Retire the C-5's?

[Guest pfcem]

I wasn't saying the Air Force should stop buying new fighters. Obviously we can't use F-15s and -16s forever, and we've already paid most of the cost of developing the F-22 so scrapping that would be a terrible idea. I agree with several others though who said cancel the F-35 program. Obviously a force of F-22s and F-35s would be nice, but a force of F-22s along with upgraded versions of the aircraft they have now would be good enough to get the job done.

241268[/snapback]

But you said yourself, "we can't use F-15s and -16s forever". Plus the F-35 is intended to replace a lot more than just the F-16.

 

Old planes cost A LOT of money to maintain & eventually they become too costly to fly. Why not replace these ageing airframes sooner rather than later? Delaying their replacement will cost even more money due to high service cost of maintaining the & the higher cost of a replacement later.

 

Using your thinking, the current C-141 & C-5 fleets should be good enough to get the job done. We knew that was not the case long ago & the C-141 is being replace by the C-17.

[Guest pfcem]

I'm all in favor of new fighters- my issue is, don't have them as pet projects and then neglect the support aircraft until you're _forced_ to deal with their problems lest they fall out of the sky.

241350[/snapback]

Lets see...

 

1st operational F-15 squadron: 1976

1st operational F-16 squadron: 1978

1st operational C-17 squadron: 1995

 

Looks to me as though fighters have been "neglected" much longer than transports.

 

 

 

We've been babying the F-22 and JSF for a decade,

241350[/snapback]

More like delaying.

 

 

 

it's time to give the support aircraft some loving too and get them good to go for the forseeable future, then go back to working on the sexy fighters.

 

Work on a C-130 replacement (boeing ATT, etc) that gives the army a little more flexibility with regards to weight and dimensions on their AFV

241350[/snapback]

I agree, a C-130 replacement in LONG overdue.

Something with at least a 30 ton (preferably 35-40 ton) payload would be nice.

 

 

 

Work on a Skycat, Pelican, or other strategic transport that ends up in between airlift and sealift in cost and capability (then you won't need C-5 for oversized cargo) to improve your strategic mobility and augment the C-17

 

Both of these projects are long term and will take decades to work on and probably decades to field, so it would be nice to get started on it now.

241350[/snapback]

I personally believe a large blended wing transport aircraft to be a better idea. You want to be able to get your stuff as close to where the fight is as quickly as possible.

 

Sea-based transports are severely limited in this reguard & require much more (longer range) land-based transports.

 

Sea-based transports have there role but that role should not expand to replace Air-based transports.

 

 

 

In the medium term, we can find a common support airframe to take us to 2050 and beyond (or a couple, if one won't do it all) for the tanker, AWACS, JSTARS, bulk cargo, and other roles that use civilian airframes. Buy them _new_ instead of leasing old, tired airframes only to end up buying them anyway at a greater cost than a new bird.

241350[/snapback]

I think 2 airframes.

 

One being the 767 & the other being the 777 (although I would prefer a 4 engined airframe to the 777 - heaven forbid should we have to use an Airbus A340 ).

 

 

 

It's all about cost of course, and there isn't enough money to go around, so it seems... not to mention the political aspect of procurement that tends to grind things to a crawl. So, I'll just sit back and let the guys who get paid to do this kind of stuff, and know more about it than I ever will, do their jobs and hope for the best.

241350[/snapback]

True. Not much that we can do about it.

[Slater]

Heck, the USAF could always buy a few A-400M's

[Burncycle360]

Lets see...

 

1st operational F-15 squadron: 1976

1st operational F-16 squadron: 1978

1st operational C-17 squadron: 1995

 

Looks to me as though fighters have been "neglected" much longer than transports.

Well, when you look at resource allocation the F-22 was center stage for a long time. The F-15's and F-16's have been continuously upgraded over time, not to mention the development of the F-15E, F-18, and the ongoing development of the F-22 over the span of more than 10 years. Despite only just now getting around to producing F-22's, they weren't "neglecting" fighters, they were pouring money into it as fast as they could.

 

Meanwhile, we're renting tankers from ireland (airforce times).

 

Again, I'm not against the F-22 (money is already spent, and it's good to stay ahead) and while I don't agree with the mindset behind the JSF, I'm not particularly against that either. I just think that while they continue to work on the JSF project, and continue to produce F-22, they need to turn around and start optimizing the support side of things too. Given your replies to my other comments, you seem to agree that there is room for improvement

 

Again though, I'm certainly not as qualified to speak on the matter as Ken or other guys in the business, this was just my $.02 based on what little I've seen.

 

I personally believe a large blended wing transport aircraft to be a better idea.

 

I do like the boeing BWB concept seems like it has a lot of potential

 

Last I heard though, boeing downscaled their BWB plans and switched to a more conservative sized design

Edited October 31, 2005 by Burncycle360

[Guest pfcem]

Wrong. Find the USAF doctrine documents on the Web and read them. Then come back after having done your homework.

241173[/snapback]

 

 

 

http://www.af.mil/main/welcome.asp

Welcome to Air Force Link, the official World Wide Web site of the United States Air Force.

 

The mission of the U.S. Air Force is to defend the United States and protect its interests through air and space power. To achieve that mission, the Air Force has a vision of Global Vigilance, Reach and Power. That vision orbits around three core competencies: Developing Airmen, Technology-to-Warfighting and Integrating Operations. These core competencies make our six distinctive capabilities possible:

 

Air and Space Superiority :  With it, joint forces can dominate enemy operations in all dimensions -- land, sea, air and space.

 

Global Attack:  Because of technological advances, the Air Force can attack anywhere, anytime -- and do so quickly and with greater precision than ever before.

 

Rapid Global Mobility:  Being able to respond quickly and decisively anywhere we're needed is key to maintaining rapid global mobility.

 

Precision Engagement:  The essence lies in the ability to apply selective force against specific targets because the nature and variety of future contingencies demand both precise and reliable use of military power with minimal risk and collateral damage.

 

Information Superiority:  The ability of joint force commanders to keep pace with information and incorporate it into a campaign plan is crucial.

 

Agile Combat Support:  Deployment and sustainment are keys to successful operations and cannot be separated. Agile combat support applies to all forces, from those permanently based to contingency buildups to expeditionary forces.

 

***

 

http://www.iastate.edu/~airforce/airpower/afsong.shtml

The Air Force Song

 

***

 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Air_Force

 

The stated mission of the USAF is "to defend the United States and protect its interests through air and space power".

 

***

 

Need more?

[Guest aevans]

It's 2005, not 1985. There is no such thing as TacAir and no such thing as strategic forces. To regard airpower as essentially a form of artillery was recognized as a bad idea in 1944. When the reach of airpower is vastly greater today than it was in 1944, it would even be a worse idea today.

241178[/snapback]

 

Hate to tell you this, Ken, but air support/interdiction/bombardment is all pretty much modeled in the same way as artillery in any number of sims, both in the gaming and professional analysis biz. This modelling reflects reality to a certain degree -- when you get down to fundamentals, it's long range fire from a fixed or semi-fixed point.

[Colin Williams]

There are more fighter planes than there are infantry squads!  Thats terrible.  Then take some of the saved money, and add four divisions to the Army, and another to the Marines. 

 

241139[/snapback]

 

Rich would have the figures, but I think this may also have been true in WW2!

[5150]

Lets see...

 

1st operational F-15 squadron: 1976

1st operational F-16 squadron: 1978

1st operational C-17 squadron: 1995

 

Looks to me as though fighters have been "neglected"  much longer than transports.

241381[/snapback]

 

You're not going to convince anyone to agree with you by using facts that aren't relevant. The average age/airframe hours of the various types is far more important than the IOC for old models that are no longer in service.

 

Just a suggestion.

[Guest pfcem]

You're not going to convince anyone to agree with you by using facts that aren't relevant. The average age/airframe hours of the various types is far more important than the IOC for old models that are no longer in service.

 

Just a suggestion.

241531[/snapback]

My point is that we have a relatively new transport plane that if procured in sufficient numbers can do the job quite well while the fighters that the USAF wants to replace originated in the 1970's.

 

True, the latest generation of F-15 & F-16 are a far cry from the original models but you can only upgrade upon any given design so far.

 

Many of the earlier aircraft need to be replaced because they have reached the end of their usefull lives.

 

Several nations are now procuring fighter aircraft that are arguably a generation ahead of the F-15 & F-16 (maybe a half generation compared to the latest versions). Why should we (the richest & most powerfull nation on earth) have to be hampered with anything less than the best than what can be had while others obtain beter equimpent than we currently have?

[Guest pfcem]

Hate to tell you this, Ken, but air support/interdiction/bombardment is all pretty much modeled in the same way as artillery in any number of sims, both in the gaming and professional analysis biz. This modelling reflects reality to a certain degree -- when you get down to fundamentals, it's long range fire from a fixed or semi-fixed point.

241471[/snapback]

Only Army oriented ones.

 

Air Force & Navy oriented ones take a decidedly opposite modeling approach.

[Guest aevans]

Only Army oriented ones.

 

Air Force & Navy oriented ones take a decidedly opposite modeling approach.

241544[/snapback]

 

Yep -- the Air Force ones tend to ignore the fact that the purpose of air power is to support decisive action on the ground. The Navy ones model anti-shipping air power as a type of semi-reusable cruise missile, while land attack air power is pretty much treated like a type of shore bombardment (because it is).

 

The major difference between air as artillery and surface fired gun or rocket artillery is that air is used almost exclusively for destructive fires, with little or no thought given to suppression.

Edited November 1, 2005 by aevans

[Kenneth P. Katz]

What you say is of course correct to a point, particularly when viewed from the tactical level of warfare. From a theater perspective, there are major differences. Artillery moves at the rate of other ground forces, more or less. Aircraft can strike locations that are hundreds or thousands of miles apart.

 

Hate to tell you this, Ken, but air support/interdiction/bombardment is all pretty much modeled in the same way as artillery in any number of sims, both in the gaming and professional analysis biz. This modelling reflects reality to a certain degree -- when you get down to fundamentals, it's long range fire from a fixed or semi-fixed point.

241471[/snapback]

[Guest pfcem]

Yep -- the Air Force ones tend to ignore the fact that the purpose of air power is to support decisive action on the ground.

241604[/snapback]

Thankfully, most people realize that Air Forces have much broader roles than that. Otherwise there would be no USAF (or any other dedicated air forces). It would still be the United States Army Air Forces (which changed in 1947 buy the way). It would also be structured quite differently.

 

Heck, there was a time when many thought that we could do without an army all together because it was thought that the Air Force (& Navy to a lesser extent) could provide all the defense we needed. They were wrong of course & thankfully those who thought so did not get their way.

 

Even as recently as the Gulf War & Bosnia, some have believed that wars could be won through air power alone.

 

Air Mobility Command is only a comparatively small part of the current USAF structure.

 

I (among others) would actually like to see that Army get its own dedicated Air Force Command because (as history has shown) the Air Force is often reluctant to provide the necessary support to the Army (preferring instead to concentrate its forces on its own goals which often to not coinside with those of the Army).

 

The Army/Air Force cooperative relationship is, thankfully, much better now that it has been in the past.

[Slater]

In the Vietnam era, seems I remember that the Army operated the C-7 Caribou fleet for a time before it was turned over to the USAF.

[Ol Paint]

April 17, 2005: The U.S. Air Force is desperately scrambling to get money to build its new F-22 and F-35 fighters. But in the meantime, an even more essential aircraft, the new C-17 transport, is being worked to death. The problem is that the C-17 is more in demand during the war on terror than are air force combat aircraft. Only the two dozen AC-130 gunships, and a hundred or so A-10 ground attack aircraft and F-16 fighter-bombers are getting steady work these days. But their workload is nothing compared to the C-17s, which are in constant demand to deliver personnel and material to American troops in Iraq, Afghanistan, and many other places where the war on terror is being fought.

 

The C-17 entered service ten years ago, and those first few aircraft quickly compiled 3,000 flight hours supporting peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. Each C-17 has a useful life of 30,000 flight hours, but the current force is flying such long, and hard (landing on rough fields) flights that many of the early model C-17s will be worn out within five or so years. This attrition is accelerated by the fact that the early model C-17s are structurally different, and weaker, than the later model C-17s. The wing box in the center of the fuselage was insufficiently strong  for the loads placed on it. This was corrected later in the production run, but those early planes are going to wear out faster than later model planes of the same flight hours. Adding to this problem is the fact that many C-17s are landing on rough fields with heavy loads and are taking life time shortening structural damage. We have flown a lot of C-17s into northern Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and a bunch of other ‘stans with rough/short strips in 2001 and 2003. The C-17 was built for this sort of thing, but lots of these landing come at the price of shorter useful life.

 

It’s always been an uphill fight getting new air transports built. There were so many delays in the C-17 program that, when the 1991 Gulf War came along, the C-17 was not available and the the C-141 transports, that was supposed to keep flying until 2010, were basically worn out and had to be retired early. Now the C-17s are doing more work, to make up for the missing C-141s. Originally, there were to be 120 C-17s (at $135 million each), with production ending in 2004. After September 11, 2001, it was realized that more air transports would be needed, and the production run of the C-17 was increased to 180. It is now proposed to  increase it again to  222 aircraft. But logistics planners insist that 300 will be needed, if wartime needs are to be met. Moreover, the rapid deterioration of the early model C-17s means that eventually 350, or more, will have to be built to maintain a fleet of 300 transports.

 

The major problem is that the air force is run by combat pilots. Although they recognize the importance of the C-17, they tend to focus on getting warplanes built. Additional C-17 construction comes at the expense of building new combat aircraft, and that’s a hard sell inside the air force. Usually, it lobbying by the army, and other branches of the government, that compels Congress to strong arm the air force generals to build the needed C-17s. It’s an ugly, messy and time consuming way to get aircraft built, but it works.

http://www.afa.org/magazine/dec2000/1200airlift.asp[/url]]Can't Do Two

 

The Defense Department, the GAO wrote, "does not have sufficient airlift and aerial refueling capability to meet the estimated two Major Theater War requirements."

 

"In total," the GAO continued, "we estimate DoD is short (1) over 29 percent of the needed military airlift capability and (2) nearly 19 percent of the needed refueling aircraft." The GAO said this didn't necessarily mean the US couldn't win in the postulated two Major Theater War scenario. However, "the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff estimates that due to airlift shortfalls, military forces would arrive later than originally planned, thereby increasing the risk that war plans would not be executed in a timely manner and possibly increasing casualties."

 

Air Force officials said that the two Major Theater War scenario depends on rapid deployment of certain hardware in the first month of operations, and that about three-fourths of this hardware "falls into the oversize or outsize category," meaning that it cannot fit on civilian freighters and must be carried by either the C-5 or C-17.

 

The GAO noted that Air Force officials said the shortfalls are due "primarily to the age of the aircraft and spare parts shortages."

 

Airlift shortfalls among older airplanes like the KC-135 tanker and C-5 Galaxy have cropped up "because of the increasing number of aircraft that need depot maintenance," the GAO asserted.

 

"More aircraft [are] in depot for longer periods than planned (which is factored into mission capable rate)," the GAO said.

 

One AMC official noted that older airplanes like the KC-135 may have "thousands and thousands of hours left on the airframe," and airframe life as measured in flying hours is a key component of assessing an aircraft's physical age. However, the official said, "When you bring a 40-year-old airplane into depot, ... no matter how well it's been taken care of ... you will find things like corrosion that can ... threaten the continued viability of that airframe."

 

The flow rate at which aircraft are expected back from depot maintenance is disrupted because of unexpected problems found during the inspection process and which must be repaired before the aircraft can be returned to service, a retired general explained.

 

"It's like when you take your old car in for maintenance," he said. "They always find something else wrong with it."

 

The Aging Aircraft Program Office at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, is working on ways to detect structural fatigue and corrosion problems on the KC-135 long before they might appear in the aircraft, since AMC has stated its intention to keep the type well into the 2020s and beyond.

 

An AMC spokesman, however, said the command had not noticed any "unusual" recent problems with corrosion on the KC-135 and that mission capable rates for the type are even running slightly above the requirement. In August, the spokesman reported, mission capable rates for the KC-135 were running at 86 percent, vs. a "desired" level of 85 percent.

 

The GAO said that AMC reported its number of tankers-359, including 317 KC-135s and 42 KC-10s-is "acceptable, assuming the aircraft can be shifted between the two nearly simultaneous wars."

 

"Technical Surprises"

 

However, Peters worries about the tanker fleet, noting, "We have no significant replacement programs on the books for our aging tankers." He went on: "It is not that we aren't going to have the tankers immediately, but what we are seeing on the KC-135 fleet are what appears to be an increasing mission incapable rate due to technical surprises. ... These are the kinds of problems which can put a whole fleet down or 200 aircraft down overnight for a period of time and those are the kinds of worries we have."

 

There is no question, however, that the chief culprit behind the airlift shortfall is the C-5 Galaxy, which in August turned in a mission capable rate of 63.3 percent vs. a requirement of 75 percent. Broken C-5s consistently gum up the train of worldwide AMC aircraft movements which take place 24 hours a day, AMC officials reported.

 

US Transportation Command and AMC chief Gen. Charles T. Robertson Jr. calls the C-5 "the bad actor" when it comes to dragging down airlift availability rates.

 

A series of fixes to the C-5 are already under way, although a complete program to bring the type up to AMC's standards in departure reliability will have to await the results of MRS-05.

 

"We have worked these contracts very carefully ... so we don't get ahead" of the mobility study, one AMC official noted.

 

The C-5 upgrades already under way involve a series of fixes to the aircraft's engines, avionics, landing gear, electrical system, flight controls, hydraulics, and fuel system. While most of the improvements raise mission capability rates less than 1 percent, collectively, they will increase the C-5's mission capable rate by 11 percent, raising it to just about the desired mission capable rate of 75 percent, according to AMC program officials.

 

Moreover, the fixes are expected to save AMC about $510 million per year in operating and support costs, meaning they will pay for themselves in a few years.

 

The biggest needed improvement to the C-5, though, is new engines. Lockheed Martin is conducting a program to develop an upgrade that would refit the C-5B fleet with the General Electric CF6-80 engine. The company, acting as the Air Force's agent, selected the commercial, off-the-shelf engine, which is used on most civilian and military widebodies around the world, in June. The re-engining of the C-5 fleet in total would raise the type's mission capability rates into the 90 percent-plus range and add significantly to the number of ton miles per day that AMC could move.

 

In addition, the new engines would be warranted to remain on the wing for more than 10,000 hours. The current engines need to be taken off the wing for inspections and maintenance at 1,500 hours.

 

The C-5 engine improvement is also necessary for the C-5 to operate under new international flight rules. With the existing engines, the C-5 cannot climb fast enough with even a half load of fuel to the entry-point-to-track altitudes and corridors now mandated in Europe.

 

"Up until now, we've been able to ask for waivers," for extra time to climb to the most efficient air corridors, an AMC official reported. After Jan. 1, 2001, however, "we've been told no more waivers will be granted." That means the C-5 will have to fly at less efficient routes that require more flying time and consume more fuel. Moreover, it will require more tankers since the type will often have to take off with less than a full load of fuel to expeditiously reach even the less-desirable tracks.

 

The C-5 re-engining would be tried first with the C-5B fleet, which is younger than the C-5A fleet and would clearly pay back the investment over the airframe life. Expansion to the C-5A fleet might be used as an incentive to Lockheed Martin for quality performance on the first batch.

 

"We expect this to be a large success, like the KC-135R [re-engining program]," an AMC program official asserted.

 

The C-5 re-engining is among the projects that will be presented in its Analysis of Alternatives to meet the airlift capability requirements set by the MRS-05. The AOA will present ways it can meet the updated ton miles per day requirements and the cost associated with each one. The C-5 re-engining would have to be weighed against other alternatives or sets of alternatives, such as further buys of the C-17 airlifter, greater crew ratios on tanker aircraft, and assorted smaller initiatives that can raise the throughput of the airlifter fleet.

 

Even if the full C-5 re-engining were to go ahead, fabrication of a test aircraft, testing the aircraft, and creating a production capability could not be accomplished quickly. Only a few airplanes could be all the way through the re-engining and available for service in 2005. Air Mobility Command officials said the most efficient re-engining schedule would make the change while the C-5 was in depot maintenance; about 12 per year would get the new power plants over five years. Since about 19 to 22 C-5s currently go through depot each year now, there would not be any interim effect on the fleet's capability.

 

The C-17 multiyear contract, signed in 1996 and hailed as one of the keys to getting the program back on track, is about to enter its final phase. Boeing, which builds the C-17, will need to begin building long-lead castings next year if any C-17s beyond the original 120 for the Air Force are to be bought without a break in the production line. The forgings and castings involved require three years of lead time.

 

Out of Cash

 

Boeing had offered the Air Force a follow-on multiyear buy of an additional 60 airplanes, at 15 per year, which would have driven the price per aircraft down to $149 million each--including larger fuel tanks-but the Air Force, short of funds, was obliged to allow the offer to expire at the end of 1999.

 

"Like everyone else, we are waiting for the MRS-05 to see what the new requirement is," a Boeing spokesman said. Boeing may make a new multiyear offer, but obtaining an advantageous price will largely depend on whether the Air Force can avoid a break in the production line.

 

Even though the Air Force has stated a requirement to replace special operations C-141s with 15 C-17s beyond the originally specified 120, as yet no funds have been put in the budget to accommodate them. The Fiscal 2002 budget so far has long-lead funding in it for only five airplanes.

 

In the Fiscal 2001 budget, the Air Force deleted three C-17s, postponing them for several years. The production line was unaffected, though, because the UK had ordered four C-17s to lease from Boeing, and the British aircraft "simply took the place of some American aircraft on the assembly line," the Boeing spokesman said. Though the Air Force will provide training and support to the UK for the C-17s, an AMC spokesman said no effect on the US Air Force is expected as a result of the UK C-17 lease.

 

While one of the options in AMC's Analysis of Alternatives would likely include replacement of some or all of the C-5s with C-17s, such an option would not be the service's preferred choice. As Robertson told the House Armed Services Committee in the fall of 1999, "It is not good business to put all your eggs in one basket. ... I would never recommend going down to just one airlifter-as long as we can afford it."

 

The GAO determined that the KC-10 continues to reliably turn in a performance slightly better than required, averaging a mission capable rate of 88 percent vs. a requirement of 85 percent. Used in both the airlift and tanker roles, the KC-10 slightly offsets the shortages among other aircraft in AMC's fleet.

 

The Analysis of Alternatives is also reported to include an option that would extend the life of a small number of C-141Bs, which were slated to leave the inventory completely by 2006. While costs would increase from maintaining an entire support system for just a few airplanes, more T-tails would be retained, adding flexibility to the fleet and more aircraft to cover missions.

 

The C-17 is replacing the C-141 on nearly a one-for-two basis, meaning that, although the tonnage that can be moved with the larger airplane is roughly the same, there are fewer individual aircraft to spread around the globe.

 

Robertson, addressing the House Armed Services readiness subcommittee in October of last year, said, "Even though tonnage capabilities remain close to the same, we lose tremendous flexibility with so many fewer tails." The 135 C-17s "can only be in half as many places as 270 C-141s."

 

Another approach to fixing-at least in the short term-the mission capable rate of the airlift fleet is simply to continue fully funding the spare parts line items in the Air Force budget. The service has added money back into spares after cutting its spending several times in the 1990s, but a senior service official admitted that "we put the money in, and we take it back out for something else. We have not made a solid enough commitment to spares yet, in my opinion."

 

Air Mobility Command has made operational changes to further squeeze missions and productivity from its airlifter fleet. At the Tanker Airlift Control Center at Scott AFB, Ill., AMC has developed a computerized system that gives on-demand visibility into where its airplanes are, what they're carrying, who's on the crew, where they're headed next, and when they should arrive. A flight manager who overseas as many as 10 aircraft keeps tabs on the airplanes and stays in touch with the crews, helping them with field diversions or other problems that may arise during their missions. The system has streamlined repair of broken airplanes and rerouting of crucial items by other aircraft, command officials reported.

 

Ryan told members of the Defense Writers Group in Washington, D.C., last June that the MRS-05 is being examined by the Joint Chiefs especially for "how much higher we need to go [in millions of ton miles per day] to reduce risk."

 

However, he put the potential cost of the MRS-05 recommendations in perspective. As a rule of thumb, Ryan said, for every million ton miles per day of increased airlift, you have to increase by about seven C-17s the size of the airlift fleet.

 

Ryan continued that he does not feel the MRS-05 will be the last word on the airlift situation.

 

"The demand for lift is an issue that will always be there," he said. "We will never have enough lift, ever, to do two simultaneous Major Theater Wars. We can't afford to go there."

My vote has long been:

• Keep the F-22, possibly with a slightly larger force. Most of the R&D is sunk, the aircraft is going operational as we speak, and it fits in with the operational needs of the USAF.
  
• USAF to back out or severely cut down its F-35 fleet with USN/USMC investment/buys remaining the same. The USN and USMC both need new fighter/attack aircraft more than the USAF and the program can't easily be eliminated with the foreign co-operation. There is more market for the F-35 (esp. as a Harrier replacement) than the F-22. Use the USAF purchase dollars to fund additional F-22s and upgrade programs for other aircraft.
  
• Procure the B-1R and provide the spares & support to the fully promised levels. Put more focus on heavy bomber programs than tactical fighters. The bigger aircraft are more flexible both tactically and strategically and have more endurance and payload. I'd like to see a F119-class engine with better SFC, though.
  
• Consider an engine upgrade for the B-52s, possibly with KC-135R, C-5, or C-17 commonality (too lazy to look up the optimal engine). Should save on fuel & maintenance costs, offsetting the procurement costs. These bad boys are going to be around until 2040, so it'll make future maintenance much easier.
  
• Proceed with the C-5D/C-5 RERP. As noted, the program could basically increase the availability rate by 50% and outsize cargo is a really big deal for the military--see bolded section above for why civilian airlifters don't cut it. CRAF helps, but isn't a panacea. Maintenance costs would come down and it might save the need to procure additional C-17s.
  
• Get the Army moving on replacing their C-23s with C-27Js (or the CASA aircraft, but I prefer the larger C-27J) to provide some organic tactical airlift to handle the logistics missions. Consider transferring some C-130s to the Army--I think they need a bit of their own tactical airlift.
  
• Investigate a stretched C-17 as a C-5 replacement in the 2020 timeframe. Unfortunately, I don't think this will be feasible, probably requiring a new wing. As an alternative, consider either reopening production for a second time to build C-5Ds to replace C-5As, or developing a new airlifter program. An-124 production may be re-starting in the near future, but I'd prefer to see a US-built aircraft.
  
• Fund upgrades for the F-15s and A-10s and allow the F-16 force to decline via attrition.
  

No, the program outlined isn't cheap. But global power projection isn't, either, and some of the expenses would be saved through lower operating costs, reduced force levels, fewer new-build aircraft required (if reliability enhancements give the effect of 25 more C-5s available, that's ~40-50 C-17s you don't have to buy), and fewer programs competing for the available money.

 

Douglas

[Smitty]

Cutting back the F-35 half way means that you pay all the nonrecurring costs and get much less. Bad, bad idea.

 

I agree, thats why we should can the whole thing.

 

Maintain the F/A-22 at ~380 and the full Block 40 ISR upgrade.

 

Allow the USN a larger F/A-18E buy with another round of upgrades.

 

If the USAF needs to backfill with a manned platform before UCAVs mature, and as F-15s and F-16s age, buy a block of F-16E/Fs.

 

Focus the tens to hundreds of billions saved on strategic lift, tanking, C4ISR, munitions, UAVs, UCAVs and long range strike options for the future.

[Smitty]

[*]Procure the B-1R and provide the spares & support to the fully promised levels.  Put more focus on heavy bomber programs than tactical fighters.  The bigger aircraft are more flexible both tactically and strategically and have more endurance and payload.  I'd like to see a F119-class engine with better SFC, though.

 

Not a fan of the B-1R. The Bone is too expensive to maintain and will never be stealthy. I'd rather see a regional UCAV or FB-22.

 

[*]Consider an engine upgrade for the B-52s, possibly with KC-135R, C-5, or C-17 commonality (too lazy to look up the optimal engine).  Should save on fuel & maintenance costs, offsetting the procurement costs.  These bad boys are going to be around until 2040, so it'll make future maintenance much easier.

 

Hindsight says this was good idea when first proposed. A cost-benefit analysis modelling current and projected fuel prices would probably favor it.

 

[*]Get the Army moving on replacing their C-23s with C-27Js (or the CASA aircraft, but I prefer the larger C-27J) to provide some organic tactical airlift to handle the logistics missions.  Consider transferring some C-130s to the Army--I think they need a bit of their own tactical airlift.

 

This will devolve into a Key West battle. But the U.S. military does need a smaller, more numerous airlifter than the C-130.

 

[*]Fund upgrades for the F-15s and A-10s and allow the F-16 force to decline via attrition.

 

The A-10s will be around for a while and are already being upgraded to the A-10C.. The F-15s are going to get hit hard by airframe fatigue life in the relatively near future.

 

A 380+ buy of block 40+ F/A-22s should be enough to replace the entire F-15 and F-117 fleet.

 

We should look to retire the older blocks of F-16s soon. Everything before Block 40-ish should be on the chopping block.

[Ol Paint]

Not a fan of the B-1R.  The Bone is too expensive to maintain and will never be stealthy.  I'd rather see a regional UCAV or FB-22.

Hindsight says this was good idea when first proposed.  A cost-benefit analysis modelling current and projected fuel prices would probably favor it.

This will devolve into a Key West battle.  But the U.S. military does need a smaller, more numerous airlifter than the C-130.

The A-10s will be around for a while and are already being upgraded to the A-10C..  The F-15s are going to get hit hard by airframe fatigue life in the relatively near future. 

 

A 380+ buy of block 40+ F/A-22s should be enough to replace the entire F-15 and F-117 fleet.

 

We should look to retire the older blocks of F-16s soon.  Everything before Block 40-ish should be on the chopping block.

241688[/snapback]

Smitty,

 

I would submit that the B-1B/B-1R need not be stealthy, that's what we have B-2s for. On the other hand, it seems to be carrying a larger share of the conventional "bomb truck" role than the B-52 and offers better survivability than the older aircraft. FB-22 suffers more for long range missions because it has less in the way of crew rest facilities than the B-1--at the very least the larger aircraft offers the ability for a crew member to stand up once in a while, which means it can make more use of its range and payload & air-to-air refueling endurance than the two-seat FB-22.

 

I know the AF and Army would probably get embroiled in a fight over airlifters. But the dividing line is silly, although it does force the USAF to provide airlift for the other services which it might otherwise completely neglect. I think the USAF should focus on its core competencies, to utilize a buzzword, by providing the global reach. Under TRANSCOM, it should be easier to make full use of any tactical airlift additions the Army provides, coordinated with both strategic & tactical assets from the USAF side.

 

I know the A-10s are receiving upgrades. I wanted to make clear that these should continue, as should maximizing the use of the F-15 fleet. The latter need replacement, but I don't know if 380 F-22 is enough to replace both F-15 & F-16 fleets, even if we do accept a smaller fighter force in exchange for more heavy bombers & airlift.

 

While canning the F-35 completely might save a lot of money, there are many good reasons to continue the program.

• USN replacement aircraft with LO characteristics--I don't like the idea of a single-aircraft naval fleet. If something happens that grounds your F-18 fleet, the USN is without any carrier strike capability if there is no JSF. Also, the F-35 should be stealthier than the F-18E/F.
  
• AV-8B replacement--there is NO other STOVL fighter program with a hope of production at this time. That means 12-13 ESGs with no organic fixed-wing, no RN fixed-wing in the near-term, no Spanish fixed-wing. You may feel "screw NATO" is a good idea, but the reality is that there is a solid market here and the political repercussions for killing the program could be/would be severe. The US defense industry is going to be hurting, too, if the program is abruptly shut down--there isn't much to survive on with 380 F-22s and no other fighters. UCAVs aren't ready for prime-time just yet and organizations like Boeing, Lockheed, & Northrop-Grumman can't be kept alive by piddly R&D contracts for 1 or 2 airframes a decade.
  
• F-16 replacement--there are a lot of F-16s & other cold-war aircraft that are getting long in the tooth. Kill the JSF and you are left trying influence allies with F-22s or non-stealthy aircraft. The former seems like a non-starter, and the latter isn't competitive.
  

Douglas

[JOE BRENNAN]

While canning the F-35 completely might save a lot of money, there are many good reasons to continue the program.

USN replacement aircraft with LO characteristics-

AV-8B replacement-

F-16 replacement--

241701[/snapback]

Those are all good reasons, and esp. the non-US implications of second and third. Calling for cancelling F-35 is generally from a too USAF-centric point of view IMO. The real UCAV (as in J-UCAS, not Predators etc) program is farther away than many seem to assume in terms of a real replacement for many manned missions. This has as you say industrial base besides strictly military implications. On the point of a reduced F-35 program having worse economics, it's worse compared to idealized original idea used to sell the program, unaffordable idea, the usual. As a kid one of the things that got me going on Aviation Week was the weekly debates in the letters section about cancel the F-14, F-15, have the AF buy the -14, Navy the -15. All pretty deja vu I have to say.

 

Back on original topic this weeks Av Week has an article on the briefings on the Mobility Capability Study, a long anticipated DoD (not AF per se) study. It proposes no additional C-17's and C-130J's*, but completing the C-5 modernization. The article was, naturally for that mag, largely from the point of view of commercial impact of shutting down all new mil transport production lines in US (if foreign orders for C-130J wouldn't sustain it). Not completing the C-5 modernization would only be plausible if the proposal was to instead completely recapitalize and buy a replacement fleet. Just do retire them and do nothing else won't fly, won't happen I predict. A likely outcome could be C-5 modernization, C-17's stop at 180, Congress throws in some C-130J's for the local ANG, year to year, like they did with C-130H's for years when the AF didn't request any, and previously already with J's too.

 

*the last study 6 yrs ago proposed the currently ordered 180 C-17's but many since have proposed around 220, and 60 C-130J's alongside a much larger number of updated older C-130's.

 

Joe

Edited November 1, 2005 by JOE BRENNAN

[Smitty]

I would submit that the B-1B/B-1R need not be stealthy, that's what we have B-2s for.  On the other hand, it seems to be carrying a larger share of the conventional "bomb truck" role than the B-52 and offers better survivability than the older aircraft.  FB-22 suffers more for long range missions because it has less in the way of crew rest facilities than the B-1--at the very least the larger aircraft offers the ability for a crew member to stand up once in a while, which means it can make more use of its range and payload & air-to-air refueling endurance than the two-seat FB-22.

 

I don't so much dislike the B-1B as I do spending a lot of money re-engining them.

 

I'd focus on upgrading their avionics and reduce the number to provide a more maintainable fleet, while we work on the replacement.

 

I'm not crazy about the FB-22 either, and it definitely has limitations, conceptually. It is not a strategic bomber, but it would fill the hole left by the retirement of the F-111.

 

I know the AF and Army would probably get embroiled in a fight over airlifters.  But the dividing line is silly, although it does force the USAF to provide airlift for the other services which it might otherwise completely neglect.  I think the USAF should focus on its core competencies, to utilize a buzzword, by providing the global reach.  Under TRANSCOM, it should be easier to make full use of any tactical airlift additions the Army provides, coordinated with both strategic & tactical assets from the USAF side.

 

Well, airlift (tactical or strategic) is not a core competency of the Army either.

 

I know the A-10s are receiving upgrades.  I wanted to make clear that these should continue, as should maximizing the use of the F-15 fleet.  The latter need replacement, but I don't know if 380 F-22 is enough to replace both F-15 & F-16 fleets, even if we do accept a smaller fighter force in exchange for more heavy bombers & airlift.

 

380 F-22s isn't enough to replace the F-15 and F-16 fleets. But it is enough to replace the F-15 and F-117 fleets.

 

If we cancel the F-35, the F-16 will have to soldier on in the USAF until UCAVs arrive.

 

While canning the F-35 completely might save a lot of money, there are many good reasons to continue the program.

[*]USN replacement aircraft with LO characteristics--I don't like the idea of a single-aircraft naval fleet.  If something happens that grounds your F-18 fleet, the USN is without any carrier strike capability if there is no JSF.  Also, the F-35 should be stealthier than the F-18E/F.

[*]AV-8B replacement--there is NO other STOVL fighter program with a hope of production at this time.  That means 12-13 ESGs with no organic fixed-wing, no RN fixed-wing in the near-term, no Spanish fixed-wing.  You may feel "screw NATO" is a good idea, but the reality is that there is a solid market here and the political repercussions for killing the program could be/would be severe.  The US defense industry is going to be hurting, too, if the program is abruptly shut down--there isn't much to survive on with 380 F-22s and no other fighters.  UCAVs aren't ready for prime-time just yet and organizations like Boeing, Lockheed, & Northrop-Grumman can't be kept alive by piddly R&D contracts for 1 or 2 airframes a decade.

 

Do the USN and USMC really need a stealthy manned aircraft? They have the F-18E/F. It's bran-new, with state of the art avionics and sensors. In major conflicts, they'll receive support from stealthy and non-stealthy USAF aircraft. Plus the USN has tons of Tomahawks VLS cells to fall back on.

 

I, personally, don't consider a manned STOVL aircraft to be a strategic requirement for the US military, let alone a VLO one. ESGs are supported today buy USMC and USN F-18s flying off CVNs, and various aircraft flying from land. Why can't that continue tomorrow? How many times have AV-8Bs made an operational difference to the USMC? Sure they are a nice capability, but they're also a marginal one, IMHO.

 

In any event, do these needs and the foreign sale aspect outweigh the massive cost of the F-35 program? You can do a lot with $250 billion.

 

I'm sorry if I sometimes sound indignant when talking about "screwing NATO". But if a (not 'the') primary justification for a quarter trillion dollar program is so that foreign countries can buy cheap stealth, I feel like I'm getting ripped off as a taxpayer.

 

 

[*]F-16 replacement--there are a lot of F-16s & other cold-war aircraft that are getting long in the tooth.  Kill the JSF and you are left trying influence allies with F-22s or non-stealthy aircraft.  The former seems like a non-starter, and the latter isn't competitive.

 

Competitive with what? New F-16s and even F-15s seem to be winning plenty of sales competitions against the likes of Eurofighter, Rafale, Gripen, Su-30+.

[Guest pfcem]

Only the two dozen AC-130 gunships, and a hundred or so A-10 ground attack aircraft and F-16 fighter-bombers are getting steady work these days.

Just like to point out that combat aircraft were much more active earlier in the war & it is only because the war has been going so well that the number of combat aircraft sorties is now so comparatively low.

[Ken Estes]

On this page we are still asking for too many toys. WTF is the hole left by the FB-111 that needs filling, BTW?? What did it ever do, and what did it replace that was also so essential?

[Guest pfcem]

I agree, thats why we should can the whole thing.  

 

Maintain the F/A-22 at ~380 and the full Block 40 ISR upgrade.

 

Allow the USN  a larger F/A-18E buy with another round of upgrades.

 

If the USAF needs to backfill with a manned platform before UCAVs mature, and as F-15s and F-16s age, buy a block of F-16E/Fs.

 

Focus the tens to hundreds of billions saved on strategic lift, tanking, C4ISR, munitions, UAVs, UCAVs and long range strike options for the future.

241681[/snapback]

Do you not realize what the cost-effectiveness comparison of the F-35 vs F/A-18E/F vs F-16E/F is?

 

Your plan will cost more money & result in a less effective force.

 

If you cancel the F-35, you essentually end up with nothing but bills to pay in developement costs & punitive damages.

[Smitty]

Those are all good reasons, and esp. the non-US implications of second and third. Calling for cancelling F-35 is generally from a too USAF-centric point of view IMO. The real UCAV (as in J-UCAS, not Predators etc) program is farther away than many seem to assume in terms of a real replacement for many manned missions. This has as you say industrial base besides strictly military implications.

 

It may be from a USAF-centric POV, but I think it also makes sense from a total force capability standpoint.

 

Losing USN stealthy strike is the biggest problem with cancelling the F-35, IMHO. And that can be addressed as it is today, with standoff munitions and USAF stealth.

 

UCAVs may not be able to replace manned aircraft in the near term, but they can certainly take the more dangerous and boring jobs that require stealth (SEAD/DEAD, ISR, strike) and leave the more difficult jobs (CAS, OCA/DCA) to a reduced number of existing, manned systems.

[Burncycle360]

On this page we are still asking for too many toys. WTF is the hole left by the FB-111 that needs filling, BTW?? What did it ever do, and what did it replace that was also so essential?

 

I dunno. You might ask the Air Force.