Top Ten Fighting Ships

[Old Tanker]

Slightly off topic .

 

How about Top 10 unluckiest ships ?

 

I just met at my local supermarket a survivor ( real life , not TV bull) of the USS Indiannapolis .

He has to be at least 81 and he was quite spry. Said he spent 4 1/2 days in water and is one of three of his crew mates living in Arizona.

 

That made my day meeting him !

[Scott Cunningham]

OT, I created this thread just for you!

 

http://63.99.108.76/forums/index.php?showtopic=14128

 

10 worst ship designs

[Guest pfcem]

Naval bombardment has never been used in conjuction with the ship-to-ship battles.

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Prove it!

 

Better yet, just read something on the subject written prior to WWII.

Edited January 3, 2006 by pfcem

[yak_v]

Prove it!

 

Better yet, just read something on the subject written prior to WWII.

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You are the one who made the assertion, you prove it.

 

Vladimir

[5150]

To allege that the Iowa class was primarily intended as a carrier escort and shore bombardment platform is purely revisionist. They were designed to take on other BBs, with all other roles being secondary to that. Attempting to turn a poor argument (NFS=NB=any firing of guns at any target) into a winner based on terminology is just silly. "But what if the ship was in port, huh, huh? What if the Yamato had grounded herself at Iwo, huh, huh?"

[bigfngun]

To allege that the Iowa class was primarily intended as a carrier escort and shore bombardment platform is purely revisionist. They were designed to take on other BBs, with all other roles being secondary to that.

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The belief that the Iowa's were built for shore bombardment is I agree incorrect.

To say that they were built with no plan to work with carriers is a bit much. They would be detached to deal with the Kongo class ships as well as any other surface threat. But detached from combined carrier/surface combatant groups. Not their only design consideration but working with carriers was one of them.

[5150]

Oh, I'm sure that working with the carriers was a design goal. I'm just saying that it wasn't a primary goal. When the design of those ships started, battle lines were still in vogue. Carrier-centric operations were still developmental theory. If beating up on Kongos (doesn't anyone italicize ship names anymore?) while escorting carriers were the primary design goal, I would think that considerable tonnage could have been saved. They were meant to take on the enemy battle line. Just because they had the speed to keep up with the carriers doesn't mean that was the purpose of the speed--each generation of battleship gained speed, as a speed advantage gave the faster ships control over the engagement.

[Ken Estes]

Oh, I'm sure that working with the carriers was a design goal. I'm just saying that it wasn't a primary goal. When the design of those ships started, battle lines were still in vogue. Carrier-centric operations were still developmental theory. If beating up on Kongos (doesn't anyone italicize ship names anymore?) while escorting carriers were the primary design goal, I would think that considerable tonnage could have been saved. They were meant to take on the enemy battle line. Just because they had the speed to keep up with the carriers doesn't mean that was the purpose of the speed--each generation of battleship gained speed, as a speed advantage gave the faster ships control over the engagement.

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The formation of Task Force 34, Willis A. Lee's battle line, from the BBs assigned to carrier groups in TF 38 during both the Philippine Sea [TF54/58] and Leyte Gulf battles probably illustrates the doctrine in vogue for the fast BBs: operate with carriers, form battle line at will. In each case, the battle ended before they could close with the enemy, although some stragglers/remnants were shot up in the latter action.

[Guest pfcem]

Naval bombardment has never been used in conjuction with the ship-to-ship battles.

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Really?

 

http://www.caithness.org/caithnessfieldclu...he_bismarck.htm

 

03.00 hrs

The Fleet, about ten miles south, eager to avenge the sinking of H.M.S. Hood by Bismark, began firing star shells on Bismark prior to bombardment. By mistake the shells fired by the Fleet were short of target and illuminated the area occupied by the four British destroyers.

 

05.00 hrs

With the first light, the bombardment of Bismark by the guns of Rodney, King George V and cruisers, began. They were pounding the battleship concentrating on fore and aft guns. Some shells were ricochetting far into the sea. I saw only one shell hit the bridge at deck level.

 

***

 

http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/ww2/A1150976

 

Admiral Tovey arrived that evening aboard the flagship King George V and, unwilling to risk engaging the Bismarck during the hours of darkness, waited until the morning of 27 May before attacking. Unable to manoeuvre, the Bismarck stood little chance and was finally sunk by two torpedoes fired by HMS Dorsetshire, having withstood two hours of bombardment. Admiral Lutjens went down with the ship, along with 2,089 others.

 

***

 

http://www.navweaps.com/index_inro/INRO_Bismarck_p3.htm

 

Mr. Statz and Lt. Cardinal were alone on the open bridge, although they did encounter a severely wounded officer with four stripes near the port bridge wing. When the British battleships began their final bombardment, the two men decided to move to the starboard bridge wing of the open bridge.

 

***

 

http://thescotsman.scotsman.com/internatio...fm?id=184402003

 

Then, on 27 May, 1941, in what many believe was turning point in the war, the helpless and cornered battleship sank to the bottom, almost five kilometers below, as it was torn apart by an unprecedented bombardment by the Royal Navy.

 

***

 

This is the way people spoke & thought about naval gunfire (against targets on land or other ships) up until about the latter half of the 20th century.

[bigfngun]

Oh, I'm sure that working with the carriers was a design goal. I'm just saying that it wasn't a primary goal. When the design of those ships started, battle lines were still in vogue. Carrier-centric operations were still developmental theory. If beating up on Kongos (doesn't anyone italicize ship names anymore?) while escorting carriers were the primary design goal, I would think that considerable tonnage could have been saved. They were meant to take on the enemy battle line. Just because they had the speed to keep up with the carriers doesn't mean that was the purpose of the speed--each generation of battleship gained speed, as a speed advantage gave the faster ships control over the engagement.

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If you read this essay http://www.ijnhonline.org/pdf/article_hone.pdf

you will see that by the late 30s carriers and BBs were not expected to be separate ops. They were both to sortie TOGETHER in a combined arms format. Granted the carrier became evenmore important during the war, but to think that prior to Pearl Harbor the USN was carrier ignorant is revisionist at best and ignorant at worst. Each generation of US BB DID NOT gain speed until the North Carolina class of the late 30s. The "Standard" US BB of the WWI era had a speed af about 21 knots across several classes of ship. http://warships1.com/US/US_battleships.htm

 

Your argument has more holes in it than the Kirishima had after U.S.S. Washington got through with it.

Edited January 4, 2006 by bigfngun

[Guest pfcem]

Oh, I'm sure that working with the carriers was a design goal. I'm just saying that it wasn't a primary goal. When the design of those ships started, battle lines were still in vogue. Carrier-centric operations were still developmental theory.

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By the time the design was finalized the the 1st hulls laid down that had changed & the resulting ships show that the designers new this & had taken it into consideration in their fianl design.

[Ken Estes]

If you read this essay http://www.ijnhonline.org/pdf/article_hone.pdf

you will see that by the late 30s carriers and BBs were not expected to be separate ops.  They were both to sortie TOGETHER in a combined arms format.  Granted the carrier became evenmore important during the war, but to think that prior to Pearl Harbor the USN was carrier ignorant is revisionist at best and ignorant at worst.  Each generation of US BB DID NOT gain speed until the North Carolina class of the late 30s.  The "Standard" US BB of the WWI era had a speed af about 21 knots across several classes of ship. http://warships1.com/US/US_battleships.htm

 

Your argument has more holes in it than the Kirishima had after U.S.S. Washington got through with it.

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Now Bruno, perhaps you go too far. Since the North Carolinas do not commission until a few months before P.H. and are not worked up for fleet ops until afterward [my guess] it is not too accurate to call this the BB class of 'the late 30s' and any fleet doctrine emphasizing such combinations remained on paper until the Solomons campaign of second half 42, and even then N.C. took an I-boat torpedo and had to retire. We also are by then short of CVs anyway. Until the fast BBs and Essex's are ready in the victory fleet of 44, we are operating separate battle line [mostly based on the west coast because of fuel consumption] and CV TFs with cruiser-destroyer screens.

[bigfngun]

Now Bruno, perhaps you go too far. Since the North Carolinas do not commission until a few months before P.H. and are not worked up for fleet ops until  afterward [my guess] it is not too accurate to call this the BB class of 'the late 30s' and any fleet doctrine emphasizing such combinations remained on paper until the Solomons campaign of second half 42, and even then N.C. took an I-boat torpedo and had to retire. We also are by then short of CVs anyway. Until the fast BBs and Essex's are ready in the victory fleet of 44, we are operating separate battle line [mostly based on the west coast because of fuel consumption] and CV TFs with cruiser-destroyer screens.

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Wait a sec Ken. The commissioning time is one thing but to say that no tactical analysis or war gaming was going on prior to P.H. basically calls the author of that essay a liar. The fact that Task Force 1 (the old BBs) were not used possibly because of misuse( David C. Fuquea, "Task Force One: The Wasted Assets of the United States Pacific Battleship Fleet, 1942," Journal of Military History61/4: 707-734) did not mean that fleet sailing prior to P.H. did not envision BBs and CVs sailing together. See the formation description in the Trent Hone article.

 

Once again, during WWII carrier ops were much more refined and powerful but that does not mean that prior to that no thought was given to combined CV/BB ops. Not the only reason for the new BBs but one of them, unless Garzke&Dulin are also lying.

 

Also Kimmel's plan for a climactic show down envisioned the carriers and BBs sailing together.

 

The admirals knew that their slower BBs were not optimal for carrier ops or for dealing with the faster capital ships of other nations. It was up to the war time admirals and later ships to bring this plan to reality.

Edited January 4, 2006 by bigfngun

[bigfngun]

I think that part of the problem is the belief that any US naval commander serving post Dec. 8, 1941 was a genius and anyone prior to that date was an idiot and a reactionary.

[Ken Estes]

Wait a sec Ken.  The commissioning time is one thing but to say that no tactical analysis or war gaming was going on prior to P.H. basically calls the author of that essay a liar.  The fact that Task Force 1 (the old BBs) were not used  possibly because of misuse( David C. Fuquea, "Task Force One: The Wasted Assets of the United States Pacific Battleship Fleet, 1942," Journal of Military History61/4: 707-734) did not mean that fleet sailing prior to P.H. did not envision BBs and CVs sailing together.  See the formation description in the Trent Hone article.

 

Once again, during WWII carrier ops were much more refined and powerful but that does not mean that prior to that no thought was given to combined CV/BB ops.  Not the only reason for the new BBs but one of them,  unless Garzke&Dulin are also lying.

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I was just going to concede the article's notion of mid-30s naval ops, but don't you think that the emerging capabilities of 1941 vintage aircraft would have dictated that the CVs operate separately from the battle line? After all, the limitations on carrier air in the war gaming remain plainly inaccurate and the notion of a nice gunnery exercise using air spotting would hardly hold up in face of VF squadrons providing CAP on each side.

 

So I think that the nature of the beast would have led to separate TF ops. Bad weather or night ops might have favored battle line engagements, in which case the CVs like HMS Formidable with the Brit BBs in the Med, would have made themselves scarce. Conversely, fair weather would have favored slashing attacks by the CVs, where we learned in 1942, he who makes the first effective strike tends to win, leaving the rest of the engagement a foregone conclusion.

 

The nice steaming formations were not battle deployments in any case and the CV space allocated looks woefully out of synch with what we now know they needed.

 

I also liked Fuquea's article on the OBB use, but don't see where they could have intervened in the campaign that ensued. The Solomons were not BB-favorable waters, in particular the Slot.

 

[edited to complete after hitting wrong button!- also spelling]

Edited January 4, 2006 by Ken Estes

[bigfngun]

After all, the limitations on carrier air in the war gaming remain plainly inaccurate and the notion of a nice gunenry exercise using air spotting would hardly hold up in face of VF squadrons providing CAP on each side.

 

 

 

I also liked Fuquea's article on the OBB use, but don't see where they could have intervened in the campaign that ensued. The Solomons were not BB-favorable waters, in particular the Slot.

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Yes events would show that air spotting would not happen against a fleet that also had air cover. Off topic but Fuquea's article IIRC says that the old BBs would have been effective in surface engagements no more or less than USS Washing ton and the SoDak were.

[Ken Estes]

Yes events would show that air spotting would not happen against a fleet that also had air cover.  Off topic but Fuquea's article IIRC says that the old BBs would have been effective in surface engagements no more or less than USS Washing ton and the SoDak were.

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Well, both sides eschewed sending 21 knot BBs from their easily available [i.e. idle] battle lines into the Solomons, we from Fiji, Samoa and the IJN from Truk. I think we can see why: Idahos + 24" torpedos...ouch!

[bigfngun]

Well, both sides eschewed sending 21 knot BBs from their easily available [i.e. idle] battle lines into the Solomons, we from Fiji, Samoa and the IJN from Truk. I think we can see why: Idahos + 24" torpedos...ouch!

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At least the Japanese were not squeamish about using the Kongo class ships as many in the USN predicted before the war. That being said the 2 modern US BBs in the Solomon's did not survive the Long Lance because they were impervious to it. It sounded like a case of deft foot work by the US ships and bad aiming by the Japanese. BTW, I prefer the newer US BBs so don't think I would have preferred the older ones. But the article makes a case that their Fire Control on the old BBs was at least adequate as was their firepower to take on Kongos. Whether they could shrug off multiple Long Lances probably not, but neither IMO could the 2 new US BBs. As for the confined space, IIRC the newer BBs were more maneuverable but I don't hink they had time to work up to full speed in IronBottom Sound so in a confined space their speed difference may not have been decisive.

[5150]

To say that each generation of BB didn't gain a speed advantage over previous generations seems to ignore the trends. If it hadn't been for the building holiday, we would have seen 30+ knot designs by the end of the 1920s. I can't imagine that anyone would want to say that a primary design goal would have been operating with the carriers then. If a person reads carefully, they'll notice that I didn't say that thought wasn't given to operating with carriers, but nobody here nit-picks. Nations without carriers were also constructing/reconstuncting fast BBs. To say that the BB speeds across the board weren't increasing as time goes on simply because older US BBs were slow seems to be incorrect.

[Nom]

Merely a product improvement, adding new type 8" and enlarged dimensions. Balt reaches right balance in armor, speed, armement with far less materials. That's like saying the Worcesters were the best of the CL class. The last one is not necessarily the trendsetter.

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The Des Moines class had the fully automatic guns. She could empty her magazines in a matter of minutes if need be.

[Nom]

I like USS Iowa, certainly som fine specs, except in one very important aspect - date of commission!

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

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The Iowa class had its final plans approved, stamped and sent out in December 1941 right after Pearl Harbor. They were built and in the field for use in less than two years.

[Nicmk5]

To say that each generation of BB didn't gain a speed advantage over previous generations seems to ignore the trends. If it hadn't been for the building holiday, we would have seen 30+ knot designs by the end of the 1920s. I can't imagine that anyone would want to say that a primary design goal would have been operating with the carriers then. If a person reads carefully, they'll notice that I didn't say that thought wasn't given to operating with carriers, but nobody here nit-picks. Nations without carriers were also constructing/reconstuncting fast BBs. To say that the BB speeds across the board weren't increasing as time goes on simply because older US BBs were slow seems to be incorrect.

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Under the tonnage limitations of the post WWI treaties,hard choices had to be made. The U.S. chose armor and guns at the expense of speed. This was, in my opinion, the correct choice. There is no sense in making a battleship unless it is made to win fights. The axis powers chose to make their ships several thousand tons over the treaty limits, also a sound choice I think that building to the treaty limits made the U.S. designers work harder to get the most out of every ton and it paid off in the end(I don't think too much of their pre WWII secondary weapons though). When the limits no longer applied, the U.S. built the best battleships in the world.

[bigfngun]

The Iowa class had its final plans approved, stamped and sent out in December 1941 right after Pearl Harbor. They were built and in the field for use in less than two years.

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Huh?!? The USS Iowa was laid down in June 1940.

http://warships1.com/US/USbb61-Iowa.htm

 

One of those urban legends of WWII is that the USN suddenly built new BBs and fleet CVs after Pearl Harbor. Just not true.

[bigfngun]

To say that each generation of BB didn't gain a speed advantage over previous generations seems to ignore the trends. If it hadn't been for the building holiday, we would have seen 30+ knot designs by the end of the 1920s.

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Not that I'm nit picking or anything but wrong again. If you check this site,

http://warships1.com/US/USbb49-SD.htm

you will see that the US BB class that was cancelled by the Washington Treaty was not exactly a rocket. The South Dakota class was to have 12 16"/45 guns as a main battery and a top speed of...23 knots! Basically a continuation with certain improvements of Standard type US BB. The USN was not into speed as much as some foreign navies. Granted the Lexington battle cruisers were to have 33+ knot speed ability but at the expense of armor protection.

 

More or less the typical US BB with the exception of the Iowas was characterized by heavy firepower and protection and somewhat slower than the top speed of some foreign ships. Remember the follow on to the Iowa class, the Montana class, would return to a max speed similar to the North Carolina/new South Dakota class of 28 knots with 12 16"/50 and heavier armor than the Iowa.

[5150]

Faster than the previous generation, eh? Now why on Earth would they have wanted that...