Dunkirk

[Colin Williams]

I don't get it,  why would they have held equipment back in the UK because they had lost half their troops in France?

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You overlooked the part about personnel. From the late summer of 1940 on there was an ever-growing stream of trained, deployable Army personnel from the UK to the Middle East. The loss of the BEF would have compromised the flow of these reinforcements and replacements. In addition, the loss of the BEF would have placed a greater emphasis on existing armored formations to make up for the shortage of trained infantry and artillery. The CinC Home Forces would have fought tooth and nail against substantial redeployments to the ME until the late fall, at least.

[Geoff Winnington-Ball]

You overlooked the part about personnel. From the late summer of 1940 on there was an ever-growing stream of trained, deployable Army personnel from the UK to the Middle East. The loss of the BEF would have compromised the flow of these reinforcements and replacements. In addition, the loss of the BEF would have placed a greater emphasis on existing armored formations to make up for the shortage of trained infantry and artillery. The CinC Home Forces would have fought tooth and nail against substantial redeployments to the ME until the late fall, at least.

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Yes, but they couldn't have afforded to let the Suez fall... the key to the survival of the Home Islands would have been far-east and Commonwealth troops methinks.

[KingSargent]

Yes, but they couldn't have afforded to let the Suez fall...

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Why not? Given Axis control (or interdiction) of the Med, the Suez Canal was basically worthless.

[BillB]

Why not? Given Axis control (or interdiction) of the Med, the Suez Canal was basically worthless.

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Careful, King, I think you are letting your anathema for the British indirect approach colour your thinking. There are a lot of RN types who would dispute that assertion. The Axis never had total control of the Med, even in the short period when the Luftwaffe was there in strength between the Battle of Britiain winding down and the opening of Barbarossa. And the interdiction cut both ways.

 

all the best

 

BillB

[KingSargent]

Careful, King, I think you are letting your anathema for the British indirect approach colour your thinking. 

How so? I didn't say not fight for the ME, just that the Suez Canal by itself was no big deal. If the Hun was close enough to take it, he was already in position to deny access to the Med to the CW.

There are a lot of RN types who would dispute that assertion. The Axis never had total control of the Med, even in the short period when the Luftwaffe was there in strength between the Battle of Britiain winding down and the opening of Barbarossa. And the interdiction cut both ways.

 

all the best

 

BillB

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There is "total control," and there is being able to send merchant ships through without major naval operations like PEDESTAL required just to get part of a convoy to Malta.

 

More than half of the British cruisers lost in WW2 (17/32) were lost in the Med. That seems to be not real cost-effective, like the US staging major amphibious assaults for totally worthless islands in the Pacific.

 

I think the RN should have held Gibraltar, sent every sub they could into the Med, and mined the He!! out of the ports - the RAF could do aerial mining, it would probably be more effective than missing factories. They could use things like Whitleys, which were pretty worthless over Germany but could lay mines at night. Another marginal SBC bomber, the Hampden, made a good long-range torpedo-bomber after retiring from Bomber Command.

 

Keep Tripoli blocked and the Axis is not going to get anything to the Armies in Africa.

 

I'd contest the Eastern Med, but not for the Suez - to prevent the Axis grabbing Turkey.

[Geoff Winnington-Ball]

How so? I didn't say not fight for the ME, just that the Suez Canal by itself was no big deal. If the Hun was close enough to take it, he was already in position to deny access to the Med to the CW.

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King, I can't concur. As long as we held the Suez, we kept the Axis out of the Middle East (including Iraq and Persia) and its resources. Maybe worse if we consider it a gateway into India's back door.

 

By 1943 we DID have virtual control over the Med, though, and that was the end of that. A bit of a sticky wicket beforehand...

[BillB]

How so? I didn't say not fight for the ME, just that the Suez Canal by itself was no big deal. If the Hun was close enough to take it, he was already in position to deny access to the Med to the CW.

 

With all due respect mate, that might be what you meant but it isn't what you said. And the Suez Canal was a big deal. It was a useful backdoor entrance to the Med in case the Axis ever did manage to close the western entrance, it was a vital link with points east, and it was even more important to keep it out of Axis hands for that reason. And there is also the prestige angle, which should not be overlooked.

 

There is "total control," and there is being able to send merchant ships through without major naval operations like PEDESTAL required just to get part of a convoy to Malta.

Which is precisley in the short period when the Luftwaffe was paying full attention to the Med before they trotted off to Russia. I don't think worse case scenarios make very good yardsticks because they are not typical. IIRC time was critical with PEDESTAL, which ruled out taking the cape route. Anyway, using that logic means they ought to have stoppped the Arctic convoys after PQ17, or discontinued the Atlantic convoys when the U-Boat wolf-packs got into their stride.

 

More than half of the British cruisers lost in WW2 (17/32) were lost in the Med. That seems to be not real cost-effective, like the US staging major amphibious assaults for totally worthless islands in the Pacific.

 

I don't think that's an apt analogy if I may say so. The scale of cruiser losses was attributable to the fact that lots of them were there because the Med was the most active area of naval ops for most of the war. Not least because of the strength and quality of the Italian Navy, which IIRC was considered the major threat by the RN. I think this is frequently overlooked by the anti-Med strategy lobby.

 

I think the RN should have held Gibraltar, sent every sub they could into the Med, and mined the He!! out of the ports - the RAF could do aerial mining, it would probably be more effective than missing factories. They could use things like Whitleys, which were pretty worthless over Germany but could lay mines at night. Another marginal SBC bomber, the Hampden, made a good long-range torpedo-bomber after retiring from Bomber Command.

Keep Tripoli blocked and the Axis is not going to get anything to the Armies in Africa.

I don't think that would have been doable with just subs and night mine dropping. And in any case there was no way in hell the Air Ministry were going to hand over bombers for anything, never mind despatch them outside the UK. The Army couldn't even get them to hand over a half dozen Whitleys for parachute training after the RAF promised they would. Also, I don't know that much about Gib, but was there enough space there to run that many planes?

 

I'd contest the Eastern Med, but not for the Suez - to prevent the Axis grabbing Turkey.

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Doesn't the last point contradict the rest? The division between West and East med is a false one IMO - and how are you going to contest the Eastern Med without the Suez Canal if you've blocked the western entrance?

 

all the best

 

BillB

[KingSargent]

With all due respect mate, that might be what you meant but it isn't what you said. And the Suez Canal was a big deal. It was a useful backdoor entrance to the Med in case the Axis ever did manage to close the western entrance, it was a vital link with points east, and it was even more important to keep it out of Axis hands for that reason. And there is also the prestige angle, which should not be overlooked.

Prestige I'll go with, after all the disasters (France, Norway, Greece/Crete,, Malaya, Burma, and Tobruk42) the British didn't have a lot left.

I'm pretty sure losing Suez would have sent Winston bye-bye. Whether the CW would have stayed in the war with him gone is unknown.

What good is a "vital link to points east" if you can't use it? About the only commercial use the Suez got from the Italian declaration of war to mid-1943 was to bring supplies to Alexandria - admittedly a big deal in terms of keeping the British fighting in the Med, but not exactly disruptive of international commerce.

 

Which is precisley in the short period when the Luftwaffe was paying full attention to the Med before they trotted off to Russia. PEDESTAL was in 1942, when the Luftwaffe was largely in Russia. I don't think worse case scenarios make very good yardsticks because they are not typical.  IIRC time was critical with PEDESTAL, which ruled out taking the cape route. PEDESTAL went to Malta, so taking the Cape route is contra-indicated..   I think you are thinking of TIGER. Anyway, using that logic means they ought to have stoppped the Arctic convoys after PQ17, They did exactly that until they could afford to commit more escorts, especially CVEs. or discontinued the Atlantic convoys when the U-Boat wolf-packs got into their stride. The Atlantic routes were vital to the UK's physical survival, let alone maintaining the war effort. The loss of the trans-Med shipping route was a PITA, but not exactly life-threatening.

I don't think that's an apt analogy if I may say so. Say ahead. You're entitled to your opinion, wrong though it may be.   The scale of cruiser losses was attributable to the fact that lots of them were there because the Med was the most active area of naval ops for most of the war. Not least because of the strength and quality of the Italian Navy, which IIRC was considered the major threat by the RN. I think this is frequently overlooked by the anti-Med strategy lobby.

I realize that the cruiser losses were because it was an important theater of war. My question is why was it so important if you couldn't use the Med anyway? It's analagous to the 3/4 of the US cruiser losses in WW2 which were directly caused by the battle for the Place God Puts Hose When World Needs Enema. I don't think that would have been doable with just subs and night mine dropping. And in any case there was no way in hell the Air Ministry were going to hand over bombers for anything, never mind despatch them outside the UK. Aha! But the foundation of my plan for prosecuting Britain's war is blowing up the Air Ministry and executing the Air Staff (at least Bomber Command)... The Army couldn't even get them to hand over a half dozen Whitleys for parachute training after the RAF promised they would. Also, I don't know that much about Gib, but was there enough space there to run that many planes? No, but they don't have to base in Gib. If they can keep the Axis supply lines to Tripoli blocked, the Axis armies in NA are impotent and the Allied a/c can operate from Cyrenaica; the better the job the blockaders do, the farther west they can base. If the Axis manages to get enough supply and reinforcement  through to get to Suez, it's moot anyway and you make sure they can't use Alex or the Canal themselves.

 

Doesn't the last point contradict the rest? The division between West and East med is a false one IMO - and how are you going to contest the Eastern Med without the Suez Canal if you've blocked the western entrance? I misspoke, perhaps. What I meant was that I would fight for the Eastern (past Italy) Med with the goal of keeping Turkey from joining the Axis if they wouldn't join us. Naturally, holding the Suez is important to that goal. But the Canal itself is not vital to the Empire because of thru-Med transport (the Allies got along fine going around Africa), so I wouldn't worry about falling back across it if I had to - if the Axis got that far control of the Med was Axis and there is no reason for Allied traffic throught the Canal. This is purely military considerations, there are obviously political ramifications.

 

all the best

 

BillB

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[Argus]

But if the Canal goes then Gib is the only viable base to work the Med from. Even if the CW retained bases in the eastern med, say Haifa or Beruit, loseing the canal means they can no longer be resupplied directly by sea. The port situation in Egypt was far from ideal, but it was still a damn sight better than anywhere else in the Red Sea/Persian Gulf and then everything would have had to be shipped overland... ouch.

 

As far as I can see Suez was a symbol right enough, but even without the link through the Med, it was still a vital log hub for the whole region. I don't know how much weight anyone places on keeping Turkey neutral, but again Suez was vital for holding Turkey's southern flank, at least once the Syrian Campaign was over with. It was during this period CW engineers finished the last link in the Istanbul - Cairo railway specifically to support any defence of Turkey.

 

Suez also represented the last viable line to keep the axis out of the Iraqi/Persian oil fields, once past Suez only distance and terrain features presented an obsticle as again the ports behind the Suez line could not sustain an army to do the job - presuming one was available.

 

Granted there's a lot of miles to cover for the axis to get to the oil fields, but IMHO it was not impossiable by any means. A striaght drive across the desert may or may not have been possiable, However, if without Suez the med coastline became untennable for the CW on logistic grounds, once the Axis hit Haifa all they have to do follow the pipeline stright to Kirkuk, a decent road, from a usable port with bugger all to slow them down once through the lebanon range.

 

It's all 'what if-ish' but I feel the Canal was worth holding for its own sake, long before the underbelly of Europe and Winnies perchant for breaking windows with Gunieas comes into the picture.

 

shane

[KingSargent]

But if the Canal goes then Gib is the only viable base to work the Med from. The point is that if the Suez goes, there is no REASON to 'work the Med.' It will be an Axis lake. Even if the CW retained bases in the eastern med, say Haifa or Beruit, loseing the canal means they can no longer be resupplied directly by sea. The port situation in Egypt was far from ideal, but it was still a damn sight better than anywhere else in the Red Sea/Persian Gulf and then everything would have had to be shipped overland... ouch. This is all true, but if the Axis gets that far the question is moot. Having the Canal does not do the Axis a bit of good; forget fantasies of the Italian Navy getting into the IO, they didn't have the range for it. OTOH, it hurts the Allies, but not fatally - except perhaps politically.

 

As far as I can see Suez was a symbol right enough, but even without the link through the Med, it was still a vital log hub for the whole region. I don't know how much weight anyone places on keeping Turkey neutral, but again Suez was vital for holding Turkey's southern flank, at least once the Syrian Campaign was over with. It was during this period CW engineers finished the last link in the Istanbul - Cairo railway specifically to support any defence of Turkey.

 

Suez also represented the last viable line to keep the axis out of the Iraqi/Persian oil fields, once past Suez only distance and terrain features presented an obsticle as again the ports behind the Suez line could not sustain an army to do the job - presuming one was available. Losing the Canal does not mean automatically losing the troops in Egypt. They would be across it before the Axis got that far, unless there was a really nippy bit of encirclement by the Axis.

Do not disparage distance and terrain features. To get to the Persian Gulf would mean an advance of twice as far as the Axis had to advance to get to Suez. Having Alex does not give the Axis a supply point, it  gives them a waystation to which they can ship supplies from Europe, but it has no resources of its own. IOW, they would have to double the supply they sent to Africa just to maintain a force the size of PanzerArmee Afrika - and they would need a lot more to get to the Persian Gulf.

 

Granted there's a lot of miles to cover for the axis to get to the oil fields, but IMHO it was not impossiable by any means. A striaght drive across the desert may or may not have been possiable, However, if without Suez the med coastline became untennable for the CW on logistic grounds, once the Axis hit Haifa all they have to do follow the pipeline stright to Kirkuk, a decent road, from a usable port That would be demolished if the Allies have Brain One. with bugger all to slow them down once through the lebanon range. It's possible to do it in a car or on a camel, but with people shooting at you? And I hope you are not expecting the CW to obligingly leave the pipeline full of gasoline to refuel the Panzers as they marched along it? An Axis strapped for fuel couldn't do it. You maintain that the CW couldn't logistically support an army in this region, but you expect the Axis to do it?

 

It's all 'what if-ish' but I feel the Canal was worth holding for its own sake, long before the underbelly of Europe and Winnies perchant for breaking windows with Gunieas comes into the picture. Oh, the Canal would be the biggest anti-tank moat the Germans hit since the English Channel. Just getting across it in the face of any resitance would be taxing. But to hold it as sea route when one end of it would be in an enemy lake? Why?

 

shane

223642[/snapback]

[Ken Estes]

Interesting, King. The fall of the Churchill cabinet after loss of Suez would be a precursor to a new govt willing to sign a new Peace of Amiens (1804) with the Germans, not so bad since CW troops would no longer be in contact, let alone combat with the Axis. Depending whether this occurs in 1941 or 1942, the Churchill govt would go down in history as the decisive heroic gambit that bought time for the nascent US rearmament, which by 1944 could handle all enemies at sea [guaranteeing the continuation of the Br Empire] and eventually building the invasion force and nucs to overcome Hitler´s New Order then stretching from the Pyranees to Smolensk. Yes, the Rus hold because they miss nothing in the process [unless the Axis take Persia] and Franco can't give in to Hitler because of dependency on US/UK for food, fuel, trade [and still no handover of Fr colonies].

[KingSargent]

Interesting, King. The fall of the Churchill cabinet after loss of Suez would be a precursor to a new govt willing to sign a new Peace of Amiens (1804) with the Germans, not so bad since CW troops would no longer be in contact, let alone combat with the Axis. Depending whether this occurs in 1941 or 1942,

Assuming a historical time line up until the surrender, it would have to be 1941 because the US would be in the war in late 1941.

 

the Churchill govt would go down in history as the decisive heroic gambit that bought time for the nascent US rearmament, which by 1944 could handle all enemies at sea [guaranteeing the continuation of the Br Empire]and eventually building the invasion force and nucs to overcome Hitler´s New Order then stretching from the Pyranees to Smolensk. Yes, the Rus hold because they miss nothing in the process [unless the Axis take Persia] and Franco can't give in to Hitler because of dependency on US/UK for food, fuel, trade [and still no handover of Fr colonies].

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I really wonder if the US would have bothered with massive re-armament absent an ongoing war and threat. The USN was being renovated, but that had been in the works for years, and the War Programmes were a massive increase in combat power (and $$$$pending). The "Two Ocean Navy" already authorized by Congress could have kept the Germans from messing in the New World.

I doubt the Army (including the Air Corps) would see the expansion that it did. That would mean peacetime conscription with no immediate threat. Even with the war on, Congress only continued the Draft after the first year by ONE vote. The Army and Air Corps would have gotten improved toys, but I don't think they would get the manpower.

I also doubt that the Manhattan Project could have happeed in peacetime - it was a very expensive gamble that turned out to work in 1945.

And WHY would the US want to invade and take over Europe? Because the Nazis were Nasties? The US public perception at the time is that the 1939-41 war was just that European generation's habitual dynastic squabble. We hadn't gotten involved in the Franco-Prussian War, had we? We had gotten involved in WW1, and a lot of people thought we had been swindled into it by the Alies; they did not want to do it again, especially all by themselves.

The US would go to war to prevent Nazi genocide? For one thing the Genocide Express was still at the siding in 1941, and I doubt anybody who heard about it would have believed it - they didn't while the war was going on. Besides, just because there is a genocide doesn't mean we are going to leap in. We didn't for the Armenians, we didn't do it for the Ukrainians, we didn't do it for China in the Taiping Rebellion in the 1800s that killed millions. More recently, we ignored Pol Pot and lots of African nastiness.

No, I think that if Britain was out of the war, the US wouldn't have jumped in by ourselves. Germany was not a believable threat to North America in 1941.

[Argus]

Pardon the formatting.

 

But if the Canal goes then Gib is the only viable base to work the Med from. The point is that if the Suez goes, there is no REASON to 'work the Med.' It will be an Axis lake. I do agree whith you, lose Suez (presumably with Egypt) and so goes any great need to 'own' the eastern Med. However mt point was in reply to "If they can keep the Axis supply lines to Tripoli blocked, the Axis armies in NA are impotent."

 

To blockade NA without the Eastern Med is only going to be half an egg. How else is a blockade going to be maintained if the allies haven't any bases to work from? Gib is alright for the western arm, but to do the job properly Malta is very important and the easten Med needs to be covered too. So far as Malta is concerned, I don't think it could have been done from one end alone. Having the option to make a run from either direction was a useful edge in itself and with areial support from NA the run from Alex was easier than that from Gib.

 

Without Suez the Med is Musso's lake, but I took it that you still intended to keep the axis on the hop vis a vis the blockade and the lose of Suez would be fatal to this IMHO.

 

Even if the CW retained bases in the eastern med, say Haifa or Beruit, loseing the canal means they can no longer be resupplied directly by sea. The port situation in Egypt was far from ideal, but it was still a damn sight better than anywhere else in the Red Sea/Persian Gulf and then everything would have had to be shipped overland... ouch. This is all true, but if the Axis gets that far the question is moot. Having the Canal does not do the Axis a bit of good; forget fantasies of the Italian Navy getting into the IO, they didn't have the range for it. OTOH, it hurts the Allies, but not fatally - except perhaps politically. Agreed too. But again I understood your position was that the Cw/Allies should remain active. How is a blockade to be supported in the central Med from the Eastern end not be crippled by a reduction to overland transport from the Indian Ocean?

 

Suez also represented the last viable line to keep the axis out of the Iraqi/Persian oil fields, once past Suez only distance and terrain features presented an obsticle as again the ports behind the Suez line could not sustain an army to do the job - presuming one was available. Losing the Canal does not mean automatically losing the troops in Egypt. They would be across it before the Axis got that far, unless there was a really nippy bit of encirclement by the Axis. Understood and agreed. By 'Available' I was assumeing any allied force that retreated from Egypt would require reinforcement/requipment, and that force commitments might be reviewed in light of the changed situation.

 

Do not disparage distance and terrain features. To get to the Persian Gulf would mean an advance of twice as far as the Axis had to advance to get to Suez. Having Alex does not give the Axis a supply point, it gives them a waystation to which they can ship supplies from Europe, but it has no resources of its own. IOW, they would have to double the supply they sent to Africa just to maintain a force the size of PanzerArmee Afrika - and they would need a lot more to get to the Persian Gulf.

 

Would they have to double their supply allocation? It's not liike the Africa Korp is going to be garrisioning NA all the way back to Tripoli. The ground they have taken is mostly desert which can go back to nature and the Bedu and the vital points are the Italians'; problem and wouldn't amount to much more than a peace time occupation unless a second Lwarance got some heavy duty insurrection going.

 

As far as I can see, takeing Alex just increases transit time for the ships and shortens Romels LoC's. Without the Canal the Allies can't maintain a blockade of the eastern med so axis tonnage shipped to Alex is pretty 'safe.' Plus its a better port than any the Axis held in NA historically. I agree Egypt is not a source of military supply for the axis, but it can make major contributions to the war effort, Egypt is basicly the richest country the Axis would have accessed in NA, food, labour, facilities - even with demolitions they are still going to be better off than they have been anywhere else east of Benghazi.

 

Further more the axis now has access to some decent traqnsport infrastructure by the standards of the day, they have the hub of the road and rail network. THey could land Tigers in Alex and ship them by rail to Syria or down to the Sudan iof they wanted to (not saying they would - just that they could).

 

On the terrain features I don't underestimate them, or I hope I don't anyway, but then I'm reluctant to over estimate them either. Wars seem to be full of 'impassable' barriers that were overcome, often quite easilly. I did not mean to imply the Axis could bounce the canal then blitz across from the Med to central Iraq, only that the ground was a lot more promising for an eventual advance than much of the ground they had already covered to reach the nile, and that the capture of the Egyptian/Palestinian/Syrian ports 'resets' the axis LoC back to about where it was when they were in Benghazi. It's not an identicle position, but in some ways its actualy better if worse in others.

 

 

Granted there's a lot of miles to cover for the axis to get to the oil fields, but IMHO it was not impossiable by any means. A striaght drive across the desert may or may not have been possiable, However, if without Suez the med coastline became untennable for the CW on logistic grounds, once the Axis hit Haifa all they have to do follow the pipeline stright to Kirkuk, a decent road, from a usable port. That would be demolished if the Allies have Brain One. And would be patched up again just like every other port that was blown up, captured and restored to service (if only limited) during the war. with bugger all to slow them down once through the lebanon range. It's possible to do it in a car or on a camel, but with people shooting at you? And I hope you are not expecting the CW to obligingly leave the pipeline full of gasoline to refuel the Panzers as they marched along it? No, that would be 'stranger than fiction' wouldn't it. An Axis strapped for fuel couldn't do it. You maintain that the CW couldn't logistically support an army in this region, but you expect the Axis to do it? Not quite, I maintain the Cw couldn't support a naval force to blockade axis shipping in Med, as I had understood your intention to be. An Army, while difficult would be possiable IMHO, we'd already done it/would do it once as part of the Syrian Campaign and we'd come through in the oposite direction during WWI.

 

 

<snip>

Oh, the Canal would be the biggest anti-tank moat the Germans hit since the English Channel. Just getting across it in the face of any resitance would be taxing. But to hold it as sea route when one end of it would be in an enemy lake? Why?

 

Well the Israli's thought so too didn't they? Seriously I agree the Canal would be an obsticle, but like any barrier it would need to be covered and in this situation we'd be in the reverse of the WWI case. The supply line would be at its longest and most difficult the army would be in some distress haveing been just thrown out of Egypt - so I'd say it would be a strong delaying position not a stop line. It's only a couple of hundred feet, a big river crossing. The axis would be weak untill it had reorganised itself, but the allies would be weaker and with less support to hand.

 

Why hold a sea route when the other end is an enemy lake? Well thats the whole argument in a nut shell isn't it. In truth I expect you hold it for what it was yesterday (peacetime position) and what it will be tommorrow, while for today you make the best of what ever advantage it gives you.

 

shane

[Ken Estes]

Assuming a historical time line up until the surrender, it would have to be 1941 because the US would be in the war in late 1941.

 

I really wonder if the US would have bothered with massive re-armament absent an ongoing war and threat. The USN was being renovated, but that had been in the works for years, and the War Programmes were a massive increase in combat power (and $$$$pending). The "Two Ocean Navy" already authorized by Congress could have kept the Germans from messing in the New World.

I doubt the Army (including the Air Corps) would see the expansion that it did. That would mean peacetime conscription with no immediate threat. Even with the war on, Congress only continued the Draft after the first year by ONE vote. The Army and Air Corps would have gotten improved toys, but I don't think they would get the manpower.

I also doubt that the Manhattan Project could have happeed in peacetime - it was a very expensive gamble that turned out to work in 1945.

And WHY would the US want to invade and take over Europe? Because the Nazis were Nasties? The US public perception at the time is that the 1939-41 war was just that European generation's habitual dynastic squabble. We hadn't gotten involved in the Franco-Prussian War, had we? We had gotten involved in WW1, and a lot of people thought we had been swindled into it by the Alies; they did not want to do it again, especially all by themselves.

The US would go to war to prevent Nazi genocide? For one thing the Genocide Express was still at the siding in 1941, and I doubt anybody who heard about it would have believed it - they didn't while the war was going on. Besides, just because there is a genocide doesn't mean we are going to leap in. We didn't for the Armenians, we didn't do it for the Ukrainians, we didn't do it for China in the Taiping Rebellion in the 1800s that killed millions. More recently, we ignored Pol Pot and lots of African nastiness.

No, I think that if Britain was out of the war, the US wouldn't have jumped in by ourselves. Germany was not a believable threat to North America in 1941.

223767[/snapback]

 

That was my point of the historic legacy of a Churchill govt collapsing in 41/42, presaging an armistice/peace in the Anglo-German War [making the IJN move south problematic]. The timing is the significance, keeping the Anglo-German War on for over a year after the Fall of France, which triggered the US national emergency and the accellerated rearmament [50,000 planes/year, two-ocean navy, etc] and likely would have seen the continuation not of the draft, but the 1-year call-up of the reserves/guard which you must have meant. If the Brits dragged out the desert war into '42 one might have seen as well the augmentation of LL, the exchanage of the a-bomb technology, etc. that would have assisted the final victory.

 

Really, King, the Taiping Rebellion? We did not care how many Chinamen died in the 19th-20th C. any more than we do Iraqis or other Arabs in the 21st...and we did shoot Arabs for sport in Algieria, Morocco in 42-43, according to An Army at Dawn. No, nobody has gone to war to prevent or revenge a genocide, that would require a new human genome not yet morphed into the species, I suspect.

 

How long the public would have tolerated the New Order 1941ff is anybody's guess, but the bitterness of the 1914-18 experience would likely have atrophied with each new aspect of that regime; look how eagerly we embraced Uncle Joe and the former Red Menace as allies. We trusted our govt back then, better or worse, and it was really like Herman Wouk said in Winds of War, that the Nazis and Japanese set out to loot the world and we and allies rallied to do the long years of sacrifice necessary to turn them back. This is part of the continuing fascination of WWII that cannot be rivaled, nor applied to other conflicts.

[swerve]

Oh, the Canal would be the biggest anti-tank moat the Germans hit since the English Channel. Just getting across it in the face of any resitance would be taxing.

 

Narrower than some of the rivers they crossed in Russia, with less current.

[KingSargent]

Narrower than some of the rivers they crossed in Russia, with less current.

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Is true, but I don't believe that PanzerArmee Afrika included bridging columns...

[KingSargent]

Argus/Shane: The formatting IS getting a bit weird so I'll just try to cover your points.

 

On the questions of "blockading" the Med, I believe you are envisioning the Allies controlling the whole Med Basin. They didn't need to. Until the Axis went into Tunisia after TORCH, the only port in Libya was Tripoli. And Tripoli's docking facilities could only service 3-4 ships at a time (depending on size) and Tripoli's cranes were unable to handle 60-ton loads, which is why the Germans had Tigers in Tunisia but Rommel never had any in Libya/Cyrenaica.

Benghazi and Tobruk are marked on maps as ports (especially in wargames where they have infinite capacity to supply armies ) but they were very small affairs with very limited capacity. If the Allies can deny access to Tripoli they will strangle Axis North Africa. So submarines and mining a/c could block one port and in effect "blockade" the entire coast. Axis ASW sucked - at least in comparison with the RN and USN - and all fuel for North Afrika had to be brought in through Tripoli; so airborne ASW operations would have to fly from Sicily/Italy once Tripoli's stocks of avgas are gone. And Italian warships had very short range, so their 'loiter time' in the Gulf of Tripoli would be limited, and their navy was perpetually starved for oil anyway.

Naturally if the Allies are pushed across the Suez they will be unable to block Tripoli; but the Axis will have a very long supply line until they can get Alexandria and Suez operational, and very limited capacity at the Tripoli end.

 

Allied supply after the loss of Suez would not necessarily have to come overland from the Persian Gulf, there is Aqaba. I'm sure it had very limited capacity, but it could help, and the Allies were much better at building and improving ports than the Axis was (and better at building/repairing pipelines ). Access to food stocks and water in the ME would lessen the supply burden, except in Sinai.

 

Like you, I think that if the Axis got as far as Suez there would be a 'major reassessment'. Turkey might join the Axis in which case the Allies would really be in trouble in the ME. Or the CW might quit...

[swerve]

Is true, but I don't believe that PanzerArmee Afrika included bridging columns...

223881[/snapback]

 

 

Ah. Got me there

[larrikin]

The real reason for the RNs desire to keep the Canal was Haifa. That was where their oil refinery was.

[Argus]

Sarge.

 

I do take your point on Tripoli and the ports in libya. Not meaning to get snotty but I am aware (in rough terms) of their historical capabilities and issues such as crane capacity and berthing. My point was that Libyan ports become almost irrevelivent as soon as the Axis gets Alex working. I know the RN can blockade the western Med from Gib, and we agree they cannot do much in the eastern basin without Alex/Haifa etc. So the loss of the eastern Med ports make the blockage of the western med ones much less critical - Untill the land battle moves back to the western end with TORCH or the equivilent.

 

To blockade the Axis in North Africa when they hold both Libyan and Egyptian ports requires an operational base in the Eastern Med and that would have to be supplied overland if Suez was in axis hands.

 

As far as bridgeing equipment for the AK, I did see that point comming <pats self on back > and I really don't think the lack of specialist kit would hold back the Germans for any great length of time. You said it yourself, the Canal is pretty useless for the Axis, so there would be little penalty to them in blocking it off for a period of time. Say sinking a couple of coasters and bridgeing across them. Improvision with local materials is something engineers tend to be pretty good at.

 

ASW and Avgas - air bridge? If they could do it historicaly for the AK's tanks as a suppliment to the tankers, then I'm sure they could keep a few ASW planes flying, Aunty Ju to the rescue.

 

Ports I agree they will have a long supply line untill they get Alex working, but then they will also have un fettered use of all the minor ports as well, Tripoli, Benghazi, Torbruk, Bardia, Matruth. They might not be worth much individually, but together that add up to a reasonable capacity. Look if historically the Axis could reach El Al and 'just' support the combined army, under active interdiction by air and sea. Is an extra hundred miles in the face of less interdiction really so impossiable? If all eslse fails hey can float drums over the beach I suppose.

 

Look as I said earlier, I can't see the axis blitzing straight across Suez, no doubt they would push if only to keep the CW off ballance, but I would expect a strategic pause in de Nile valley untill they could get Alex and Port Said up and working. So they would face a week or three on 'life support,' dependant on the long line back across the desert. But then in the same period the Cw is not going to be much of a position to counter attack in force is it? They have to establish a new line back to where ever, reorganise the forces that escaped from Eqypt etc.

 

Sinai is hardly a market garden, but then its also a damn sight closer to Egypt than it is to Tripoli. Those local resource that the Axis can use in Egypt are still going to be an advantage to them in crossing the Sinai and still be valuable into palestine and beyond. Food and water are both portable, they don't turn to dust as soon as they cross the canal .

 

Aquaba - cue Peter O'Tool on a camel. It might be useful for a little while, but it is rather close to Egypt and axis airpower once it moves forward to those nice RAF fields around Cairo (and gets a supply of fuel of course). Anyway I'm prety sure the road net from Aquaba up into the Sinai isn't much to write home about.

 

shane

[Ken Estes]

Even if the long shot worked and Rommel defeated the CW at Alamein, the push to the Nile, Alexandria, Cairo, Suez [and these are serious populated areas] would leave the German-Italian African Army perilously stretched out. If the Med Fleet [less heavy units I suppose] decided to hole up in Haifa, backed by the Desert Air Force, all supplied via Acaba, there is not a clear LOC to keep the Axis supplied. Even before that happens, I wonder what Auckinleck's last defense scheme was for the Nile and how well the 8th Army might have extricated itself from Alamein to man it...certainly Rommel had no resources for a pursuit. A bit dodgy for the Axis, as the Brits call it?

[KingSargent]

Sarge.

 

I do take your point on Tripoli and the ports in libya. Not meaning to get snotty but I am aware (in rough terms) of their historical capabilities and issues such as crane capacity and berthing. My point was that Libyan ports become almost irrevelivent as soon as the Axis gets Alex working.

Well, depending on how far the Allies are from Alex. If they can base planes just east of the Suez Canal, they can interdict the port. And they can base subs in Cyprus and Haifa to keep contesting the Axis use of Alex.

I know the RN can blockade the western Med from Gib, and we agree they cannot do much in the eastern basin without Alex/Haifa etc. So the loss of the eastern Med ports make the blockage of the western med ones much less critical - Untill the land battle moves back to the western end with TORCH or the equivilent.

My point is that it will take the Axis much longer to recondition Alex than the Allies did for Cherbourg, Brest, Naples, etc. WE had special engineering units for just that task, when they weren't rebuilding damaged ports they were improving or building new ones.

To blockade the Axis in North Africa when they hold both Libyan and Egyptian ports requires an operational base in the Eastern Med and that would have to be supplied overland if Suez was in axis hands.

Well, if the Axis gets as far as Alex, it will be pretty obvious the RN and RAF won't be able to interdict the whole coastline from thr Nile to Tunisia, so it becomes moot at that point.

 

 

As far as bridgeing equipment for the AK, I did see that point comming <pats self on back > and I really don't think the lack of specialist kit would hold back the Germans for any great length of time. You said it yourself, the Canal is pretty useless for the Axis, so there would be little penalty to them in blocking it off for a period of time. Say sinking a couple of coasters and bridgeing across them. Improvision with local materials is something engineers tend to be pretty good at.

Well, I neglected it before, but before the Axis gets to Suez they have to cross the Nile. It's fairly wide at Cairo, but trying to cross the Delta between Alex and Suez would be a real trip. Several trips actually, they would have to build a bunch of bridges to get across all the little drainages of the Delta, and the ground won't support vehicles, it's like gluey gumbo.

As for sinking a couple of coasters and using them to bridge the Canal (under fire), where will they get the coasters? The Brits would be very careful to remove or blow in place everything that floated. And Egypt is rather short of bridge-building materials.

ASW and Avgas - air bridge? If they could do it historicaly for the AK's tanks as a suppliment to the tankers, then I'm sure they could keep a few ASW planes flying, Aunty Ju to the rescue.

And what happened to the "air bridge" when the Allies got fighters within range of it? I refer to the one to Tunisia.

Ports I agree they will have a long supply line untill they get Alex working, but then they will also have un fettered use of all the minor ports as well, Tripoli, Benghazi, Torbruk, Bardia, Matruth. They might not be worth much individually, but together that add up to a reasonable capacity. Look if historically the Axis could reach El Al and 'just' support the combined army, under active interdiction by air and sea. Is an extra hundred miles in the face of less interdiction really so impossiable? If all eslse fails hey can float drums over the beach I suppose.

That didn't work out too well when the Japanese tried it on The Enema Place.

Oh yes, I agree that the Axis could build up their supply. If determined enough and if they got enough support from home they could probably get across the water obstacles and push forward again. But they'll have a long way to go, and it won't be a walkover.

I'm not saying it was completely impossible, I am explaining how wrong the armchair strategists are when they blithely say, "Just cross the Canal and go the Persian Gulf!" Sure. Right...

Look as I said earlier, I can't see the axis blitzing straight across Suez, no doubt they would push if only to keep the CW off ballance, but I would expect a strategic pause in de Nile valley untill they could get Alex and Port Said up and working. So they would face a week or three on 'life support,'

Probably a lot longer than that unless Hitler and Mussolini were really interested in improving the support sent to Africa. That would probably depend on how things were going in Russia.

dependant on the long line back across the desert. But then in the same period the Cw is not going to be much of a position to counter attack in force is it? They have to establish a new line  back to where ever, reorganise the forces that escaped from Eqypt etc.

They wouldn't be running any offensives any time soon, but I think they could make it very hard for the Axis to attack themselves.

Sinai is hardly a market garden, but then its also a damn sight closer to Egypt than it is to Tripoli. Those local resource that the Axis can use in Egypt are still going to be an advantage to them in crossing the Sinai and still be valuable  into palestine and beyond. Food and water are both portable, they don't turn to dust as soon as they cross the canal .

Water they would have. Food would be problematical at first, depending on how much the British left. If they have to wait for Egyptian farmers to plant, grow, and harvest, they could be hungry for a while.

Aquaba - cue Peter O'Tool on a camel. It might be useful for a little while, but it is rather close to Egypt and axis airpower once it moves forward to those nice RAF fields around Cairo (and gets a supply of fuel of course). Anyway I'm prety sure the road net from Aquaba up into the Sinai isn't much to write home about.

 

shane

224091[/snapback]

Aqaba is actually a fair distance from the Egyptian side of the Canal, and I doubt the Germans had air charts to navigate across one of the most desolate places on Earth. I know: "Fly straight East until you hit water. Try to miss the mountains. Turn left and follow water until there is no more water. The port is around there someplace. Sieg Heil!"

As for the "nice RAF airfields" the Axis would probably be better off building new ones than trying to repair the demolitions. Of course if the RAF handled the demolition as well as they did in Malaya, the Germans and Italians would get nice ready-to-go airfields... just like the Japanese did...

As for Aqaba's transit net, it had connections to Amman, and Amman had connections to Palestine and Palestine had roads down into the Sinai. I don't know what shape they were in. There were some railroads too, but I don't know the capacity.

[swerve]

If the Med Fleet [less heavy units I suppose] decided to hole up in Haifa, backed by the Desert Air Force, all supplied via Acaba, there is not a clear LOC to keep the Axis supplied.

 

Aqaba ia one of the most easily blockaded ports in the world. You can see across the straits on a clear day. Axis air, plus a few U-boats (they're small: they can get through a mostly blocked canal), could limit the use of Aqaba rather severely. They don't actually need to bomb the port: just sink ships. Also, there were a few crap roads & exactly one single track railway running north from there. I doubt it would contribute much in the way of supplies.

 

The land route from Iraq looks much better. Also lousy roads (Tarmac? What's that?), & a solitary single-track railway, but more roads, & assuming continued Turkish neutrality, that railway is not subject to Axis air interdiction, plus ports at the other end safe from both U-boats & Axis bombers.

 

However, any route would be very thin.

 

One question is, how far up the Nile would the Axis go? It's likely British forces would hold on in Sudan, supplied via Port Sudan & the railway.

 

I think King overstates the difficulties of crossing the Nile delta. There are - and were - roads & railways from Alexandria (west of the delta) to Cairo (south of it) & Cairo to Suez (done that route ), Ismailia & Port Said, & several railway lines through the delta, as well as numerous roads. The British army would have to do a lot of bridge demolition. The main railways in 1935 are shown at -

 

http://mikes.railhistory.railfan.net/r050.html

 

which also mentions train repair works.

Edited September 19, 2005 by swerve

[KingSargent]

I think King overstates the difficulties of crossing the Nile delta. There are - and were - roads & railways from Alexandria (west of the delta) to Cairo (south of it) & Cairo to Suez (done that route ), Ismailia & Port Said, & several railway lines through the delta, as well as numerous roads. The British army would have to do a lot of bridge demolition. The main railways in 1935 are shown at -

 

http://mikes.railhistory.railfan.net/r050.html

 

which also mentions train repair works.

224129[/snapback]

Having been on a bus from Alex to Cairo, to Suez, it is not necessary to cross the Delta. You take a road on the West bank of the Nile from Alex to Cairo, cross the Nile at Cairo after looking at pyramids, and go to Suez on the East bank. To go straight east from Alex to Suez is another game.

Yes there are routes and there are lots of bridges.

As for demolishing bridges, US Engineers blew up many Belgian bridges during the Battle of the Bulge. I see no reason Royal Engineers would be less efficient.