WW2 alt history. slipping Italy

[cdnsigop]

"I think that someone who was a pre-teen living on a US Army post, who watched his father go off to fight those aforementioned "Nips" can be forgiven a few non-PC slips which might offend your delicate sensibilities.

*

 

Agreed. I've met the man and I can say that he's far fro"m racist."

 

Its not the person, it's the comment, "nips" is very much a racist word. If you won't use the word to someone's face its racist. not going to get a debate, but Nips is no diferent than the "n" word or calling someone a darkie..... all are carry overs froma very racist time period.

[FormerBlue]

The US navy had at least 2 dozen various CVs in mid-1943> http://www.hazegray.org/navhist/carriers/forcelev.htm

Whoa! Slow down there a minute. 2 dozen various CVs? A CV is a fleet carrier. Its kind of easy to track them as the are sequentially numbered.

 

CV-1 - Langley. Really a converted collier but whatever. Sunk February of 1942.

CV-2 - Lady Lex. Beautiful ship. Big. Sunk May of 1942.

CV-3 - Saratoga. She is available.

CV-4 - Ranger. First purpose built. She is available but pretty small.

CV-5 - Yorktown. Sunk June of 1942.

CV-6 - Enterprise. Undergoing repairs but well count her as available anyway.

CV-7 - Wasp. Sunk September of 1942.

CV-8 - Hornet. Sunk October 1942.

CV-9 - Essex. New carrier. Commission Dec 1942.

CV-10 - Yorktown(new). Commission Apr 1943.

CV-11 - Intrepid. Commission August of 1943.

CV-12 - Hornet(new). Commission November of 1943.

CV-13 - Franklin. Commission January of 1944.

 

So, we only commissioned 13 CVs up to January of 1944. We're discussing 1943 so let's count the actual 12 (even that means commission in November so it's not trained and ready). Of those, 5 were sunk. That leaves 7. You'll have to skip training and magically repair the Enterprise faster than they were able to. To get 7. There are not "2 dozen CVs" in 1943. If you want to count light and escort carriers you can inflate the numbers but the reality is the summer of 1943 saw:

Ranger in the Atlantic

Sara in the Pacific.

Enterprise being repaired.

Victorious being borrowed as the Sara was alone when the Enterprise went off for repairs. The arrival of the Essex allowed them to return the Vic. Frankly, in the summer of 1943 we had 2 1/2 carriers ready for duty. Not 2 dozen. Ranger is the 1/2.

[FormerBlue]

"I think that someone who was a pre-teen living on a US Army post, who watched his father go off to fight those aforementioned "Nips" can be forgiven a few non-PC slips which might offend your delicate sensibilities.

*

 

Agreed. I've met the man and I can say that he's far fro"m racist."

 

Its not the person, it's the comment, "nips" is very much a racist word.  If you won't use the word to someone's face its racist.  not going to get a debate, but Nips is no diferent than the "n" word or calling someone a darkie..... all are carry overs froma  very racist time period.

202240[/snapback]

Prior to being called "Japan" it was "Nippon." Nip is diminutive for Nipponese.

 

Others:

Japs, Brits, Swedes, Danes, Russ, Finns, Scots, Tex's, Mex's, Poles, Jews, Germs*.

 

I don't use Nips. Too archaic. Nobody calls it "Nippon" anymore. Kind of like calling the Brits "*Celts."

 

*Sorry, couldn't resist.

[Jim Martin]

Would it make you feel better if we just called ourselves "gaijin" (barbarian/subhuman)?

 

Still a very common term Over There.

 

"I think that someone who was a pre-teen living on a US Army post, who watched his father go off to fight those aforementioned "Nips" can be forgiven a few non-PC slips which might offend your delicate sensibilities.

*

 

Agreed. I've met the man and I can say that he's far fro"m racist."

 

Its not the person, it's the comment, "nips" is very much a racist word.  If you won't use the word to someone's face its racist.  not going to get a debate, but Nips is no diferent than the "n" word or calling someone a darkie..... all are carry overs froma  very racist time period.

202240[/snapback]

[seahawk]

I doubt even then. Franco would have sucked up the damage and shut up, because that's what they did when incidents happened, remember he was investing his own future into it, and by then it was clear that the allies were winning. Besides, it was hard to prove that a U boat had refueled in a Spanish port if done covertly (Das boot whitstanding). My wife's grandfather was in charge of doing just that and he was unable to catch the Germans at it, so either it was not done or was done so covertly the hosts didn't notice.

202100[/snapback]

 

I agree on the spanish reaction, but how certain could the allies be ? Too much risk imho.

 

Apart from other drawbacks, like less patrol time for aircover etc.

[RETAC21]

I agree on the spanish reaction, but how certain could the allies be ? Too much risk imho.

 

Apart from other drawbacks, like less patrol time for aircover etc.

202380[/snapback]

 

Agreed.

[JWB]

Whoa!  Slow down there a minute. 2 dozen various CVs?  A CV is a fleet carrier.  Its kind of easy to track them as the are sequentially numbered.

 

CV-1 - Langley.  Really a converted collier but whatever.  Sunk February of 1942.

CV-2 - Lady Lex.  Beautiful ship.  Big.  Sunk May of 1942.

CV-3 - Saratoga. She is available.

CV-4 - Ranger.  First purpose built.  She is available but pretty small.

CV-5 - Yorktown.  Sunk June of 1942.

CV-6 - Enterprise.  Undergoing repairs but well count her as available anyway.

CV-7 - Wasp. Sunk September of 1942.

CV-8 - Hornet.  Sunk October 1942.

CV-9 - Essex.  New carrier.  Commission Dec 1942.

CV-10 - Yorktown(new).  Commission Apr 1943.

CV-11 - Intrepid.  Commission August of 1943.

CV-12 - Hornet(new).  Commission November of 1943.

CV-13 - Franklin.  Commission January of 1944.

 

So, we only commissioned 13 CVs up to January of 1944.  We're discussing 1943 so let's count the actual 12 (even that means commission in November so it's not trained and ready).  Of those, 5 were sunk.  That leaves 7.  You'll have to skip training and magically repair the Enterprise faster than they were able to.  To get 7.  There are not "2 dozen CVs" in 1943.  If you want to count light and escort carriers you can inflate the numbers but the reality is the summer of 1943 saw:

Ranger in the Atlantic

Sara in the Pacific.

Enterprise being repaired.

Victorious being borrowed as the Sara was alone when the Enterprise went off for repairs.  The arrival of the Essex allowed them to return the Vic.  Frankly, in the summer of 1943 we had 2 1/2 carriers ready for duty.  Not 2 dozen.  Ranger is the 1/2.

202299[/snapback]

Add RN carriers> http://www.hazegray.org/navhist/carriers/uk_fleet.htm

[Ken Estes]

Victorious being borrowed as the Sara was alone when the Enterprise went off for repairs.  The arrival of the Essex allowed them to return the Vic.  Frankly, in the summer of 1943 we had 2 1/2 carriers ready for duty.  Not 2 dozen.  Ranger is the 1/2.

202299[/snapback]

 

Not even 2.5 CV, and I object to anybody using Ranger in face of a threat; certainly not done in its history. Enterprise: 20 July 1943 Puget Sound Navy Yard, Bremerton, Wash., for a much needed overhaul…..Back in action waters by mid-November. Saratoga: steamed over a year without repairs, and detached on 30 November underwent overhaul at San Francisco from 9 December 1943 to 3 January 1944. [Dict of Am Ftg Ships] So, Sara/Enter count as 1. The provision of Victorious was not a successful integration and these were stopgaps for defensive measures in the SW Pacific, not an offensive capability.

[Tony Williams]

That would seem to put the kybosh on a carrier-supported landing anywhere in 1943, then. The RN carriers had too small an aircraft complement to be effective in that role, plus the aircraft they had then weren't really good enough to face up to the Luftwaffe fighters.

 

Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website and discussion forum

[JWB]

What threat?> http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/207...icASForces.html

 

That is basically what the Luftwaffe had to stop an invasion. They did have a tiny number of Me-109s available. But a CV and a CVe could destroy them on the ground with a bolt out of the blue attack. Also P-38s could be brought from England.

 

Luftwaffe at that time had barely more than 600 fighters in all of France. Almost all of them in the North and out of range of Bordeaux.

 

And to see why Luftwaffe was so weak> http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchro...-apr/murray.htm

[RETAC21]

What threat?> http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/207...icASForces.html

 

That is basically what the Luftwaffe had to stop an invasion. They did have a tiny number of Me-109s available. But a CV and a CVe could destroy them on the ground with a bolt out of the blue attack. Also P-38s could be brought from England.

 

Luftwaffe at that time had barely more than 600 fighters in all of France.  Almost all of them in the North and out of range of Bordeaux.

 

And to see why Luftwaffe was so weak> http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchro...-apr/murray.htm

202772[/snapback]

 

Well, but only if you omit what they had in the Med, which I guess would be sent there rather than stay put:

 

 

Luftflotte 2 (Mediterranean)

 

Stab LG1 7 Ju-88A Eleusis (Greece)

I/LG1 55 Ju-88A Foggia (Italy) (+2 Ju88C)

II/LG1 48 Ju-88A Foggia (Italy) (+2 Ju88C)

III/LG1 6 Ju-88A Eleusis (Greece)

Stab KG1 4 Ju-88A Airasca (Italy)

I/KG1 32 Ju-88A Viterbo (Italy)

II/KG1 31 Ju-88A Airasca (Italy) (+1 Ju88C)

Stab KG30 1 Ju-88A Viterbo (Italy)

III/KG30 26 Ju-88A Viterbo (Italy)

Stab KG6 5 Ju-88A Foggia (Italy)

I/KG6 31 Ju-88A Foggia (Italy)

II/KG6 27 Ju-88A Foggia (Italy)

III/KG6 39 Ju-88A Foggia (Italy)

Stab KG54 1 Ju-88A Grottaglie (Italy)

III/KG54 25 Ju-88A Grottaglie (Italy)

Stab KG76 2 Ju88A Foggia (Italy)

I/KG76 26 Ju88A Foggia (Italy)

II/KG76 32 Ju88A Foggia (Italy)

III/KG76 2 Ju88A Foggia (Italy)

Stab KG77 1 Ju88A Piacenza (Italy)

I/KG77 15 Ju88A Piacenza (Italy)

II/KG77 30 Ju88A Piacenza (Italy)

III/KG77 4 Ju88A Piacenza (Italy)

Eins./KG100 17 He 111H Kalamaki (Greece)

Stab JG27 5 Bf-109G Kalamaki (Greece)

II/JG27 33 Bf-109G San Vito dei Normanni (Italy)

III/JG27 26 Bf-109G Tanagra (Greece)

IV/JG27 30 Bf-109G Kalamaki (Greece) (+8 Bf-109F)

Stab JG53 7 Bf-109 Catania (Italy)

I/JG53 49 Bf-109 Vibo Valentia (Italy)

II/JG53 39 Bf-109 Rammaca (Italy)

III/JG53 49 Bf-109 Torazzo (Italy)

Stab JG77 4 Bf-109 Trapani (Italy)

I/JG77 38 Bf-109 Sciacca (Italy)

II/JG77 46 Bf-109 Trapani (Italy)

III/JG77 39 Bf-109 Chilivani/Sardinia (Italy)

II/JG51 38 Bf-109G Casa Zeppera (Sardinia)

IV/JG3 43 Bf-109 Leverano (Italy)

Stab ZG1 3 Bf-110 Montecorvino (Italy)

II/ZG1 36 Bf-110 Montecorvino (Italy)

III/ZG1 9 Me-410 Montecorvino (Italy)

Stab StG3 4 Me-110 Eleusis (Greece)

I/StG3 34 Ju-87D Eleusis (Greece)

II/StG3 39 Ju-87D Eleusis (Greece)

Stab SG2 3 FW-190 Castelvetrano (Italy)

I/SG2 37 FW-190 Castelvetrano (Italy)

II/SG2 24 FW-190 Castelvetrano (Italy)

III/StG151 4 Ju-87D Athens-Tatoi (Greece) (+9 Ju-87R; 5 Bf-109E)

Erg./StG51 12 Ju-87R Vel Gorica

Stab SKG10 4 Fw 190A Gerbini (Italy)

II/SKG10 20 Fw 190A Gerbini (Italy)

III/SKG10 25 Fw 190A S. Pietro (Italy)

IV/SKG10 25 Fw 190A Gerbini (Italy)

III/ZG26 32 Bf-110 Ciampino/Rome (Italy)

Edited August 3, 2005 by RETAC21

[Ken Estes]

Well, but only if you omit what they had in the Med, which I guess would be sent there rather than stay put:

 

Not only that, but many of these schemes assume that the Allies would sneak up on a Wehrmacht somehow hopelessly locked into its historical 1943 deployments in the Med and E. Front, leaving only training and refit units in France. That would require a lot of stealth, to say the least.

 

The 'what if' must also demonstrate what the other side was capable of doing. Beaming newly commissioned CVs with green air groups into the Eastern Atlantic can be easily matched by shifts in Luftwaffe deployments. These LW forces are far from defeated in 1943. Even the Kriegsmarine threatens the Murmansk Run with serious surface ship task forces until Hitler has a fit over the New Year's Eve Battle.

[FormerBlue]

Add RN carriers>  http://www.hazegray.org/navhist/carriers/uk_fleet.htm

202397[/snapback]

That site wasn't particularly accurate regards the US CV fleet as I showed. Is there any reason to believe that it would be any more accurate regards Brit carriers?

 

You still haven't explained what's to be done in the Pacific while you pull what's left of the US fleet out. Does Japan take a timeout while this is going on?

 

The Saratoga is a converted Battlecruiser hull. It's a rather large ship. Kind of hard to miss as it steams through the straits of Gilbraltar. The German's didn't lack eyes in Spain. Or Egypt for that matter so the Suez is covered. How long, exactly, is it going to last? You'd better make it quick as the Roma was sunk with Fritz-X missiles in September of 1943. The USS Savanah was hit by them on the 11th of September.

[KingSargent]

Not only that, but many of these schemes assume that the Allies would sneak up on a Wehrmacht somehow hopelessly locked into its historical 1943 deployments in the Med and E. Front, leaving only training and refit units in France. That would require a lot of stealth, to say the least.

The German deployments could be changed, sure, but they didn't have enough force to be strong everywhere. If forces are moved from Russia the Soviets have an easier time of it (and that was what the 'Second Front' was all about). The German forces at Kursk were about the most up-to-strength ones they had and even they were not at theoretical TOE.

 

The Germans could move troops west, but they couldn't pull an Atlantic Wall out of their hip pocket.

 

The 'what if' must also demonstrate what the other side was capable of doing. Beaming newly commissioned CVs with green air groups into the Eastern Atlantic can be easily matched by shifts in Luftwaffe deployments. These LW forces are far from defeated in 1943. Even the Kriegsmarine threatens the Murmansk Run with serious surface ship task forces until Hitler has a fit over the New Year's Eve Battle.

202774[/snapback]

The same holds true here; getting forces out of Russia was the goal of the 'Second Front' folks. Anything the LW pulls to the West makes it easier on the Soviets.

 

"shifts in Luftwaffe deployments." are easier said than done. The planes are not much trouble to move, but their ground elements are. Also, one of the goals of MY particular 'what-if' is to draw the LW to Western France where it is in range of the considerable Allied forces in the UK that could cover France but not Germany.

 

As for the 'green CVs', one of the beauties of the CVTF is it's ability to make a strike and get out before land-based forces can redeploy - you don't sit around in one spot waiting for retaliation. If the 1943 strikes on Rabaul that crippled the IJN's cruiser force are transplanted from the Bismarcks to Norway, there is a good chance that the Kriegsmarine threat to the Russian convoys is neutralized.

[Ken Estes]

King, I think that I am operating on a different time scale. I don't see the Allies suddenly appearing off the coast of France and surprising the Germans before they can move against the beachheads. I am saying that the marshalling and assembling processes of the invasion force in the UK or No Africa [for So France]are going to be so obvious that the Germans can move forces to cover the beaches and create mobile reserves in France before any operational move by the Allies. In a previous post I conceded the Atlantic Wall is not available [although the ports are strongly held]. Nor do I see the Germans taking the offensive on the E. Front under the same circumstances. You only have to defeat the invasion of France once and you are free for at least a year, right?

 

The dates of the Rabaul raids [was it 2 CV/CVL on our side?] show the first instance of US offensive carrier actions since the crucial and costly battles of 1942, hence also the earliest any offensive could have been mounted in the Atlantic as well. But an air raid on an overrated and distant outpost of the IJN hardly can compare to operations in European waters within a few hundred miles of Germany.

[Richard Lindquist]

That is basically what the Luftwaffe had to stop an invasion. They did have a tiny number of Me-109s available. But a CV and a CVe could destroy them on the ground with a bolt out of the blue attack. Also P-38s could be brought from England.

 

Luftwaffe at that time had barely more than 600 fighters in all of France.  Almost all of them in the North and out of range of Bordeaux.

202772[/snapback]

 

Yes, that gets you on the beach. Then, your small force of carriers has to go away and the Germans can fly in more planes and have air superiority. In the SWPA, the invasions were often to capture an airbase to support the next invasion. Even in the Central Pacific, most invasions took place within range of land based air until US carrier air built up to overwhelming strength.

[Richard Lindquist]

King, I think that I am operating on a different time scale. I don't see the Allies suddenly appearing off the coast of France and surprising the Germans before they can move against the beachheads. I am saying that the marshalling and assembling processes of the invasion force in the UK or No Africa [for So France]are going to be so obvious that the Germans can move forces to cover the beaches and create mobile reserves in France before any operational move by the Allies. In a previous post I conceded the Atlantic Wall is not available [although the ports are strongly held].  Nor do I see the Germans taking the offensive on the E. Front under the same circumstances. You only have to defeat the invasion of France once and you are free for at least a year, right?

 

The dates of the Rabaul raids [was it 2 CV/CVL on our side?] show the first instance of US offensive carrier actions since the crucial and costly battles of 1942, hence also the earliest any offensive could have been mounted in the Atlantic as well. But an air raid on an overrated and distant outpost of the IJN hardly can compare to operations in European waters within a few hundred miles of Germany.

202836[/snapback]

 

Even after the isolation of Rabaul, part of Kenney's bomber force and almost all of the RNZAF in the Pacific was dedicated to keeping Rabaul neutralized for the next eighteen months. Any let up in the bombing and pretty soon, a bombing mission would be met by Zeros cobbled together on the ground. CV's cannot keep up this strike tempo for more than a few days.

[Geoff Winnington-Ball]

I've been trying to catch up on this thread as time has permitted, so if I may have missed something, I apologize; but has anyone addressed the real problem with Bordeaux? We're talking about 45 miles of Gironde Estuary which is itself only two to seven miles wide. It's also noted for its treacherous tides and currents due in part to it being the confluence of two rivers.

 

In short, we're dealing with another "Scheldt" operation here, but without a ground-based infrastructure. You have to take - and hold - the turf on both sides before ANY shipping can use the port. And without shipping and big-port capabilities (never mind all the other objections raised so far), this operation doesn't work.

 

Bordeaux in 1943? It would have been murder. A toe-hold in southern France MIGHT have been possible, but without full control of the Med, doubtful it could have been maintained; Italy HAD to come out of the war, and the Germans otherwise distracted.

 

More later.

[Rich]

I've been trying to catch up on this thread as time has permitted, so if I may have missed something, I apologize; but has anyone addressed the real problem with Bordeaux? We're talking about 45 miles of Gironde Estuary which is itself only two to seven miles wide. It's also noted for its treacherous tides and currents due in part to it being the confluence of two rivers.

202863[/snapback]

 

Geoff, you must have missed it in your skimming of the thread, JWB answered the question earlier, I think quite cogently and pithily, his response was:

 

Operation Bordeaux would have been easier than Torch.

202863[/snapback]

 

[KingSargent]

"Whoa! Slow down there a minute. 2 dozen various CVs? A CV is a fleet carrier. Its kind of easy to track them as the are sequentially numbered.

 

CV-1 - Langley. Really a converted collier but whatever. Sunk February of 1942.

CV-2 - Lady Lex. Beautiful ship. Big. Sunk May of 1942.

CV-3 - Saratoga. She is available.

CV-4 - Ranger. First purpose built. She is available but pretty small.

CV-5 - Yorktown. Sunk June of 1942.

CV-6 - Enterprise. Undergoing repairs but well count her as available anyway.

CV-7 - Wasp. Sunk September of 1942.

CV-8 - Hornet. Sunk October 1942.

CV-9 - Essex. New carrier. Commission Dec 1942.

CV-10 - Yorktown(new). Commission Apr 1943.

CV-11 - Intrepid. Commission August of 1943.

CV-12 - Hornet(new). Commission November of 1943.

CV-13 - Franklin. Commission January of 1944.

 

So, we only commissioned 13 CVs up to January of 1944."

======================================================

Actually the USN commissioned 15 CVs before 1944. The problem with the above list is that the Essexes were not completed in sequential order. Two main yards built most of them - the Newport News ships completed in order and the Bethlehem Quincy ships did also, but they were in a different sequence.

First to commission after Essex was BQ's Lexington CV-16 on 17/2/43; then NN's Yorktown CV-10 on 15/4/43; BQ's Bunker Hill CV-17 on 20/5/43; NN's Intrepid CV-11 on 16/8/43; BQ's Wasp CV-18 on 24/11/43; and NN's Hornet CV-12 on 29/11/43. The rest commissioned in 1944-5.

 

So the order went CV-9, CV-16, CV-10, CV-17, CV-11, CV-18, CV-12 in 1943. All nine of the Independence class CVL-22 - CVL-30 commissioned by 15/12/43.

[JWB]

Yes, that gets you on the beach.  Then, your small force of carriers has to go away and the Germans can fly in more planes and have air superiority.  In the SWPA, the invasions were often to capture an airbase to support the next invasion.  Even in the Central Pacific, most invasions took place within range of land based air until US carrier air built up to overwhelming strength.

202846[/snapback]

Where are the Germans to deploy these aircraft? The airfields are at the coast. Allies will have occupied the airport at Bordeaux. The various warplanes can self deploy from the UK using auxiliary tanks faster than Luftwaffe can deploy anyway.

[RETAC21]

Where are the Germans to deploy these aircraft? The airfields are at the coast. Allies will have occupied the airport at Bordeaux. The various warplanes can self deploy from the UK using auxiliary tanks faster than Luftwaffe can deploy anyway.

203132[/snapback]

 

Take your pick:

 

http://www.pilotfriend.com/World%20airfiel..._main_frame.htm

[Rich]

That is basically what the Luftwaffe had to stop an invasion. They did have a tiny number of Me-109s available. But a CV and a CVe could destroy them on the ground with a bolt out of the blue attack. Also P-38s could be brought from England.

 

Luftwaffe at that time had barely more than 600 fighters in all of France.  Almost all of them in the North and out of range of Bordeaux.

 

202772[/snapback]

 

Not quite, since the available dates given in that source are the beginning and end of 1943. And that is also only for Fliegerfuehrer Atlantik, so does not include Fliegerkorps IX or indeed any of the rest of Luftflotte 3, Luftflotte 2 or Fliegerkorps X, all of which were in the west and any parts of which could have easily intervened. The Luftwaffe was in fact designed for rapid transfer from one strategic axis to another at short notice and did so with significant forces a number of times (see Rise and Fall of the Luftwaffe pp. 121 and 146 for an excellent graphical presentation of the two largest movements in April 1941 and November 1942).

 

In fact as of 1 July 1943 the forces in the west had on hand the following:

 

LF 3 - 270 BMB, 318 FTR, 115 GA, 46 2-E FTR, 146 RCN

LF 2 - 417 BMB, 476 FTR, 18 NFTR, 143 DB, 91 GA, 85 2-E FTR, 21 RCN

FK X - 32 BMB, 64 FTR, 85 DB, 9 2-E FTR, 79 RCN

 

Total of 2,415 aircraft on hand with serviceability rates between 55-85 percent depending upon unit and location.

[Rich]

Take your pick:

 

[

203152[/snapback]

 

To be fair, that's modern, but a quick count just shows that the Germans had about 30-odd airbases within operational range of an Allied force attacking in the Bay of Biscay, basically from about 42.5 to 48.5 degreees Northing and from about 4.5 degrees Westing to 1.9 degrees Easting.

 

Alencon

Angers

Argentan

Biscarosse

Bordeaux-Merignac

Brest-Laanveoc

Chartres

Cognac

Chateaudun

Dinan

Dinard

Dreux

Falaise

Gros Caillou

Haute Fontaine

Lannion

Laval

Le Mans

Lorient

Mont de Marsan

Morlaix

Nantes

Orleans-Bricy

Rennes

St. Andre de l'Eure

St. Brieuc

St. Jean d'Angely

St. Malo

Tarbes

Toulouse-Blagnac

Vannes-Meucon

 

Of course not all were active, but on the other hand many of those listed are simply the primary field, many of which had associated satellite and emergency fields.

 

So seizing Bordeaux-Merignac because it's "at the coast" will not knock out Luftwaffe basing in the arc from Brittany-Bordeaux-Pyrranees.

Edited August 4, 2005 by Rich

[Colin Williams]

Let me try to bring this thread back to reality. I can think of a number of significant decision points in the Med that could have allowed for pursuit of a different strategy. Assuming Torch goes as actually executed, in early 1943 the Allies were looking at the "what next?" question that was answered with the invasion of Sicily. IIRC at the time there was substantial debate over whether Sardinia or Sicily should be the next objective. Churchill, of course, was already casting a covetous eye toward the Dodencanese and a possible Turkish alliance. Hindsight doesn't help the Sardinia advocates, as the capture of Sicily led directly to the exit of Italy from the war and the subsequent easy capture of both Sardinia and Corsica by the Free French. I don't see how the capture of Sardinia would have led to the fall of Sicily or provided shipping lanes through the Med free of Axis air and naval interference.

 

Once Sicily was in the bag the Allies moved into southern Italy, both in the hope of attracting German forces from elsewhere in Europe and with the goal of acquiring territory up to the Appenines for further Mediterranean adventures and for strategic bomber bases. It seems to me that the first point where the Allied Med strategy ran into trouble was after Salerno with the persistant efforts to drive through to Rome. Possible alternatives to the bloody battles for Ortona, the Sangro, the Rapido, Cassino and Anzio would have been (1) an earlier landing in the south of France, (2) greater support for Churchill's efforts in the Dodencanese, followed with a systematic drive across selected Aegean islands toward a landing at Salonika, (3) a landing across the Adriatic for a drive on Salonika from the west and an effort to cut-off the Germans in Greece, and (4) something outside the Med.

 

Personally, I don't think there was much to recommend the Salonika operation, as it would place the Allies facing the same mountain ranges that frustrated the Salonika expedition in WW1. Perhaps it would provide a means of driving Bulgaria and Rumania out of the war. A more intriguing possibility is a landing in southern France. A foothold in southern France at the end of 1943 would attract substantial German forces and also make JWB's Bay of Biscay landing a possibility, as the landing could be covered from air bases near Marseilles. With luck the Germans would end up abandoning everything south of the Loire.