Vichy France

[Nick Sumner]

I thought it was Bristol??!!

 

No, the Watford Gap

[Colin Williams]

de Gaulle didn't self promote general. He got this rank thanks to Reynaud who let them in the government in May 1940. It was the rank of brigade general. And it was a temporary promotion.

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Slight correction. I believe de Gaulle was promoted when given command of the 4th DCR. He was brought into the government later.

[Colin Williams]

One thing that's glossed over here is the degree to which the senior military leadership (essentially Weygand and Petain, even though Petain was a retired general in a civilian position) undermined the civilian government's ability to continue the war. Even before the "Battle of France" started with the German offensives across the Somme, Weygand was telling Reynaud and company that the Army would be defeated after putting up a good fight. At this point there could have been plans to evacuate men and material to North Africa, but Weygand was fixed on the idea of an armistice after an honorable fight. The government and the military together undermined even that effort by declaring Paris and other urban areas "open cities". Some speculate that part of Weygand's reluctance to advocate a fight to the finish was a sensitivity to his Belgian origins which made him uncomfortable ordering extreme measures in defense of France.

 

While the spirit of Joffre, Foch, Gallieni and Clemenceau was sadly missing in 1940, as seen in the limits to French resistance, what truly appalls me is the willingness of the government to simply abolish itself and hand everything over to Petain. President Lebrun, in particular, had no business abandoning his post.

[GdG]

One thing that's glossed over here is the degree to which the senior military leadership (essentially Weygand and Petain, even though Petain was a retired general in a civilian position) undermined the civilian government's ability to continue the war. Even before the "Battle of France" started with the German offensives across the Somme, Weygand was telling Reynaud and company that the Army would be defeated after putting up a good fight. At this point there could have been plans to evacuate men and material to North Africa, but Weygand was fixed on the idea of an armistice after an honorable fight. The government and the military together undermined even that effort by declaring Paris and other urban areas "open cities". Some speculate that part of Weygand's reluctance to advocate a fight to the finish was a sensitivity to his Belgian origins which made him uncomfortable ordering extreme measures in defense of France.

 

While the spirit of Joffre, Foch, Gallieni and Clemenceau was sadly missing in 1940, as seen in the limits to French resistance, what truly appalls me is the willingness of the government to simply abolish itself and hand everything over to Petain. President Lebrun, in particular, had no business abandoning his post.

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I've never heard of such a stand from Weygand before May 1940. Keep in mind that Gamelin was the generalissime by then, Weygand arrived from Syria once his predecessor was fired.

 

Gamelin could not envisage a total defeat on the western front before the offensive. At worst a stalemate. Therefore, nothing such as an evacuation to NA could be envisaged.

 

Weygand realized that the situation was hopeless once the late may 1940 counter offensives to disengage the northern troops failed. And even by may 15th, Gamelin knew what would happen.

 

Weygand tried nonetheless to stop the Germans, and not by evacuating ressources to North Africa, but by transferring as many troops from NA to France, quiet the opposite!

 

As for this (still hard to understand to me after years) give up of the government in front of Pétain, one thing may give us clues: keep in mind that the political world was a very narrow one. Everyone (right or left) knew very well each other, with its fidelities and inimities.

 

Add to this that Reynaud had to government in June 1940 in the middle of an administration which was collapsing. He couldn't govern in normal conditions (that is to say give orders and have them applied). The 'normal' government lasted until June, when the government left Paris. Until then, the government was still keen on resisting.

 

Once they were evacauted, most of the time on the roads, without a good communication network, and (it's extremly important, even if nobody thinks about it) without sleep. Really. They barely slept more than 2 hours per day for 3 weeks. Meetings at 2 AM, evacuating at 5 AM, etc... I feel that the psychological fatigue of these men played a lot with the fall of Reynaud's government. Read the diaries, they lived at a rythm that was hard to follow. Had Poincarré, Joffre or Foch subished the same fatigue, I doubt they would have acted otherwise.

[BillB]

I thought it was Bristol??!!

 

No, the Watford Gap

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Nah, the homegrown tosspots aka soft southern shandy drinkers start south of the Watford Gap, changing to wogs at Calais.

 

Bill "East Midlander" B

[Redbeard]

One thing that's glossed over here is the degree to which the senior military leadership (essentially Weygand and Petain, even though Petain was a retired general in a civilian position) undermined the civilian government's ability to continue the war. Even before the "Battle of France" started with the German offensives across the Somme, Weygand was telling Reynaud and company that the Army would be defeated after putting up a good fight. At this point there could have been plans to evacuate men and material to North Africa, but Weygand was fixed on the idea of an armistice after an honorable fight. The government and the military together undermined even that effort by declaring Paris and other urban areas "open cities". Some speculate that part of Weygand's reluctance to advocate a fight to the finish was a sensitivity to his Belgian origins which made him uncomfortable ordering extreme measures in defense of France.

 

While the spirit of Joffre, Foch, Gallieni and Clemenceau was sadly missing in 1940, as seen in the limits to French resistance, what truly appalls me is the willingness of the government to simply abolish itself and hand everything over to Petain. President Lebrun, in particular, had no business abandoning his post.

231007[/snapback]

 

I believe (judging mainly from Julian Jacksons's "The Fall of France") that Weygrand at the fights over the Somme Line in early June for some time wondered if it actually would be possible to stop the Germans, as his new "chequer-board" deployment (as opposed to continious front) worked well. It soon became obvious however that too many forces had been wasted elsewhere and after that Weygrand certainly was prominent in the efforts to get France out of the war ASAP. Apparently he and others feared communist uprisings more than the Germans (1871 syndrome?). The final push probably came when the German armistrice conditions were much more "relaxed" than anticipated.

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

[Colin Williams]

I've never heard of such a stand from Weygand before May 1940. Keep in mind that Gamelin was the generalissime by then, Weygand arrived from Syria once his predecessor was fired.

 

Gamelin could not envisage a total defeat on the western front before the offensive. At worst a stalemate. Therefore, nothing such as an evacuation to NA could be envisaged.

 

Weygand realized that the situation was hopeless once the late may 1940 counter offensives to disengage the northern troops failed. And even  by may 15th, Gamelin knew what would happen.

 

Weygand tried nonetheless to stop the Germans, and not by evacuating ressources to North Africa, but by transferring as many troops from NA to France, quiet the opposite!

 

As for this (still hard to understand to me after years) give up of the government in front of Pétain, one thing may give us clues: keep in mind that the political world was a very narrow one. Everyone (right or left) knew very well each other, with its fidelities and inimities.

 

Add to this that Reynaud had to government in June 1940 in the middle of an administration which was collapsing. He couldn't govern in normal conditions (that is to say give orders and have them applied). The 'normal' government lasted until June, when the government left Paris. Until then, the government was still keen on resisting.

 

Once they were evacauted, most of the time on the roads, without a good communication network, and (it's extremly important, even if nobody thinks about it) without sleep. Really. They barely slept more than 2 hours per day for 3 weeks. Meetings at 2 AM, evacuating at 5 AM, etc... I feel that the psychological fatigue of these men played a lot with the fall of Reynaud's government. Read the diaries, they lived at a rythm that was hard to follow. Had Poincarré, Joffre or Foch subished the same fatigue, I doubt they would have acted otherwise.

231128[/snapback]

 

GdG,

 

It was sloppy language on my part. I was referring to the post-Dunkirk part of the campaign. At this point, an effective government would have made a decision one way or the other to prepare for continuing the fight from the North Africa.

 

As for Poincare, Joffre or Foch, it's worth remembering that before the Battle of the Marne in 1914 Gallieni was in the process of preparing for a second siege of Paris, with full approval of Joffre and the government. If one had the ability to reincarnate Joffre or Foch and place him in command at the moment Weygand replaced Gamelin, the end result of the campaign would have been the same. Still, even as an admirer of Weygand, I have no doubt that either one would have gripped the reins of power with greater control and forced the government to act more decisively or acted on his own authority.

[Colin Williams]

Some context for 1914 vs. 1940 -

 

On August 26th the fate of Paris seemed sealed. The right wing of the German armies under Von Kluck was moving by forced marches due south upon the city. On this date General Gallieni was given command of the fortified region of Paris, having three corps of the active army assigned him for this purpose, in addition to reserve formations.

 

A rumor got abroad that Paris was to be considered as an open, that is unfortified, town, in order to save it from bombardment. This led Gallieni to consult Monsieur Millerand on that question and he was informed that the city was to be defended à outrance.

 

"Do you know what that may mean?" inquired Gallieni.

 

"I might have to blow up public buildings and historical monuments, and destroy bridges---such as the Pont de la Concorde, for instance."

 

The Minister of War merely repeated, "You will defend Paris to the last ditch," and Gallieni went to work. The armament and garrison of the forts were reinforced, trenches dug, chevaux-de-frise and other obstructions placed to cover the approaches to the city, and active reconnaissances by land and air organized. Gallieni then posted on the walls a proclamation of a few lines: "The government has left Paris for the purpose of giving a new impulse to the country's defence. I have been charged with defending Paris against the invader. I will carry out this duty to the bitter end."...

 

President Poincaré sent me a note on September 1st asking that I come to the Élysée the next day. He naturally had been informed by Delcassé of my intention to stay in Paris, and when I arrived he said he had requested me to come in order that he might thank me in the name of his

government for my decision. I could see that he was laboring under a strong emotion. The step being taken by the Cabinet was desperately painful to him, based as it was upon the reasoned belief that in a few days the Germans would enter Paris. We of course talked of this eventuality, and he told me that the government had become cognizant of the German plan to destroy the city section by section until France yielded unconditionally. This, he said, would never be done. It was better that the capital be laid in ashes than that France surrender. The town would be defended to the last ditch, whatever the outcome. These were brave words, but there was a note of despair in them.

[Redbeard]

As for Poincare, Joffre or Foch, it's worth remembering that before the Battle of the Marne in 1914 Gallieni was in the process of preparing for a second siege of Paris, with full approval of Joffre and the government.

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Wasn't it Joffre who once said, referring to a rivalry between him and Gallieni: "I don't know who is to honour for winning the battle of the Marne, but I sure know who would have been blamed if we had lost it!" ?

 

Being an admirer of Weygrand myself I still think he and a lot of other French Generals then exagerated the "red" threat. By 1940 the Popular Front was long gone, communists were still very few, and anyway the rearmament had been started by the Popular Front.

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

[LeoTanker]

I don´t know if this is true or not. But the other day when I watched Discovery Channel I heard that by the time of the surrender the Frensh army had actually begun to stabilize the sittuation, the Germans had been stopped at several points, and the Frensh had even launched a few counter attacks to recapture lost territory.

 

But then, as we all know, the politicians decided that they had had enoughth andthrowed in the towel.

 

Annyone knows if this is true? Or, rather, do you think it would have been possible for the French army to keep on fighting in anny effective way (not suicidal insurgent style, but as an ARMY) after the peace deal forced them to lay down arms?

 

I know the Frensh army had suffered tougth losse to the germans, but still the French army was big and had some good equipement. What if they had made a tactical retreat to the south (if necesary leave the capital undefended, as the Russians did against Napoleon), to shorten the front, dig in and make a stand until the possibilities for a major counteroffencive became favourable? All this requires that the RAF helps the French to ceep the skies reasonable clear of Stukas though...

[swerve]

I don´t know if this is true or not. But the other day when I watched Discovery Channel I heard that by the time of the surrender the Frensh army had actually begun to stabilize the sittuation, the Germans had been stopped at several points, and the Frensh had even launched a few counter attacks to recapture lost territory.

 

But then, as we all know, the politicians decided that they had had enoughth andthrowed in the towel.

 

Annyone knows if this is true? Or, rather, do you think it would have been possible for the French army to keep on fighting in anny effective way (not suicidal insurgent style, but as an ARMY) after the peace deal forced them to lay down arms?

 

I know the Frensh army had suffered tougth losse to the germans, but still the French army was big and had some good equipement. What if they had made a tactical retreat to the south (if necesary leave the capital undefended, as the Russians did against Napoleon), to shorten the front, dig in and make a stand until the possibilities for a major counteroffencive became favourable? All this requires that the RAF helps the French to ceep the skies reasonable clear of Stukas though...

 

Any "dig in" order would have bought, at best, a brief pause. After all, that's exactly what they'd done after the May Wehrmacht offensive: shortened the front & dug in. It worked briefly, delaying the next German offensive, but the loss of heavy weapons in the first phase left the new defense line weak, & the German possession of armour when the French had virtually none meant the Germans always had the initiative. Any attempt to hold Bordeaux & Marseille would have faced the same problem, but with a worse ratio of forces. They'd lost the old artillery used in the first "dig in". The only advantage would have been the extended supply lines of the Wehrmacht, & that would have been brief, until the German supply organisation caught up.

 

I doubt very much that the RAF could have kept the skies free of Stukas. In 1940 our fighters didn't have the range to operate from England over southern France, & even if they did they'd have had to fight their way through the Luftwaffe operating from occupied airfields.

 

You speak of a tactical retreat to the south: at the time of the surrender, they were already in the south. The Wehrmacht was approaching Bordeaux, where the French government had retreated to.

[GdG]

GdG,

 

It was sloppy language on my part. I was referring to the post-Dunkirk part of the campaign. At this point, an effective government would have made a decision one way or the other to prepare for continuing the fight from the North Africa.

 

As for Poincare, Joffre or Foch, it's worth remembering that before the Battle of the Marne in 1914 Gallieni was in the process of preparing for a second siege of Paris, with full approval of Joffre and the government. If one had the ability to reincarnate Joffre or Foch and place him in command at the moment Weygand replaced Gamelin, the end result of the campaign would have been the same. Still, even as an admirer of Weygand, I have no doubt that either one would have gripped the reins of power with greater control and forced the government to act more decisively or acted on his own authority.

231286[/snapback]

 

True.

 

A Foch or a Clémenceau in 1940 wouldn't have changed anything. The fate of France was sealed in 1934 when the king of Yugoslavia was assassinated. Not that his death caused the fall of France. But the french foreign minister was sitting right on his side, and was wounded, and later died.

 

This guy (can't recall his name) had a staunch anti-german policy, and from 1933 to 1934, the french foreign policy toward Germany was the one the Allies should have followed (even if it was more of a germanophobic policy, fearing the revival of the IInd Reich), the fascist dimension of Hitler's Germany was not that visible by then.

 

This guy would have pushed the government to act against the occupation of Rhineland. After he died, a new generation of diplomats took control of the foreign affairs, and we know what it gave.

 

Unlike this new generation, this diplomat had (paradoxally) a strong mistrust of Britain (due to the different inter wars conflicts between UK & France, especially about European affairs). In 1936, the foreign affairs and the rest of the government perfectly knew that a purely french (or in coordination with Belgium) action against Germany was perfectly feasible. But they refused to do anything without a support from UK, which never came. This guy would have been able to change the mind of the politicians, thanks to his strong personality.

 

The Entente Cordiale was sure a great thing. But it was the worst thing that tied the french diplomacy during the 30's. France, being a continental power and a direct neighbour realized that there would have a clash sooner or later. Until 1937, it was still possible to stop that race to the war. Then the balance of powers switched in favor of Germany.

 

It's pretty normal that UK, with its insulary mentality wanted to balance the powers in continental Europe. The french government lacked balls to act alone, but the british one remained criminaly weak until late 1938.

 

A Clémenceau (and if you read his books written after the war, he envisaged a revival of the Reich) would have changed everything in 1936. In 1940, it was too late.

 

Chruchill had guts, Reynaud as well. Both had elements in their respective governments in favor of negociations with Germany. But geography made Churchill's government survive long enough to keep his country in the war.

 

WW2, especially in the military, was a question (along the ideological war) of honor and obedience. The RN shelled their former allies at Mers El Kebir, even if they disagreed with it. Most of the french military refused to desert and join Free France because they simply couldn't disobey. Most of the crews at Toulon in Nomverber 1942 would have been glad to escape and join North Africa. But their order was to scuttle their ships and keep the honour safe.

 

This is what always comes back on the table during WW2: the most atrocious acts were done because the men felt obligated to do it. Read the experiments done by the 70's by american ethnologists about obedience. People taken in the street were able to do the worst things on earth (kill somebody) after they were given the order. That's sad, I can't recall the name of the ethnologists.

 

That raises an issue however: if somebody feels disreponsabilized (?) because he applies an order, that means that their leaders are fully responsible.But aren't the men who did such things responsible nonetheless? In democracy, you act according common sense and ethics.

 

Applied to nazi Germany, that means that the 'ideological guys' who were in charge were responsible. That doesn't make the whole german nation guilty, which obeyed. But in Germany, you had a culture & ambiance that made such abberations (war crimes) possible, thanks to the prussian culture. The allies did the good thing by deeply changing Germany after WW2. It's hard to imagin Germany nowadays doing the same thing.

 

Same in France. Even if this country has never been close to the prussian mentality, among the military, you had a similar background, which led admirals and generals to collaborate with the Germans, following the orders of the 'ideological guys' such as Laval.

 

By then, the french military didn't know that disobeying could be a duty. That's what de Gaulle, who is a result of such a disobedience, emphasized after the war. That if an order was in contradiction with the primary values of the Republic, you could disobey. That's why after the war, a paragraph was added in the french constituation to permit the citizens to rebel against the government if it bypasses the fundamental rights (it was not explicit in the 1789 declaration of human rights, which states that a State which doesn't follow the basic democratic values is void).

 

So basically, I don't think that the Free French soldiers were better citizens than the ones who shot at the Allies in NA in November 1942. Both felt that they were fighting for France, not Germany. The Free French were however more wise, because they took the most effective decision to keep France alive. But they were also the most courageous. It took guts to get rid of that fear and lead screed covering France during the occupation.

[Matt L.]

GdG,

 

You comments bring up an interesting idea for an alternative WWII. Louis Barthou avoids getting killed along with the King of Yugoslavia and the course of history is changed. It would be interesting since it could cover a lot of prewar history that many people (like myslef - this thread has been fascinating) don't know about.

 

Matt

[GdG]

GdG,

 

You comments bring up an interesting idea for an alternative WWII. Louis Barthou avoids getting killed along with the King of Yugoslavia and the course of history is changed. It would be interesting since it could cover a lot of prewar history that many people (like myslef - this thread has been fascinating) don't know about.

 

Matt

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Ok, I'm not 100% certain that it is exactly the same book I read few years ago. Duroselle wrote two excellent books covering the french diplomacy before and during the war (I: from 1932 to 1940, II: from 1940 to 1944).

 

In its french edition, the first book was out of print. I bought the second one, which is amazing, and explain a lot of things especially reguarding the franco-american relationships during WW2.

 

The first one was even more interesting, but unfortunately, I could just read bits of it in a library (Sainte Geneviève) which doesn't allow you to bring them back to home. But this book explains a LOT.

 

So here are the references of an english version, but i'm not certain that it is the same book I read in french

 

France and the Nazi Threat 1932-1939: The Collapse of French Diplomacy Jean-Baptiste Duroselle