Vichy France

[Matt L.]

Something I've always wondered about was why the Nazis formed Vichy France after their victory. It seems to me they could have easily taken over the entire country. Why not directly control it all?

 

Thanks,

 

Matt

[Tiornu]

A negotiated surrender by France effectively eliminated all French forces around the world. Had the Germans continued to conquer all of Metropolitan France, French naval forces and all units in North Africa etc would have continued as combatants.

[larrikin]

A negotiated surrender by France effectively eliminated all French forces around the world. Had the Germans continued to conquer all of Metropolitan France, French naval forces and all units in North Africa etc would have continued as combatants.

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And a large chunk of the Army in France would have been lifted to NA, which the Germans/Italians really couldn't touch. Plus you would have had a steady trickle of French sneaking across the Channel, through Spain etc, to join up, and a much more enthusiastic resistance movement.

[LeoTanker]

Something I've always wondered about was why the Nazis formed Vichy France after their victory. It seems to me they could have easily taken over the entire country. Why not directly control it all?

 

Thanks,

 

Matt

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Im sure the Germans hoped that a "independent" Vichy France could become a strong allie. If they simpely occupied the whole country they would most likely spoil that chanse.

 

One thing I don´t get though, why didn´t the Germans try to cappture (and use) the large and well equipped frensh navy? If there was one thing the Germany missed, it was a good surface fleet! Anny idéas?

[Scott Cunningham]

One thing I don´t get though, why didn´t the Germans try to capture (and use) the large and well equipped frensh navy? If there was one thing the Germany missed, it was a good surface fleet! Anny idéas?

 

Because at Mers el Kebir Winston Churchill made sure the French Fleet would not have the same chance to surrender/collaborate as the rest of France did.

[Guest phil gollin]

All of which raises the point of what did the French think they would get out of it (and NO, this isn't a French bashing troll).

 

The French, presumably, wanted the semi-independent (?) Vichy state for practical reasons (i.e. at least a proportion of their population under a less exacting occupation), but what did they expect in the long-run.

 

If the Germans won the war, did they expect Vichy to expand to rule all of France (except maybe the border region with Germany ?

 

If Germany lost, did they think the Vichy authorities would be forgiven ?

 

And if a stalemate ensued, was Vichy a potential bargaining tool ?

 

I could understand a whole-hearted pro-Germany or pro-Britain stance, but the Vichy settlement seems odd.

 

I never have understood the reasoning, any sensible info would be appreciated.

[GdG]

The Germans didn't create the Vichy regime. It's because Reynaud, the PM, left voluntarily the government, leaving Pétain as the only 'realistic' PM. It was still the IIIrd Republic.

 

By the beginning of July, once the armistice had been signed, Petain passed a law in the parliament to create the Etat Français. Which was overwhelmingly accepted by the deputies (who didn't think that it would evoluate like it actually did. I can't imagin a parliament dissoluting itself). Pétain was seen as a good choice to be in charge of the country in the conditions of the time, due to his federative role of winner of Verdun.

 

The Germans didn't have anything to do with the creation of the Vichy regime. They however later pressured Petain to get back his PM Laval (who was pro-german) back in power, after he had fired him.

 

The splitting of France in two parts (fully occupied by the Germans and ruled by Vichy) was seen as a good by both parties:

 

-Vichy France kept its independance on southern France and the Empire. It kept its fleet. Considering what happened to the other countries conquered by Germany, it was seen as better than nothing. This relative independance was seen as a good thing once the peace will be signed. France (even in a bad position) will be able to negociate, not to be given back its independance by Germany.

 

Plus, the collaborationist minority wanted to remodel France on the fascist model. Something that would have been impossible if done by the Germans themselves: the french population wasn't keen on getting rid of democracy and to accept the german style system. Especially when you know that germanophobia was rather strong among the population.

 

The army saw itself as the Reichwehr of the 1920's. What they had to do was to work secretly on a revenge. The neverending war between France and Germany thingy.

 

-Occupying whole France would have drained huge ressources out of Germany. For the administration, but as well as for the military occupation. See how many troops were required to occupy France during the war. That was manpower which was not available for Russia.

 

They thought they'd get more by negociating with somebody in front of them than doing everything by themselves. The Germans still could retaliate on the northern populations if Vichy refused them something.

 

Plus, as stated above, they could indirectly interfer with the french empire: by asking U Boot bases in Africa for example (which Vichy always refused)., sending spies in North Africa, etc... Had metropolitan France been occupied and the empire kept fighting, it would have been impossible.

 

And eventually, neutralizing (primary smeaning) the french fleet and empire kept them a margin of freedom in the mediterranean. Sizing both was way too risky. The fleet could escape, and attacking the empire would have caused the resuming of the war. In the end, Germany lost the fleet which was scuttled rather than being captured (and this secret order existed since June 1940 and was approved by the whole navy and government).

 

 

In the end, it is extremly difficult to decifer the Vichy regime and its relationship with Germany. Some will say that it was a puppet of the German, by passing antisemitic laws and fighting the Brits in Syria. Others say that it tried to prepare secretly a revenge by negociating secretly with UK (even after Mers El Kebir) and keeping excellent relations with the US.

 

IMHO, the incoherence of the policy of Vichy has been caused by the fact that it was a shaky regime. It was not a fully fascist State nor a seccessor of the IIIrd Republic. Something halfway between an authoritarian IIIrd Republic and italian fascism.

 

Pétain was the only reason of the existence of Vichy. As he was a weak elder, all the streams in the Vichy government managed successively to convince him to follow him.

 

You have so many streams, that it's an historiographic nightmare. Fascists à la française, blind colloborationists, anti-communists, others who wanted to keep the low profile, other who wanted to resume the fight but only along the US but not UK, etc...

[Ken Estes]

In brief, it is late June 1940, Italy has entered the war, although stopped cold on the Alpine and Riviera fronts. The German army has broken through, enveloped the Maginot Line from the rear and leading tank columns are approaching Bordeaux, where the government has withdrawn. The British army has left the continent, except for the Highlander Div plus other units, which will share the fate of the French army.

 

France can continue fighting. withdrawing to No Africa, but the entire population and property of Metropolitan France [exc. Algeria] will be at the mercy of the occupier until the end of the war.

 

France can seek armistice terms, preserving as much of its territory as possible, pending the outcome of the war's end, which seems very soon to come. There is no sign of intervention by the USA or USSR, the CW remains alone, but unable to change the outcome. Using the example of 1870 [or reverse 1918], France can expect to lose Alsace-Lorraine again, perhaps return former German colonies it holds, plus reparations, etc.

 

In addition, a quick armistice will minimize Italian claims in the peace treaty. This is not a collaborationist government [yet], but one seeking to preserve as much sovereignty and population as possible [two obvious functions of govt], while recognizing that the Germans have effectively won the immediate outcome. Poland, the causus beli, is not to be saved and the German New Order is thus recognized, in which France will have to fit in as a reduced continental power.

 

The Petain govt is determined, within its sphere of control, to reform France and erradicate the sources of weakness that contributed to the debacle. Therefore, a series of laws and decrees toughen French policy toward labor, leftist parties, education, family values, etc. The remaining territory and the colonies will be defended by the reduced armistice army and some portion of the navy still active, the latter to be negotiated as part of the armistice accords. Mers-el-Kebir, Dakar and other actions under the Brit Op Matador [edit: I was thinking of Menace but that was Dakar only; Tiornu has the overall op right, Catapult. Matador was a Malaya option, 1918-41] will alter the scheme somewhat.

 

The Vichy govt of course operates from a weak position, not the least because of 1.5M+ French POWs remaining in German hands. The situation becomes more difficult as the war continues, rather than coming to an early peace, a key premise of the Vichy strategy. The Germans exploit the French economy and recruit labor for German factories, and Vichy negotiates an exchange of workers for return of POWs. Philippe Burrin credits the Vichy regime with facilitating the release of 220,000 of the 600,000 French prisoners thus returned from the German camps, 90,000 specifically released under the labor relève, which involved sending three times the amount of laborers.

 

The Russo-German War surprised the French public in the summer of 1941. For varied reasons, many Frenchmen welcomed it for it brought the prospect of the destruction of Communism, reduced pressure upon France, and later, introduced the first realistic hopes that Germany might be defeated. It strengthened the positions of the collaborationist parties, especially amid the depression, cynicism, and pessimism that the Armistice had increased in French life. For some of those Frenchmen not interested in friendship with Germans, it posed the notion that a German victory remained the sole alternative to the Bolshevisation of Europe, including France. For these observers, such a fate loomed worse than German domination of France. However, the Hitler regime took little note of this phenomenon and would not share the war against Russia with Vichy France as it would with Finnish allies and Italian, Romanian, Bulgarian, Slovakian, and Hungarian satellites.

 

The idea for a French legion (LVF) to fight at the side of the Germans came neither from Vichy nor the Germans. Rather, it became the creation of the Paris collaborationist parties [the “Paris Fronde”] in association with the German ambassador in Paris [not Vichy], Otto Abetz.

 

The deteriorating military situation of the Germans placed even more pressures on Vichy, for more laborers, for participation in the transport of Jews to the east, for crackdowns against the French resistance, only building after the Russo-German war began, and the tilt toward collaboration can be seen in 1942, especially after the completion of the German occupation and the loss of sovereignty in former Vichy. By then, the game had changed, but there was always a grey line between resistance and collaboration. If you were a civil servant, did you remain at your post, hoping that you could take actions to delay transports or other German actions, even if the bulk of your actions supported the German war effort?¿ The judgements were harsh in 1944-46, and wounds remain to this day, as evidenced in the documentaries of Marcel Ophuls, for instance.

Edited September 24, 2005 by Ken Estes

[Ken Estes]

GdG had several good points and it ought to be reinterated that France continuing the war from overseas poses much more of a problem for the Germans than the cases of other exile govt/forces such as Norway, Holland. The Army of Africa, it seems to me, makes the Italian, later Italo-German, situation in North Africa almost certainly a loss. The French fleet and merchant marine, which also largely escaped, swells the allies at sea. The result could only be an emboldened CW continuing the war for years, akin to the coalitions against Napoleon, but with no peace of Amiens needed. It also makes the Japanese situation in 1941 less advantagous.

 

The French 3rd Republic is in reality voted out of existence by the Vichy parliament. A new set of laws replaces it.

 

The Paris collaborationist parties have little real effect on Vichy politics, and the Germans generally ignore them, except in the recruitment of volunteers for the German forces and in the creation of the Milice with their commander the mercenary Joseph Darnaud.

Edited September 23, 2005 by Ken Estes

[Guest phil gollin]

Is it too simplistic to say that the general expectation was a German victory with Vichy a way of reaching a better (if not particularly good) settlement when the war ended or peteered out ?

[Yama]

One thing I don´t get though, why didn´t the Germans try to cappture (and use) the large and well equipped frensh navy? If there was one thing the Germany missed, it was a good surface fleet! Anny idéas?

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It was against the Armistice terms, and had the Germans broke them and made an attempt to capture the fleet, French would have scuttled it immediately. In fact, this is exactly what happened when Germans finished off Vichy.

[Tiornu]

"One thing I don´t get though, why didn´t the Germans try to cappture (and use) the large and well equipped frensh navy?"

In 1940, the Germans did not have enough trained seaman for their own surface fleet; they'd already lost two cruisers to poor crew performance. Along with the complications associated with assimilating non-standard equipment, this would have made the French ships virtually worthless to Germany for quite some time.

But more importantly, how were the Germans going to get the French ships? The French successfully withdrew most of their major units from the occupied zone--the journey of Jean Bart represents one of the great sailing feats of the war--so the only other option was to try to secure some ships as negotiated booty. Insofar as the fleet was a primary French bargaining chip, there was no way that was going to happen.

This was all before Catapult, which did nothing to keep French ships from German grasp--rather, it eventually caused more French ships to come within German grasp. There was no one happier about Catapult than Hitler, as it assured him the French fleet would not rejoin the fight.

[Ken Estes]

Is it too simplistic to say that the general expectation was a German victory with Vichy a way of reaching  a better (if not particularly good) settlement when the war ended or peteered out ?

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If you are looking for a one-liner, and they certainly have merits, that would work.

[Ken Estes]

[Duplicate, hit wrong switch]

Edited September 24, 2005 by Ken Estes

[GdG]

Excellent post Ken!

 

One more thing about the different options envisaged by the french government before the signature of the armistice:

 

Reynaud wanted to keep fighting, but there had some reticences among his cabinet (it's almost the same situation that Churchill faced, but with another conclusion). It was clear that evacuating meaningful forces to North Africa was technically impossible, unlike what happened at Dunkirk.

 

You had several alternatives:

 

-a military surrender: that is to say that the Army had to surrender on the battlefield, like what happened to Belgium: the government was not engaged by this surrender, and could flee to North Africa. Thatt's again what happened to Belgium. The army surrendered on the field, the king stayed in Belgium, but the government was evacuated to UK.

 

Weygand didn't want to take responsability for the surrender. He considered that the defeat was caused by the politicians, not the army. Technically, the army was not beaten, you had something like 3 million men left, but unable to fight effectively anymore.

 

It was more of a 'cast spirit' from Weygand. He considered that the politicians didn't engage France into this conflict in the best conditions. And he hid behind a law, which bans military surrender. Any general surrendering on the battlefield could be sentenced to death.

 

Plus, the Germans would have been able to do whatever they wanted on the french territory. Basically, that meant that the Germans owned the territory they had conquered.

 

-Do nothing. That is to say no military surrender, nor an armistice. Evacuate s many troops as possible and install the government at Algiers. Of course impossible. Skipped pretty quickly.

 

-an armistice. It was the best solution, and Churchill agreed with it in the end. It kept the government and the army free. And it didn't mean peace on the paper. It was the only occasion to play the empire and fleet cards for France.

 

These two points were the only two things that could keep France afloat. That's whyVichy was infuriated by the british agressions over the fleet and Syria & Dakar. It was largely seen in France as giving indirectly France to the Germans. The Vichy resistance against these operations were not a fight along the Germans, but just to preserve the french interests against the Germans. That's why it was seen as a huge betrayal: the former allies were pushing France in even deeper sh*t than it already was.

 

In this case it was a free for all game. Until 1943, there had no realistic hope for a liberation of France. UK was seen as a dwarf in comparison to the Reich. The only hope was the US. That's why Vichy kept excellent relations with Washington DC. USSR was out of question, as it was communist.

 

You see this feeling among the military in North Africa. Which was enthusiastic to fight along the US, but not UK. After all, Commonwealth troops which landed during operation Torch had to land under Stars and Stripes, not Union Jacks, to avoind being fired at.

 

Keep in mind that the fear of retaliations was an obsession for Vichy. Especially when you know that the opinion was shocked by the reports of the german atrocities in Poland during the Phoney War (and the german war crimes in occupied France during WW1. See their retreat when they applied the burned land policy).

[UN-Interested Observer]

"All of which raises the point of what did the French think they would get out of it (and NO, this isn't a French bashing troll)."

 

Why, they could murder Jews at their own rate, while not bothering with the Gypsies. They certainly won't be let off the hook for that, now or ever, imo. If it's bashing, then so be it.

[Ken Estes]

"All of which raises the point of what did the French think they would get out of it (and NO, this isn't a French bashing troll)."

 

Why, they could murder Jews at their own rate, while not bothering with the Gypsies. They certainly won't be let off the hook for that, now or ever, imo. If it's bashing, then so be it.

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Well, if you are not simply bashing, you are simply demonstrating ignorance. All European countries on the continent share responsibility for contributions to the Holocaust, on a varying scale. The Dutch, for instance, saw about 95% of their Jews off to the camps, including Ann Frank, and at the other end of the scale are the Danes, who saved 98% of them...admittedly a case of a less harsh occupation and fewer numbers & convenient Swedish territory though. The French fall in the middle and it is clear they transported foreign Jews purpously before having to round up their own, and numerous acts of courage are recorded in terms of people hiding them, officials sabotaging transports, etc. Of the neutrals, the Swedes and Spanish come off OK, and the Swiss....¿

[larrikin]

And the Italians. Whatever else can be said about Il Duce and his regime, they didn't let the Nazis have their Jews, and protected those in Greece while being occupiers there. Even after the Italian surrender many Italian Fascist officials worked hard to hide and protect the Jews. A pity the hard work was undone for much of the time by Pope Pius.

[swerve]

And the Italians.  Whatever else can be said about Il Duce and his regime, they didn't let the Nazis have their Jews, and protected those in Greece while being occupiers there.  Even after the Italian surrender many Italian Fascist officials worked hard to hide and protect the Jews.  A pity the hard work was undone for much of the time by Pope Pius.

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Bulgaria. Flatly refused to hand over any Bulgarian citizens, regardless of religion.

 

They did let the Germans deport Greek & Yugoslavian Jews from Bulgarian-occupied territory, but I think that counts as anti-Greekism & anti-Yugoslavianism (part of their revenge for the Second Balkan War?), not anti-Semitism.

[LeoTanker]

Yes, the Bulgarians were brave in this respect. Especially the Bulgarian king did a lot for the protecton of the jews. But on the other hand, Bulgaria wasn´t occupied by the nazis, right? This fact should make it easier for Bulgaria to protect the jews than countries like France or Holland. Did Bulgaria even declare war on the USSR after Barbarossa, by the way?

 

Ok, back to France: When Germany decided to occupy all of France in 1943, did anny Vichy forces try to resist the invation in anny way? Were there anny fights between German and Vichy troops during this operation?

[swerve]

Yes, the Bulgarians were brave in this respect. Especially the Bulgarian king did a lot for the protecton of the jews. But on the other hand, Bulgaria wasn´t occupied by the nazis, right? This fact should make it easier for Bulgaria to protect the jews than countries like France or Holland. Did Bulgaria even declare war on the USSR after Barbarossa, by the way?

 

Right about the occupation. It was much easier to resist German pressure without German troops in your country. Same in Denmark until 1943 - local government, with the Germans only occupying strategic points. And when the Germans took over administration, the occupation troops had got used to the relatively easy & safe life there, & were perhaps less enthusiastic about rounding up Danes, whether or not Jewish, than Germans in Poland or Ukraine.

 

Still, there are differences. Bulgaria has a better record than Hungary or Romania in similar circumstances, & Denmark better than Norway. Norwegian police assisted in German round-ups of Jews. Danish police helped Jews flee, giving the Resistance both warning of the imminent roundup (courtesy of a German officer who risked his life to pass it on), & lists of names & addresses of Jews so the Resistance knew who to spirit away.

 

I think Bulgaria declared war on the USSR, but refused to send troops to fight it, & when the Red Army reached the border, made a deal (IIRC they'd been engaged in secret negotiations for a while) under which Bulgaria was not occupied. Russia was their traditional ally.

[Jim Martin]

Is that why US troops attempting to land in French ports were machine-gunned mercilessly before they could step off their boats?

 

If that's enthusiastic alliance, we don't need enemies.

 

You see this feeling among the military in North Africa. Which was enthusiastic to fight along the US, but not UK. After all, Commonwealth troops which landed during operation Torch had to land under Stars and Stripes, not Union Jacks, to avoind being fired at.

 

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[KingSargent]

Is that why US troops attempting to land in French ports were machine-gunned mercilessly before they could step off their boats?

 

If that's enthusiastic alliance, we don't need enemies.

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Be fair, Jim. They were on British boats (ex-USCG cutters, but still in the RN).

 

Also the troops defending the harbor only knew that somebody was attacking them. They followed their orders and defended the harbor.

[larrikin]

Is that why US troops attempting to land in French ports were machine-gunned mercilessly before they could step off their boats?

 

If that's enthusiastic alliance, we don't need enemies.

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Jim, that would be while making an armed assault on French ports during wartime. If the French troops hadn't opened up what would they have been? Cheese eating surrender monkeys?

[Weeble]

I have never understood why the Japanese forces waited until March 9th 1945 to annex (Vichy) French Indo-China.

 

The Germans had occupied Metropolitan Vichy with 'Operation Anton' on November 10th 1942, following the 'Torch' landings in North Africa. Madagascar had fallen to Allied forces in November 1942.

 

By March 1945 Vichy was a "Government in Exile" in Germany. The allies in the CBI theatre were in no position to invade Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia

 

Does anyone have any reasons for Japan's delay, and final decision to annex?