Vichy France

[BillB]

Jim, that would be while making an armed assault on French ports during wartime.  If the French troops hadn't opened up what would they have been?  Cheese eating surrender monkeys?

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Nice one, Larrikin, beat me to it and in a far better way!

 

BillB

[BillB]

I have never understood why the Japanese forces waited until March 9th 1945 to annex (Vichy) French Indo-China. 

 

The Germans had occupied Metropolitan Vichy with 'Operation Anton' on November 10th 1942, following the 'Torch' landings in North Africa.  Madagascar had fallen to Allied forces in November 1942.

 

By March 1945 Vichy was a "Government in Exile" in Germany.  The allies in the CBI theatre were in no position to invade Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia

 

Does anyone have any reasons for Japan's delay, and final decision to annex?

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Only a guess, but I imagine it would be to avoid having to garrison the Vichy territory themselves after annexing it. As I understand it the Japanese in that neck of the woods were quite strapped for manpower, and they had access to the bits they needed anyway via an agreement with the local Vichy authorities. IIRC the IJN torpedo bomber units that sank the Prince of Wales and Repulse were based in Indo China, near Saigon I think.

 

all the best

 

BillB

[Weeble]

Only a guess, but I imagine it would be to avoid having to garrison the Vichy territory themselves after annexing it. As I understand it the Japanese in that neck of the woods were quite strapped for manpower, and they had access to the bits they needed anyway via an agreement with the local Vichy authorities. IIRC the IJN torpedo bomber units that sank the Prince of Wales and Repulse were based in Indo China, near Saigon I think.

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I agree with your reasoning, the Vichy French already had their hands full with 'local issues' that erupted fully after the Japanese surrender. The Japanese did have military bases where required [ the aircraft that sank Force 'Z' flew from Saigon and Thu Dau Mot ]. When they did finally annex/coup they imprisoned and disarmed all the Vichy forces, thereby increasing their manpower problem. I was just wondering if there was some political initiative behind the timing other than the imminent fall of Germany?

[FirstOfFoot]

I think Bulgaria declared war on the USSR, but refused to send troops to fight it, & when the Red Army reached the border, made a deal (IIRC they'd been engaged in secret negotiations for a while) under which Bulgaria was not occupied. Russia was their traditional ally.

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AIUI (from a couple of years of childhood spent in Bulgaria in the 1970s) the Bulgarians only managed to arrange peace with the Allies in October 1944 after they had declared war on the Axis in September 1944. So, for those few days, they were at war with everyone

 

Another point was the treatment of the SOE / Partisan liaison types parachuted into Bulgaria who were caught and executed (not many - 30ish, from memory of the Allied graveyard in Sofia on Remembrance Sunday). When the war-crimes types went in to Bulgaria to investigate those Germans guilty of same, they didn't find any. The executions had all been done by Bulgarians.

 

Apparently there was a phrase "last-ten-days-Communists", referring unkindly to those who joined the "Resistance" only when it was blatantly obvious which way the war was turning.

 

An interesting note in history is the progress made by Tito and Dimitrov (Bulgarian leader at the time) towards a Balkan Federation

 

http://www.answers.com/main/ntquery?method...viet%20break-up

 

Stalin didn't like the fact that they weren't following his orders particularly closely, and Dimitrov ended up with a bad case of "dead in a Moscow hospital" about this point in history. Tito had more sense than to visit the USSR.....

 

http://www.answers.com/main/ntquery?method...nktext=Bulgaria

[swerve]

AIUI (from a couple of years of childhood spent in Bulgaria in the 1970s) the Bulgarians only managed to arrange peace with the Allies in October 1944 after they had declared war on the Axis in September 1944. So, for those few days, they were at war with everyone

 

Another point was the treatment of the SOE / Partisan liaison types parachuted into Bulgaria who were caught and executed (not many - 30ish, from memory of the Allied graveyard in Sofia on Remembrance Sunday). When the war-crimes types went in to Bulgaria to investigate those Germans guilty of same, they didn't find any. The executions had all been done by Bulgarians.

 

I think they were at war with everyone except the USSR briefly. They went straight from Axis to ally of the USSR in late September, but it took longer to make arrangements with the rest.

 

Did I say anything about how sweet & kind the Bulgarians were? I noted their disregard of the rights of Greek & Yugoslavian Jews - which also applied to other Greeks & Yugoslavs. (there was a grudge there: they were allies in the First Balkan War, & after it the others reneged on the pre-war treaty, grabbing much of the territory allotted to Bulgaria. Hence the Second Balkan War, Bulgaria vs the rest). All I said was that Bulgaria refused to hand over any Bulgarian Jews. That refusal seems to have had support at all levels. Their king died of a mysterious illness when he was summoned to Berlin to discuss it & reiterated the refusal, & there were demonstrations in Sofiya against it, addressed by the Patriarch of the Bulgarian Orthodox church.

 

BTW, why was executing SOE types a war crime? What would we have done to Germans doing the same here? Not in uniform, trying to organise British Nazis to fight against the British government. Hmmm. If they were British, they'd have been guilty of treason, of course.

Edited September 28, 2005 by swerve

[GdG]

Is that why US troops attempting to land in French ports were machine-gunned mercilessly before they could step off their boats?

Well, it depended on the areas where the Allied troops landed. The fighting was harsh in Morrocoo, and on the Algerian coast, the Allies landed without a single shot.

 

In Morocco, the fighting had begun off coast between the USN and the MN (and the airfields were bombed), so it's pretty normal that once the US troops had landed, they took fire.

 

French troops followed their orders. The defense of the Empire against any agressor was an intengible part of Vichy's policy. Because it would have given an pretext to the Germans to occupy the rest of metropolitan France (which they did).

 

Keep in mind that the same troops that fired on GIs in November 1942 fought gladly the Germans in Tunisia few months later or in Italy in 1943.

 

Everybody did his duty (french or US) in November 1942. The resistance depended from the local officers.

 

 

Ok, back to France: When Germany decided to occupy all of France in 1943, did anny Vichy forces try to resist the invation in anny way? Were there anny fights between German and Vichy troops during this operation?

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The Germans occupied southern France on November 11th 1942, three days after the Torch landing (and when Darlan ordered the end of the fighting in Morrocco).

 

The Armistice army was preparing for a resistance against a german intervention (which would have been hopeless due to the armistice restrictions and despite the hidden arms stocks & secret mobilisation plan). But the government ordered them to stay in their barrack. The air force was disarmed.

 

The Navy (based in Toulon) and Army moved to the "Camp Retranché de Toulon" under Laval's orders. Following Laval's idiocy, who believe that the german occupation would be temporary, this Camp Retranché was the frontline which was assigned to the Vichy troops in the case of a hypothetic allied landing in France. So Laval was glad, wheee, we're defending France along the Wehrmacht. The landing never came.

 

On November 27th, Hitler ordered the capture of the fleet (operation Attila?) at night (by the Das Reich Division). The Luftwaffe dropped mines to block the channels, U Boots ambushed the gulf. The Germans were not very professional in this case.

 

The Navy shot at the Luftwaffe (without referring to the government) and prepared a cast off (as you know, it takes hours to heat the engines of a BB). But Laborde (admiral in chief) wanted formal orders to cast off. Which never came.

 

The panzers eventually showed up at the gates of the harbour. Knocked at the doors (!), but the doors remained closed. A few subs managed to escape. Some individuals disobeyed and shot at the Germans. But the harbour was so big that once the panzers had forced the gates, they got lost and lost precious time. Some Pz IV shot at the ships and the ships shot at the panzers with AA guns from time to time.

 

Laborde enventually decided to scuttle the fleet, following Darlan's secret order of 1940. In certain cases, the germans managed to get on the ships before the end of the scuttling, but didn't have a single clue of how to stop the fuses or water. Laval called several times Laborde to order him to stop the scuttling, but Laborde prefered to obey Darlan.

 

The scuttling was success, if you consider that most of the crews were not in the harbour that night, and most of the equipment was destroyed (from the guns tothe instruments). The Germans & Italians managed to re-use few ships, but none bigger than a destroyer.

[Ken Estes]

BTW, why was executing SOE types a war crime? What would we have done to Germans doing the same here? Not in uniform, trying to organise British Nazis to fight against the British government. Hmmm. If they were British, they'd have been guilty of treason, of course.

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Swerve, that has a familiar ring does it not? Weren't the SOE running around after V-E day conducting some unofficial paybacks when such info could be uncovered?

Ken

[Nick Sumner]

GdG wrote

 

-Do nothing. That is to say no military surrender, nor an armistice. Evacuate s many troops as possible and install the government at Algiers. Of course impossible. Skipped pretty quickly.

 

Why was it impossible? Why was it so quickly skipped?

 

I'm not being contentious, I'm interested in your opinion.

[GdG]

GdG wrote

 

-Do nothing. That is to say no military surrender, nor an armistice. Evacuate s many troops as possible and install the government at Algiers. Of course impossible. Skipped pretty quickly.

 

Why was it impossible? Why was it so quickly skipped?

 

I'm not being contentious, I'm interested in your opinion.

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Well, that's pretty simple. It was technically impossible. I quickly made a small map to explain you the military situation by the middle of June.

 

 

In red the main stopping positions covering the retreat of what was left of the army (including several pockets such as the Maginot Line or harbours).

 

After the fall of Dunkirk, the frontline was the Somme and Aisne rivers. Then it became the Seine. Then the Loire River (the relatively flat geograhy of northern France was impossible to defend with so few troops left after the loss of the armies in Belgium, on a 1:3 ratio. And keep in mind that France has a very dense road network). Once the Germans had passed the Loire, there had nothing left to stop them.

 

As you can see, the only thing that could slow down the Germans was the Massif Central (these mountains between the Alps and the Atlantic in the middle of France. On each side of these mountains two valleys.

 

By June 15th you had something 15 (relatively) operationnal divisions left. Not a single armoured or cavalery division able to match the panzer divisions (most DCRs started the campaign with 250 tanks and ended with a dozen left). The rear guards covering them were often melting pots of what the HQ could find, while the bulk of the army, horse drawn and having forced marches was retreating. The motorized units had lost their logistical bases of the North, and were running out of supplies (especially fuel). That was a debacle.

 

Sure, the Germans had an hard time to pursuit the retreating French. Most of their army was lagging behind, horse drawn as well. But the few motorized and armoured divisions were enough to push the french rear guards to the South.

 

To the SE, general Orly did an incredible job by holding 500 000 Italians with 80 000 men taken in depots or harbours. But the problem was that the Germans were coming from behind. They took Lyon, and entered the Rhone valley (between the Massif Central and the Alps). He managed to divert some troops to face them, and halted them for a few days, thanks to his artillery, which had some pretty good results on the panzers rolling in the valley. But it was a matter of days. The Italians were not the problem, the incoming german reinforcements were.

 

To the West, the resistance was impossible. There had not frontline, but stopping points on the major axis' of penetration.

 

The government retreated to Bordeaux, which was about to fall and was subishing german air raids.

 

In such circumtances, it was impossible to organize an evacuation, simply because the troops would have never been able to reach the harbours (and keep in mind that the roads were crowded with refugees). Disengaging troops from the Alps without being overrun by the ennemy was simply impossible, because the army was out of supplies and disorganized.

 

The circumstances were much worse than the already bad ones in which Dynamo occured.

 

Plus, on a naval aspect, it was something completely different from Dynamo. First, you have something like 1200 km between France and North Africa, not 30 km between Dover and Dunkirk. That is to say that it was impossible to mobilize small crafts.

 

The infrastructure lacked as well:: you had two major harbours: Toulon (war fleet) and Marseille (civilian). It's not like the Channel, which was the mos frequented sea lane of the world, with harbours every 30 km on the coast.

 

Shipping was impossible to find in time. Sure, UK and France had large war and civilian fleets. But how do you want to bring enough ships considering the side of the Med?

 

'Fortress Corsica' was not a viable option. Corsica is (and was) a dead weight for France: lacking of infrastructures (especially good harbours), not self sufficient for food. Sure, Corsica was taken back in 1943 relatively easily, but the balance of powers was completely different.

 

An evacuation would have been terribly dangerous as well. The Regia Aeronotica led tons of air raids over Toulon in June 1940. Even if these raids were ineffective, the air power was lacking to counter them. The Armée l'Air was evacuating to NA and left 2 squadrons against the Italians (and the bulk of the Armée l'Air had retreated to Toulouse, in the SW)

 

The Regia Marina was the real threat. Sure, the MN and RN had significant forces in the Med to counter it. And in June 1940, the MN had the initiative in the Med, leading shore bombings of the italian coast in a relative impunity.

 

But keep in mind that In June 1940, Toulon only hosted DDs and Cruisers, nothing bigger. All the battleships were either in the Atlantic, escaping from the Germans, or in North Africa (and all of them of the Dunkerque Class, not Reichelieu). That is to say that if the Regia Marina would have dared a sortie with battleships, nothing would have been there to stop them.

 

And if you add that once in NA, these units would have had no logistical support because there had no industry, you draw the same conclusion as Reynaud. The Armée d'Afrique (that is to say the 600 000 men who were there before May 1940) had supplies for 1.5 months of fighting. So better get rid of the italian presence in Africa quickly.

[swerve]

GdG,

 

it sounds to me as if the only option for continued resistance was to evacuate to North Africa & Britain (whichever was nearest to each port) as much equipment & supplies as possible for the troops already in N. Africa, in whatever shipping could be found, & for the Air Force & Navy to get as much of their own stuff out as could fly or float. Anything that ended up in Britain should be sent to North Africa later, as soon as it could be arranged.

 

I agree, not possible to get many troops out. Maybe if large numbers walked into Spain the Spaniards would allow them to leave for another neutral country (i.e. Portugal, from where they could then rejoin the army) rather than have to feed them. But even so, only a small proportion could escape.

 

However, 600 000 trained men, if we could get fuel to them, & either buy ammo (if it could be made fast enough) to fit their weapons or start re-equipping units ASAP, would be a major addition to the anti-Axis forces at the time.

[GdG]

GdG,

 

it sounds to me as if the only option for continued resistance was to evacuate to North Africa & Britain (whichever was nearest to each port) as much equipment & supplies as possible for the troops already in N. Africa, in whatever shipping could be found, & for the Air Force & Navy to get as much of their own stuff out as  could fly or float. Anything that ended up in Britain should be sent to North Africa later, as soon as it could be arranged.

 

I agree, not possible to get many troops out. Maybe if large numbers walked into Spain the Spaniards would allow them to leave for another neutral country (i.e. Portugal, from where they could then rejoin the army) rather than have to feed them. But even so, only a small proportion could escape.

 

However, 600 000 trained men, if we could get fuel to them, & either buy ammo (if it could be made fast enough) to fit their weapons or start re-equipping units ASAP, would be a major addition to the anti-Axis forces at the time.

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Well, keep in mind that it would have taken several months (in good conditions) to ship the basic infrastructures to NA or even UK. You need heavy and fixed equipment to maintain a fleet.

 

As for the air force, you know that it's the branch of the army that requires the most spare parts, simply for the safety of the crews. Engines have to be changed pretty often. That requires a huge & complex network of contractors, and a Dewoitine fighter is not just my by Dewoitine, but 200 or 300 subcontractors. That's the nature of capitalism. I doubt that the West would have ever been able to achieve the same success as the soviets in relocalizing their industry in the Ural. Because the State could deal with the industry on a centralized manner.

 

OK, the goal here is not to evacuate the whole production plants, but how do you want to maintain an operational air force without a source for spare parts (there's canibalizing, right, but...)?

 

Many modern aircrafts were evacuated to NA. Right. But once in North Africa, they had nothing to hold for more than a single week of air battle (if not worse. Some DB7 which were evacuated to Tunisia had to bomb Sicily with WW1 air bombs! de Bange shells of the 1880's which didn't fit in the bomb racks!).

 

The Armée de l'Air survived in North Afric between 1940 and 1942 ONLY because after Mers El Kébir, the Germans allowed Vichy to keep an air force, and resume the production of spare parts.

 

There is no way, before the NATO standardization, that the NA french troops would have been able to fight with their weapons and supplied by UK or the US. UK did produce 8 mm and 75 mm ammunitions during WW1 but stopped its production. The US still produced 75 mm shells, and produced during the phoney war 20 and 25 mm shells for France. But that's all.

 

As for evacuating for UK? How? The Germans controlled Britanny, were able to operate over the Gulf of Gascogne, and all the major harbours (Brest, Nantes, Le Havre, Cherbourg were in their hands.

 

OK, say that many troops has seeked refuge in Spain. Why in the hell would they have released to Portugal when they had the Germans at their gates? I doubt that Germany would have appreciated the release of manpower in favor of the Allies. Romania did help the Poles because by 1939, they still followed the Petite Entente. Spain didn't really have the best relations with France due to the republican refugies in France and was lurking on Morrocco.

 

If you know in which conditions the decisions of the Allies were taken between may 10th and June 24th, you know that such a thing was impossible. Everything was happening quick, very quick. Read the various books (even if they are not objective) written by the different protagonists. You feel oppressed by the constant tension in which the discussion did evoluate.

[Guest phil gollin]

There are a couple of points in recent replies :

 

There was supposedly difficulty in evacuating ships and men from the south because of Italian air raids, but the aircraft which could have defended had been evacuated.

 

Also, you talk of the difficulties of re-equipping and maintaing men and material in North Africa, but not of them going to the UK.

 

But those are details (sort of) that were lost in the fog of German advances, what was the reason the Fench government stayed ?

[KingSargent]

There are a couple of points in recent replies :

 

There was supposedly difficulty in evacuating ships and men from the south because of Italian air raids, but the aircraft which could have defended had been evacuated.

Most of the modern a/c that were evacuated were not even assigned to squadrons. They could fly (some waiting on components), but were not operational in the military sense. Even in those evacuated by squadrons, the squadrons had been caught changing over to new types in May 1940, and were not trained and experienced on the newer a/c (and the old ones were death traps). There was no maintenance organization, no stocks of spares, and not much fuel. The French managed to evacuate airplanes, not an air force.

 

Also, you talk of the difficulties of re-equipping and maintaing men and material in North Africa, but not of them going to the UK.

The UK had enough problems trying to re-equip its own army after Dunkirk. It could never have absorbed 600,000 French soldiers and made a viable fighting force of them. French units fought in Tunisia in 1942-3, but they were woefully equipped, especially with AT stuff. After Tunisia, the whole force had to be re-equipped by the US. That re-equipping could not have been done by the US in 1940, and we weren't in the war anyway.

But those are details (sort of) that were lost in the fog of German advances, what was the reason the Fench government stayed ?

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What remained of the French government was totally dysfunctional. The only way they could see to salvage the French nation was surrender. When they surrendered, the military did as well. Those few who sided with Colonel DeGaulle (his self-promotion to General was not confirmed by the French Army or government) were regarded as traitors - they were essentially deserting the French colors to fight under a foreign government.

[Ken Estes]

tsk! Armistice, King; a surrender would have left France Overseas free to continue the fight.

[KingSargent]

tsk! Armistice, King; a surrender would have left France Overseas free to continue the fight.

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My bad....

 

Consider my wrist slapped.

[Ken Estes]

We are also forgetting what the world looked like at the end of June, 1940. Nobody expected the war to continue very long, and the Germans by most accounts had accomplished a repeat of 1870. Thus, France's govt saw a duty to keep itself and the nation intact for whatever the New Order was going to be in Europe. Depending on how long the Brits resisted, an eventual peace settlement would have left France reduced in territory in the north, obliged to ally itself economically and diplomatically with Germany and to return the former German colonies she held. But then life would go on, France would remain intact and an occupation by the Germans would have not extended beyond the war and perhaps payment of reparations. Had Germany later turned to the east [and futuristically, against America], as seemed inevitable in Hitler's mind, French industry and labor would have played a key role in furthering German ambitions, thus remaining an essential, perhaps the most essential, of the second rank nations of New Order Europe [the first rank being the nordic neighbors of the III Reich].

 

Only the first part of the above played in the minds of French leaders, the rest is drawn from Norman Rich, Hitler's New Order, a 2 vol. seminal study of German war aims and how they likely would have played out.

[GdG]

de Gaulle didn't self promote general. He got this rank thanks to Reynaud who let them in the government in May 1940. It was the rank of brigade general. And it was a temporary promotion.

[Geoff Winnington-Ball]

Forgive me if this has already been mentioned, but why did what was left of the French Navy not simply load up with surviving troops and set sail for the U.S. or U.K.? This would have obviated the British compulsion to destroy it in place to prevent its use by the Germans.

[Redbeard]

We are also forgetting what the world looked like at the end of June, 1940. Nobody expected the war to continue very long, and the Germans by most accounts had accomplished a repeat of 1870. Thus, France's govt saw a duty to keep itself and the nation intact for whatever the New Order was going to be in Europe. Depending on how long the Brits resisted, an eventual peace settlement would have left France reduced in territory in the north, obliged to ally itself economically and diplomatically with Germany and to return the former German colonies she held. But then life would go on, France would remain intact and an occupation by the Germans would have not extended beyond the war and perhaps payment of reparations. Had Germany later turned to the east [and futuristically, against America], as seemed inevitable in Hitler's mind, French industry and labor would have played a key role in furthering German ambitions, thus remaining an essential, perhaps the most essential, of the second rank nations of New Order Europe [the first rank being the nordic neighbors of the III Reich].

 

Only the first part of the above played in the minds of French leaders, the rest is drawn from Norman Rich, Hitler's New Order, a 2 vol. seminal study of German war aims and how they likely would have played out.

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I also believe the French leadership, not at least Weygrand, feared communist uprisings, and so wanted the army to remain as intact as possible for the "counter-revolution". This was seen as much more important than risking what was left by contiuing the fight against the Germans.

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

[KingSargent]

Forgive me if this has already been mentioned, but why did what was left of the French Navy not simply load up with surviving troops and set sail for the U.S. or U.K.? This would have obviated the British compulsion to destroy it in place to prevent its use by the Germans.

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Why go to the US? We weren't in the war, they could rot on Ellis Island for years.

 

As for the UK, I answered above, what would they do with them? The UK was desperate to rearm its own Dunkirk survivors, they had nothing to spare for "wogs." ("Wogs begin at Calais," y'know... )

 

France had gotten an Armistice. To sail for the US or UK was desertion. If the French Army and Navy had scarpered off to continue a war already lost (virtually nobody was betting the UK would survive in Summer 1940), what do you think the Germans would have done to France for violating Armistice conditions?

 

If the UK had fallen, do you think the whole British Army would get on the whole Royal Navy and sail to Canada?

 

Which brings up another point: the French Navy was not sitting handily in ports, and the French Army was not in those ports. They would have to abandon the positions they held, poor though they may have been, and walk a good distance with no support services to get to a port and hope to find a ship there.

 

So the French Army boarding the French Navy and sailing off to continue a lost war was neither legal nor practical.

[GdG]

Forgive me if this has already been mentioned, but why did what was left of the French Navy not simply load up with surviving troops and set sail for the U.S. or U.K.? This would have obviated the British compulsion to destroy it in place to prevent its use by the Germans.

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This has been longly discussed in the Mers El Kebir topic.

[Pachy]

"One thing I don´t get though, why didn´t the Germans try to cappture (and use) the large and well equipped frensh navy?"

In 1940, the Germans did not have enough trained seaman for their own surface fleet; they'd already lost two cruisers to poor crew performance. Along with the complications associated with assimilating non-standard equipment, this would have made the French ships virtually worthless to Germany for quite some time.

But more importantly, how were the Germans going to get the French ships? The French successfully withdrew most of their major units from the occupied zone--the journey of Jean Bart represents one of the great sailing feats of the war--so the only other option was to try to secure some ships as negotiated booty. Insofar as the fleet was a primary French bargaining chip, there was no way that was going to happen.

This was all before Catapult, which did nothing to keep French ships from German grasp--rather, it eventually caused more French ships to come within German grasp. There was no one happier about Catapult than Hitler, as it assured him the French fleet would not rejoin the fight.

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Many good points here. A few comments:

 

Hitler played very smart regarding the French fleet. By not demanding the only thing that could effectively be refused to him, he ensured that the fleet would become Vichy's most precious asset, and therefore a symbol of French independance and neutrality - or the illusion thereof. He created goodwill towards Germany, the "reasonable victor".

 

The British, of course, had legitimate reasons to be worried. It must be pointed out that French ships in Dakar, Mers el-Kebir or Alexandria were not in compliance with Armistice terms as they were supposed to be stationed at their peacetime harbours... which were nearly all located in the occupied part of France. Hence, the Germans could have asked Darlan to bring the ships back. Of course, they had sworn they would no use them - but at the same time required that it would be possible for them to do so! By early July 1940, Vichy was trying to negotiate and keep the ships in Africa...

 

Another legitimate point of concern is that, as the war went on, the Germans could have tried to get the fleet by blackmailing ("give us the Richelieu or we burn Paris") or bribing ("you can have Alsace back/500,000 POWs freed if you give us the Dunkerque and Strasbourg").

 

Nevertheless I think Churchill took the wrong bet. An error which directly or indirectly caused a lot of French, British and American deaths.

[BillB]

("Wogs begin at Calais," y'know... )

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And Rekyavik if one is travelling West rather than south, too....

 

BillB

[KingSargent]

And Rekyavik if one is travelling West rather than south, too....    

 

BillB

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I thought it was Bristol??!!

[BillB]

I thought it was Bristol??!!    

230450[/snapback]

It will be once His Toniness formally hands Ulster over to PIRA/SinnFein and we detach Taffland from the mainland and float it out into the Irish Sea...

 

all the best

 

BillB