Vietnam War what if?

[Ol Paint]

To echo what's been said before, we missed an opportunity to avert this disaster as far back as the Eisenhower and Truman administrations. 

 

  I don't believe that it was possible to "win" the Vietnam War once we decided that our objectives were to maintain the UN partition of the country into a North and South, rather than to unite the country under a single democratic government. 

 

  On the subject of the air war, earlier ACM training would've done less than a set of sensible rules of engagement to protect our aircrews.  The internal gun may not have been obsolete by the late '60s, but it should have been. 

 

  By the way, anyone have a good link that documents actual cases of gun kills in air combat from the '60s to present day?  Can't imagine there's very many.

225566[/snapback]

F-105s are credited with 27.5 kills in Vietnam, of which 24.5 were achieved with the cannon, alone. The others were Sidewinders.

 

Under the restriction of changing tactics/strategy of the war, but not the US involvement, I'd suggest making more utilization of BB and CA gunfire in North Vietnam (in conjunction with the historical air strikes), easing the ROE, eliminating the restrictions on bombing SAM sites under construction, airfields, ships in harbor, etc., and increased use of armor.

 

Douglas

 

[Edited for clarity.]

 

[2nd Edit: I count 15 cannon kills by A-1, F-4C/D, F-8, and F-100 on this list: http://www.csd.uwo.ca/~pettypi/elevon/gust...y/usvictor.html Some kills are unattributed.]

Edited September 22, 2005 by Ol Paint

[swerve]

F-105s are credited with 27.5 kills in Vietnam, of which 24.5 were achieved with the cannon, alone.  The others were Sidewinders.

<snip>

 

[2nd Edit:  I count 15 cannon kills by A-1, F-4C/D, F-8, and F-100 on this list:  http://www.csd.uwo.ca/~pettypi/elevon/gust...y/usvictor.html  Some kills are unattributed.]

 

I found a more recent version (dated 2002) somewhere, but I've lost the link. However, I saved it to a Word document. Quick skim gives 32 F-105 kills, all MiG-17, all but 3 cannon, from Apr 65 to Dec 67. Only 1 unattributed.

[Old Tanker]

Question ?

 

If we had stuck to the plan of ground troop removal leaving advisors and some air assets backed by financial aid how would that have played out ?

 

Remember the U.S. congress cut all aid to R.V.N. under Ford. Korea was just as f*'d up as RVN but over the years became a viable country.

Rhee(ROK pres.) was a dictator by any measurement. He was also againist any cease-fire as he wanted to rule the entire peninsula.

[baboon6]

How would you reconcile the performance of the North Vietnamese soldier?  Same parents, same society, same people, same values.  Yet North Vietnam was able to organize successfully... with minimal foreign advisors.

 

And according to Benard Fall's Hell in a Very Small Place depicting the battle of Bien Bien Phu, the best performing formations were mixed French-Vietnamese paratroopers who continued to volunteer jump into the Valley even after they knew the battle was lost.

 

The Vietnamese is a warlike culture. There've been plenty of practice with the Chinese for about 10,000 years. 

 

The US should have never committed troops to Vietnam. Should have stuck with the Strategic Hamlet program. Should have only provided military equipment assistance.

225641[/snapback]

 

I don't know how to reconcile the differences. Maybe because the Viet Minh/NVA were a genuine revolutionary movement- its soldiers (many of whom were conscripted) were not even paid until 1958! Discipline was tough, life was harsh, noone was in it for their own gain. Yes they were often brutal and I don't agree with their aims but they (at least the officers and commissars) really believed in what they were doing. Maybe because the ANV/ARVN officers were mainly recruited from a privileged Catholic minority who often despised their Buddhist peasant troops and would always be associated with the colonialists.

 

As regards the mixed French-Vietnamese units- all units of the Expeditionary Corps (except North and West African but including Foreign Legion) had significant amounts of Vietnamese troops by the early 1950s. This was both to make up the numbers and provide a cadre for the ANV. The paratroopers performed well because of their (mainly French) leadership, guys like Langlais and Bigeard, outstanding officers by anyone's standards, and tough training. In the 1960s-70s some SVN troops performed extremely well under direct US leadership (mainly in the various Special Forces programmes). There were SVN units who performed- such as the Airborne Division and Marines. The fact remains though that the leadership and training of the ARVN as a whole was corrupt and ineffective.

 

Probably the most effective local combatants for both the French and Americans were tribal irregulars- in the French case Lt Col Roger Trinquier's GCMA, and in the American case the CIDGs. Unfortunately both ended up being neglected in favour of conventional forces.

Edited September 22, 2005 by baboon6

[pi]

Reuven Gal (Israel's top military psychologist) cites the Wehrmacht and the NVA as the standout examples of 20th century armies that were very good at developing cohesive units. They must have been doing something right.

Edited September 22, 2005 by pi

[larrikin]

Reuven Gal (Israel's top military psychologist) cites the Wehrmacht and the NVA as the standout examples of 20th century armies that were very good at developing cohesive units.  They must have been doing something right.

225839[/snapback]

 

He should have looked at Aust Army units. Quite a number of them took over 60% casualties and remained combat effective, in both Wars. The 9th Div took 4,500 casualties during Alamein 1 & 2, that is more than the book strength of their combat bns, and yet still were the division that finally achieved the breakthrough.

[Paul F Jungnitsch]

The NVA had a system of checkpoints where the soldiers could move south but not north. Therefore the country was set up like a series of one way valves, keeping soldiers moving to the front. Whatever the losses and terrible conditions they faced, there was no choice but to tough it out.

[Doug Kibbey]

The NVA had a system of checkpoints where the soldiers could move south but not north. Therefore the country was set up like a series of one way valves, keeping soldiers moving to the front. Whatever the losses and terrible conditions they faced, there was no choice but to tough it out.

225870[/snapback]

 

Not to mention 3 man cels, political officers with pistols, and potentially dire consequences to their families. And that was not always enough. KCS ("Kit Carson Scouts") that "chieu hoi'd and we worked had a common profile: young, fed up, missed families, were convinced they'd die before they ever went home, lousy conditions, inept leaders at unit level insensitive to casualties, etc.

 

Love of the cause did not feature promininetly in their service.

[Old Tanker]

The NVA had a system of checkpoints where the soldiers could move south but not north. Therefore the country was set up like a series of one way valves, keeping soldiers moving to the front. Whatever the losses and terrible conditions they faced, there was no choice but to tough it out.

225870[/snapback]

 

I read a book called 'Inside the NVA' it's a good read. All was based on the three count unit , 3 men , three 3 x 3 teams and so on. One thing the NVA spent the vast majority of it's time in a military bivouac situation and very liitle time in actual combat operations.

[tankerwanabe]

It seems you are asserting that the Northeners and the Southeners have no cultural differences. This is absurd. Certainly the "Southeners" produced some decent soldiers, but the corrupt society from whenc the young men sprang could not instill the sort of dicipline (often harsh, to be sure) that the North did. Organize? (the North)....Jeez, you surprized?...it was a totalitarian communist regime with a paranoid internal security apparatus.

 

BTW, I worked in the field with the ARVN, and apart from the Hãc Bao, found their leadership and it's effect on morale perfectly appalling.

225734[/snapback]

 

The culture of Vietnamese Notherners and Southerners are nearly identical. What ever difference they had could not explain the difference in how they performed in combat nor organization. Most South Vietnamese formations were led by Northern-born Vietnamese officers.

 

Albeit we can label Northern organization as totalitarian communism with paranoid internal security, it was still highly effective. This is evidence in their perfomance.

 

So we have an effective Northern Vietnamese military. And we have an ineffective South Vietnamese military to which were led by Northern-born/raise officers. Therefore, culture can not explain the ineffectiveness of the South Vietnamese military.

 

With culture out, there is only two resonable explanations. The South Vietnamese military was not as ineffective as we believe. Or in the alternative, It was ineffective but for a reason other than culture.

 

It's my opinion that we perpetuated poor Southern leadership. Many South Vietnamese generals after the fall of the Diem administration were on our CIA payroll (Source - Former Ambassador Nolting). It's likely that we paid them for their loyalty rather than their effectiveness.

 

It's rather difficult to criticize the ARVN when we employed their generals.

[Old Tanker]

It's rather difficult to criticize the ARVN when we employed their generals.

225886[/snapback]

Somebody already posted the RVN leadrship was Christian/ Francophiles and the general peasantry was Buddist. That fact was a major contributing factor in how things went. Something akin to the Sunni-Shia situation in Iraq today.

 

During the VN war it was common to see Buddist monks setting themselves on-fire for thr TV cameras. This was to protest the Francophile/Christian leadership in power. This situation led to a three way conflict as in Iraq today.

[Richard Lindquist]

Here is a bit of "arm chair soldiering" that i did after my first tour there.

 

HCM Trail (requires violation of Laos "neutrality" in 1966-67).

 

1. Keep SOF/LRRP surveillance of the HCM trail through Laos.

 

2. Periodically insert a brigade-sized airmobile force onto the trail to set up defenses and aggressively patrol.

 

3. After the NVA laboriously assemble by foot marches (while being pounded by the air farce) enough force to threaten the air-mobile brigade, you pull it out (via helicopter) and insert another brigade two hundred miles up or down the trail.

 

4. You drive them ragged running up and down the trail with enough force to eliminate the roadblocks.

 

DMZ:

 

1. Switch a goodly chunk of the massive engineer construction oplant from building base camps to construction of a huge paved road along the DMZ with wide open swaths of right-of-way.

 

2. Agressively patrol this road with an ACR or a Mmech Brigade.

 

 

Just tossing out some REMF thoughts....

[tankerwanabe]

I don't know how to reconcile the differences. Maybe because the Viet Minh/NVA were a genuine revolutionary movement- its soldiers (many of whom were conscripted) were not even paid until 1958! Discipline was tough, life was harsh, noone was in it for their own gain. Yes they were often brutal and I don't agree with their aims but they (at least the officers and commissars) really believed in what they were doing. Maybe because the ANV/ARVN officers were mainly recruited from a privileged Catholic minority who often despised their Buddhist peasant troops and would always be associated with the colonialists.

 

As regards the mixed French-Vietnamese units- all units of the Expeditionary Corps (except North and West African but including Foreign Legion) had significant amounts of Vietnamese troops by the early 1950s. This was both to make up the numbers and provide a cadre for the ANV. The paratroopers performed well because of their (mainly French) leadership, guys like Langlais and Bigeard, outstanding officers by anyone's standards, and tough training. In the 1960s-70s some SVN troops performed extremely well under direct US leadership (mainly in the various Special Forces programmes). There were SVN units who performed- such as the Airborne Division and Marines. The fact remains though that the leadership and training of the ARVN as a whole was corrupt and ineffective.

 

Probably the most effective local combatants for both the French and Americans were tribal irregulars- in the French case Lt Col Roger Trinquier's GCMA, and in the American case the CIDGs. Unfortunately both ended up being neglected in favour of conventional forces.

225833[/snapback]

 

You can read my reasoning (and ramblings and mumblings) in my response to Doug's post.

 

It's was my conclusion that we picked the wrong Vietnamese leadership. We should have picked more capable South Vietnamese generals and avoided the "yes sir!" generals.

 

Yes, we would have lost some control. Capable men do have a tendency to be terribly stubborn and have independent thought especially when controlled by a foreign government. But there was more to gain in the placing of more capable men in the best positions. It's a delicate balancing act.

 

So cliche, but we allowed our polical aims to lose this war.

[Doug Kibbey]

=tankerwanabe,Thu 22 Sep 2005 1628]

"The culture of Vietnamese Notherners and Southerners are nearly identical. "

 

Nonsense

 

 

"Albeit we can label Northern organization as totalitarian communism with paranoid internal security, it was still highly effective. This is evidence in their perfomance."

 

You missed my point. It was precisely because of those characteristics that the units has good cohesion and was highly effective. Trust me, you don't need to advise me that it was highly effective.

 

 

"So we have an effective Northern Vietnamese military. And we have an ineffective South Vietnamese military to which were led by Northern-born/raise officers. Therefore, culture can not explain the ineffectiveness of the South Vietnamese military."

 

 

Why...because you said so? I find that very uncompelling. Since you are ill-informed as to point one, you conclusion is flawed. Further, where, exaclty, does you information come from that most ARVN officers were Northern born/raised?

 

 

"With culture out, there is only two resonable explanations. The South Vietnamese military was not as ineffective as we believe. Or in the alternative, It was ineffective but for a reason other than culture. "

 

Culture is not "out". And the South Vietnamese military was largely ineffective, contributed to largely by corruption and total lack of committment (or much reason) until for some units, things got really desperate in '72...for example.

 

 

"It's my opinion that we perpetuated poor Southern leadership. Many South Vietnamese generals after the fall of the Diem administration were on our CIA payroll (Source - Former Ambassador Nolting). It's likely that we paid them for their loyalty rather than their effectiveness. "

 

 

Well, we didn't create them, per se, but we certainly perpetuated them. Short of establishing a U.S. Miltary governorship, we did kinda' have to appease the SV gov't, unfortunately.

 

 

'It's rather difficult to criticize the ARVN when we employed their generals."

 

 

Not for me, I worked with them in the field. You? BTW, leadership is not a property necessary only for generals.

Edited September 22, 2005 by Doug Kibbey

[tankerwanabe]

Here is a bit of "arm chair soldiering" that i did after my first tour there.

 

HCM Trail (requires violation of Laos "neutrality" in 1966-67).

 

1.  Keep SOF/LRRP surveillance of the HCM trail through Laos.

 

2.  Periodically insert a brigade-sized airmobile force onto the trail to set up defenses and aggressively patrol.

 

3.  After the NVA laboriously assemble by foot marches (while being pounded by the air farce) enough force to threaten the air-mobile brigade, you pull it out (via helicopter) and insert another brigade two hundred miles up or down the trail.

 

4.  You drive them ragged  running up and down the trail with enough force to eliminate the roadblocks.

 

DMZ:

 

1.  Switch a goodly chunk of the massive engineer construction oplant from building base camps to construction of a huge paved road along the DMZ with wide open swaths of right-of-way.

 

2.  Agressively patrol this road with an ACR or a Mmech Brigade.

Just tossing out some REMF thoughts....

225893[/snapback]

 

 

Ok, back to military talk after my political ramblings.

 

I'd invade the north right after Linebacker. The former prermier of N. Vietnam later stated after the war that the bombing of Hanoi was so effective that they'd probably surrender had they been invaded after the bombings.

 

How? I'll leave it to the armchair generals to plan Overlord II.

[JOE BRENNAN]

That would be an F-105 guning a MiG 17.  As far as I know, there were no air to air kils by F-100's in Vietnam.

225600[/snapback]

The April 5 1965 F-100 kill by Kilgus of a MiG-17 in some lists was credited only "probable", but Vietnamese sources (from Toperczer's books etc) say 3 MiG-17's were lost in that action, with no others claimed. Which is a problem in the list IMO for the 2 F-105 victories listed that day; two F-105's were lost but no indication either got in a position to fire.

 

The official USAF list reprinted in "Phantom in Combat" by Boyne has 30 F-105 victories (one shared by a pair of F-105F's). 27 20mm, 2 Aim-9, and 1 combination.

 

Ideally we'd always speak of real kills not claims. But AFAIK for SEA, though there's some interesting info from Vietnamese sources (via Toperczer's books) it's nothing like complete VPAF claims and losses by date, let alone time etc (which for other air wars there often is, at least mostly). So since a real kill list is very hard to approximate, it seems apples/oranges to add some underclaims (even if valid) to the official claim list, when you can't strike out overclaims, and then take a total.

 

Joe

[tankerwanabe]

=tankerwanabe,Thu 22 Sep 2005  1628]

"The culture of Vietnamese Notherners and Southerners are nearly identical. "

 

Nonsense 

"Albeit we can label Northern organization as totalitarian communism with paranoid internal security, it was still highly effective. This is evidence in their perfomance."

 

You missed my point. It was precisely because of those characteristics that the units has good cohesion and was highly effective. Trust me, you don't need to advise me that it was highly effective.

"So we have an effective Northern Vietnamese military.  And we have an ineffective South Vietnamese military to which were led by Northern-born/raise officers. Therefore, culture can not explain the ineffectiveness of the South Vietnamese military."

Why...because you said so?  I find that very uncompelling. Since you are ill-informed as to point one, you conclusion is flawed. Further, where, exaclty, does you information come from that most ARVN officers were Northern born/raised?

"With culture out, there is only two resonable explanations. The South Vietnamese military was not as ineffective as we believe.  Or in the alternative, It was ineffective but for a reason other than culture. "

 

Culture is not "out". And the South Vietnamese military was largely ineffective, contributed to largely by corruption and total lack of committment (or much reason) until for some units, things got really desperate in '72...for example.

"It's my opinion that we perpetuated poor Southern leadership. Many South Vietnamese generals after the fall of the Diem administration were on our CIA payroll (Source - Former Ambassador Nolting). It's likely that we paid them for their loyalty rather than their effectiveness. "

Well, we didn't create them, per se, but we certainly perpetuated them. Short of establishing a U.S. Miltary governorship, we did kinda' have to appease the SV gov't, unfortunately.

'It's rather difficult to criticize the ARVN when we employed their generals."

Not for me, I worked with them in the field. You?  BTW, leadership is not a property necessary only for generals.

225895[/snapback]

 

Ok Doug, explain to me the differences betwen a Northern Vietnamese and a Southern Vietnamese that would make a difference in their performance.

 

As to the mix of the South Vietnamese officer corp., I live in Southern California right next to the largest Vietnamese population outside of Vietnam. Every year, I attend their festivals and meet up with prior officers in the ARVN veterans associations. They were predominatly made up of Notherners. What are your sources that would contradict this observation?

 

Didn't creat the corruption? Even Thieu, Vietnam's last elected president was on our payroll when he was lowly colonel who assisted in assasinating his own president Diem back in 1960. Who know whether he went off our payroll when he became president. We start them off young, and we made sure they make it to the top.

 

If put a "yes sir!" general in his position. It's it not likely that he would pick his officers in the same capacity? It's just unlikely that he'd pick an ambitious uncorruptable officer that may challenge him. Isn't it true that this is meant by the saying that leadership starts from the top?

[Doug Kibbey]

As to the mix of the South Vietnamese officer corp., I live in Southern California right next to the largest Vietnamese population outside of Vietnam. Every year, I attend their festivals and meet up with prior officers in the ARVN veterans associations.  They were predominatly made up of Notherners. What are your sources that would contradict this observation?

 

 

If put a "yes sir!" general in his position.  It's it not likely that he would pick his officers in the same capacity?  It's just unlikely that he'd pick an ambitious uncorruptable officer that may challenge him. Isn't it true that this is meant by the saying that leadership starts from the top?

225905[/snapback]

 

OK, you have VN neighbors, very impressive (I'm in SoCal too, with quite a few around me...hardly a "reference"). You didn't answer my question, exactty WHAT (if any) direct field experience do you have with ARVN units during the war? Avuncular elderly neighbors living in the U.S. cannot necessarily be relied upon to provide a completely unbiased, unvarnished account of ARVN performance, or do you find tht surprizing?

 

I didn't hobnob with ARVN generals, they tended to shy away from the AO's we worked. Come to think of it, I don't recall any ARVN officers above the rank of Major. And since it apparently escapes you, there were several levels of ARVN units and leadership....a few of them pretty good, by all accounts. I only directly observed one, the others were pretty much like college kids on a camping trip with guns who's primary objective was to avoid contact.

 

You have your opinon, and I have mine, and it isn't based on local reunions in SoCal.

[JOE BRENNAN]

Korea was just as f*'d up as RVN but over the years became a viable country.

Rhee(ROK pres.) was a dictator by any measurement. He was also againist any cease-fire as he wanted to rule the entire peninsula.

225820[/snapback]

The second and third sentences I agree, the first I think is more questionable. It would be hard to absolutely prove, since as you say there's also the difference of the US throwing in the towel in one case but not the other. OTOH that towel throwing could be seen as a response to the rough realization (along with many other political factors in the US) that the whole concept of "RVN" was in fact more f*cked up than ROK.

 

As several have mentioned, without trying to quantify it precisely, the factor of ruling elites, officers class, etc being tainted by colonialist collaboration was much more true in South Vietnam than South Korea. The split in Korean society was more straight left-right. Also re: earlier dicsussion slightly off point, we have to distinguish I think cultural differences between northerners and southeners in those countries (also said to exist in Korea even then, but relatively marginal I think) and societal organization differences of Communist v. relatively "free" (albeit not completely) societies. Now, in Korea that's had almost 60yrs to *become* "cultural" (they often show subtitles on Korean TV now when northerners speak, it *was* the same language accent difference but not seriously difficult to understand 60yrs ago).

 

Also, my general sense studying the Korean War is that US veterans tend to exaggerate the relative ineffectiveness of the ROKA compared to themselves, esp correcting for material factors, and that's become part of popular history. In even objective US sources for some periods of the war, like after US intervention (allowed the ROKA to regain its footing) but before Chinese intervention, it's hard to see a big difference in actual battle results of the US and ROK armies, whether things were going the KPA's way or UN's way. The ROKA did have a lasting moral/mental block about the Chinese, the US forces got over that but the ROK's for some reason didn't seem to.

 

I don't know if possibly this could also be true of Vietnam, but I think less so if so. I think the ROKA had basic elements of a reasonably effective army even during the KW to a substantially greater extent than ARVN ever had. Obviously the ROKA was quite a tough force by the time of the Vietnam War, quite a while later, but the SV forces in one form or another had quite a long time to get their act together too.

 

Joe

Edited September 22, 2005 by JOE BRENNAN

[Matt L.]

A great deal of the ARVN's morale problem was caused by US help. I don't think they ever felt they could stand on their own. It was a welfare military with no confidence because big brother had always propped them up.

 

Case in point:

 

The 72 Easter Offensive was a full blown invasion. The ARVN supported by US advisors and airpower (No US ground troops were significantly involved in the fighting) dealt the NVA a severe blow and sent them packing.

 

The 75 Offensive was much more limited in scope. They were still smarting from the 72 defeat. The North had only planned to take territory in the North of RVN to use as staging area for a later follow attack. This time there was no US help and the ARVN melted away. What was originally planned as a limited offensive, overan the entire country. The US had spent a lot of treasure to equip the ARVN, but it did no good because they had no confidence.

 

My take,

 

Matt

[FlyingCanOpener]

How? I'll leave it to the armchair generals to plan Overlord II.

225899[/snapback]

 

...Which would also include the 2 other fronts opening up as a result... the Soviet invasion of Western Europe and the radioactive front as both sides would exchange nuclear weapons, right...?

[tankerwanabe]

OK, you have VN neighbors, very impressive (I'm in SoCal too, with quite a few around me...hardly a "reference"). You didn't answer my question, exactty WHAT (if any) direct field experience do you have with ARVN units during the war? Avuncular elderly neighbors living in the U.S. cannot necessarily be relied upon to provide a completely unbiased, unvarnished account of ARVN performance, or do you find tht surprizing? 

 

I didn't hobnob with ARVN generals, they tended to shy away from the AO's we worked. Come to think of it, I don't recall any ARVN officers above the rank of Major. And since it apparently escapes you, there were several levels of ARVN units and leadership....a few of them pretty good, by all accounts. I only directly observed one, the others were pretty much like college kids on a camping trip with guns who's primary objective was to avoid contact.

 

You have your opinon, and I have mine, and it isn't based on local reunions in SoCal.

225909[/snapback]

 

Well Doug, I have zero experience in the field with ARVN units. But performance was not your pior question. It was how did I know that the ARVN officer corp was primarily composed of Nothern Vietnamese natives. There is no need to have field experience with the ARVN 30 years ago in order to count the number of Native- Northern Vietnamese officers in one room, is there? Nor is there any experience needed to ask a couple of officers both Northern and Southern about the percentage of the makeup of their officer corp. Nor is field experience required to conduct a statistical analysis.

 

Now that I've answered your question, will you answer mine? What is the difference between the Northern Vietnamese and Southern Vietnamese in culture that would enable the Northern one to outperform the Southern one?

 

And what are your sources that would contradict my conclusion that the ARVN officer corp was predominantly Nothern-born Vietnamese? Doesn't have to be fancy. Could be just counting heads and talking to people just like me.

 

And the reason I ask this is many people states that the poor performance of the ARVN was due to its culture.

Edited September 23, 2005 by tankerwanabe

[tankerwanabe]

...Which would also include the 2 other fronts opening up as a result... the Soviet invasion of Western Europe and the radioactive front as both sides would exchange nuclear weapons, right...?

226091[/snapback]

 

Well yes, there are those pesky minor details. Hence I am delegating Overlord II.

[JWB]

The biggest problem in Vietnam was interdicting the HCM trail. The technology to do this could have been developed in time for it have made a difference.> http://www.afa.org/magazine/april1999/0499gunships.asp

[Kenneth P. Katz]

In 1965 not to mention 2005, American strengths are the shock, mobility and firepower, particularly from the sea and air. American weaknesses are dislike of static wars of attrition and the cultural/linguistic/intell capabilities required for counterinsurgency.

 

This argues for a conventional invasion and a no-kidding bombing campaign (not the Rolling Thunder game of patty cake) of the SRVN. Of course then we get back to the Korean War dilemna of achieving victory in the theater at the cost of igniting a direct war with the USSR or China.

 

To go off on a tangent, I think that the same analysis applies to Iraq in 2005. the US should disengage from the counterinsurgency campaign and turn it over the Iraqis. Then form up into conventional forces that are America's strengths and strike deep into Syria. No occupation, just keep killing, smashing and burning until the insurgency in iraq stops.