crossed, would have meant concentration on only one crossing.

 

To cross the Rhine at Wesel or Rees, XXX Corps would not only still be required to cross the Maas but they would have to bust through the Siegfried line to boot.

 

but without Antwerp, I do not believe that MARKET GARDEN could possibly have been exploited for the (only) purpose for which it was devised.

Hmmm... having 2nd Army poised like the Sword of Damocles just 60 miles from the Ruhr, with little in the way of barriers man-made or natural is not a highly desirable position to be in whilst Antwerp waits to be opened?

As it was 21st Army Group had instead to complete three major operations; the clearing of the Maas, VERITABLE and PLUNDER, before they could threaten the Ruhr.

 

and doubt even more the strateglc and political practicability of reining in General Patton, whose Third Army was racing towards the Southern Rhineland.

 

Patton no longer 'racing' anywhere by the time of M G.

[BillB]

Some puzzle over the good David Frasers comments SNIP

290074[/snapback]

Good catches, John. You could add this gem:

It has been suggested that the presence in the Arnhem area of 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions - resting from the Eastern front, depleted in numbers but being refitted and always formidable - was or could have been known. 1st Airborne Division was dropped into something of a hornets' nest.

Leaving aside the fact that it has been conclusively proven that 1st Airborne was delivered into nothing of the kind, there is the inconvenient fact that 9 & 10SS Panzer had been fighting in *Normandy* from the end of June 1944, largely against British units, IIRC. Leastways, one of their first actions was against 49th (West Riding) Div at Rauray on 1 July 1944, and they arrived in Holland via the Falaise Gap and some interesting ducking and diving across north-eastern France and Belgium.

 

Which in sum support my original assertion about treating Fraser's writings with a healthy degree of scepticism, I think.

 

all the best

 

BillB

[Geoff Winnington-Ball]

Leaving aside the fact that it has been conclusively proven that 1st Airborne was delivered into nothing of the kind, there is the inconvenient fact that 9 & 10SS Panzer had been fighting in *Normandy* from the end of June 1944, largely against British units, IIRC. Leastways, one of their first actions was against 49th (West Riding) Div at Rauray on 1 July 1944, and they arrived in Holland via the Falaise Gap and some interesting ducking and diving across north-eastern France and Belgium.

 

Which in sum support my original assertion about treating Fraser's writings with a healthy degree of scepticism, I think.

290106[/snapback]

Methinks both Normandy and Arnhem have more than their share of apologists. Excuses are always cheap.

[Mk 1]

I just saw this email message on the Yahoo TO&Es chat group. Thought it would be something TankNetters who are interested in Market Garden might like to see.

 

This message was the third in an exchange. The writer first claimed that the Brits sent Locusts in to Arnhem, but none arrived. Another writer responded with a statement that the Brits did not use the M22 Locust at Arnhem, and did not have the M22 Locust on strength at the time of Market Garden. (Attribution was given to Tetrachs being used at Normandie, and Locusts being used when bouncing the Rhine.) When thus "called" on his claim, this is what the first writer replied with:

 

When I was in Nam  my unit was ambushed and our tails were pulled out the fire by some Aussies who were in the area.  Their leader was a SgtMajor.  While we were relaxing after the fight I noticed his tabs and he was wearing both Para and Tank badges.so I asked him about it.

  He told me about the M22s being sent but they never got there.  When the 1st Paras were in trouble he was being trained on the M22 in England.  The Brits had finally realized the hornets nest that they had dumped the 1st into and were scrambling to get  them relieve.  The only tanks available to drop to them were the M22s in the training unit and 6 were immediately preped.  The tanks were put in the gliders but the crews flew in the tow planes.  They were to be dropped at night inside the Brit lines.  Somewhere over the coast the stream was fired on by German AA and knocked down three transports and glider teams. One glider broke loose and was never seen again.  Night fighters got the other two gliders and one transport.  The tank crews were dropped anyway to reinforce the ground troops.  Because of bad navigation, defences, evasive manuvers etc and sheer good luck he wound up landing on the roof of an American billet and was sent home. 

  Maybe it was just a war story or maybe he forgot over time what tank he was being trained on I don't know 

 

-Mark 1

[BillB]

I just saw this email message on the Yahoo TO&Es chat group.  Thought it would be something TankNetters who are interested in Market Garden might like to see.

 

This message was the third in an exchange.  The writer first claimed that the Brits sent Locusts in to Arnhem, but none arrived.  Another writer responded with a statement that the Brits did not use the M22 Locust at Arnhem, and did not have the M22 Locust on strength at the time of Market Garden.  (Attribution was given to Tetrachs being used at Normandie, and Locusts being used when bouncing the Rhine.)  When thus "called" on his claim, this is what the first writer replied with:

-Mark 1

290754[/snapback]

Nice catch, Mk 1. Its bollocks IMHO. I've just checked Keith Flint's Airborne Armour: Tertrarch, Locust Hamilcar and the 6th Airborne Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment 1938-50 (Solihull: Helion, 2004), which has details of all the Hamilcar flights made. Nothing about this at all, and all the Hamilcar serials at Arnhem went in by day. Besides, the loadouts for them all are available in the primary and secondary stuff and there is nothing about any kind of tank, Tetrarch or Locust. IIRC Middlebrook's Arnhem 1944 has the details too. On top of that, AFAIK the tank crews travelled in the glider with the tank and I believe they actually landed inside the vehicle. The prolly mythical Aussie sergeant major would not therefore have been parachute qualified, at least not while he was an airborne tankie. Sounds to me as if the Nan vet is indulging in a bit of walting, or if not, the Aussie was shooting him a line.

 

The only bit that rings true is the bit about retraining on Locusts, altho the timing is out. The 6th AARR took Tetrarchs into Normandy, but were re-equipped with Locusts and Cromwells in October 1944; they took Locusts for Op VARSITY in March 1945.

 

all the best

 

BillB

[Solid_Snake]

Why didi Graebner didi such an idiotic thing? Only comparable to the Light Brigade Charge.

[KingSargent]

On top of that, AFAIK the tank crews travelled in the glider with the tank and I believe they actually landed inside the vehicle.

 

all the best

 

BillB

290763[/snapback]

Don't know about Locust, but the Tetrarch crews loaded in the tank, rode inside the tank, and landed inside the tank. The fit in a Hamilcar was so tight nobody could get in or out of the tank inside a Hamilcar.

 

The M22's dimensions are within a few inches of Tetrarch's, so I imagine it was the same routine for them.

[Jim Martin]

Don't know about Locust, but the Tetrarch crews loaded in the tank, rode inside the tank, and landed inside the tank. The fit in a Hamilcar was so tight nobody could get in or out of the tank inside a Hamilcar.

 

The M22's dimensions are within a few inches of Tetrarch's, so I imagine it was the same routine for them.

290790[/snapback]

 

Tanks, but no tanks. You can get HURT in an AFV when it crashes...

[larrikin]

Nice catch, Mk 1. Its bollocks IMHO. I've just checked Keith Flint's Airborne Armour: Tertrarch, Locust Hamilcar and the 6th Airborne Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment 1938-50 (Solihull: Helion, 2004), which has details of all the Hamilcar flights made. Nothing about this at all, and all the Hamilcar serials at Arnhem went in by day. Besides, the loadouts for them all are available in the primary and secondary stuff and there is nothing about any kind of tank, Tetrarch or Locust. IIRC Middlebrook's Arnhem 1944 has the details too. On top of that, AFAIK the tank crews travelled in the glider with the tank and I believe they actually landed inside the vehicle. The prolly mythical Aussie sergeant major would not therefore have been parachute qualified, at least not while he was an airborne tankie. Sounds to me as if the Nan vet is indulging in a bit of walting, or if not, the Aussie was shooting him a line.

 

The only bit that rings true is the bit about retraining on Locusts, altho the timing is out. The 6th AARR took Tetrarchs into Normandy, but were re-equipped with Locusts and Cromwells in October 1944; they took Locusts for Op VARSITY in March 1945.

 

all the best

 

BillB

290763[/snapback]

 

 

Aussies don't wear Tank badges, only their Regt badges when in Armd/Cav units, some of which have tanks on them. And in VN he definitely wouldn't have been wearing anything but his rank and Regt badges.

[Argus]

... n VN he definitely wouldn't have been wearing anything but his rank and Regt badges.

290871[/snapback]

 

If that!

 

From what I've seen any badge other than Regt would be at best 50:50, rank insignia were almost a definate no-no. Unless of course the WO leading this patrol was pulled stright off the parade ground of course.

 

shane

 

.

[BillB]

Why didi Graebner didi such an idiotic thing? Only comparable to the Light Brigade Charge.

290773[/snapback]

Do you mean his repeated attempts to get back across the Arnhem road bridge after the British took the northern end?

 

BillB

[BillB]

Tanks, but no tanks.  You can get HURT in an AFV when it crashes...

290834[/snapback]

Can't argue with that, Jim. Consequently, I thought this might be of interest...

 

The Operational Record Book for Tarrant Rushton also records 10 Hamilcars plus tanks flying on 20th January [1944], and this seems to be the date of the most well recorded accident, the story of which has become rather apocryphal due to its spectacular nature and lack of serious injuries incurred.  On this day one of the Hamilcars came in too fast, or landed too long (or quite likely both), and overshot the landing area. It ran into a nissen hut, destroying both hut and glider, and the tank itself "was thrown clear", to quote the ORB. The reader may take his or her choice of the various stories that have grown up around this accident. In one, the nervous driver of the tank has been instructed before the flight not to get out of his vehicle until told. In the accident, the release mechanism operates and the tank flies out of the nose of the Hamilcar at high speed, screeching to a halt some distance away. In the confusion, it is some time before rescuers approach the solitary tank, to hear a plaintive voice from inside asking "Is it OK to get out now skip?".

 

Colonel Chatterton claims to have witnessed the accident, which he says occurred on the first time 6th AARR took their tanks into the air, and he has his own version of events. The two Hamilcar pilots in their cockpit were sitting atop the heap of rubble that had been the nissen hut, whilst the tank shot through at eighty miles an hour and came to rest fifty yards away. Chatterton rushed over to find the driver chucking out the debris that had found its way into the tank. Asked if he was alright, the reply was "Yes, but I'm coovered in bloody moock!" (Flint, pp.86-87)

 

Ah reckon t'driver must have been from Von Richter's neck of the woods...

 

all the best

BillB

[capt_starlight]

If that!

 

From what I've seen any badge other than Regt would be at best 50:50, rank insignia were almost a definate no-no. Unless of course the WO leading this patrol was pulled stright off the parade ground of course.

 

shane

 

.

290876[/snapback]

 

 

A check of the AWM collections site will show examples badges of rank worn in the bush in Vietnam - both sown on and on brassards.

 

It became less common as the war went on.

 

Frank

[Dave Clark]

Yes, it's worth getting. Gives the German side of the story with a lot of stuff from German primary source stuff. Not perfect, it jumps about a bit, a careful reading throws up some contradictions and his conclusion is a bit conventional IIRC (don't have my copy to hand) but still well worth getting hold of.

 

all the best

 

BillB

287277[/snapback]

 

Another book giving the German side of the story is

 

Tieke, Wilhelm. Im Feuersturm letzter Kriegsjahre. Munin Verlag, Osnabrück, 1975. ISBN 3-921242-18-5

 

This is a history of II SS-Panzerkorps with 9 "Hohenstaufen" and 10 "Frundsberg" SS-Panzerdivisions compiled by former members of these formations. Tieke uses a good mixture of source material including war diaries held at the Bundesarchiv, unpublished material such as personal diaries and a wide range of books including the usual suspects such as Ryan.

[Larry Hayward]

"The blame for this was partly Browning's because he didn't fight his men's corner for reasons of his own, but the real blame lies with the RAF planners whose word was law and who took no notice of the soldiers opinions. "

 

The man ultimately responsible for not landing on the bridge at Arnhem was ACM Sir Trafford Leigh- Mallory who had helped stab Lord Dowding in the back after the Battle of Britain. It is also Leigh-Mallory who is said to have dismissed the idea of allowing close support Typhoons etc to operate in the Arnem battle, for fear of getting in the way of the transports.

 

As for Browning he 'hijacked' extra gliders to take his HQ to Nijmegen, when they could have been better used to take more troops to Arnhem and for what good it served Browning could well have stayed in the UK

[superfractal]

"The blame for this was partly Browning's because he didn't fight his men's corner for reasons of his own, but the real blame lies with the RAF planners whose word was law and who took no notice of the soldiers opinions. "

 

The man ultimately responsible for not landing on the bridge at Arnhem was ACM Sir Trafford Leigh- Mallory who had helped stab Lord Dowding in the back after the Battle of Britain. It is also Leigh-Mallory who is said to have dismissed the idea of allowing close support Typhoons etc to operate in the Arnem battle, for fear of getting in the way of the transports.

 

As for Browning he 'hijacked' extra gliders to take his HQ to Nijmegen, when they could have been better used to take more troops to Arnhem and for what good it served Browning could well have stayed in the UK

301385[/snapback]

 

i was under the impression it was the head of the allied air force who refused to allow the drops at arnheim.

[BillB]

"The blame for this was partly Browning's because he didn't fight his men's corner for reasons of his own, but the real blame lies with the RAF planners whose word was law and who took no notice of the soldiers opinions. "

 

The man ultimately responsible for not landing on the bridge at Arnhem was ACM Sir Trafford Leigh- Mallory who had helped stab Lord Dowding in the back after the Battle of Britain. It is also Leigh-Mallory who is said to have dismissed the idea of allowing close support Typhoons etc to operate in the Arnem battle, for fear of getting in the way of the transports.

 

As for Browning he 'hijacked' extra gliders to take his HQ to Nijmegen, when they could have been better used to take more troops to Arnhem and for what good it served Browning could well have stayed in the UK

301385[/snapback]

Sorry mate, I'm not quite clear on the reasoning in your middle paragraph there. Not being funny, I'm genuinely curious. Care to clarify for us?

 

all the best

 

BillB

[Kit Hildreth]

"The blame for this was partly Browning's because he didn't fight his men's corner for reasons of his own, but the real blame lies with the RAF planners whose word was law and who took no notice of the soldiers opinions. "

 

The man ultimately responsible for not landing on the bridge at Arnhem was ACM Sir Trafford Leigh- Mallory who had helped stab Lord Dowding in the back after the Battle of Britain. It is also Leigh-Mallory who is said to have dismissed the idea of allowing close support Typhoons etc to operate in the Arnem battle, for fear of getting in the way of the transports.

 

As for Browning he 'hijacked' extra gliders to take his HQ to Nijmegen, when they could have been better used to take more troops to Arnhem and for what good it served Browning could well have stayed in the UK

301385[/snapback]

 

I've got news for you old chap. T.L-M was killed in an air crash in August 1944 to cries of relief all-round! It was his successor that kiboshed the "Tiffies"

[Doug97]

If the Allies had had the benefit of the hindsight we have now, could they have made this operation a success? If so, what would they have been able to do differently?

[PONGO_7409]

1. coup de main glider attack on the Arnhem Bridge

 

2. Air Assault on the south end of the bridge concurrent with main drop & coup de main attack. Use seized polders on the south end, where the Poles eventually landed, to glider in troops & armour to atack south, into the rear of the German lines, to meet main body attacking north

 

3. 200% ass-kicking hard driving commander FORCING the Armor up the highway, 24hrs a day, flat out attacking, regardless of losses, no stopping for regrouping or whatever.

Edited August 29, 2006 by PONGO_7409

[Doug97]

1. coup de main glider attack on the Arnhem Bridge

 

2. Air Assault on the south end of the bridge concurrent with main drop & coup de main attack.  Use seized polders on the south end, where the Poles eventually landed, to glider in troops & armour to atack south, into the rear of the German lines, to meet main body attacking north

362573[/snapback]

So the reasons given for them not doing this in the first place are spurious?

[Old Tanker]

The game TOAW has the scenario has anyone tried it ?

 

Ref. TOAW in Game Forum.

 

You can pick and choose pertaining to drop zones.

[PONGO_7409]

So the reasons given for them not doing this in the first place are spurious?

362576[/snapback]

I believe so.

 

Coup de Main gliders worked in Normandy on the Caen Canal bridge for the Ox & Bucks. No reason they could not have come up with a plan at Arnhem. Land 20 or 30 gliders in the polders, storm the bridge. 30 minutes tops. It took hrs for the march from the selected drop zones and Col Frost's men still managed to seize the north end of the Bridge. Could have seized both ends of the bridge concurrently.

 

The poles landed in the polders a few days later so I do not believe they were a terrain hazard as claimed.

[Doug97]

The poles landed in the polders a few days later so I do not believe they were a terrain hazard as claimed.

362591[/snapback]

Interesting, so the initial drops did not occur there due to the terrain (was it too soft or something)?, but then they changed their minds and that's where they dropped the Poles.

[PONGO_7409]

Interesting, so the initial drops did not occur there due to the terrain (was it too soft or something)?, but then they changed their minds and that's where they dropped the Poles.

362592[/snapback]

 

 

to soft I recall was the rationale/excuse for the Air Force to nix the drop