RAF bombers on Battle of Britain

[Richard Young]

Besides, given that Bomber Command had trouble finding Germany, the chances of them finding an unlit air base and hitting anything seem pretty slim.

 

...not to mention that most fighter fields were just grass fields..hard t knock out a pile of dirt.

[Richard Young]

The Mustang was a British aircraft, designed and built by North American to a British Air Ministry specification. If it lacked superhargers, that was because the Brits did not specify them.

 

..uh, not quite. The Mustang was an American fighter designed by North American as an alternative to license-production of the latest Curtis P-40 varient - as such, it was designed around the same engine, for availability reasons. Since it used a laminar-flow airfoil, NA was required to purchase Curtis wind tunnel data about a similar airfoil proposed for an advanced P-40 derivative. P-40 and P-39, (and as a consequence, most early Allson engines) had no high altitude supercharging because the prevailing wisdom at the time is that little combat above 15,000 feet would occur, as the role of the a/c was to support the army. For the record, the fastest varients of the P-51 had Allison engines, and a "special" Allison in a p-39 developed a blistering 3,000 horsepower - albeit at exhaust valve temperatures over the max recommended by the enineers for sustained operation. With sodium-filled valves, such levels may possible today.

 

It probably also lacked superchargers because they were going into bombers and P-38s. I wish I could find info on supercharger production, to find out if they were left off designs like P-39 because there simply weren't enough to go around.

255017[/snapback]

 

The allisons HAD superchargers - driven by gearing off of the crankshaft. They just didn't have large enough superchargers with enough stages and speeds to maintain high altitude performance. They WERE origanally slated for TURBOsuperchargers - where the compressor(s) are turned by a turbine in the exhaust system rather than a mechanical clutch/gear arrangement off of the crankshaft. Such a system, when well designed, becomes more efficient at higher altitudes, as the increasing difference between exhaust pressure and ambient air pressure provides more power to the system, at the same time that reduced ambient air pressure is reducing the amount of power needed to spin the compressor - this makes the whole thing largely self-regulating, without the need for multiple stages or gears. Alas, it took time to devope exaust turbines with a useful life (see how many of the surviving P-47s still have their turbos...) and they were always in short supply.

[KingSargent]

The Armée de l'air was planning to do so, ordered the LN.411 which was merely an un-navalized variant of the LN.401, then rejected the plane. So there were no dive bombing units in the AdA in May 1940, only "assault bombers" with a strong forward armament and time-delayed bombs, and using nap-of-the-earth tactics (Breguet 691, 693 and 695). But the idea hadn't been abandoned, and several US aircraft projects were considered for that role (from Brewster and Vultee mostly).

255575[/snapback]

There were a bunch of Curtiss SBC biplane dive-bombers at Martiique waiting transport to France when the armistice came.

 

I wouldn't call the French ideas of "assault bombers" very heavily armed. Not near refernces, but IIRC the Breguet seres had one 20mm cannon and two 7.5mm MGs firing forward, half the armament of a Bf110 (although the French had a better cannon).

[GregShaw]

For the record, the fastest varients of the P-51 had Allison engines, and a "special" Allison in a p-39 developed a blistering 3,000 horsepower - albeit at exhaust valve temperatures over the max recommended by the enineers for sustained operation.  With sodium-filled valves, such levels may possible today.

That was a turbo-compounded V-1710. Basically the exhaust gas went into a manifold, ran down the outside of the aircraft to cool the manifold, then into a GE CH series turbo. But instead of running a compressor as a traditional turbo-supercharger, the turbo was connected back into the crankshaft to provide power. Wright did the same thing with the turbo-compounded R-3350 postwar, although they were more conservative than Allison in regards to operating temperatures.

 

The engine ran WET at 100 in Hg, good for about 2100 hp from the core, and the turbo-compound added just short of 900 hp to that, it was typically about 2980 hp, although IIRC it ran about 3200 hp with some modifications. It was really optimized for fuel efficiency in the 2000-2500 hp range rather than absolute power. But that P-63 would have had incredible performance even on ONLY 3000 hp.

 

BTW, Allison did have sodium cooled valves, the temp limit was the exhaust pipe limits, not the valves. Allison was using a P-38 exhaust pipe, but pushing it to about 1850 degrees, which was just too much for the piping. As I mentioned, they did run the exhaust external to the aircraft to get some air cooling, but it still pushed the limits of the materials. Unfortunately they just let development drop postwar, those whiny jet engines were more attractive, but it would have been a challenge to the first generation or two of gas turbines if they would have continued with it.

 

Greg Shaw

[Yama]

That´s completely at odds with everything I´ve read on the subject, The test pilots (who you might think would be listened to) were all in favour of the He112. This was the test in 1936 (?) when the competing prototypes all flew with RR Kestrals because Daimler Benz hadn´t quite finished the design of the DB600 (which they ripped off from Rolls Royce incidentally). Bf109 production had not yet begun.

255480[/snapback]

 

Never heard of such thing. When Finnish test pilot Magnus Gustaffson flew both types, he noted that whilst He-112 was perfectly good for it's time, Bf-109 was exemplary. He was flabbergasted when told that definitive variant of Bf-109 would have almost twice the engine power...

 

You need to understand what happened in 1935 and why Ernst Heinkel would complain about the Contest for decades to come. Heinkel was one of the biggest and most esteemed aircraft manufacturer in Europe, and particularly noted from his high-speed designs. Thus, when his design lost to relatively little known Willy Messerschmitt (who had somewhat controversial reputation, which is related to why Milch hated him), it was pretty much equal shock had Lockheed-Martin lost JSF contest to Burt Rutan. Heinkel just couldn't accept the result.

[Yama]

The He100 speed-record race plane had the surface area cooling. The He100D was a fighter, designed to be cheaper than the Bf109, better landing qualities, over 400 mph, and twice the radius of action. I'd say that was a significant improvement.

255535[/snapback]

 

Radius of action was better than 109, but not twice. Landing gear was little or no improvment over 109. It was designed to be simpler to produce than He-112, but I've never heard it being cheaper than 109, which was specificially designed for easy production as well. Especially as 100 had much more laborous surface finish.

 

What went wrong with 100 was that surface evaporation cooling was a predictable failure, and by the time more conventional He-100D-1 was prepared, FW-190 was already flying, being almost as fast as 100 but without many of it's weaknesses and, most importantly, it had an engine which was not earmarked to running and crucially important Bf-109/110 production.

 

I don't think the Germans could have sustained a large strategic bomber force, they couldn't sustain their smaller planes. I see no reason to believe that He277s over the Urals would knock the USSR out of the war when thousands of Allied four-engine bombers over the Reich did not knock Germany out - they definitely contributed, but the Bomber Barons had said they could win the war all on their lonesomes and they didn't.

255535[/snapback]

 

Yes, and it is totally irrelevant because by the time He-274/277 would have been ready for service, war would have been hopelessly lost anyway and German strategic bombers would have been massacred.

[yak_v]

During that period of time any single engine bomber sent to attack a target in daylight without fighter escort usually got slaughtered. TBDs did fairly well before they got chewed up at midway.  The first TBF use was during that battle without escort and only one survived(and it was a write off).  Stukas were very succesful until they ran into fighters, then they became easy meat.

 

It is interesting to note that soviet Su-2 light bombers had the best loss to sortie to loss ratio of all of the Soviet bombers in 1941 (twice better than Il-2s IIRC and better than any twin engined ones as well). IIRC it was on the order of 40 or so sorties per loss. And this is in 1941 when a lot of the times there was no escort or it was ineffctive.

 

Vladimir

[yak_v]

That´s highly subjective, the He117 was a turkey yes but the He277 led directly to the He274 which, if it had been built, would have been a weapon as formidable as the B29. If the Germans had a strategic bomber force they could have hit the Russian factories behind the Urals and there is really no telling the results of that, so once again we wind up being thankful for Nazi idiocy.

255487[/snapback]

 

I would suggest looking at the map first of all. The distance from London to Berlin is about 600 miles, distance from where Germans were in 1943 to Urals is over 1000miles. Then look at the production runs of the US and UK Heavy bombers 43-45 and at the number of bombers that Germans produced in 43-45, and finally at the fuel situation in Germany in 1944-45. Do you really think they could have done anything to have any effect on the war?

 

Vladimir

[vardulli]

'aircraft for the few- The RAF's fighters and bombers in 1940' MJ Bowyer

gives a pretty good idea of what the bombers were up to

 

a lot of attacks on shipping and coastal target

 

mining (including in canals)

 

towns in Germany

 

different aircraft types (perhaps obviously) tend towards certain types of targets

 

ie wellingtons against towns in Germany

 

Hampens coastal and canals figure pretty heavily

 

Battles and Blenheims french coastal areas and shipping

 

etc

[vardulli]

as an example of airfield attacks

 

Whitleys listed attacks on airfields

 

on 2/3 july

5/6

8/9

23

9/10 august

10/11

18/19

29/30

30/31

 

10/11 october

 

 

blenheims

3 july

4

7

9

13

15

16

21/22

23

23/24

25/26

26

28/29

30

1 august

2

9

10

11

12/13

13

13/14

14

14/15

15/16

17/18

21

23

24

24/25

26

25/26

26/27

28/29

29

30/31

1 septmber

2

3/4

4/5

8

 

 

 

I might have missed some

 

[Detonable]

I would suggest looking at the map first of all.  The distance from London to Berlin is about 600 miles, distance from where Germans were in 1943 to Urals is over 1000miles.  Then look at the production runs of the US and UK Heavy bombers 43-45 and at the number of bombers that Germans produced in 43-45, and finally at the fuel situation in Germany in 1944-45.  Do you really think they could have done anything to have any effect on the war?

 

Vladimir

255782[/snapback]

 

 

Speer wrote that the Germans thought that much of Soviet electrical production was concentrated in 7? showcase facilities. Perhaps it wouldn't have required a huge force to hit these if the bombers could come in low. Disrupting electrical power would have idled machine tools, hoists, mixers, rivet guns, pumps, etc. Perhaps mining equipment was also partly electric powered. Certainly lighting would have been affected. Its not clear how vulnerable the plants were to bombs, but presumably the boilers and some of the transmission cables could be damaged. The US power grid is vulnerable to relatively small disruptions, so perhaps the wartime Soviet power grid was also vulnerable enough to result in a large scale blackout. Remember, you don't have to destroy all the powerplants to bring the grid down.

 

I don't think the location of the front lines in 1943 was in any of the 1942 German plans!!

[Nick Sumner]

and it is totally irrelevant because by the time He-274/277 would have been ready for service, war would have been hopelessly lost anyway and German strategic bombers would have been massacred.

255749[/snapback]

 

The He277 could have been ready in 1942, it was only a twin tailed version of the 177 with 4 engines.

[Nick Sumner]

I would suggest looking at the map first of all.  The distance from London to Berlin is about 600 miles, distance from where Germans were in 1943 to Urals is over 1000miles.  Then look at the production runs of the US and UK Heavy bombers 43-45 and at the number of bombers that Germans produced in 43-45, and finally at the fuel situation in Germany in 1944-45.  Do you really think they could have done anything to have any effect on the war?

 

Vladimir

255782[/snapback]

 

Well we will never know. Both you and Yama are assuming that the Germans would launch an allied style strategic bombing campaign - which they might - butwe can´t say that with certainty.

[yak_v]

Well we will never know. Both you and Yama are assuming that the Germans would launch an allied style strategic bombing campaign - which they might - butwe can´t say that with certainty.

255818[/snapback]

 

How else could they damage Soviet production facilities enough to have any effect on the war? I'd be happy to hear your ideas on how He-277 could knock SU out of the war in 1943-44 or 45...

 

Vladimir

[yak_v]

  Speer wrote that the Germans thought that much of Soviet electrical production was concentrated in 7? showcase facilities.

 

Considering that German intelligence of the SU in WWII was abyssimal, I would doubt that they were right or even knew which facilited to hit.

 

Perhaps it wouldn't have required a huge force to hit these if the bombers could come in low.  Disrupting electrical power would have idled machine tools, hoists, mixers, rivet guns, pumps, etc.  Perhaps mining equipment was also partly electric powered.  Certainly lighting would have been affected.  Its not clear how vulnerable the plants were to bombs, but presumably the boilers and some of the transmission cables could be damaged.  The US power grid is vulnerable to relatively small disruptions, so perhaps the wartime Soviet power grid was also vulnerable enough to result in a large scale blackout.  Remember, you don't have to destroy all the powerplants to bring the grid down.

I'm not quite sure the status of the Soviet power grid in 1942 (or even if there was a grid), but considering the fact that it survived losing a very large percentage of power generation capacity in 1941-42, I would highly doubt that any such disruption would be big enough to have a lasting effect. Second point is that a lot of the factories were evacuated to places where there was no grid and were running on local power, so it would be very hard for the Germans to accomplish.

 

I don't think the location of the front lines in 1943 was in any of the 1942 German plans!!

255814[/snapback]

 

You got that right .

 

Vladimir

[Nick Sumner]

How else could they damage Soviet production facilities enough to have any effect on the war?  I'd be happy to hear your ideas on how He-277 could knock SU out of the war in 1943-44 or 45...

 

Vladimir

255823[/snapback]

 

That is not what I´m saying Vladimir.

 

The specific point that I´m trying to make is that we can´t asume that a Luftwaffe armed with strategic bombers would have adopted the same tactics or strategy as the RAF or USAAF.

 

The general point is merely that it is hard to measure the effect of a strategy or tactic that was never tried.

[Paul F Jungnitsch]

They had something similar in mind for the Mistel series, Operation Eisenhammer:

 

The operation, known as Plan Iron Hammer, was the 1943 brainchild of Professor Steinmann of the German Aviation Ministry, who had pointed out the benefit of raiding selected points in the Soviet infrastructure in order to damage the whole. Iron Hammer was meant to attack the Soviets' Achilles' heel--their electrical generation turbines. The Soviets relied on a haphazard system of electrical supply with no integrated grid, which revolved around a center near Moscow that supplied 75 percent of the power to the armament industry. The Germans sought to destroy an entire factory system in one quick blow.

 

http://history1900s.about.com/library/prm/blsecretkg3.htm

 

IIRC the Allies found out after the war that the German electrical generation industry was extremely vulnerable also, they just never thought to target it.

[Animal Mother]

IIRC the Allies found out after the war that the German electrical generation industry was extremely vulnerable also, they just never thought to target it.

256018[/snapback]

 

Would not one define the dambusters raids as attacks on the German electrical generation industry?

[Pachy]

There were a bunch of Curtiss SBC biplane dive-bombers at Martiique waiting transport to France when the armistice came.

255664[/snapback]

Yes but as I understand it (though sources are vague on the issue) they were intended to enter Aéronautique Navale service for "conventional" anti-ship missions, like the SB2U, LN.401 and their British counterpart the Skua. My original reply was about ground-based dive-bombers supposed to attack ground targets.

 

I wouldn't call the French ideas of "assault bombers" very heavily armed. Not near refernces, but IIRC the Breguet seres had one 20mm cannon and two 7.5mm MGs firing forward, half the armament of a Bf110 (although the French had a better cannon).

255664[/snapback]

It's rather heavy for 1939 standards, the Bf 110 was only used as a fighter at the time IIRC. And I don't think the Allies didn't get anything comparable until much later with the ground attack variants of the Beaufighter.

[Geoff Winnington-Ball]

Would not one define the dambusters raids as attacks on the German electrical generation industry?

256040[/snapback]

No, not really. They were only a pinprick. We discussed this quite a while back - what the Allies should have done is divert their air resources to utterly destroying the power grid and its infrastructure throughout Germany; that might well have been far more cost-effective than flattening cities.

[hojutsuka]

The specific point that I´m trying to make is that we can´t asume that a Luftwaffe armed with strategic bombers would have adopted the same tactics or strategy as the RAF or USAAF.

That is true. But the capabilities of bombers like He-277 or He-274 (or the Lancaster and the B17/B29 on the Allied side) were understood by the war planners back then, and they did their best to come up with tactics and strategy utilizing the capabilities in order to defeat the enemy most efficiently. What they did come up with would not have enabled the Luftwaffe to inflict enough damage on Russian industry for the Germans to win.

 

We on the TankNet today are in a better position to come up with tactics or strategy than the WWII planners, because we not only have the plans that were tried, but their results, and information about the enemy that was unavailable to WW II planners.

 

But I confess that I cannot think of any tactics or strategy that would enable the Luftwaffe armed with strategic bombers (and by that I mean a Luftwaffe with realistic resource constraints as in real life, not a "Germany has everything it had in real life, plus 40,000 He-277s and aircrew, fuel, and ammunition for them" type fantasy scenario) can make enough difference for the Germans to win on the Eastern Front. In fact, my guess is that putting the resources into building up a strategic bomber force (to be ready by 1942, or earlier) would reduce the resources for tactical bombers and fighters essential for the ground war, so that the Germans would lose more quickly than in real life.

 

So if you can think of tactics or strategy for this theoretical Luftwaffe with strategic bombers, why don't you post your ideas, and we can debate it?

 

The general point is merely that it is hard to measure the effect of a strategy or tactic that was never tried.

256000[/snapback]

Absolutely true! (Can you tell that I majored in mathematics? )

 

The German Army never tried tickling its enemies to death! Who can tell what the effect on the war might have been?

 

Hojutsuka

 

Spelling edit.

Edited December 7, 2005 by hojutsuka

[hojutsuka]

It's rather heavy for 1939 standards, the Bf 110 was only used as a fighter at the time IIRC. And I don't think the Allies didn't get anything comparable until much later with the ground attack variants of the Beaufighter.

256056[/snapback]

The Henschel Hs 123, considered obsolete by 1939, carried twice as many cannons as the Breguets when doing close support, 2x20mm MG-FF and 2x7.9mm MG 17. Being a very small plane, the Hs 123 could not carry bombs in addition to the pair of cannon (it was "either or"), but this does show that the French idea of what was adequate gun armament for close support was not shared by the Germans.

 

Hojutsuka

[Pachy]

this does show that the French idea of what was adequate gun armament for close support was not shared by the Germans.

256087[/snapback]

Out of curiosity, how often were the cannons fitted versus the bombs?

[hojutsuka]

Out of curiosity, how often were the cannons fitted versus the bombs?

256095[/snapback]

Sorry, I have no figures for that.

 

The general impression I have (and it is just an impression) is that the 20mm were used quite often (possibly because the bomb load was unimpressive, 4x50kg, possibly because the HS 123 tended to do close close support where accuracy was vital).

 

Hojutsuka

[Detonable]

Considering that German intelligence of the SU in WWII was abyssimal, I would doubt that they were right or even knew which facilited to hit.

I'm not quite sure the status of the Soviet power grid in 1942 (or even if there was a grid), but considering the fact that it survived losing a very large percentage of power generation capacity in 1941-42, I would highly doubt that any such disruption would be big enough to have a lasting effect.  Second point is that a lot of the factories were evacuated to places where there was no grid and were running on local power, so it would be very hard for the Germans to accomplish.

You got that right .

 

Vladimir

255826[/snapback]

 

It looks like there was a large amount of industry along the Moscow-Gorki axis. Perhaps this is what would be vulnerable. It might not be affected much by the loss of generating facilities west of Moscow, if there were similar generating plants east of Moscow.

 

The big Soviet powerplants were apparently "showcase" facilities, and so may have been advertised somewhat before the war.

 

I'll bet the Germans did not have much idea about the plants relocated east of the Urals. After all, they did not recognize the relocation when it was going on. What local power were the plants running on? It seems like it would be difficult to suddenly come up with a large number of electrical generators in late 1941- early 1942.

 

I have a brother in law who grew up on an Australian sheep ranch. The shearing building was powered by a pole running down the length of the building (i.e., a rod, not a Northern European). The equipment was all belt driven off the pole.

 

It should be remembered that the German oil industry was crippled over a period of a few months in 1944, although the bombing campaign was dispersed over a wide number of other targets. So a bomber force 1/10 or 1/20 in size might have had an effect on one industry. The transmission lines were impossible to defend everywhere.