Why did US think Pearl Harbor attack so dirty?

[ickysdad]

By the Luftwaffe, it also seams the Luftwaffe bombed Madrid for strategic reasons before Guernica.

 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Guerra_Civil_Espa%C3%B1ola.svg

[Rich]

Sorry I haven’t been able to reply sooner. Rather more important things have taken precedence over this tediousness.

 

You stated that the British had done it ‘better’ at Taranto with fewer resources, to which I made an observation - that if your intention was to be as pedantic as possible about the operational characteristics of the Pearl Harbor Raid vs. all previous naval history, then Cuxhaven was the better hook on which to hang your hat.

 

Yes, I did, but probably should have said they achieved identical results with fewer resources and in more difficult conditions. The Japanese had greater resources – six carriers to one and 40 VT versus 11 – and yet the British, attacking at night against an Italian fleet at war and with their AA defenses ready, managed to match the Japanese torpedo accuracy, five of 11 versus 19 of 40, and did the same damage – three battleships sunk.

 

BTW, the seven attackers at Cuxhaven did almost zero damage, so actually were less effective than either the Taranto or Pearl Harbor attackers.

 

Retac21 and Istvan47 were the authors of the excerpted quotes.

 

You’re a real gem…the quote you “excerpted” was “the most destructive action ever made by naval aviation was not 'brilliant'?”. How is it that two different posters supplied you with the same “excerpt”? Even better, you were then in fact replying to me, since you were agreeing with their reply to me and I was the one that “excerpted quote” was directed at that you then doctored – as is your want – by adding your own language to it “That will tell you if it was brilliant inspiration”.

 

Rich, your answer is evasive bullshit. You said 26 aircraft were written off in addition to the 29 shot down. So, cough it up. Which carriers did each of these planes come from? How many and what types were written off from Akagi? Kaga? How were they disposed of – were they stored below and written off in Japan, or did they go over the side as the strikes returned? Do you have their serial numbers from the reports that must exist in Japanese records detailing their loss? Or did you imagine that 1st CAR DIV just pulls into port and asks for an extra 15 planes over declared losses, no questions asked?

 

Sorry, no, but “evasive bullshit” is claiming that “US Navy anti-aircraft was absolutely atrocious in the first months” and then refusing to provide any evidence whatsoever for the claim. I gave you the reason I believed your claim to be bullshit and your reply is this tripe?

 

Anyway then, let’s see…

 

1st Carrier Division

Akagi

DNR – 1 Zero, 4 Val

Known Damaged - 2 Kate (VB) (Fuchida and the one he observed hit that lost its bomb), plus 4 Kates (VT) in the first wave (see below), 1 Val (Iizuka’s, written off) in the 2nd wave (all to AA)

 

Kaga

DNR – 4 Zero, 6 Val, 5 Kate VT

Reported Damaged - 3 Zero, 18 Val, 7 Kate (6 were KanKo in the first wave, see below) (Ryunosuke)

 

2nd Carrier Division

Soryu

DNR – 3 Zero, 2 Val (note that Hisashi Date’s TROM in Kingsepp et al records 4 Val “lost”, probably a typo, but maybe reporting two write-offs)

Hiryu

DNR – 1 Zero, 2 Val (note that Hisashi Date’s TROM in Kingsepp et al records 4 Val “lost”, ditto)

Reported Damaged (Soryu, Hiryu) - 20 Zero, 23 Val, 3 Kate (3 were Kanko in the first wave, 2 from Hiryu and 1 from Soryu, see below) (Ryunosuke)

 

BTW, for those really interested in just what bullshit you care to indulge in, I will note that you yourself have quoted the damaged figures for Kaga and 2nd Carrier Division before – how is it that you suddenly don’t know them…and now need “serial numbers from the reports” to confirm them?

 

Also BTW, it is possible to reconstruct the likely carriers for the damaged aircraft by working backwards from the wave and unit assignments, but I think I’ll wait for Werneth, Wenger, Aiken, and company to do the definitive work, even if it seems to be hanging fire. But maybe they’ll have serial numbers for you…

 

5th Carrier Division

Zuikaku

DNR – None

Damaged – reported as none

Shokaku

DNR – 1 Val

Damaged – 1 Kate, plus others

 

Totals

DNR – 9 Zero (5 AA, 2 E/AC, 2 UNK), 15 Val (7 AA, 7 E/AC, 1 UNK), 5 Kate (AA) = 29 (17 AA, 9 E/AC, 3 UNK)

Damaged – 23 Zero, 42 Val, 17 Kate = 82 plus

Losses in total as given are 29 DNR and 111 damaged (also given in Joseph Czarnecki, Richard Worth, Matthias C. Noch, Mark E. Horan, and Tony DiGiulian, “Order of Battle

Pearl Harbor 7 December 1941”, http://www.navweaps.com/index_oob/OOB_WWII_Pacific/OOB_WWII_Pearl_Harbor.htm, Fuchida, God’s Samurai, p. 38, says 29 lost, 10-15 badly damaged and pushed overboard, 40-45 damaged but operational; 19 aircraft were “stripped and jettisoned” Polmar and Genda, Aircraft Carriers p. 173; Japanese lost 5 Kate, 15 Val, and 9 Zero, with 34 Kate, 58 Val, and 19 Zero damaged, Gudmens, Staff Ride Pearl Harbor, 2005, p. 116.)

 

Losses by attack wave:

1st Wave

DNR – 3 Zeros (AA), 1 Val (UNK), 5 Kate (AA) = 9

DWO – 11 Kate (AA), 1 Val (UNK) = 12

Damaged – 7 Kate, 16 Val, 11 Zeroes = 34

Total – 14 Zero, 18 Val, 23 Kate = 55

 

2nd Wave

DNR – 6 Zeros (2 AA, 2 E/AC, 2 UNK), 14 Val (7 AA, 7 E/AC) = 20

DWO – 14 Val = 14

Damaged – 8 Zeros, 27 Val, 16 Kate = 51 (Three of the damaged Zeroes were from Iida’s Soryu group that hit Kaneohe, including that of his second-in-command Iyozo Fujita according to Smith, Pearl Harbor: Day of Infamy, Osprey, 2002, p. 62.)

Total – 14 Zero, 55 Val, 16 Kate = 85

 

Total 20 destroyed, 74 hit, and 50 “crashed on return” in the 2nd wave according to Hixson, Pearl Harbor and Memory, p. 11, citing Prange et al, Pearl Harbor, 278-309; 74 aircraft were “holed” according to Fukadome in Stillwell, Air Raid Pearl Harborp. 69;

Wilmot, Pacific War, says that 324 aircraft were operational on 8 December out of 441 aboard. Even assuming the spares had not been utilized (at least the 18 Zero were supposedly) then that is 63 non-operational or lost.

 

Reported Damaged Kanko in 1st Wave (Aiken, “Torpedoing Pearl Harbor”):

Kate – Kadano (Hiryu) fuel line severed by AA fire

Kate – Kasajima (Hiryu) 29 hits, one 15cm (6”)

Kate – Murata, leading First Shotai (Akagi) one hit

Kate – Yasue, Goto’s Second Shotai No. 3 (Akagi) 21 hits

Kate – Hanai, Negishi’s Third Shotai No. 3 (Akagi) hit and gunner Sugaya mortally wounded

Kate – Suzuki, leading Fourth Shotai (Akagi) hit three times

Kate – Yoshikawa, Kitajima’s First Shotai No. 2 (Kaga) hit in right wing

Kate - ???, Kitajima’s First Shotai No. 3 (Kaga) hit four times

Kate – Sato, Leading Second Shotai (Kaga) hit eight times

Kate – Nakagawa, Sato’s No. 2 (Kaga) hit eight times and gunner Kawasaki severely wounded

Kate – Tanaka, Suzuki’s No. 2 (Kaga) hit twice

Kate – Mori, (Soryu), hit in both wings and cockpit, ditched

Kate – Iwata, leading Fourth Shotai (Kaga) hit four times

Total – 13 damaged including one ditched

 

So of the 40 VT, five were shot down, one ditched, and 12 were known to have been hit. So we know that five of five shot down were VT hit by AA, and 15 of 18 Kate listed as damaged in the 1st Wave were hit by AA. Gee…I wonder what may have damaged the other three? Gee, I wonder if the 11 reported as write-offs were hit by AA fire? So if we assume the 11 write-offs were proportional to the number damaged we know were VT 13/18, then 8 write-offs were likely to VT due to AA fire. One-in-three hit and destroyed or written off by surprised gunners was “atrocious”?

 

Nagumo’s mission orders were to prevent the Pacific fleet from being able to interfere with the conquest of the southern region for six months. If the torpedo strike was fatally disrupted, then results from the attack could be as many as 6-7 battleships combat operational, assuming Arizona is sunk.

 

You just haven’t a clue, do you? Even if the torpedo strike was “fatally disrupted” as I posited, the Japanese over claiming was such that they likely would assume that at least one or more was still hit and, in any case, their BDA was so poor they still would have assessed Tennessee as sunk, and Arizona, Maryland, and West Virginia as “serious” from the level-bombing attacks, which would have achieved Yamamoto’s requirement of four battleships out of action or sunk (they actually only assessed three as sunk (Oklahoma, West Virginia, and Tennessee – Arizona was only counted as “serious” until they confirmed she had suffered a catastrophic explosion when a photo of her was found by them in an international newspaper).

 

29 Japanese aircraft were shot down, of which about 11 were lost to fighters. 29 – 11 = 18. About 18 aircraft shot down by anti-aircraft – so 9 in the first wave, and about 9 in the second.

 

So what caused the 12 other damaged and written off of the first wave? The 34 damaged? What put holes in 74 aircraft that were recovered? What caused 50 of the recovered aircraft to crash?

 

BTW, note that the damage to Tokuji Iizuka’s KanBaku was just three .30 caliber rounds, two of which penetrated his wing and wing tank and one of which struck the fuselage. By dint of very clever thinking and some luck he managed to nurse his leaking plane back to Akagi and landed. However, the single bullet in the fuselage apparently so weakened the airframe that it “folded up” when catching the wire and wound up in the deck barrier as a total loss…except it wasn’t jettisoned as one of the 10-15 or 19 (depending on accounts) dumped overboard. So very evidently, all those written off were not jettisoned.

 

I’m awaiting your information giving the number and types of write-offs by carrier and then we can look at AA damage in more detail. If your first answer was combative because you have no specific information to substantiate your claim, then we can drop off these 26 aircraft as an uncertain total and look at the 29 lost for certain.

 

I see, so now ditched aircraft and others reported as written off are not "lost for certain"? Is that because they didn't track the serial numbers? Anyway, sorry, but no, I think instead I’ll wait for you to provide any substantive information that supports your claims and that is not a shifting of goalposts, strawman, or an egregious and deliberate misquote of another poster.

 

BTW, how many 800-kilo bombs hit Arizona?

 

Cheers!

[glenn239]

The impression of poor performance is gathered from the overall lack of A-A performance prior to Watchtower, and the almost universal reliance on 50-cal and 20mm in the first six months for what results were achieved. “Atrocious” refers to USN shipborne heavy anti-aircraft (3” and 5”) in the first six months. Did these shipborne gun types even get a confirmed kill before Eastern Solomons or Santa Cruz?

 

In terms of references to highlight AA deficiences, Lundstrom in Black Shoe Carrier Admiral lists anti-aircraft in four places in the index. These constitute three disparaging passages about experience up to Midway, sprinkled with a few indications that things were going to improve,

 

“…For the most part the results pleased everyone. Halsey declared the achevement of the Enterprise, ‘justifies the highest hopes heretofore held regarding the efficiency of their ships, aircraft and men in the Pacific Fleet’s first counterattack. Concerns were raised about ship’s gunnery. Antiaircraft, in particular, was slow to get on target and erratic, but radar fire control and better training would cure that….” 71

 

So, most everything but anti-aircraft performance was acceptable in the early carrier raids,

 

“…Schindler, TF-17 gunnery officer and anti-aircraft expert, also depreciated the general ineffectiveness of ship antiaircraft fire in the early days of the war. He judged the support group’s contribution “a very minor consideration as far as AA protection was concerned”…” 162

 

So, peeling off the surface force from Fletcher’s carriers during Coral Sea had next to no impact on AA defences, because these were crappy anyway,

 

“Up to this point the ships had been overwelmed at Pearl Harbor or merely weathered skirmishes with level bombers. In neither case did the antiaircraft perform well….Usually only the ships being attacked had much of a chance to employ them to good effect. Because light antiaircraft enjoyed an effective range of one to two thousand yards at most – out near to where enemy planes realsesd their bombs and torpedoes – most of their kills were of “revenge” vareity after the attackers did their job.

 

A gunnery expert, Fletcher held no illusions about the likely effectiveness of antiaircraft…” 188

 

That excerpt speaks for itself. Heavy A-A performance against G4M bomber attack was atrocious,

 

“The fleet awaited the introduction of the powerful quad 40-mm heavy automatic guns that would greatly increase firepower beyond the range of the lighter 1.1-inch and 20-mm cannons.” 300

 

So, while things hadn’t been great so far, A-A was about to get much better.

[glenn239]

You just haven’t a clue, do you? Even if the torpedo strike was “fatally disrupted” as I posited, the Japanese over claiming was such that they likely would assume that at least one or more was still hit and, in any case, their BDA was so poor they still would have assessed Tennessee as sunk,

 

You suppose “Japanese overclaiming” will cause Nagumo to imagine the Pacific Fleet is incapable of attack for six months despite the failure of the torpedo unit, and he will withdraw without achieving his mission orders. A feasible theory, but not very convincing. More likely that Nagumo’s nerve will fail him, if withdrawing in this instance.

[glenn239]

BTW, for those really interested in just what bullshit you care to indulge in, I will note that you yourself have quoted the damaged figures for Kaga and 2nd Carrier Division before how is it that you suddenly dont know them…and now need serial numbers from the reports to confirm them?

 

Cut the bullshit, Rich it isnt helping you make a case. You said 26 Japanese planes were WRITTEN OFF. You dont know the difference between a damaged plane and a write-off?

 

Even assuming the spares had not been utilized (at least the 18 Zero were supposedly) then that is 63 non-operational or lost.

 

Did you have a reference stating that 2nd or 1st CAR DIV had spare D3A or B5N spares embarked?

 

So of the 40 VT, five were shot down, one ditched, and 12 were known to have been hit. So we know that five of five shot down were VT hit by AA, and 15 of 18 Kate listed as damaged in the 1st Wave were hit by AA. Gee…I wonder what may have damaged the other three? Gee, I wonder if the 11 reported as write-offs were hit by AA fire?

 

Hit does not mean writeoff. Yokosuka Naval Air Corp, Air Branch Committee, Battle Lessons Committee Investigations Committee Dai Toa Senso Senko <Koku> (Hawaii Kaisen No Bu) Dai Ichi Hen as contained in The Pearl Harbor Papers states that 5 VT were shot down, 8 were damaged, 1 was written off for a total of 6 of 40 VT destroyed in the raid.

 

So if we assume the 11 write-offs were proportional to the number damaged we know were VT 13/18, then 8 write-offs were likely to VT due to AA fire

 

The Japanese report I cited states 1 VT bomber was written off, not 8.

 

Soryu DNR 3 Zero, 2 Val (note that Hisashi Dates TROM in Kingsepp et al records 4 Val lost, probably a typo, but maybe reporting two write-offs).

Hiryu DNR 1 Zero, 2 Val (note that Hisashi Dates TROM in Kingsepp et al records 4 Val lost, ditto) Reported Damaged (Soryu, Hiryu) - 20 Zero, 23 Val, 3 Kate (3 were Kanko in the first wave, 2 from Hiryu and 1 from Soryu, see below) (Ryunosuke)

 

2nd CAR DIV had 4 Vals shot down and 26 bombers damaged in the raid, 30 of a total of 72 bombers embarked. At Wake, at least 33 B5N's were operational and 29 D3A's, for a total of at least 62 of the 68 bombers remaining operational. Of the 6 other bomber not accounted for by loss at Pearl Harbor or combat sortie at Wake, there is no reason to suppose they'd been thrown overboard.

 

DNR 9 Zero (5 AA, 2 E/AC, 2 UNK), 15 Val (7 AA, 7 E/AC, 1 UNK), 5 Kate (AA) = 29 (17 AA, 9 E/AC, 3 UNK)

Damaged 23 Zero, 42 Val, 17 Kate = 82 plus

 

No, the report says 121 were damaged and 2 written off for 123.

 

Gods Samurai, p. 38, says 29 lost, 10-15 badly damaged and pushed overboard, 40-45 damaged but operational; 19 aircraft were stripped and jettisoned Polmar and Genda, Aircraft Carriers p. 173; Japanese lost 5 Kate, 15 Val, and 9 Zero, with 34 Kate, 58 Val, and 19 Zero damaged, Gudmens, Staff Ride Pearl Harbor, 2005, p. 116.)

 

Gods Samurai is not a credible reference. The figures 10 and 15 and 19 none of these are the 26 you stated. The term damaged from Gudmen does not mean written off, and Gendas account of planes pushed overboard was from memory, not Japanese records, and also not "26".

 

Also BTW, it is possible to reconstruct the likely carriers for the damaged aircraft by working backwards from the wave and unit assignments, but I think Ill wait for Werneth, Wenger, Aiken, and company to do the definitive work, even if it seems to be hanging fire. But maybe theyll have serial numbers for you…

 

So, for now, unless youve got better than what youve just cited, your claim of 26 aircraft as written off is not substantiated. If Wenger comes out later with more information, then well have another look at that point. Genda thinks he remembers some planes going over the side, so perhaps there were some writeoffs.

Edited December 23, 2011 by glenn239

[Ken Estes]

I don't think the "powerful quad 40-mm heavy automatic guns" had that much improvement in range over the 1.1" quads, nor was the shell explosive weight that ineffective against Japanese aircraft. The gun was new and needed some adjustment and training to be effective. It remained in service until 1945.

 

Prewar AA training probably left much to be desired, as in all other forms of USN training. It became better over time. The sheer numbers of guns delivered via shipalts installing double and triple the numbers of 40mm and 20mm from delivered specs by late 1944 accounted for much, as did the disappearance of most of the better IJN aircrew.

 

Probably, the intro of the Mk 51 director and its lead computer was more decisive than the guns, although the single or paired 20mm with a lead sight was a far cry from the lowly .50 cal.

[glenn239]

By the time of Santa Cruz the types of A-A kill numbers the USN was wracking up leaves no doubt as to an exponential improvement over the early months of the war. But in encounters such as Lexington at Rabaul, Enterprise in the Marshall raid, Coral Sea, Midway, anti-aircraft simply wasn't very good.

 

Note that Lundstrom assesses USN anti-aircraft at Pearl Harbor as poor.

 

In terms of write-offs, 5th CAR DIV's operational strength on Dec 8th is known, and it was pretty much full strength. 1st CAR DIV is a wild card - situation unknown. 2nd CAR DIV is now resolved with a quick check of Lundstrom's First Team, page 39. At Wake, Yamaguchi had 32 Zero, 32 Val and 36 Kate available in 2nd CAR DIV. 4 Vals were lost at Pearl Harbor, meaning that all 72 bombers are accounted for, since there is no evidence 2nd CAR DIV had spare bombers embarked. 3 Zeros were shot down, so at least 1 Zero in 2nd CAR DIV at Wake was embarked non-operational, or had been thrown overboard.

 

The only confirmed instance I see of the Japanese throwing aircraft overboard was Zuikaku during Coral Sea, when it was attempting to recover both its and Shokaku's strikes. Parshall mentioned at one point on Combined Fleet that some aircraft from Coral Sea had to be returned to factory in Japan for repair. That seems a far more logical approach for a navy with limited aircraft production and room aboard in the hangers for all aircraft in the unit. Rather than the USN practice of throwing aircraft overboard when the USN had massive production and employed deck parks.

[JOE BRENNAN]

Re: Pearl Harbor IJN a/c losses, one, though not the only, original source are the ‘kodochosho’ or ‘tactical operation records’ of the ships, available online at http://www.jacar.go.jp I summarize each below.

 

The a/c types are written on these reports starting with a funny ‘f’-like character (it’s neither a Chinese character nor Japanese kana) followed by the Latin letter ‘c’ for fighter, ‘k’ for torpedo (aka ‘carrier attack’) plane and ‘b’ for divebomber (aka ‘carrier bomber’) and year type number: 0, 97 and 99 respectively.

 

These reports don’t have details like a/c serial numbers. Some individual a/c records do survive; I saw one posted online on a Japanese language site for a particular Zero lost at Midway, for example. But I don’t know how complete they are and anyway they aren’t at this Jacar site AFAIK. A/c outright losses are listed under descriptions like ‘shot down’, ‘missing’ and ‘suicide crash’, though those had no standard definitions across units and time. Then there’s a total of a/c ‘expended’. There’s also a category ‘greatly damaged’ (same word can also be translated ‘wrecked’). A/c in that category are sometimes included in ‘expended’ or not, speaking in general of 1941-43 ‘kodochosho’ I’ve studied. However, no a/c were classed ‘greatly damaged’ in these PH reports. So, these reports give no direct evidence of total losses besides the 29 a/c lost outright, which they confirm. That’s not to say they are proof of no write offs, but if that’s documented in Japanese records, it’s somewhere else.

 

On causes of loss, AFAIK no one has definitely tied each US aerial victory credit to a particular Japanese loss, and the number of ‘official’ claims varies anyway. IMO it probably understates the actual losses to ground fire by several a/c to subtract 11 from 29, though OTOH at least one Japanese a/c was downed by a US a/c but not credited (Ishii’s Zero from Soryu by P-36). But ground fire was from all types of guns over ships and land, not only shipboard or USN manned guns.

 

Akagi: C08051579600 pp. 1-2: 9 fc0, 27 fk97 (15*800kg, 12* torpedo); 1 fc0 suicide crash, 1 total a/c expended; 2 KIA, 2 lightly WIA; 10 a/c damaged (3 fk97 w/800kg hit once each, 4 fk97 w/ torp hit 21, 3, 1 and unk [w/KIA] times, 3 fc0 hit once each).

Akagi: C08051579600 pp. 3-4: 9 fc0, 18 fb99; 3 fb99 missing (table p.3, but actually listed as ‘suicide crash’ individually on p.4), 1 fb99 suicide crash, 4 total a/c expended; KIA 8 (pg 3 summary table says 7, but 4*2 man crews are named as ‘war dead’ on pg 4); 13 a/c damaged (12 fb99 hit 2*6, 3*5, 2*4, 2*3, 2, 2*unk times; fc0 hit once)

(not including CAP/local recon flights, uneventful)

 

Kaga: C08051585400 pp 1-2: 9 fc0, 26 fk97 (14*800kg, 12*torpedo); 2 fc0 missing, 5 fk97 missing (all torpedo), 7 total a/c expended; 17 KIA, 2 lightly WIA (disagrees with notations on pg 2 which say heavily WIA); 9 a/c damaged (2 fk97 w/800 kg hit 3 and 1 times; 4 fk97 w/ torpedo hit 2*8 [one w/ WIA], 4, 2 [w/ WIA] and 1 times; 2 fc0 hit 3 and 1 times)

Kaga: C08051585400 pp 3-4: 9 fc0, 26 fb99; 2 fc0 missing, 6 fb99 missing, 8 total a/c expended; 14 KIA, 2 lightly WIA; 19 a/c damaged (3 fc0 hit 2*2 and 1 times, 16 fb99 hit 22, 18, 2*7, 2*5 [one w/WIA], 6*4 [one w/ WIA], 2*3, 2*1 times)

 

Soryu: C08051578600 pp 1-2: 8 fc0; 1 lightly WIA; 2 a/c damaged (hit 2 and 1 times)

Soryu: C08051578600 pp 3-4: 10 fk97 (800kg); 2 a/c damaged (hit once each)

Soryu: C08051578600 pp 5-6: 8 fk97 (torpedo); 1 a/c damaged (hits unspecified) [this is the only piece of info at odds with that quoted from Aiken’s article, which I don’t have; an a/c was flown by a PO2C Mori is listed but damage is given as ‘none’]

Soryu: C08051578600 pp 7-8: 9 fc0; 3 suicide crash, 3 total a/c expended; 3 KIA; 4 a/c damaged (hit 9, 5, 4 and 2 times) [2 lost and 3 damaged were by P-36’s which lost 1 with another shot up but landed safely]

Soryu: C08051578600 pp 9-10: 17 fb99; 2 suicide crash, 2 total a/c expended; 4 KIA; 13 a/c damaged (hit 7, 6, 3*4, 3, 4*2, 3*1 times)

(not including CAP flights, uneventful)

 

Hiryu: C08051579100 pp 1-2: 6 fc[0], 18 fk[97]; 25 total hits on an unspecified number of a/c.

Hiryu: C08051579100 pp 3-4: 9 fc0, 18 fb99; 1 fc0 shot down [Nishikaichi who landed on Nihau], 2 fb99 missing, 3 total a/c expended; 5 KIA, 1 seriously WIA; 109 total hits on an unspecified number of a/c.

(not including fk97 patrols, uneventful)

 

Shokaku: C08051577100 pp 1-2: 26 fb99; 1 suicide crash, 1 total a/c expended; 2 KIA; 4 a/c hit once (as I read it, not completely clear)

Shokaku: C08051577100 pg 3: 5 fc0, 1 a/c hit 2 times.

Shokaku: C08051577100 pg 4-5: 27 fk97 (46*250kg, 48*60kg); 14 a/c damaged (details not given per a/c on pg 5)

(not including CAP flights, uneventful)

 

Zuikaku: C08051577600 pp. 1-2: 6 fc0, 25 fb99; 13 a/c damaged (including 2 fc0 hit 3 and unspecified number of times, details of fb99 damage cut off on the scan)

Zuikaku: C08051577600 pp. 3-4: 27 fk99[sic, 97] (36*250kg, 108*60kg); 2 a/c damaged

 

Joe

[Ken Estes]

The 'A-A kill numbers the USN was wracking up' at Santa Cruz have generally been considered exaggerated, and Joe Brennan gave an excellent summary of this in another thread several months ago. Enterprise undoubtedly had an AA refit at PH, where her damage from E Solomons was repaired, and I'd wager not only 40mm guns but new AA directors for her 5-inch guns were fitted. In any case, AA fire did not save Hornet from being mortally damaged and Enterprise was again damaged, leaving her the sole CV operational [not completely repaired] for the rest of the year.

 

There were other factors, such as miserable fighter direction and I think Kinkaid was never to command carrier TFs in battle again.

 

 

 

 

A great propaganda painting, another equally iconic one depicted BB S. Dakota bringing down the IJN best team. Note the 1.1 inchers in action. The carrier task forces were too heavily engaged to receive many AA mods through 1942.

Edited December 25, 2011 by Ken Estes

[ickysdad]

I think it's not just the AA meme but the fact that if alerted the Pearl Harbor defenders would taken less damage and inflicted more along with alerted defences being more disruptive to the attackers.. I don't see how any other alternative is possible.

Edited December 25, 2011 by ickysdad

[thekirk]

Knowing what I know of peacetime military life, I'm really not sure that "30 minutes warning" would have made much difference. We like to think it would, but I suspect the benefits of additional warning might well have evaporated in all the confusion. Going from a Sunday-morning peacetime mentality to fighting back against a raid like the Japanese staged? I don't think 30 minutes is anywhere near enough time for the US forces to put together a better response than they did anyway.

 

We can posit all the "Well, if they'd had 30 minutes warning, they could have X...", but the fact of the matter is that when these things light off, the amount of chaos and confusion generated is awe-inspiring, and unless you were to somehow come up with a way for everyone to know where to be, or precisely what they needed to do in order to counter the raid, things just weren't going to change that much. I can see 30 minutes being frittered away on such issues as getting access to the ammo necessary, which the quartermaster folks wouldn't have been eager to issue out until the right paperwork was done. And, without the impetus brought by actually being shot at by the Japanese, I can see a lot of obfuscation going on with regards to things like that. "Oh, I see, Lieutenant... You want me to just hand over all this ammunition based on an alert? Even if this is some kinda drill, I gotta account for this stuff... Fill this out, and I'll call Division to see if they'll authorize this... Nobody told me about any "exercise"...".

 

If you want to put the Japanese raid up against a fully-prepared set of US defenses, I think you need to allow at least 6 to 8 hours of advanced warning before you're going to see much difference in performance during the attack. Some benefits might have accrued with 30 minutes due to things like getting flood control set properly in the warships, but I really doubt that much more than that would have been accomplished. Too many people would have been behaving as though it were a routine peacetime surprise exercise, which was something not likely to change until the Japanese started shooting.

Edited December 25, 2011 by thekirk

[Marek Tucan]

But even with all the confusion and peacetime talk, 30 minutes would mean that atleast some procedures would be in much better state than in real life time 0. Watertight doors may be prepared for closing etc.

[RETAC21]

But even with all the confusion and peacetime talk, 30 minutes would mean that atleast some procedures would be in much better state than in real life time 0. Watertight doors may be prepared for closing etc.

 

But only if, as I pointed above, word got to everyone.

[thekirk]

But even with all the confusion and peacetime talk, 30 minutes would mean that atleast some procedures would be in much better state than in real life time 0. Watertight doors may be prepared for closing etc.

 

I did mention that they might get the flood conditions set better than they did in historical reality, but the fact remains that most of that 30 minutes would be wasted trying to get organized, return men to duty stations, and pull their peacetime heads out of their asses. Realistically, 30 minutes is nowhere near enough time, especially if you're wanting to get a CAP up over the islands. In 30 minutes, they might have been beginning to get pilots back to the bases, and more men out on the AA defenses. They still wouldn't have had time to undo the non-dispersal of aircraft, or half-a-dozen other issues that caused problems. And, remember--This 30 minutes warning we're talking about isn't accompanied by the very real evidence that the Japanese were shooting at us. All there is is a warning, just like any other peacetime drill. Something like that isn't going to be taken very seriously on a Sunday morning, when everyone wants to be at church or lazing in a bunk somewhere.

 

We all want to think that all it would have taken would be a few minutes warning, but I fear the reality is far different. Hell, even with the evidence of bombs falling, it took time to get men back from shore leave and passes. And, consider: This was in an era without ubiquitous communications. Let's say you did have the Japanese ambassador get a declaration of war to the State Department in time, and they started the wheels rolling to tell the Hawaiian Department what to expect. What channels did they have available? How would telling Kimmel and Short 30 minutes prior to the attack even begin to change things? This wasn't a time when Washington, D.C. could just pick up a phone and talk to a commander, nor was it one where a commander could address every subordinate commander in a timely way. Let's say that FDR did place a long-distance call in, and warns both Kimmel and Short that what's coming is coming. What then? Is 30 minutes enough to get the word out, and change things? I'll submit that some things would have come off far better, but I'll also point out that the majority of conditions are just not subject to change in that little bit of time. The fantasists who say "If only..." are expecting that everyone would have done everything they needed to do, just right, for things to have come out better. I disagree: The frictions of the moment would have come into play, and I honestly believe that with that little time, very little concrete changes would have been made. Hell, things might have even been worse--That 30 minutes might have enabled someone to get up steam and try to leave by the channel--Where the Japanese would have no doubt concentrated their attacks, in an attempt to block the fleet in.

 

No, if you want to change Pearl Harbor, I think you're going to need a hell of a lot more than 30 minutes to do it in. My guess? Before the results obtained really differ from history, you're going to have to warn the Americans something around 6-8 hours before the attacks, minimum. Maybe a little less, but certainly significantly more than just 30 minutes...

[ickysdad]

Yes but even getting a decent portion of fighters aloft means Zero's having to concentrate on getting rid of them versus conducting fighter sweeps of the airfields.IMHO there should have been more made out of the Ward-mini sub incident. However I'm just saying far less damage would have been done,far less casualties suffered and far more inflicted if even 30 minutes more warning was issued. I'm not saying the US will strike back and sink 2 of the IJN CV's and shoot down 200 aircraft or anything like that.

Edited December 25, 2011 by ickysdad

[ickysdad]

I'd also like to address the "briliant planning" issue. The IJN had in their planning had to address all the fuel/range/endurance issues in this operation of their own ships and in doing so should have realised the US Pacific Fleet couldn't have operated in the Western Pacific without proper basing which wasn't then availiable. They also should have understood any operation by the USN in the Western Pacific would have to go through the Central Pacific right in the middle of all their mandates which did have fully functioning bases with ample land based airpower. One also has the mini-subs being involved which in the ward's case almost tipped the hand of their plans.

 

One can talk of "tatical brilliance" all you want but if a strategic operation,which is what this operation was, isn't even really neccessary then how does said "tatical brilliance" overshadow "strategic un-neccessarity" and "pure political stupidity" ?

Edited December 25, 2011 by ickysdad

[Mobius]

Did the Japanese ever formally declare war on the Australians, British, Dutch, Indians (and anyone else) ?

The Japanese had been rewarded with victory on previous sneak attacks. They did try to cut the time between declaring war and the attack as short as possible to not allow any alarm going out. But failed to get their timing right.

[R011]

The Japanese had been rewarded with victory on previous sneak attacks. They did try to cut the time between declaring war and the attack as short as possible to not allow any alarm going out. But failed to get their timing right.

Mind you, the note they were to deliver before the attack was not a declaration of war, but a notice that they were breaking off negotiations. The British didn't even get that courtesy. The attack on their forces came several hours before the note was to be delivered to the US and as far as I know, no note was delivered to them.

 

The actual declaration of war on the US and British Empire (but not the Netherlands) was issued in Tokyo some hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

[Ken Estes]

Maybe the occupied Netherlands and its govt in exile did not merit a formal declaration of war, just as Indochina was seized as a protectorate from Vichy without diplomatic notice.

 

I think The Kirk is too skeptical of what ships' organization is, and peacetime situations still require crews and duty sections to be ready to save the ship under any circumstances. So, if we met RETAC's conditions of getting the word out, and the PH base command center merely hoisted the appropriate flag signal, the ships in harbor would have all gone to GQ at the same time, set watertight conditions and begun to break out ammo and man the guns, the last of which could have then shown some variation. But it is safe to say that California would not have all W/T doors open for the inspection that was scheduled, and the IJN would have had to earn their victory by inflicting extensive damage from more hits that were scored historically, save one-offs such as Arizona's magazine detonation, and even then we don't exactly know, do we?

[rmgill]

Thanks, Ryan. FDR was definitely a patron of the Navy, especially as it was seen as the first line of national defense (those pesky Army bomber types notwithstanding).

Shep, I finally remembered to look for this book while I was at home and had to search for this thread to respond.

 

Clash of Titans.

Walter J Boyne

 

Disarmament in World Racing to War

 

Disarmament and the political climate in which it flourished encouraged the exercise of aggression by Italy, Germany and Japan. It resulted int he nominally powerful navies of the US and Great Britain becoming hollow, unbalanced forces, lacking the numbers and variety of ships their global responsibilities demanded. Both were severely undermanned in both officer and enlisted ranks, and their reserve components were overage and undertrained. Realistic training was almost nonexistent.

 

This might not have been as catastrophic if the national leaders had adopted policies reflecting the status. Henry Stimson, then secretary of State for Herbert Hoover, and later to be Secretary of War for FDR, had protested the Japanese actions in Manchuria strongly. For three consecutive years, 1932, '33 and '34, the Navy General Board informed the government of Japan's quest for dominance and its goal of naval supremacy. The board advised the Roosevelt administration to decide whether it intended to defend the Philippines long enough for a U.S. relief force to arrive. If it did, then Manila would have to be extensively fortified at great expense, and naval construction would have to be accelerated. If it did not, then the US should renounce its Asian policy and leave the field to the Japanese.

 

Roosevelt chose to follow a middle path, refusing to fortify Manila, enter a naval race with Japan or forsake US commitments in Asia. Instead he chose to remind Japan of its treaty obligations, while trying to avoid a crisis. It was an ostrich policy but one calculated to get him reelected.

 

The British Government received the same advice on Singapore from within its own military. All through the 1930s, England conducted its activities as if it were still a great power in Asia. But thanks to its policy for disarmament and attitude of appeasement, when Japan Attacked, Britain lacked the resources and the will to resist.

 

In the US, the navy was in relatively favored position, thanks to the affectionate regard in which it was held by President Roosevelt, who had been Assistant Secretary of the NAvy during World War I and was the defato Secretary of the Navy for his first two administrations. As a result, although the battleship was still considered the decisive instrument, a great deal of experimentation was conducted with operating dive bombers and torpedo planes off carriers. The US was fortunate to have Admiral William Moffett, who, though infatuated with airships, also backed Admiral H.T. Mayo and Rear Admiral Hugh Rodman in their belief in carrier aviation. And in 1934, Representative Carl Vinson of Georgia, a member of the NAval Affairs Committee, pushed legislation to begin building to treaty limitations. ('A CVN was named after Rep Vinson')

 

[glenn239]

Got it.

 

Osamu Tagaya’s “Aichi 99 Kanbaku “Val” Units 1937-42” is a new book out in Japan this year. In response to my question on Combined Fleet, a poster checked Osamu and stated,

 

Osamu says that of the 29 aircraft lost during the Pearl Harbor attack, 15 were Type 99s - one from Shokaku, two each from Soryu and Hiryu, four from Akagi and six from Kaga. He adds that in addition about a dozen seriously damaged aircraft were pushed overboard after landing and that half of these were Type 99s. Immediately after the second wave returned, the following number of dive bombers were "fit for duty":

 

Shokaku: 22

Zuikaku: 14

Akagi: 2

Kaga: 6

Soryu: 7

Hiryu: unkown

 

Some of these numbers undoubtedly went up over the next few days as repairs were completed.

 

So 12 aircraft were thrown overboard after the attack, 2 were written off, 29 shot down for a total of 43 aircraft destroyed. 5th CAR DIV went from 36 Vals operational right after the attack to 51 available for dawn on the 8th.

[JOE BRENNAN]

Got it.

 

Osamu Tagayas Aichi 99 Kanbaku Val Units 1937-42 is a new book out in Japan this year. In response to my question on Combined Fleet, a poster checked Osamu and stated,

 

Osamu says that of the 29 aircraft lost during the Pearl Harbor attack, 15 were Type 99s - one from Shokaku, two each from Soryu and Hiryu, four from Akagi and six from Kaga. He adds that in addition about a dozen seriously damaged aircraft were pushed overboard after landing and that half of these were Type 99s. Immediately after the second wave returned, the following number of dive bombers were "fit for duty":

 

Shokaku: 22

Zuikaku: 14

Akagi: 2

Kaga: 6

Soryu: 7

Hiryu: unkown

 

Some of these numbers undoubtedly went up over the next few days as repairs were completed.

 

So 12 aircraft were thrown overboard after the attack, 2 were written off, 29 shot down for a total of 43 aircraft destroyed. 5th CAR DIV went from 36 Vals operational right after the attack to 51 available for dawn on the 8th.

See the info from kodochosho in post 357, those outright Type 99 loss numbers for each ship are confirmed. The ready for duty numbers in general approximate the number of Type 99's which were launched but not hit at all (Shokaku 20, Zuikaku 12, Akagi 1, Kaga 4, Soryu unk, Hiryu unk) so seem plausible. The write off/overboard number is again not beyond reason given for example Kaga Type 99's hit 22 and 18 times, 109 hits on only 16 returning Type 99's on Hiryu, and details for 13 damaged 99's on 'Zui' not visible on the scan of the report. But, at this stage of the game I don't view our knowledge as really being advanced by just another book citation saying 'around a dozen' a/c were written off, without saying the original source of that information, even by a thorough author like Tagaya. Because again, the kodochosho in many other cases listed returned irreparable a/c as 'greatly damaged' and included them as 'expended' but here none of the ships recorded that. There are other cases of info well established in other sources which doesn't appear on the kodochosho; but they tend to be smaller omissions.

 

Joe

Edited December 29, 2011 by JOE BRENNAN

[glenn239]

Good points.

 

In terms of the relative value of a write-off vs. a shootdown. The plane is destroyed in either case, but a write-off returns the crew (more important than the plane) and valuable elements (engine) can be salvaged. All things considered, 12 planes written off might be worth maybe 3-4 planes shot down.

[istvan47]

I did mention that they might get the flood conditions set better than they did in historical reality, but the fact remains that most of that 30 minutes would be wasted trying to get organized, return men to duty stations, and pull their peacetime heads out of their asses. Realistically, 30 minutes is nowhere near enough time, especially if you're wanting to get a CAP up over the islands. In 30 minutes, they might have been beginning to get pilots back to the bases, and more men out on the AA defenses. They still wouldn't have had time to undo the non-dispersal of aircraft, or half-a-dozen other issues that caused problems. And, remember--This 30 minutes warning we're talking about isn't accompanied by the very real evidence that the Japanese were shooting at us. All there is is a warning, just like any other peacetime drill. Something like that isn't going to be taken very seriously on a Sunday morning, when everyone wants to be at church or lazing in a bunk somewhere.

 

We all want to think that all it would have taken would be a few minutes warning, but I fear the reality is far different. Hell, even with the evidence of bombs falling, it took time to get men back from shore leave and passes. And, consider: This was in an era without ubiquitous communications. Let's say you did have the Japanese ambassador get a declaration of war to the State Department in time, and they started the wheels rolling to tell the Hawaiian Department what to expect. What channels did they have available? How would telling Kimmel and Short 30 minutes prior to the attack even begin to change things? This wasn't a time when Washington, D.C. could just pick up a phone and talk to a commander, nor was it one where a commander could address every subordinate commander in a timely way. Let's say that FDR did place a long-distance call in, and warns both Kimmel and Short that what's coming is coming. What then? Is 30 minutes enough to get the word out, and change things? I'll submit that some things would have come off far better, but I'll also point out that the majority of conditions are just not subject to change in that little bit of time. The fantasists who say "If only..." are expecting that everyone would have done everything they needed to do, just right, for things to have come out better. I disagree: The frictions of the moment would have come into play, and I honestly believe that with that little time, very little concrete changes would have been made. Hell, things might have even been worse--That 30 minutes might have enabled someone to get up steam and try to leave by the channel--Where the Japanese would have no doubt concentrated their attacks, in an attempt to block the fleet in.

 

No, if you want to change Pearl Harbor, I think you're going to need a hell of a lot more than 30 minutes to do it in. My guess? Before the results obtained really differ from history, you're going to have to warn the Americans something around 6-8 hours before the attacks, minimum. Maybe a little less, but certainly significantly more than just 30 minutes...

 

Fully agree. 30 minuts would have done a difference in the Battle of Britain (with British ready for the war, squadrons full operational ecc). PH was, honestly, in a complete different situation in that morning.

[Ken Estes]

....

 

No, if you want to change Pearl Harbor, I think you're going to need a hell of a lot more than 30 minutes to do it in. My guess? Before the results obtained really differ from history, you're going to have to warn the Americans something around 6-8 hours before the attacks, minimum. Maybe a little less, but certainly significantly more than just 30 minutes...

 

 

Fully agree. 30 minuts would have done a difference in the Battle of Britain (with British ready for the war, squadrons full operational ecc). PH was, honestly, in a complete different situation in that morning.

Wow. These two really deserve each other, if only they could be brought to the same planet.