Could the USSR won WWII without the western allies

[Redbeard]

My impression is that the Soviet crisis really culminated in early 1942, when losses taken in 1941 still had not been replaced and production still suffered from moving factories to Ural.

 

Without strong allies, supplies running in and prospect of much more I think there is a serious risk that the Soviets would have thrown in the towel, much like the Russian Empire did in WWI.

 

BTW no western allies also should mean no Balkan trouble in 1941 and thus an earlier German start of Barbarossa. This in itself ensures no German victory, but if it just means smaller German losses before Moscow in 1941, the consequences in spring of 1942 could indeed be significant.

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

[Blunt Eversmoke]

Question on that, though.  I've read that this victory (and the rest of the war to date, of course) for the Soviets badly depleted them of many of things that Lend Lease made up for; trucks and railway cars that were fallling apart, food stocks, medicine, explosives, etc almost gone, etc.  What I drew from this was that the Soviets pulled it off but were staggering pretty badly at that point.  So was Germany, of course, but it's infrastructure was largely intact which would have facilitated rebuilding.  Absent L-L, the USSR would have been unable to build itself back up in '43 and early '44 as it did in the real world.  Give '43 for Germany and the USSR to pause and desperately rebuild and the USSR would have been in real trouble against the Germans.

 

Matt

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Factories would be (and have been) rebuilt and newly constructed east of Ural. It would not be just Germany to rebuild stuff... And then, there's the Russian winter. The Germans did not learn to cope with it, not during WW1 nor during the Great Patriotic War. And even if they did, it would not only require warm winter clothes for the soldiers, no, it would also mean development of new, winter-proof vehicles, for some part from scratch. On a side note, Germany was even worse off than the USSR without L-L when it came to metals enhancing steel quality.

 

Without strong allies, supplies running in and prospect of much more I think there is a serious risk that the Soviets would have thrown in the towel, much like the Russian Empire did in WWI.

 

Steffen Redbeard

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Not even the slightest chance of that... I mean, every fourth(according to some statistics, every third) Belorussian civilian murdered by the German army does forbid surrendering somewhat strictly - the Germans were seen as foul beasts that had to be wiped off one's land, period. Also, the propaganda did its job well. If anything, every man, woman and even child strong enough to hold a weapon would die fighting...

[KingSargent]

much higher than 500 per month would it have climbed without the raids. 

  Soviet production in 1942 is just amazing.  You have the disruptions of 1941, plus the Stalingrad tank factory production is lost for 1/3 of the year.

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It wasn't really lost it just got killed off real quick when the tanks were driven out of the factory directly into combat.

[arctic fox]

I don't understand why 1941 was the "best" year for the Germans to invade Russia.  If they had waited until 1942 who's to say that Stalin wouldn't have killed the other half of his officers.

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You quote Glantz' "When Titans Clashed". He covers this subject in this book of his. Do you disagree with his reasoning?

[Detonable]

You quote Glantz' "When Titans Clashed". He covers this subject in this book of his. Do you disagree with his reasoning?

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I don't remember his reasoning (on why more officers would not have been killed). He didn't stop killing them after Barbarossa. He killed a number of generals whose troops had been routed, even though many of the Soviets losses were due to his forbidding them to retreat.

 

It has been noted that lend lease did not kick in before Moscow, or Stalingrad. However, the allies main contribution, the destruction of the Luftwaffe, started long before the Soviet Union entered the war. American aircraft production in 1942 dwarfs Soviet and German production. I think Glantz credits about half of Luftwaffe losses in 1942 (and maybe early 1943) to the Western allies. I don't know how accurate his information is, he does not seem very aware of the air war.

 

There were considerable Luftwaffe losses in the battle of France. I think someone posted that Luftwaffe losses in the Battle of Britain were 1600 planes. And, there was a steady drain at Crete, and in North Africa. By Alem Halfa, the Luftwaffe was pretty much wiped out in Africa.

 

I'm not sure that if the Germans had reached Moscow in 1941 they would be better off. People have pointed out that the major rail lines ran through Moscow. To me, that suggests that troops from all over the Soviet Union would be arriving in the Moscow area. The winter was the coldest in many years, and the Germans were totally unprepared in 1941. I think a repeat of Napolean's experience was possible. The German trucks and horses couldn't handle the cold, so they couldn't maneuver or retreat very well.

 

The Belorussian experience wasn't the same as the Ukrainian experience, for example. In the Ukraine, the Soviets had wiped out one third of the population, and weren't particularly welcomed back.

 

I think the Germans were adequately prepared for the winter of 1942-1943, at least in the Caucasus. They'd learned from 1941. I've seen a picture of a soldier riding a Camel somewhere in the Caucasus, so it can't be too cold there in 1942 and later. Its pretty far south of Moscow.

 

I think that many of Russian specialty metal (perhaps molybdenum?) mines had been overrun by the Germans. Don't remember where I read this, but they also said the Germans could not produce much from them. Is the Donetz basin area the metals production area?

[KingSargent]

BTW no western allies also should mean no Balkan trouble in 1941 and thus an earlier German start of Barbarossa. This in itself ensures no German victory, but if it just means smaller German losses before Moscow in 1941, the consequences in spring of 1942 could indeed be significant.

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

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There couldn't have been a much earlier start, the 1941 Spring was late and the ground was muddy until almost 22June.

 

What "no Balkans" would mean is that the troops that were used there would not have taken casualties, worn their vehicles out, etc. 2nd and 5th Panzer and 60th Motorized sat out the opening of Barabossa because they were refitting after the Balkans. OTOH, the "Balkans vets" constituted the OKW Reserve. There would probably have been a reserve anyway, so the whole thing might be a wash.

[arctic fox]

I don't remember his reasoning (on why more officers would not have been killed).

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Glantz points out many reasons why Soviets were caught so off balance in June 1941. The killing of officers is just one of them.

 

Here's a quote from the book you quoted earlier ("When Titans Clashed", by David M. Glantz), from page 44.

 

"In retrospect, the most serious Soviet failture was neither strategic surprise nor tactical surprise, but institutional surprise. In June 1941, the Red Army and Air Force were in transition, changing their organization, leadership, equipment, training, troop dispositions, and defensive plans. Had Hitler attacked four years earlier or even one year later, the Soviet armed forces would have been more than a match for the Wehrmacht. Wether by coincidence or instinct, however, the German dictator invaded at a time when his own armed forces were still close to their peak while his arch enemy was most vulnerable. It was this institutional surprise that was most responsible for the catastrophic Soviet defeats of 1941."

 

Emphasis mine.

[arctic fox]

What "no Balkans" would mean is that the troops that were used there would not have taken casualties, worn their vehicles out, etc. 2nd and 5th Panzer and 60th Motorized sat out the opening of Barabossa because they were refitting after the Balkans. OTOH, the "Balkans vets" constituted the OKW Reserve. There would probably have been a reserve anyway, so the whole thing might be a wash.

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Operations at Balkans, and other such "diversions", were used by Germans as excuses for their heavy troop presence by the Soviet border. They used the air war at West, and many other things, for similar purposes.

 

Had there been no such "diversions", it is very likely that Soviets would not have bought so deep into German lies, and German invasion in June 1941 wouldn't have found Soviet forces so unprepared, which was one key element for German victories in 1941.

[WHM]

Had there been no such "diversions", it is very likely that Soviets would not have bought so deep into German lies, and German invasion in June 1941 wouldn't have found Soviet forces so unprepared, which was one key element for German victories in 1941.

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Don't think he would be the only source but the author if Stalin's Folly by Constantine Pleshakov, points out the only person who was fooled was the one who made all the decisions, Stalin.

 

He was so paranoid that he distrusted his own generals and security services, probably the best in the world at the time.

 

Stalin helped the Germans by fooling himself.

[FlyingCanOpener]

Hurrah - first post!

 

The Germans would have had a much better chance if they had liberated the peoples of the Baltic states, rather than oppress them. That extra manpower would have been denied to the Soviets and the Germans would not have had to have used the large numbers of troops needed to secure their rear areas and lines of supply against highly organisd partisan 'armies'.

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Can I sue for copyright infringement over the resemblance of names?

 

You could apply that idea to, well, everywhere the Nazis ran over. But then again, that would require rational behaviour from a group of people who consistently defies rational behaviour...

 

[EDIT]

 

The Germans did not learn to cope with it, (Winter) not during WW1 ...

 

Tell that to the Russians at the Second Battle of the Masurian Lakes in Feb. 1915...

Edited September 3, 2005 by FlyingCanOpener

[larrikin]

IIRC the biggest influence of Lend Lease was the %age of explosives it supplied, both as finished product and as the chemical components.

[Detonable]

Glantz points out many reasons why Soviets were caught so off balance in June 1941. The killing of officers is just one of them.

 

Here's a quote from the book you quoted earlier ("When Titans Clashed", by David M. Glantz), from page 44.

 

"In retrospect, the most serious Soviet failture was neither strategic surprise nor tactical surprise, but institutional surprise. In June 1941, the Red Army and Air Force were in transition, changing their organization, leadership, equipment, training, troop dispositions, and defensive plans. Had Hitler attacked four years earlier or even one year later, the Soviet armed forces would have been more than a match for the Wehrmacht. Wether by coincidence or instinct, however, the German dictator invaded at a time when his own armed forces were still close to their peak while his arch enemy was most vulnerable. It was this institutional surprise that was most responsible for the catastrophic Soviet defeats of 1941."

 

Emphasis mine.

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The VVS was pretty much annihilated anywhere the Luftwaffe went in force in 1942. So I don't see how their performance would have been much better a year after Barbarossa.

 

If year after year of chaos occurred, why would it suddenly end in 1942 and everything would be fine? Why wouldn't you have more chaos, supervised by officers who were desperately afraid of taking any initiative. that might seem like it contradicted Stalin's perceived intentions.

 

Perhaps 4 years earlier the Germans had not rearmed themselves very much, so a strong Soviet effort is possible.

[arctic fox]

The VVS was pretty much annihilated anywhere the Luftwaffe went in force in 1942.  So I don't see how their performance would have been much better a year after Barbarossa.

 

If year after year of chaos occurred, why would it suddenly end in 1942 and everything would be fine? Why wouldn't you have more chaos, supervised by officers who were desperately afraid of taking any initiative. that might seem like it contradicted Stalin's perceived intentions.

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I think the main reasoning is that in that one year of time the pilots and the new officers would have been a lot better trained. Many of the serving officers never got to finish their training and the pilots often had flown with the real planes only a couple of times. And of course time favors the Soviets with production.

 

I have the impression that Stalin's purges, what comes to officers, took place mainly during 1937-1939, so in 1941 it was generally over, but there wasn't yet enough of new officers to replace the purged ones.

[KingSargent]

I have the impression that Stalin's purges, what comes to officers, took place mainly during 1937-1939, so in 1941 it was generally over, but there wasn't yet enough of new officers to replace the purged ones.

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It was still a threat and stifled what little iniative any Red Army officer had. If you wanted to stay alive, you just hunkered down, went to Party meetings, and said "Yes Comrade" to whatever BS your unit commissar was spouting that day.

 

Tank officers who knew that 70% of their force was deadlined for lack of spare parts couldn't even ask for parts because it might be seen as Interfering With Five-Year Plan.

[arctic fox]

It was still a threat and stifled what little iniative any Red Army officer had. If you wanted to stay alive, you just hunkered down, went to Party meetings, and said "Yes Comrade" to whatever BS your unit commissar was spouting that day.

 

Tank officers who knew that 70% of their force was deadlined for lack of spare parts couldn't even ask for parts because it might be seen as Interfering With Five-Year Plan.

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That's true and there still were executions, but as far as I know the actual purges were already over.

 

Soviet doctrine, as such, was perhaps the most advanced in the world.

[KingSargent]

That's true and there still were executions, but as far as I know the actual purges were already over.

You can be sick and get sick again. It is only with hindsight that we surmise the Great Purge was over.

Soviet doctrine, as such, was perhaps the most advanced in the world.

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Probably in the 1930s, but they had scrapped it because of "lessons" from the Spanish Civil War and the Winter War. Besides, the officers who made the doctrine and practiced it were among the first to be purged.

[larrikin]

Soviet doctrine, as such, was perhaps the most advanced in the world.

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There's doctrine, and then there's practice. It's no use having the most advanced doctrine in the world if you don't have the officers, NCOs, ORs or equipment to carry it out. Not only did the SUs forces lack training they also lacked communications. I wonder just how capable they would have been of deep manouvre even without the purges given their lack of radios.

[arctic fox]

You can be sick and get sick again. It is only with hindsight that we surmise the Great Purge was over.

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I haven't seen sources that would claim that the purges continued after 1939. Why would the purges have returned in 1942, then?

 

 

Probably in the 1930s, but they had scrapped it because of "lessons" from the Spanish Civil War and the Winter War. Besides, the officers who made the doctrine and practiced it were among the first to be purged.

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Yes, Soviets learned from lessons of the past and present, and the Soviet doctrine went thru adaptions still during the war, not least because Red Army was caught in the middle of transition. The Soviet doctrine was very advanced in 1940s, even more advanced than that of the Germans and certainly more advanced than those of the Western Allies (save perhaps the US, whose doctrine I am not that familiar with).

[arctic fox]

There's doctrine, and then there's practice.  It's no use having the most advanced doctrine in the world if you don't have the officers, NCOs, ORs or equipment to carry it out.

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Exactly.

 

 

Not only did the SUs forces lack training they also lacked communications.  I wonder just how capable they would have been of deep manouvre even without the purges given their lack of radios.

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That's a very good question.

[KingSargent]

I haven't seen sources that would claim that the purges continued after 1939.  Why would the purges have returned in 1942, then?

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Try "Stalin was an unpredictable megalomaniac murderer" and see if that fits. Stalin kept murdering people throughout the war. He ordered that any Soviet soldier who surrendered (became a POW) would be executed, and his family as well. He fulfilled that promise when POWs returned after WW2.

[swerve]

Try "Stalin was an unpredictable megalomaniac murderer" and see if that fits. Stalin kept murdering people throughout the war. He ordered that any Soviet soldier who surrendered (became a POW) would be executed, and his family as well. He fulfilled that promise when POWs returned after WW2.

 

Not quite. He only had some killed. The majority were sent to the Gulag, as were some (but not most) of their families. More died in German prison camps than at Stalins hands - though he killed plenty.

 

Poor bastards. PoWs were in a fire/frying pan scenario. Escape & get home & it's the Gulag, or a mine-clearing unit, or maybe even summary execution. Stay & you were likely to die of typhus, malnutrition, overwork, dysentery or something equally lovely.

[KingSargent]

Not quite. He only had some killed. The majority were sent to the Gulag, as were some (but not most) of their families. More died in German prison camps than at Stalins hands - though he killed plenty.

 

Poor bastards. PoWs were in a fire/frying pan scenario. Escape & get home & it's the Gulag, or a mine-clearing unit, or maybe even summary execution. Stay & you were likely to die of typhus, malnutrition, overwork, dysentery or something equally lovely.

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Kind of makes you understand why many served Germany in 'Ost' units, or became 'kiwis' - unofficial Russian additions to German units to German units in the USSR.

[Fritz]

Soviet doctrine, as such, was perhaps the most advanced in the world.

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I'm really not sure what you mean?

[WHM]

I have the impression that Stalin's purges, what comes to officers, took place mainly during 1937-1939, so in 1941 it was generally over, but there wasn't yet enough of new officers to replace the purged ones.

 

Not necessarily so, Stalin's Folly by Constantine Pleshakov mentions Stalin was thinking of ANOTHER purge of the army. You got to believe this put a damper on things.

 

As for Soviet doctrine being the most advanced well to be fair, I have read that after 1943 the Soviets did understand deep battle better then the Germans, but the Germans remained superior tactically, that was why in the Red Army's march through Poland they lost 5 tanks to everyone the Germans had, but they always had the 6th.

 

Their doctrine does make you wonder however. true they did have the T-34 and the KV tanks, but also those multiturreted "land battleships". Kind of makes you wonder what were they thinking.

 

As for German tactical superiority, that would be one facter when considering if the war in the east may have ended differently (German win/stalemate) if the western allies hadn't engaged them on a seond front

[gnocci]

Their doctrine does make you wonder however. true they did have the T-34 and the KV tanks, but also those multiturreted "land battleships". Kind of makes you wonder what were they thinking.

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The "Soviet Doctrine" usually refered to, Tukhachevski's "Deep Battle" is asociated with previous generation tanks, in particular with the BT series cavalry tanks. T-35 is a child of the times, almost everyone had a multiturreted heavy design back then, the British, the French, even... gasp! the Germans...

The KV is in fact a child of the Winter War (and it had some multiturreted incarnations, too). They just tought they needed something to slug it out with fortifications, not much doctrine here.

Now, the T-34 was the new thing. And seems the most important doctrinal factor here was the Spanish Civil War. The experience showed that the main designs of the time, the BT and the T-26 were vulnerable to the current AT guns (37mm and the like), and that the loses to them would be too heavy to operate in a real war. Thus the new level of protection for the T-34. Another conclusion that was in the air was that there were problems in the interaction between infantry and tanks, but seem they couldn't/wouldn't/hadn't the time to solve them.