What do you think of RoK Navy KDX3 Aegis Destroyer

[5150]

What types of threats does the South Korean navy face?

[Gorka L. Martinez-Mezo]

It's a fact Spain has a quite long history of purchasing US equipment: FFG Baleares (Knox), FFG Santa Maria (Perry), the old Fletcher and Gearing type DDs, RL Dedalo (Independence), the Cabildo, Terrebonne Parish and Paul Revere type landing ships/auxiliaries, the Agile and Bluebird minesweepers.

This - at least to me - was also an important factor towards a decision favouring AEGIS.

 

That doesn`t means we aren`t ready to accept European equipment. Older ships came almost free from US aid. After that we have adopted other European equipment and designs as needed (radar equipment for the DESCUBIERTA, with Italian EW originally fit, MTU engines; the SEGURA class minesweepers based on the British SANDOW class altough bigger and more capable, not to mention our subs)

 

We joined the APAR project with the aim of fitting APAR to our next frigate design. Problem was nobody new how much time or money would have APAR cost, not to mention it did not fill our perceived needs. So we got AEGIS. We wanted it and nobody forced us to adopt it, nor it came at a sensible discount price. Plus, we didn`t bought a "as built" system: we designed the command and control interface and we use our own display system, which uses Belgian Barco displays and wich will also be fitted on its submarine version in the S-80 class subs plus the upgraded PRINCIPE DE ASTURIAS and SANTA MARIA classes.

 

Aegis filled our needs and we could afford it. There are no political hassless behind it.

 

I said current, yes, because the current APAR configuration as used aboard F124 and LCF has finally been developed according to Dutch and German specifications. Spain has been a member of the Trilateral Frigate Agreement since 1994, and prior to its collapse also participated in the NFR90 programme during the 80s. IMHO there has been plenty of time to have influence on the radar concept towards a fully fixed MFR without an additional volume search radar.

Spain left the program very early and besided nobody else was interested on making it a true multipurpose set at the time. Also, there was no way to calculate what the costs involved would have been. I think understanding why we left the project is quite clear from this message.

 

APAR already has a range of around 150 nm - by increasing the size of the arrays and therefore increasing the number of T/R modules, combined with a higher antenna peak power it should have been possible to retain system commonality with German and Dutch APAR at least to a good extent, keep R&D and financial efforts low and yet get a radar along the lines of the SPY-1 but using active array technology, for example eliminating the need for dedicated fire-control radars.

 

Of course, anything is possible with money! But we couldn`t afford to pay for the development of an essentially new system when there was a far cheaper, tried and trusted alternative.

 

That doesn`t means we wouldn`t be ready to accpet APAR if the need for such a system arose in the future, although with one more F-100 on order (which will have an upgraded Aegis system as already mentioned) and one more likely it looks like the Spanish navy wouldn`t need more high tech surface escorts in the next 10 years.

[FITZ]

What types of threats does the South Korean navy face?

264451[/snapback]

 

A very few obsolete "frigates".

A healthy number (25?) of nearly as obsolete but still troublesome conventional submarines.

Several hundred small missile, gun and torpedo fast attack craft.

A large number of midget submarines which can lay mines or insert commando teams. Some may even have torpedo tubes and could attack ships in harbor.

An amphibious assualt force of close to 200 ships and craft.

 

Then of course there is the air threat, which is as large as it is unsophisticated, and a ballistic missile threat - not a direct threat to ships themselves but now a navy mission nontheless.

[seanofoz]

It can also be used as a form of EMCON.  Lots of ships have SPS-49 - from carriers to frigates to amphibs. Only destroyers and cruisers have SPY-1.  Light that one up and everyone knows what you are right away.

264435[/snapback]

Brilliant point. Should the US navy get a few SPS-49 decoy ships to simulate emcon battlegroups?

[JOE BRENNAN]

A very few obsolete "frigates". 

A healthy number (25?) of nearly as obsolete but still troublesome conventional submarines. 

Several hundred small missile, gun and torpedo fast attack craft.

A large number of midget submarines which can lay mines or insert commando teams.  Some may even have torpedo tubes and could attack ships in harbor. 

An amphibious assualt force of close to 200 ships and craft.

 

Then of course there is the air threat, which is as large as it is unsophisticated, and a ballistic missile threat - not a direct threat to ships themselves but now a navy mission nontheless.

264477[/snapback]

I think it indicates how not all ROKN programs are concieved now specifically to meet the threat from DPRK. There's also the desire to further develop an advanced military industrial base commensurate with Korea's overall industrial and technological strength as well as consideration of its longer term strategic position in Asia.

 

To be fair, we were comparing technically to Spain (which has about the same size economy as South Korea, though slightly smaller population). What specific threats does Spain face that require the F-100's?

 

Well, Spain doesn't have to defend a hostile land border against a (weak but) maniacal regime so doesn't need as good an answer, but then again as you imply the NK threat could *partially* justify the KDX-3's, though far from an exact match. The bottomline is still that naval forces in Korea are highly unlikely to determine the outcome of a second KW. BM defence once on ships would be important in such a war but eg. Israel isn't mounting BM defence on ships. Advanced ROKN naval programs don't seem to be all about a future KW.

 

Joe

[FITZ]

I think it indicates how not all ROKN programs are concieved now specifically to meet the threat from DPRK.

 

Advanced ROKN naval programs don't seem to be all about a future KW.

 

Joe

264549[/snapback]

 

Providing ballistic missile defense for the South while also offering significant air control facilties as far north as the Chinese border certainly seems like a worthwhile mission. How about providing air, surface and sub-surface protection for an amphibious counter attack? Keeping valuable shipping lanes and supply lines from the U.S open? Those are all missions for which KDX-3 is quite well suited.

[JOE BRENNAN]

Providing ballistic missile defense for the South while also offering significant air control facilties as far north as the Chinese border certainly seems like a worthwhile mission.  How about providing air, surface and sub-surface protection for an amphibious counter attack?  Keeping valuable shipping lanes and supply lines from the U.S open?  Those are all missions for which KDX-3 is quite well suited.

264678[/snapback]

I don't think it's a worthless mission, but again if you sat down and tried to figure out the *critical* capabilities to stop an NK invasion, given an alliance with the world's most powerful navy, a blue water force of your own would not be among the results. Keeping sea lanes open and amphib counterattacks after days or weeks are things the big ally can mainly do, bogging down the attack on land in the first hours and days is something the big ally's tripwire land force can only do a small part of, though its presence is a reasonable assurance of the availability of the naval forces later. Quickly winning on land is the only realistic strategy for the opponent so the natural focus of the defence. As we covered BM defence is another important aspect but kind of neutral between naval and land forces, if you look at other examples.

 

Besides that obvious strategic equation, I think you'd find the general flavor of ROK attitudes nowadays also says projects like KDX-3 are not all about the DPRK, they might not try even as hard as you have to argue that they were.

 

Joe

[FITZ]

I don't think it's a worthless mission, but again if you sat down and tried to figure out the *critical* capabilities to stop an NK invasion, given an alliance with the world's most powerful navy, a blue water force of your own would not be among the results. Keeping sea lanes open and amphib counterattacks after days or weeks are things the big ally can mainly do, bogging down the attack on land in the first hours and days is something the big ally's tripwire land force can only do a small part of, though its presence is a reasonable assurance of the availability of the naval forces later. Quickly winning on land is the only realistic strategy for the opponent so the natural focus of the defence. As we covered BM defence is another important aspect but kind of neutral between naval and land forces, if you look at other examples.

 

Besides that obvious strategic equation, I think you'd find the general flavor of ROK attitudes nowadays also says projects like KDX-3 are not all about the DPRK, they might not try even as hard as you have to argue that they were.

 

Joe

264724[/snapback]

 

So your saying South Korea should rely on an overstretched, shrinking and badly underfunded U.S. Navy for its seaward defense when an increasing number of its citizens want the United States out of their country entirely?

 

South Korea does have certain other interests beyond her own EEZ of course, but you can't really accomplish some of the KDX-3 missions with anything smaller.

[JOE BRENNAN]

So your saying South Korea should rely on an overstretched, shrinking and badly underfunded U.S. Navy for its seaward defense when an increasing number of its citizens want the United States out of their country entirely? 

 

South Korea does have certain other interests beyond her own EEZ of course, but you can't really accomplish some of the KDX-3 missions with anything smaller.

264748[/snapback]

Underfunded, but like US military in general funded in the ballpark of all other world militaries combined. What we get for our money is a good debate, but kind of silly to speak of the USN as unable to deal with NK naval threat. Whereas, the combined ROK US ground force (latter of which such as could be brought to bear in the critical time period) is not obviously capable of stopping the NK land force. So it's a matter of priorities.

 

I'd again suggest plugging into modern ROK attitudes and see if what I say is wrong working it from that direction instead. Projects like that are about Korea's proper place in the order of nations more than the North Koreans. Fear of lack of US support v. a grave NK naval threat is a quick web board argument but just not where the ROK's head is at nowadays from anything I can tell from either media or people I know there. But as I said, in fairness a lot of military spending in a lot of places is about stuff like that.

 

Joe

[swerve]

I think it indicates how not all ROKN programs are concieved now specifically to meet the threat from DPRK. There's also the desire to further develop an advanced military industrial base commensurate with Korea's overall industrial and technological strength as well as consideration of its longer term strategic position in Asia.

<snip>

Advanced ROKN naval programs don't seem to be all about a future KW.

 

Joe

 

Yes. For example, I can't see their new LPD as being primarily designed to defend against a N. Korean attack.

[jakec]

NOt in the slightest

Taiwan is the single country I see with the largest need for Aegis level systems.

264408[/snapback]

 

Completely agree, but there is no way in the wide world ROK would sell to Taiwan. Even the hint of such would send their diplomats into a spin as they tried to placate the PRC.

[gewing]

Completely agree, but there is no way in the wide world ROK would sell to Taiwan. Even the hint of such would send their diplomats into a spin as they tried to placate the PRC.

264930[/snapback]

 

 

Then the ROK does not have the Courage I believe it does.

 

 

HELL WE should have sold them to them years ago.

[FITZ]

Underfunded, but like US military in general funded in the ballpark of all other world militaries combined. What we get for our money is a good debate, but kind of silly to speak of the USN as unable to deal with NK naval threat. Whereas, the combined ROK US ground force (latter of which such as could be brought to bear in the critical time period) is not obviously capable of stopping the NK land force. So it's a matter of priorities.

 

I'd again suggest plugging into modern ROK attitudes and see if what I say is wrong working it from that direction instead. Projects like that are about Korea's proper place in the order of nations more than the North Koreans. Fear of lack of US support v. a grave NK naval threat is a quick web board argument but just not where the ROK's head is at nowadays from anything I can tell from either media or people I know there. But as I said, in fairness a lot of military spending in a lot of places is about stuff like that.

 

Joe

264758[/snapback]

 

But KDX-3 doesn't deal strictly with the problem of the North Korean navy. It has a very significant ability to impact the land battle, far more than any other SK naval platform.

[Jeff]

IIRC the short Burkes were built because they could be built in the existing hulls faster.  The older cruisers were retired they were never going to buy anymore CGNs and they were afraid of massed ASM attacks.

264145[/snapback]

 

Aren't the Burkes built on a new design hull? Why would there be any constraint other than just not realizing the importance of a full helo capability? Especially when the older designs like Spruance started to leave the inventory.

[Guest pfcem]

The Arleigh Burks were intended to be AAW escorts to replace the Charles F. Adams & Coontz (Farragut) class DDGs so the need for full helo facilities was not considered necessary. They did include a towed sonar for detecting enemy subs but were not intended to engage them directly (ASROC being included should the sub get withing range however). It was thought that there would always be enough ships close by that had full helo facilities that could engage long-range sub contacts.

 

Later ships (Flight IIA) had full helo facilities added to the design. Partly due to the critisim the earlier ships recieved for not having them (even though they were not needed for their primary role) & because doing so produced a more "balanced" ship capable of performing additional tasks. Coincidentally the towed sonar in not fitted to the Flight IIA ships so they ended up trading off some of their ability to detect subs in gaining full helo facilities.

[FITZ]

The Arleigh Burks were intended to be AAW escorts to replace the Charles F. Adams & Coontz (Farragut) class DDGs so the need for full helo facilities was not considered necessary.  They did include a towed sonar for detecting enemy subs but were not intended to engage them directly (ASROC being included should the sub get withing range however).  It was thought that there would always be enough ships close by that had full helo facilities that could engage long-range sub contacts.

 

Later ships (Flight IIA) had full helo facilities added to the design.  Partly due to the critisim the earlier ships recieved for not having them (even though they were not needed for their primary role) & because doing so produced a more "balanced" ship capable of performing additional tasks.  Coincidentally the towed sonar in not fitted to the Flight IIA ships so they ended up trading off some of their ability to detect subs in gaining full helo facilities.

265112[/snapback]

 

The lack of helicopter faclities was more a practicallity. At the time there was little prospect there would be enough helicopters available to equip them anyway. In hindsight this was a lousy decision as the helicopter is about the most useful item of equipment on the modern surface combattant - certainly the most frequently tasked.

 

There was little lost with the deletion of the "tail" in IIA Burke's BTW. The old passive towed arrays are deep-water detection systems with little value in the littoral environments the Navy sees as its primary area of operations today. Even those ships still equipped with them rarely trail them. Nor are the helo's principally though of as just ASW weapons today.

[level]

I deleted it.

Edited August 25, 2007 by level

[level]

I deleted it.

Edited August 25, 2007 by level

[Jim Martin]

Very lovely ship. Thanks for the pics!

[Cookie Monster]

I am surprised that they would allow the media and public to see the propellers. That's such a serious breach of security and information because US Navy never allows the public or media to see the propellers of any ship or submarine.

[sunday]

Very interesting. What are those seemingly swinging radomes in wings above the bridge?

[Archie Pellagio]

What types of threats does the South Korean navy face?

 

|Not so much threats as 'interests'.

 

Primarily, 1) Japanese, |Chinese influence and |DPRK influence come a distant second, same reason for buying the F-15K's...

[level]

I deleted it.

Edited August 25, 2007 by level

[philgollin]

I am surprised that they would allow the media and public to see the propellers. That's such a serious breach of security and information because US Navy never allows the public or media to see the propellers of any ship or submarine.

 

Two things.

 

First, at least in the UK things have relaxed a lot (for instance an Agouti propellor was on show at the National Maritime museum last time I went there). As has been shown many times on the internet, all the major naval powers seem much more relaxed over showing the basic shape of propellors nowadays.

 

Second, the propellors don't seem to be Agouti/Prairie (or equivalent) types so either they are "ordinary" types just put on for show/initial trials or (unlikely) the destroyer isn't equpped with such a system.

[Corinthian]

Arleigh Burkes and her cousins in various navies are very pretty ships.

 

Q: how much is the KDX3 an improvement over the Arleigh Burke? Is it in the same league or better as Japan's Kongou class?