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RAF bombers on Battle of Britain


D Simcock

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Hi everyone,

Most literature on the RAF in the Battle of Britain focusses on Fighter Command, for understandable reasons.

 

What was Bomber Command was up to during that period? I've read a few brief files on their engaging in operations against coastal targets and shipping, amd some inland work.

 

Howvere I'd have thought they should have been engaged in operations against German airfields in France. Did they ever engage in such operations? If not, why not?

 

After all, German air superiority over France was largely negated at night when all the fighters were tucked up at their aerodromes. Being tucked up in their aerodromes, they would have been vulnerable to attack. Until later stages, the bombers would likewise mostly have been back in France at night.

 

Even if attacks on airfields weren't that effective, they may have lowered the sortie rate of the Luftwaffe a bit, or even just kept the pilots awake longer so they'd be less effective in the day when operating over Britain. Both outcomes would have aided Fighter Command.

 

Cheers

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Attacking German airfields was not on Bomber Command's list of things to do. It wasn't in the category of 'win the war all by ourselves by strategic bombing' which was the altar at which the Bomber Barons worshipped.

 

Besides, given that Bomber Command had trouble finding Germany, the chances of them finding an unlit air base and hitting anything seem pretty slim.

 

BTW, the usual measure of "Victory" in the BoB is the ratio of German planes lost to Fighter Command fighters lost. When the other RAF Command's losses during the period are added in, the RAF advantage shrinks considerably.

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And I understand that Bomber Command was being forced into handing over many of their single engined bomber (ie Fairy Battle) pilots for conversion to fighter pilots.

 

Bomber Command was also going to be important in any counter strikes against the invasion armada, if it appeared that the invasion was imminent.

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Attacking German airfields was not on Bomber Command's list of things to do. It wasn't in the category of 'win the war all by ourselves by strategic bombing' which was the altar at which the Bomber Barons worshipped.

 

Besides, given that Bomber Command had trouble finding Germany, the chances of them finding an unlit air base and hitting anything seem pretty slim.

 

BTW, the usual measure of "Victory" in the BoB is the ratio of German planes lost to Fighter Command fighters lost. When the other RAF Command's losses during the period are added in, the RAF advantage shrinks considerably.

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During the BoB Bomber Command losses were mostly due to flak over the harbours and other installations in France and the Low Countries attempting to destroy resources to be used in the projected invasion of the UK. The only 2 notable raids outside this for the period were 11JUN40 - raid on Fiat works in Turin - and 24/25AUG40 - raid on Berlin in retaliation for bombs dropped on London which had effects far beyond the material damage inflicted.

 

Actually I thought the more appropriate measure was aircrew wastage.

 

Aircraft can be built in days (elpased time) but aircrew take many more times that to train.

 

Here is where the RAF had a definite advantage - aircrew forced to bail out over England were a total loss to the Germans (except for one of course :) )

 

Frank

Edited by capt_starlight
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And I understand that Bomber Command was being forced into handing over many of their single engined bomber (ie Fairy Battle) pilots for conversion to fighter pilots.

 

Bomber Command was also going to be important in any counter strikes against the invasion armada, if it appeared that the invasion was imminent.

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No - volunteers from FAA and other commands were taken on for conversion to fighters. The Battles were still regarded as vital to the defeat of any invasion so it would have been extremely illogical to remove them.

 

Frank

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Attacking German airfields was not on Bomber Command's list of things to do.

 

They seem to have done it, nonetheless:

 

No 82 Squadron was almost wiped in a single operation on 13 August. Twelve aircraft from No 82 were sent to attack Hamstede airfield in Holland. Only one aircraft returned, the rest having been caught by fighters over the airfield during their bombing runs.

 

snip

 

Airfields were becoming secondary targets as the Command sought to disrupt Hitler's invasion plans by targeting the barges moored along the length of the Channel coast.

 

http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/diary1940_1.html

 

Bomber command went on the offensive and bombed the airfields at Cherbourg (France) and Schipol (The Netherlands).

 

 

http://www.battle-of-britain.com/BoB2/Diar...ary_6_12aug.htm

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BTW, the usual measure of "Victory" in the BoB is the ratio of German planes lost to Fighter Command fighters lost. When the other RAF Command's losses during the period are added in, the RAF advantage shrinks considerably.

 

RAF fighter vs Luftwaffe fighter loss ratio in the BoB was quite close to 1:1. The difference was in bombers.

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RAF fighter vs Luftwaffe fighter loss ratio in the BoB was quite close to 1:1. The difference was in bombers.

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Which adding in Bomber, Coastal, and Training Command losses for the period reduces the British "Victory Margin" by a bit.
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They seem to have done it, nonetheless:

 

No 82 Squadron was almost wiped in a single operation on 13 August. Twelve aircraft from No 82 were sent to attack Hamstede airfield in Holland. Only one aircraft returned, the rest having been caught by fighters over the airfield during their bombing runs.

 

snip

 

Airfields were becoming secondary targets as the Command sought to disrupt Hitler's invasion plans by targeting the barges moored along the length of the Channel coast.

 

http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/diary1940_1.html

 

Bomber command went on the offensive and bombed the airfields at Cherbourg (France) and Schipol (The Netherlands).

http://www.battle-of-britain.com/BoB2/Diar...ary_6_12aug.htm

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Bombing airfields in daylight was suicide, as 82 Sqdn found, bombing at night was useless.

 

I think some Battle pilots were shifted to Fighter Command, as they were at least used to the same R-R Merlin engine. That was the plan anyway, I suppose somebody at the Air Ministry thought engine type made a difference in flying skills.

 

I have data on which Group of BC flew what, but not here. I think the Light Bomber (Blenheim and Battle) Group (5?) was designated for anti-invasion (barge-bashing) duties.

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I think the true measure of victory in the B0B is not the various ratios of loss, but the fact that Herr Hitler did not have a victory parade in London.

 

(Yes, I know the Royal Navy and the overall logistics of the operation could have made invasion unlikely, but let's not forget we said the Ardennes were impassable to armour and they came through that twice - so let us ex-airforce types have our moment of inherited glory.)

 

Per Ardua Ad Astra

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2 Group had the light bombers (Battles and Blenheims). Later in the war these were replaced by Bostons and still later these were supplemented/replaced by Mitchells and Mosquitos. The whole of 2 Group was transferred to 2 Tactical Air Force in preparation for the the invasion of Europe (late 1943). 5 Group at the time (1940) had Hampdens.

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2 Group had the light bombers (Battles and Blenheims).

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Poor guys. Battle has to be one of the most useless warplanes ever accepted to production (over 2000 built! And each eating up a valuable Merlin Engine). All the disadvantages of Ju-87 without any of its' advantages. What they were thinking? :huh:

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The Battle was a propaganda machine. If you had 2000 engines (made or planned) you could get 1000 two-engine bombers or 2000 Battles, which sounded good to people who thought a bomber was a bomber.

 

It was also an 'expansion' machine, that could get more squadrons into service faster and which was as good as a bigger plane for training.

 

The Battle wasn't the only single-engine British bomber, it is just remembered because they got slaughtered in May 1940 (how many people remember any US cavalryman except George Armstrong Custer?). There was the Vickers Wellesley, which actually did do a bit of bombing in Africa in 1940. The Japanese were also fond of single-engine bombers, and the Battle was much superior to to the ones the IJAAF used in China.

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Poor guys. Battle has to be one of the most useless warplanes ever accepted to production (over 2000 built! And each eating up a valuable Merlin Engine). All the disadvantages of Ju-87 without any of its' advantages. What they were thinking?  :huh:

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As Stuart said, not that bad in their day. If the Stuka had been swapped for Battles in 1940 we'd be saying the same thing about Stukas. As it was the Battle was actually a more versatile aircraft than it's contemporary, the Stuka, as it could level bomb, dive bomb (vertical dive capable), and low level bomb. It's main problem was the use of a three man crew. That extra little bit of weight was what caused it to date so quickly.

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As Stuart said, not that bad in their day.  If the Stuka had been swapped for Battles in 1940 we'd be saying the same thing about Stukas.  As it was the Battle was actually a more versatile aircraft than it's contemporary, the Stuka, as it could level bomb, dive bomb (vertical dive capable), and low level bomb.  It's main problem was the use of a three man crew.  That extra little bit of weight was what caused it to date so quickly.

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You have to have people trained for dive-bombing, and the RAF didn't. I'd also like to see them get those bombs out of the Battle's wing 'bomb bay' cells in a dive.

 

The only designated British 'dive-bomber' was the Skua, which didn't have a bombsight and was a Navy bird anyway.

 

Besides being able to look good numerically, the Battle was a single-engine high-level strategic bomber, that being the only kind the Bomber Barons recognized (the strategic part, not the single-engine). The Advanced Air Striking Force did not go to France to support the Army - the RAF had the wonderful Lysanders for that - it went to France to get the Battles within range of the Ruhr. Their four 250lb bombs (the Battle's only choice in bomb-load) each were intended to devastate German industry and win the war.

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As Stuart said, not that bad in their day.  If the Stuka had been swapped for Battles in 1940 we'd be saying the same thing about Stukas.  As it was the Battle was actually a more versatile aircraft than it's contemporary, the Stuka, as it could level bomb, dive bomb (vertical dive capable), and low level bomb.  It's main problem was the use of a three man crew.  That extra little bit of weight was what caused it to date so quickly.

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Gotta disagree. Battle was obsolescent already upon service entry. In reality it couldn't dive bomb, and I have to wonder about it's bombing accuracy otherwise too, how was the bomb sight arrangement done as it didn't have a convenient glazed nose for bombardier?

 

Stuka's bomb load was much more useful. FAF discovered that small-medium sized bombs (50 to 100kg) were not very useful. Against soft targets, it was better to have large number of even smaller fragmentation bombs. Against structures and hard targets, 250kg was minimum for decent effectiveness. Having four 250lb bombs is about the most ineffective possible distribution of bomb load.

 

Blenheim at least had more versatile bomb load, more power reserve and more growth potential.

Edited by Yama
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Gotta disagree. Battle was obsolescent already upon service entry. In reality it couldn't dive bomb, and I have to wonder about it's bombing accuracy otherwise too, how was the bomb sight arrangement done as it didn't have a convenient glazed nose for bombardier?

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There was a window in the belly, the bombardier (middle guy in the three-man cockpit) laid on his stomach to sight. Same arrangement was used by Douglas TBD when used for level bombing, also the IJN 'Kates' IIRC.
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Of course, what we SHOULD have been building was lots of A20s...

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British aeronautical industry was not up to all-metal attack bombers, they had fabric covered fighters (Hurricanes) and bombers (Wellesley, Wellington), and they had to go to WOOD for their best airplane... :P :D
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Im a great fan of the Blenheim, but I think the growth potential in it was near nonexistant by 1940.

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True, but even MkIV was considerable improvment over original production model - you didn't see even that level of evolution with Battle. I maintain that even something as anachronistic as Fokker C.X was way superior to Battle. Okay, Battle was better than Lysander...I admit that much. :P

Edited by Yama
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During that period of time any single engine bomber sent to attack a target in daylight without fighter escort usually got slaughtered. TBDs did fairly well before they got chewed up at midway. The first TBF use was during that battle without escort and only one survived(and it was a write off). Stukas were very succesful until they ran into fighters, then they became easy meat.

 

If the Battle had been escorted it might have be better remembered. The problem is that the bomber barons still believed that bombers will always get through even without escort.

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They seem to have done it, nonetheless:

 

No 82 Squadron was almost wiped in a single operation on 13 August. Twelve aircraft from No 82 were sent to attack Hamstede airfield in Holland. Only one aircraft returned, the rest having been caught by fighters over the airfield during their bombing runs.

 

snip

 

Airfields were becoming secondary targets as the Command sought to disrupt Hitler's invasion plans by targeting the barges moored along the length of the Channel coast.

 

http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/diary1940_1.html

 

Bomber command went on the offensive and bombed the airfields at Cherbourg (France) and Schipol (The Netherlands).

http://www.battle-of-britain.com/BoB2/Diar...ary_6_12aug.htm

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Thanks for those references Chris. So Bomber Command was attacking airfields from quite early in the war, but these missions were relatively ineffective, and the targets not really a high priority. Since there was no real hope of fighters escorting the bombers during daylight missions, these would seem to be of little value.

 

I wonder if the missions at night would have been more successful if all bombers concentrated on one target. The shorter mission runs in attacking airfields in France and Holland would have helped decrease the attrition rate, and concentration may have meant that more bombs actually hit the target (I think results in general show that bombing with small numbers of aircraft at night (i.e. less than 20) at this stage of the war was generally ineffective.

 

Although these operations against airfields existed, they weren't that high a priority, and I'd question the military logic of hitting targets in Germany, especially with just a few bombers, over concentrating resources against airfields which were launching planes that were hammering industry and transport in England at that time. It seems a little over-eager to be trying to hit Germany itself at this time.

 

I suppose that fighter command needed these negative experiences to develop the more successful tactics used later in the war. Large numbers of bombers against single targets at night is a tactic which they developed as a result of the failures in 1940/41. Likewise I suppose it was necessary to get the experiences (even though the missions were unsuccessful) in trying to reach and find targets in Germany at this stage of the war to develop the more effective strategic campaign later in the war.

 

Sargent, why don't you put that flamethrower away. :P

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I wonder if the missions at night would have been more successful if all bombers concentrated on one target.  The shorter mission runs in attacking airfields in France and Holland would have helped decrease the attrition rate, and concentration may have meant that more bombs actually hit the target (I think results in general show that bombing with small numbers of aircraft at night (i.e. less than 20) at this stage of the war was generally ineffective. 

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Exactly how do these bombers even find their targets?

 

In fall of 1941 (i.e. after a full year of experience in night bombing) a RAF survey showed that only one in three bombers were dropping their bombs within 5 miles of the Aiming Point. This was trying to hit industrial targets, so it means that 66% of the bombers were not even finding the right city.

 

The airfields used by the Luftwaffe in 1940 were not huge visible things that modern airports like Kennedy or Heathrow are today. Many of them were basically large level open fields with tents or (in more permanent fields) small buildings and hangars scattered about, often actually camouflaged. With aircrew that were not even as experienced in night bombing as in 1941, how do you propose to find a darkened camouflaged field somewhere in France at night?

 

Hojutsuka

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I wonder if the missions at night would have been more successful if all bombers concentrated on one target. The shorter mission runs in attacking airfields in France and Holland would have helped decrease the attrition rate, and concentration may have meant that more bombs actually hit the target (I think results in general show that bombing with small numbers of aircraft at night (i.e. less than 20) at this stage of the war was generally ineffective. Do not forget that these airfields were located in what had been until very recently friendly and/or allied natons. The RAF could scatter bombs all over Germany (and Denmark when they missed Germany) with impunity (to both sides), but one would expect the Queen of the Netherlands to be a trifle upset about bombs being strewn over her subjects. Look how upset the French got over that little Mers-el-Kebir incident.

 

Sargent, why don't you put that flamethrower away. :P Afraid I'll set your wood and canvas planes on fire? :D

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RAF fighter vs Luftwaffe fighter loss ratio in the BoB was quite close to 1:1. The difference was in bombers.

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Which is actually quite surprising, considering that the RAF fighters were primarily concerned with stopping the bombers, and engaged the escorting fighters only when they had to. The German fighters, OTOH, were there only to shoot down the RAF fighters, so you would have expected that the Luftwaffe would have achieved a better kill ratio against the RAF fighters.

 

Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website and discussion forum

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