WW2 alt history. slipping Italy

[Rich]

A: From whence comes this five Panzer divisions in 1943?

 

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Well, sort of, but he may be geographically challenged. In France and Belgium was:

 

1) Schnell Brigade West was a panzer division by another name, and for 1943 facing Western Allies driving Crusaders, Covenantors, Rams, and Grants (about all there was in England), it was nothing to sneeze at, 275 SP 7.5 and 4.7cm AT guns ain't bad by themselves.

 

2) 14 PzD

 

3) 16 PzD (moved to Italy as a consequence of Husky)

 

4) 24 PzD

 

5) 26 PzD (moved to Italy as a consequence of Husky)

 

6) 3 PzGD (moved to Italy as a consequence of Husky)

 

7) 29 PzGD (moved to Italy as a consequence of Husky)

 

8) 9 SS PzD (effectively a strong motorized infantry division at this time)

 

9) 10 SS PzD (effectively a strong motorized infantry division at this time)

 

The rest (HG, 15 PzGD/PzGD Sizilian, 90 PzGD, and FHH) were all either in Corsica/Sardinia, Sicily or northern Italy at the time.

[Rich]

Further on the subject, it is interesting to do an actual comparison - as best I can - between the situation in FRance in June 1943 and that in June 1944.

 

Comparison of the West June 1943 to June 1944 (hope its legible)

 

Number (incl. Schnell) June 1943/Number (incl. Schnell) June 1944

Total Western Front 60 (12)/91 (20)

(Total in France and Belgium) (47 (8))/(53 (10))

(Total in Holland) (5)/(6 (1))

(Total in Denmark) (4 (1))/(5 (2))

(Total in Italy) (4 (3))/(27 (7))

 

Total in Norway 14 (1)/12 (1)

Total in Finland 7 (0)/7 (0)

Total in Balkans 10 (1)/20 (2)

Total in Crete/Greece 2 (0)/1 (0)

Total in Germany 2 (0)/4 (1)

Total in Hungary 0/1 (0)

Total in Poland 1 (0)/2 (0)

 

Total Eastern Front 179 (28)/142 (25)

 

In terms of degrees of readiness, 6 of the 8 Schnell divisions in France in 1943 were either ready or nearly ready by 1 June 1943 (75%), although a lot of their assigned tanks were still in transit. In contrast in 1944 only 5 of the 10 Schnell divisions in France were either ready or nearly ready by 1 June 1944 (50%), [Edit] although for most of the others their replacement tank situation was better than in June 1943 [/Edit, sheesh, the mind is a terrible thing to waste! ].

 

Of the other 39 divisions in France in 1943, 23 were infantry (including, 5 newly formed or reformed and 5 static), 1 was SS Grenadier, 10 were Reserve-Infantry, 2 were Fallschirm, and 3 were LW-Feld, so about 18 of the 39 (46%) were 'effective'. In 1944 the other 43 divisions included 31 Infantry (including 2 “reflagged” Reserve-Infantry, 14 newly formed, and 4 static), 7 Reserve-Infantry, 3 Fallschirm (all newly formed), and 2 LW-Feld, so about 13 of the 43 (30%).

 

(Edit: Whoops, forgot Panzer Lehr - correction made) (Edit: Damn I wish I could remember to finish my thought....see above, next to the last paragraph.)

Edited August 10, 2005 by Rich

[Rich]

Further on the subject, it is interesting to do an actual comparison - as best I can - between the situation in FRance in June 1943 and that in June 1944.

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No takers? Geez, you guys are turning into a bunch of wimps!?

[KingSargent]

No takers? Geez, you guys are turning into a bunch of wimps!? 

205847[/snapback]

I thought you meant you were going to do the comparison...

[RETAC21]

So, simplifying a bit,

 

In 1943 there were 6 Schnell divisions ready against 5 in 1944 (but with half the armor more or less, 1.144 tanks and Stugs vs. 3.551) with 18 effective infantry divisions vs. 13 in 1944. At the time defences were less formidable (but by how much) but then the Germans had a better ability to reinforce as there has been no transportation plan. On the plus side, they are about to receive a beating in the Russian Front after Kursk (though, the allies couldn't know).

 

I don't know how the beaches of Britanny stand up vs. Normandy, but for a Anzio like redoubt they may be enough (though the plan must include a breakthrough in the spring of 1944), and has the bonus of denying the Germans the use of the submarine bases, which should be a worthy objective in 1943.

[JohnB]

Rich, do you know how many DUKWs were available for US 7th Army during HUSKY? British 8th Army had about 350 allocated.

DUKWs available for NEPTUNE numbered in excess of 2,000 I believe.

[Rich]

I thought you meant you were going to do the comparison...

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Chicken!

[Rich]

Rich, do you know how many DUKWs were available for US 7th Army during HUSKY? British 8th Army had about 350 allocated.

DUKWs available for NEPTUNE numbered in excess of 2,000 I believe.

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I'm not sure, but will see what I can find.

[Rich]

So, simplifying a bit,

 

In 1943 there were 6 Schnell divisions ready against 5 in 1944 (but with half the armor more or less,  1.144 tanks and Stugs vs. 3.551) with 18 effective infantry divisions vs. 13 in 1944. At the time defences were less formidable (but by how much) but then the Germans had a better ability to reinforce as there has been no transportation plan. On the plus side, they are about to receive a beating in the Russian Front after Kursk (though, the allies couldn't know).

 

I don't know how the beaches of Britanny stand up vs. Normandy, but for a Anzio like redoubt they may be enough (though the plan must include a breakthrough in the spring of 1944), and has the bonus of denying the Germans the use of the submarine bases, which should be a worthy objective in 1943.

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Well, it's a little more complicated than that. The actual panzer state (Panzer and StuG) in the west (Ob. West in FRance, Belgium and Holland and Ob. Sued in Italy) fluctuated quite a bit in 1943. The total on hand (I believe you included those en route in your figures, which is incorrect, many of those could take weeks to arrive and many were diverted) was:

 

21 May (i.e, after Tunisia was written off) - 534

2 June - 585

10 June - 286!

14 June - 390

2 July - 814

11 July - 686

21 July - 848

2 August - 854

11 August - 1,005

23 August - 1,024

3 September - 1,222

 

Part of the fluctation was because all units were not always reported, but also because of the transfer and arrival of various units and replacements - at the time the Germans had a much more robust transportation system to depend on than in 1944.

 

Also, it must be considered that a large number of those tanks available in Ob. West in 1944 were never committed to battle in France, many were actually in Panther Abteilungen assigned to Panzer Brigade 10. at Mailly and were sent to the Eastern Front to join their parent divisions, a situation that did not pertain in 1943 (albeit that many of the reconstituted divisions there were shipped to other locales). Overall, of the 1,811 on hand in Ob. West on 31 May 1944, perhaps 800 had been committed against the invasion by 1 July.

[larrikin]

So, simplifying a bit,

 

In 1943 there were 6 Schnell divisions ready against 5 in 1944 (but with half the armor more or less,  1.144 tanks and Stugs vs. 3.551) with 18 effective infantry divisions vs. 13 in 1944. At the time defences were less formidable (but by how much) but then the Germans had a better ability to reinforce as there has been no transportation plan. On the plus side, they are about to receive a beating in the Russian Front after Kursk (though, the allies couldn't know).

 

I don't know how the beaches of Britanny stand up vs. Normandy, but for a Anzio like redoubt they may be enough (though the plan must include a breakthrough in the spring of 1944), and has the bonus of denying the Germans the use of the submarine bases, which should be a worthy objective in 1943.

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For the beaches, think lots and lots of heavy surf. Lots and lots of heavy surf. And pray tell, how are you going to deny Germany the use of those sub bases while the Heer is chewing your landed divisions to pieces in an "Anzio like redoubt"? How are you going to supply those divisions with your supply shipping sailing across the face of the afore mentioned submarine bases.

 

Every time I see Bordeaux mentioned as a possible invasion site I shake my head in disbelief. Why would anybody in the right mind, or WSC, attempt to land in the worst possible place in Western Europe in 1943? Not even the US Joint Chiefs considered this one with any seriousness, and given some of their ideas about continental lodgements in 1942, that is saying something

[JWB]

How are heeren going to "chew the landed force to pieces?"

[larrikin]

How are heeren going to "chew the landed force to pieces?"

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Confined battleground, limited resources and reinforcement, almost impossible re-suplly situation, no air cover on one side. Interior lines of communication, air superirority, and if the invasion force don't actually manage to take Bordeaux an ammunition factory 10 minutes drive away.

It wouldn't be like Anzio or Normandy. Here the defenders would have all the advantages, and then some. What you would be doing would be throwing away any chance of invading for real in 1944.

[JWB]

Confined battleground, limited resources and reinforcement, almost impossible re-suplly situation, no air cover on one side.  Interior lines of communication, air superirority, and if the invasion force don't actually manage to take Bordeaux an ammunition factory 10 minutes drive away.

It wouldn't be like Anzio or Normandy.  Here the defenders would have all the advantages, and then some.  What you would be doing would be throwing away any chance of invading for real in 1944.

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Yes, but with what forces are the Germans to do this "chewing"? Apart from the 159 Reserve Training Division what else was available?

[swerve]

For the beaches, think lots and lots of heavy surf.  Lots and lots of heavy surf. 

 

Depends on which side of Brittany you're talking about. No surf on the north coast. Or do you mean around Bordeaux? Certainly lots of surf there, though not always - there are days when it's smooth. You mention both.

Edited August 12, 2005 by swerve

[RETAC21]

Depends on which side of Brittany you're talking about. No surf on the north coast. Or do you mean around Bordeaux? Certainly lots of surf there, though not always - there are days when it's smooth. You mention both.

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Well, since everyone was jerking their fantasies around, I thought, since we are going to invade France, why not try to achieve an important objective in 1943?

 

IMO, it would be the Northern coast, which shouldn't be that disimilar from Normandy and allows to cut off Brest, Lorient and St. Nazaire and leaves La Rochelle within striking range. I think it's a bit marginal for fighter range, tough. Railroad access could be cut by bombing Le Mans into oblivion.

Edited August 12, 2005 by RETAC21

[Ken Estes]

Yes, but with what forces are the Germans to do this "chewing"? Apart from the 159 Reserve Training Division what else was available?

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The ones that they would have transferred once the Allied landing craft & shipping buildup and transfers from the Med became clear. If you are going to play what-if games, you logically cannot limit the Axis to a fixed historical setting. Both are dynamic, if not imaginary.

[KingSargent]

Depends on which side of Brittany you're talking about. No surf on the north coast. Or do you mean around Bordeaux? Certainly lots of surf there, though not always - there are days when it's smooth. You mention both.

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Bordeaux is several departments away from Brittany. IIRC it's in Gascony.

 

To try to land on Brittany's north coast (I doubt there are suitable sites, and there certainly wasn't much of a road net), you have to go past the Channel Islands, the part of England that was occupied for almost all of WW2.* Because they were British Territory, Hitler was nervous about them and their part of the Atlantic Wall started early. In any event, guns on the Channel Islands make a landing on the west side of the Cotentin or the north side of Britanny a tricky proposition. Also the north shore of Britanny was more open to weather and wave action, where the Cotentin at least absorbed some of the wave action.

 

Besides all that, Britanny is getting 'iffy' WRT air cover from England. Short-ranged fighters could operate over Normandy from English bases, fewer would have been able to operate over Brittany.** British radar stations could reach to Normandy and provide some fighter direction, I doubt Britanny was within radar range.

 

Nope, it's the Cotentin, guys. Gotta be.

 

*OT, but the case of the Channel Islands amuses me. Here there are people thinking that the US is obligated to launch massive operations to recover two worthless lumps that housed two white teaching missionaries and 30-some Aleuts, because the Japanese are on "American soil."

Meanwhile the Germans are occupying the Channel Islands, which have been British soil for centuries, have a good-sized population (relative to the size of the islands), and I believe they had at least one MP in Parliament.

Yet the US has to spend millions and suffer thousands of casualties (a lot of which were frostbite and hypothermia) to recover Attu and Kiska, and the same people feel that the Brits were under no obligation to the Channel Islanders.

 

**For one thing, navigation would be trickier. To get to Normandy, you could tell the pilot "fly south until you run out of land, fly south across the water until you hit land and you are there." Britanny was much more complicated - "fly south until you run out of land, fly south across the water until you hit land, keep going until you hit water again and keep going until you come to land again and you are there." That would be tricky for lots of the pilots...

[KingSargent]

The ones that they would have transferred once the Allied landing craft & shipping buildup and transfers from the Med became clear. If you are going to play what-if games, you logically cannot limit the Axis to a fixed historical setting. Both are dynamic, if not imaginary.

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But would the transfers become clear? LW recon over the UK sucked. Besides, some of the troops could come directly from the US, as they did in TORCH. I mean, why unload in Blighty and then load up again to go across the Channel?

 

And would any German troop transfers be to the correct area? OKW and OKH could still have sent everybody to Pas de Calais, and probably would have kept them there as they actually did in OVERLORD.

[Ken Estes]

But would the transfers become clear? LW recon over the UK sucked. Besides, some of the troops could come directly from the US, as they did in TORCH. I mean, why unload in Blighty and then load up again to go across the Channel?

 

And would any German troop transfers be to the correct area? OKW and OKH could still have sent everybody to Pas de Calais, and probably would have kept them there as they actually did in OVERLORD.

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King, I didn't bug you the first time you raised it, but converting a cross-channel attack into an amphib op mounted from the USA, like the Western Task Force at Torch, would invite catastrophe. The WTF was not combat loaded very well, and only weak resistance prevented serious failures. Even though we learned mountains from Torch errors, I don't think the combined Overlord staff and the associated US Army and USN were up to it.

 

Yes, the Germans would likely have repeated the 1944 laydown in a 1943 reinforcement, strongest in the NW to weakest in the SW; an obvious requirement to protect the Reich foremost. They also might have seriously delayed releasing the troops in Pas de Clais, Normandy even longer than in '44 in the event of a SW landing, which would be too good to believe.

 

I continue to believe that an Allied landing in the Gironde region would play best of all possibilities into German defenses: strategy, doctrine, operational strengths, geography, logistics all work best for them, even if nothing can stop the initial landings. Somebody else pointed out that Marshall's boys gave it no thought at all, it was so obvious then.

 

It is, I confess, fun to game it, as I have occasionally in the old SPI Second Front...wanna try?

[RETAC21]

To try to land on Brittany's north coast (I doubt there are suitable sites, and there certainly wasn't much of a road net), you have to go past the Channel Islands, the part of England that was occupied for almost all of WW2.* Because they were British Territory, Hitler was nervous about them and their part of the Atlantic Wall started early. In any event, guns on the Channel Islands make a landing on the west side of the Cotentin or the north side of Britanny a tricky proposition. Also the north shore of Britanny was more open to weather and wave action, where the Cotentin at least absorbed some of the wave action.

 

Besides all that, Britanny is getting 'iffy' WRT air cover from England. Short-ranged fighters could operate over Normandy from English bases, fewer would have been able to operate over Brittany.** British radar stations could reach to Normandy and provide some fighter direction, I doubt Britanny was within radar range.

 

Yes, but the Channel Islands weren't that dangerous specially as they were left alone on the flank of the Normandy invasion until 1945. Wave action is a factor in the channel but Brittanny is protected by the reefs near the tip. Road net would be at least equal to that on Cotentin or Normandy. Google maps show plenty of beaches, but I reckon they are smaller than those in Normandy.

Radar cover could be provided by fighter direction ships, I believe those were already available in 1943.

 

The biggest problem I see is the availability of a major port, since taking Brest is going to take longer than taking Cherbourg, if only for the distance. On the plus side, the Germans could only come from one side, not from both.

 

 

 

Nope, it's the Cotentin, guys. Gotta be.

 

**For one thing, navigation would be trickier. To get to Normandy, you could tell the pilot "fly south until you run out of land, fly south across the water until you hit land and you are there." Britanny was much more complicated - "fly south until you run out of land, fly south across the water until you hit land, keep going until you hit water again and keep going until you come to land again and you are there." That would be tricky for lots of the pilots...      

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Problem with the Cotentin is, the Germans could afford to ignore it, just build a mini-Atlantic wall on the exit and man it with a few divisions, and now you have freed the important mobile divisions for other roles, Italy is still on the fray, if only to divert allied assets, and the U boat peril still has to be defeated on the Atlantic routes...

 

As for your second point, I don't really see a difference between both peninsulas, frankly.

[RETAC21]

But would the transfers become clear? LW recon over the UK sucked.

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Master, I respectfully believe that the Germans were able to place nearly all the allied divisions in Britain in the correct place (including FUSAG) through air recon before D Day.

[swerve]

Bordeaux is several departments away from Brittany. IIRC it's in Gascony.

 

To try to land on Brittany's north coast (I doubt there are suitable sites, and there certainly wasn't much of a road net), you have to go past the Channel Islands,

 

Aquitaine?

 

The Channel Islands are certainly in the way if you're heading for the bay around Mont St. Michel & want to land on that vast area of mudflats. Possible to miss them by going further west, but as you say, the beaches get more exposed. They're also fewer & much smaller, the coast being rockier.

 

Cotentin sounds good for a defensible lodgement to fill with airfields, but as has been pointed out, could be hard to break out of.

 

BTW, the Channel Islands have never had any MPs in our parliament. They each have their own parliaments, except Sark, which has a Seigneur. Despite their long association with England, they remained French in language & custom until the 19th century, & the majority of locals have French surnames.

 

From http://www.alderney.gov.gg/index.php/pid/25

 

"The Channel Islands have never been subject to the British Parliament and have always been self-governing units under the direct rule of the Crown acting through the Privy Council. According to constitutional custom, the Crown does not interfere in Island politics, save when some vital constitutional change is necessary, and never in local affairs. "

 

www.gov.gg

www.gov.je (note - the two big islands have their own country domains)

www.sark.gov.gg

 

The Isle of Man (www.gov.im) has a similar constitutional position.

[JohnB]

W e d n e s d a y

 

Wind:

Dover:- South force 5 or 6 easing Southwest force 4 or 5.

Wight:- South force 4 or 5 freshening force 5 or 6, veering Southsouthwest force 4 or 5 later.

Portland:- South force 5 or 6 veering Southsouthwest force 4 or 5.

Plymouth:- South force 6 veering Southsouthwest force 4 or 5.

Weather: Sunny or clear spells and scattered showers.

Visibility: Good falling moderate in showers.

Sea State: Moderate or rough, with an Atlantic swell running into the Channel

 

 

T h u r s d a y

 

Wind:

Dover:- Southwest force 4 or 5 backing Southeast force 6 to Gale force 8, veering Southwest later.

Wight:- Southsouthwest force 4 or 5 backing Southeast force 7 or Gale force 8, veering Southwest force 6 to Gale force 8 later.

Portland:- Southsouthwest force 4 or 5 backing Southeast force 7 to Severe Gale force 9, veering Southwest force 6 to Gale force 8 later.

Plymouth:- Southsouthwest force 4 or 5 backing Southeast Gale force 8 or Severe Gale force 9, veering Southwest force 6 to Gale force 8 later.

Weather: Rain, heavy at times, spreading in from the southwest, clearing to showers in the east later.

Visibility: Good falling moderate in showers or longer periods of rain.

Sea State: Moderate or rough building rough or very rough.

 

 

F r i d a y

 

Wind:

Dover:- Southwest force 6 to Gale force 8 easing force 4 or 5.

Wight:- Southwest force 6 to Gale force 8 easing force 4 or 5.

Portland:- Southwest force 6 to Gale force 8 easing West to Southwest force 4 or 5.

Plymouth:- Southwest force 6 to Gale force 8 easing West to Southwest force 4 or 5.

Weather: Rain in the west clearing to showers. Showers in the east throughout.

Visibility: Good falling moderate in showers or longer periods of rain.

Sea State: Rough or very rough, with an Atlantic swell running.

 

S a t u r d a y

 

Dover:- Southwest force 4 or 5 freshening South to Southwest force 7 or Gale force 8.

Wight:- Southwest force 4 or 5 freshening force 7 or Gale force 8.

Portland:- West to Southwest force 4 or 5 freshening Southwest force 7 or Gale force 8.

Plymouth:- West to Southwest force 4 or 5 backing South to Southwest force 5 or 6, veering Southwest force 6 to Gale force 8.

Weather:- Scattered showers at first. Rain spreading in from the west later.

Visibility:- Good falling moderate in showers or longer periods of rain.

Sea State:- Rough or very rough.

 

 

 

I really can't see a bridgehead surviving on the continent through the winter, especially without the 'improvised sheltered waters'.

[PCallahan]

I suppose my real question for the proposed 1943 invasion is "why?" If you are simply developing a lodgment to break out of in the spring of 1944, how does this help you strategically? Realistically, are the forces in the lodgment likely to be more capable of carrying out a 1944 offensive than the troops landed in Overlord? Certainly neither the air nor supply situation is likely to be as good as it was historically -- even with the assets transferred from the Med theater, spending a winter doggedly supporting a beachhead will take its toll.

 

Additionally, I don't like the idea of no knocking Italy out of the war when the time was ripe. While their forces were not in great shape by the summer of 1943, keeping them in the war poses several problems:

1) shipping through the med remains dodgy (or dodgier)

2) Italy was garrisoning much of the Balkans and Greece; historically, the Germans had to commit 8 (IIRC) infantry divisions to the Balkans once Italy withdrew from the war.

3) Italian units were (IIRC) garrisoning parts of southern France and, given time to rebuild over the winter of '43-'44, conceivably be committed to France in early '44.

4) With a reduced threat to their homeland, Italians might be in position to rebuild/recreate their 8th army for the Eastern Front.

 

Pat Callahan

[Rich]

Yes, but with what forces are the Germans to do this "chewing"? Apart from the 159 Reserve Training Division what else was available?

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You must have missed my post, so I'll repeat it, with some detail.

 

The schematic layout at the time was:

 

WBN - Holland

347, 376, 719 ID

16 LW-FD

 

15 Army - Belgium-Pas de Calais

65, 305, 348, 384, and 711 ID

156, 171, 191 Res-ID

17, 18, 19 LW-FD

9 SS-PzD

24 PzD

 

7 Army - Normandy-Brittany

76, 94, 113, 319, 343, 346, 371, 389, 709, and 716 ID

165 Res-ID

 

1 Army - Bordeaux

297, 344, 708, 715 ID

158 Res-ID

10 SS-PzGD

14 PzD

 

AA Felber - southern France-Italy

326, 338, 356 ID

 

HG D (reserves and occupation troops)

29 ID (Mot),

3, 60 PzGD

148, 157, 159, 182, 189 Res-ID

1, 2 FJD

26 PzD

13 SS-GebD

 

Note that the PzGD and ID (Mot) were effectively only different in name.

 

Also note that the assumptions about the "Pas de Calais" are based partly upon the German reaction to FORTITUDE, which really didn't kick off until January-February 1944, so it is difficult to see why those assumptions should apply to June-July 1943.

 

Finally note that many of the Heeresgruppe D (reserves) were actually deployed in the south and near the coast, since that is where many of their training areas were. In particular, 3 and 60 PzGD (so to be redesignated Feldherrnhalle), 29 ID (Mot), and 26 PzD were all in southern France.

 

BTW, "Reserve Training Division" is actually incorrect and something of a tautology, the correct nomenclature was Reserve-Infanterie-Division. As such they were organized and equipped as a regular infantry division, but with second-line equipment and were manned mainly by older reservists. Those assigned to the armies were primarily intended as second-line defenses, while those assigned at army group occupied various LOC and occupation duties. [edit] To expand that a bit, the Reserve-ID assigned to HG D were actually under the administrative and operational control of the Militarsbefehlshaber (military governors) of the various occupation districts, who reported directly to Berlin. But in the case of an invasion, they were to come under the operational control of the Feldheer as did most eventually (they were all either disbanded or retitled as Inganterie or Jaeger Divisions). Those assigned to the various armies reported administratively to the Militarbefehlshaber while remaining under the operational control of the Feldheer and were often dual roled as LOC, occupation and anti-Partisan troops. Hope that's a bit clearer. [/edit]

 

Also BTW, the 700-series divisions were created for coastal defense duties and were essentially static, most of the other infantry divisions were regular series divisions, some reconstituting from service in the east or were reforming "Stalingrad" divisions.

 

I hope that clarifies things a bit for you.

Edited August 12, 2005 by Rich