WW2 alt history. slipping Italy

[KingSargent]

Winnie had also sent troops to Greece in 1941, left Malaya out on a limb, and invaded Gallipoli in 1914. He sent troops into the Aegean in 1943 and they got their butts whipped by German "inferior garrison and anti-partisan forces."

 

Gallipoli failed because the generals in charge didn't want go there and were very slow in deploying forces. At the outset the Turks had only 2 divisions available to stop the invasion. By the time Hamilton was enabled to launch the invasion the turks had 6 division and the Brits only 4 plus a french division. When the Mr Georges' government finally decided to go at it with by increasing the force to 12 divisions the Turks had 15.Even then victory was in sight with a push through a sector held by only 12/2 turk battalions. But the British commanders on the scene weren't convinced and wouldn't push.

I only mentioned Gallipoli because some people I have read say that Winnie (consciously or subconsciously) was trying to "prove" that he had been correct in strategy in WW1. I don't want to go deeper here, it's too OT. If you want a Gallipoli thread we can have one.

 

I notice you did not reply to the 'boo-boos' from WW2 I mentioned.

Winnie had lots of ideas that his own people thought insane, and very few of his schemes worked out.

 

His Balkan strategy was favored by the staff.

Of course it was, it would have kept them out of NWE, where they were afraid they'd get their butts kicked.

Assuming we DO go to the Balkans and throw our weight behind one partisan group their rivals would probably fight us. They certainly wouldn't be "grateful."

 

Not  ONE group but all of the groups battling the AXIS forces.

Impossible. Handing out arms and equipment in the Balkans would be worse that handing out candy to a Kindergarten class - "Tito got all the good stuff! The Chetniks got more than me! {tons of snivelling from all sides}" And if we DID give them all weapons, they'd used them on each other, just like after Tito died.

It is also out of range of air cover from the UK,

 

The US navy would bring CVs from Pacific as was mentioned earlier.

It woudn't be a question of bringing CVs east rather than not sending them to the Pacific. In any event the whole USN air arm at that date would not have been able to provide the support that the air power in the UK could. (in 1943, that is. In 1945 the USN could fly more a/c off decks than had existed ten years earlier.)

 

There's another factor against Bordeaux - it is close to Spain. In 1943 the Allies were very paranoid about Spain. They were wrong, but that's what they thought at the time. To the planners the Bay of Biscay looked like an open trap (Brittany to the north, Iberia to the south) just waiting to snap shut. Again, I don't want to do more than mention that it was a factor in planning, any serious discussion should have another thred.

wide open to U-Boats in near-by bases,

 

The U-Boat offensive was halted in May.

Au contraire, mein Herr, the U-boats operated until 1945. May 1943 is the date given by historical hindsight as to when the Allies got the upper hand in the ASW war. Planners in January 1943 didn't have a timetable saying, 'May, 1943, U-boat war over."

 

One of the reasons I put for a 1943 cross-channel operation is that it would turn the Channel into a U-boat trap - confined waters where short-range ASW from the UK could be effective. In the Bay of Biscay the trap would be the other way around.

and the Bay of Biscay is renowned for storms. An invasion in the Channel in 1943 could be covered; one in the Bay of Biscay couldn't.

 

The Channel is renowned for storms.

There's storms and then there's STORMS. The Channel is sheltered water compared to the Bay of Biscay, where the long 'reach' across the Atlantic makes for huige waves.

Gee, there were sure a lot of "Hitler's worst combat units." The "worst combat units" garrisoning Greece kicked the crap out of Brits trying to take the Dodecanese, including mounting successful amphibious counter-attacks with next to no warning and lead time.

 

The AXIS units in the Balkans were worse than the ones in Greece. More importantly the indigenous population in Greece was docile. In the Balkans they were extremely violent. Same for Italy. Germans in Italy didn't have to watch their backsides constantly for ambushes. In the Balkans the AXIS forces had become physically and psychologically exhausted.

I see, the Germans are always weakest where you say they are. Could it possibly be that the 'indigenous Greek population' was docile BECAUSE the Axis forces in Greece were better than the ones in the Balkans? Huh? Could it?

That's just words; I want the RECREATIONAL CHEMICALS!!!

 

If the generals don't like the plan they can stuff it. Just like Stormin' Norman in December 1990

You still haven't come up with my drugs.....

[JWB]

I notice you did not reply to the 'boo-boos' from WW2 I mentioned.

 

Those other "boo boos" didn't have near total agreement of the Admiralty.

 

Of course it was, it would have kept them out of NWE, where they were afraid they'd get their butts kicked.

 

Monty in early 1944 was doing everything he could to get more amphibious ships for Overlord. He wasn't 'fraid of nuthin'.

 

Impossible. Handing out arms and equipment in the Balkans would be worse that handing out candy to a Kindergarten class - "Tito got all the good stuff! The Chetniks got more than me! {tons of snivelling from all sides}" And if we DID give them all weapons, they'd used them on each other, just like after Tito died.

 

Yes after Tito died. During the war the various groups would be more intent upon killing AXIS and worry about the power struggle after.

 

 

It woudn't be a question of bringing CVs east rather than not sending them to the Pacific. In any event the whole USN air arm at that date would not have been able to provide the support that the air power in the UK could. (in 1943, that is. In 1945 the USN could fly more a/c off decks than had existed ten years earlier.)

 

The USN and the RN combined could bring enough CVs to get the job done. The real problem was domestic politics. Official policy was to attack the Germans first but Joe Voter wanted to get after the Japs.

 

There's another factor against Bordeaux - it is close to Spain. In 1943 the Allies were very paranoid about Spain. They were wrong, but that's what they thought at the time. To the planners the Bay of Biscay looked like an open trap (Brittany to the north, Iberia to the south) just waiting to snap shut. Again, I don't want to do more than mention that it was a factor in planning, any serious discussion should have another thred.

 

Yes I know they were wrong. Spain wasn't in any position to march any real force north.

 

Au contraire, mein Herr, the U-boats operated until 1945. May 1943 is the date given by historical hindsight as to when the Allies got the upper hand in the ASW war. Planners in January 1943 didn't have a timetable saying, 'May, 1943, U-boat war over."

 

In May of 1943 Hitler ordered the U-Boat offensive halted because they were being lost at a rate faster then they could be built. Later he turned the campaign on again because he had no choice. And exactly what are a few U-Boats going to do when the Allies have such a huge fleet moving in? U-Boats might be able to sink a few screening ships before they are sunk themselves.

 

I see, the Germans are always weakest where you say they are. Could it possibly be that the 'indigenous Greek population' was docile BECAUSE the Axis forces in Greece were better than the ones in the Balkans? Huh? Could it?

 

I know where the Germans were weak because I know what unit were deployed where. The Greeks were docile because the Germans didn't treat them nearly as brutally. The average Landser considered Greek duty to be a vacation. They considered the Balkans to be a rat infested slum.

 

There's storms and then there's STORMS. The Channel is sheltered water compared to the Bay of Biscay, where the long 'reach' across the Atlantic makes for huige waves.

 

Yes but Bordeaux has a sheltered harbor that is protected from waves. The stuff at Normandy was washed away by one of the biggest storms in history and the invasion force held the beach against a far stronger force than the Germans were able to bring at Bordeaux. Do you know how much force the Germans had there?

 

And before we go any further I want you to inform us of the German forces in the Balkans and in the vicinity of Bordeaux.

[JWB]

I know all of this Balkan campaign stuff sounds impossible. But the UK had campaigned under more difficult circumstances than this. In 1982 the Pentagon told Reagan that the lo0oming British defeat in the South Atlantic could destroy NATO. The India campaign and Burma would make the Balkans look like tip toe through the tulips.

[JWB]

Albania??  Back in 1999, during the Kosovo crisis, all of the US liberals were screaming for immediate US invasion of Kosovo (to make up for their cowardice in Vietnam?).  I was in a chat room where the libs were whooping it up for such an action and the few realists there and I began to look at just how it could be done.  Looking at pretty good maps of the area, the best way would have been to come up through Salonika as in WWI (not too successful).  Getting into Albania was easy.  Going anywhere from Albania was extremely difficult (and this was in 1999-imagine 1943).  No rail lines and execrable highways over very forbidding terrain.

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The left wants US foreign policy to be based upon social justice instead of national interests.

[KingSargent]

Ratz. I can't get the formatting to work. I'm going to put initials in front of each part to keep track of who's saying what.

 

 

K I notice you did not reply to the 'boo-boos' from WW2 I mentioned.

 

J Those other "boo boos" didn't have near total agreement of the Admiralty.

 

K Of course not. Staying in the Med gave them an excuse not to go out and confront the IJN again.

Of course it was, it would have kept them out of NWE, where they were afraid they'd get their butts kicked.

 

J Monty in early 1944 was doing everything he could to get more amphibious ships for Overlord. He wasn't 'fraid of nuthin'.

 

K Monty wasn't on the General Staff, either. Of course Monty wanted all he could get for OVERLORD - he wasn't afraid of anything except losing his reputation.

K Impossible. Handing out arms and equipment in the Balkans would be worse that handing out candy to a Kindergarten class - "Tito got all the good stuff! The Chetniks got more than me! {tons of snivelling from all sides}" And if we DID give them all weapons, they'd used them on each other, just like after Tito died.

 

J Yes after Tito died. During the war the various groups would be more intent upon killing AXIS and worry about the power struggle after.

 

K "Would be" you say? They certainly weren't during the war, the gangs killed each other every chance they got. They'd been doing it for thousands of years, they did it recently, they'll do it tomorrow if we let them.

K [/b]It woudn't be a question of bringing CVs east rather than not sending them to the Pacific. In any event the whole USN air arm at that date would not have been able to provide the support that the air power in the UK could. (in 1943, that is. In 1945 the USN could fly more a/c off decks than had existed ten years earlier.)

 

J The USN and the RN combined could bring enough CVs to get the job done.

 

K Ballz. The RN and USN together together couldn't have put up the sustained effort required for a seriously resisted comtinental invasion. It's one thing to hang around a few days or a week while groundhogs capture some atoll, but both navies found out during and after Okinawa what happened when the carrier groups stayed too long in one place.

J The real problem was domestic politics. Official policy was to attack the Germans first but Joe Voter wanted to get after the Japs.

K I say again, ballz. Joe public didn't have much to do with it. The press (especially Hearst) was constantly trying to influence the way the war was fought, and didn't manage (well, they did more or less force FDR to hang onto MacArthur ). King and Marshall may have wanted to do the Pacific bit, but they were a lot more inclined to push for a quick defeat of Germany than the Brits were - until, must I reiterate, Casablanca.

K There's another factor against Bordeaux - it is close to Spain. In 1943 the Allies were very paranoid about Spain. They were wrong, but that's what they thought at the time. To the planners the Bay of Biscay looked like an open trap (Brittany to the north, Iberia to the south) just waiting to snap shut. Again, I don't want to do more than mention that it was a factor in planning, any serious discussion should have another thread.

 

J Yes I know they were wrong. Spain wasn't in any position to march any real force north.

K They weren't worried about the Spanish so much as they worried about Germany using Spanish bases. They even worried about Germany going through Spain and across the Strait to Spanish Morocco and falling ravenously on the rear of the Allied forces in North Africa. It seems ludicrous now, but it a big factor in planning at the time.

K Au contraire, mein Herr, the U-boats operated until 1945. May 1943 is the date given by historical hindsight as to when the Allies got the upper hand in the ASW war. Planners in January 1943 didn't have a timetable saying, 'May, 1943, U-boat war over."

 

J In May of 1943 Hitler ordered the U-Boat offensive halted because they were being lost at a rate faster then they could be built.

K Yes and the Allies would have had to have a might good crystal ball to know that when they were making the decisions, wouldn't they?

J

Later he turned the campaign on again because he had no choice. And exactly what are a few U-Boats going to do when the Allies have such a huge fleet moving in? U-Boats might be able to sink a few screening ships before they are sunk themselves.

K U-boats got in among the TORCH invasion convoys, which were heavily escorted and fairly far away from their bases in Biscay. Fortunately they didn't sink any transports until after they unloaded, but they got in because they had a lot of water to work with - something they wouldn't have in the Channel.

 

K [/b]I see, the Germans are always weakest where you say they are. Could it possibly be that the 'indigenous Greek population' was docile BECAUSE the Axis forces in Greece were better than the ones in the Balkans? Huh? Could it?

 

J I know where the Germans were weak because I know what unit were deployed where. The Greeks were docile because the Germans didn't treat them nearly as brutally. The average Landser considered Greek duty to be a vacation. They considered the Balkans to be a rat infested slum.

 

K Then the conclusion to be drawn is that the troops in Greece were better at their job of keeping control over an occupied country.

K There's storms and then there's STORMS. The Channel is sheltered water compared to the Bay of Biscay, where the long 'reach' across the Atlantic makes for huige waves.

 

J Yes but Bordeaux has a sheltered harbor that is protected from waves. The  stuff at Normandy was washed away by one of the biggest storms in history and the invasion force held the beach against a far stronger force than the Germans were able to bring at Bordeaux. Do you know how much force the Germans had there?

 

K Sigh... The fact that Bordeaux is sheltered (as are all ports on the Bay of Biscay) doesn't do a whole lot for ships trying reach the port, does it. Or do you think the ships and supplies teleport in?

 

J And before we go any further I want you to inform us of the German forces in the Balkans and in the vicinity of Bordeaux.

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K Want away. I still don't have my drugs, nor do I have an answer regarding your feelings about Winnie's other bloopers.

[Ken Estes]

I think that Bordeaux was always rejected in the 42-44 versions of the invasion [sledgehammer, Bolero to Overlord] because it was simply too far for the logistical support to keep any army landed in action, including the port-port and port-frontline distances. Might as well just do So. France and grind it out north from Marseilles. Consider the time to ship/truck a round of ammo from Portsmouth-Bordeaux-Paris, for instance...months? Do not count ofn rail with the air picture undecided inland. Now that I mention it, air cover also made Bordeaux a no-no.

 

There was no soft underbelly, witness the Italian campaign; and it gets less soft the further east one goes. A Balkan campaign also greatly simplifies the German defense problems of 43 or 44.

 

Let's stick to 1943 conditions. The viability of carrier air in the shadow of land based air power was yet to be proved. Nor is the Victory Fleet yet ready. The USN at one point has only Enterprise in action, with Sara in the Indian Ocean. What CVs come to Europe in 1943 to support the Med? With what fleet train? Is the IJN no longer respected???

 

Remember it is more important what the soldiers, sailors and airmen thought, than what had happened, frequently missed at the time. The Allies did not know the U-boat had been beaten in the Atlantic until too late in 1943 to set new strategies in motion. The planning cycle for Overlord must be on the order of 12-18 months, depending on the variables. One does not just plop the troops down on some [soon-to-be forlorn] beach...unless it is Guadalcanal.....

 

 

********************

 

Part of the problem in all these what-if thingies is that Allied strategy commits few errors after 1942. No so nice for the Axis....

[Tony Williams]

I think that Bordeaux was always rejected in the 42-44 versions of the invasion [sledgehammer, Bolero to Overlord] because it was simply too far for the logistical support to keep any army landed in action, including the port-port and port-frontline distances.

 

I understand that an essential criterion in the choice of landing was that it had to be within the range of fighter cover from England. This placed the westernmost limit as the Cotentin Peninsula.

 

I don't think that a couple of aircraft carriers could have maintained sufficient cover over an extended period of time - which in the event of a hotly opposed landing could have run into weeks.

 

Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website and discussion forum

[Richard Lindquist]

I know all of this Balkan campaign stuff sounds impossible. But the UK had  campaigned under more difficult circumstances than this. In 1982 the Pentagon told Reagan that the lo0oming British defeat in the South Atlantic could destroy NATO. The India campaign and Burma would make the Balkans look like tip toe through the tulips.

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Burma was a truly rotten place in which to fight. The Brits (and US) didn't make much headway there either until the Nips were virtually on the edge of collapse. Slim then was able to pull off a mini-blitzkreig in the closing months (not his fault, he was a super-soldier, but terain ruled against anything decisive there).

[cdnsigop]

"Nips"

 

Your post was great, but that is a totally racist term. Waas racist even back in WW2 when they used it. You post loses most of its meaning when you fill it with racism. I think term you looking for here is Japanese... I know it might seem PC but that is really the correct word to use when talking about the Japan and its people.

[seahawk]

And a BAy of Biscaya invasion would have been risky, when looking towards Spain. Spain had no real intentions of power to join the war, but some unfortunate allied attacks on spanish fishers or even bombing of a spanish city could have made a difference. And the question is if Franco could have felt threatened by an invasion so close to Spain. Surely not an ideal option and surely not in 1943, when most of the combat proven troops were in North Africa.

[Jim Martin]

I think that someone who was a pre-teen living on a US Army post, who watched his father go off to fight those aforementioned "Nips" can be forgiven a few non-PC slips which might offend your delicate sensibilities.

 

"Nips"

 

Your post was great, but that is a totally racist term.  Waas racist even back in WW2 when they used it.  You post loses most of its meaning when you fill it with racism.  I think term you looking for here is Japanese...  I know it might seem PC but that is really the correct word to use when talking about the Japan and its people.

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[RETAC21]

And a BAy of Biscaya invasion would have been risky, when looking towards Spain. Spain had no real intentions of power to join the war, but some unfortunate allied attacks on spanish fishers or even bombing of a spanish city could have made a difference. And the question is if Franco could have felt threatened by an invasion so close to Spain. Surely not an ideal option and surely not in 1943, when most of the combat proven troops were in North Africa.

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You mean like shooting down Spanish planes? or like buzzing Spanish airbases? both happened during the war, a civilian Ju-52 was shot down over Gibraltar and an Air force SM-79 was shot down in the Med, US planes overflew Spanish Morocco and one got shot down by a He-112. Spanish flak fired on allied aircraft in the Canaries and CR.32 intercepted patrol planes in the area, with shots exchanged. Note that all this happened with allies fortunes being lower than in 1943 and yet nothing happened.

 

There was no way that Spain was going to enter the war in 1943, unless one of the beligerents invaded (not entered) Spanish territory. This was the time the Pyrenees were being fortified, in case the Germans were tempted. The S. coast was already fortified.

[JWB]

The US navy had at least 2 dozen various CVs in mid-1943> http://www.hazegray.org/navhist/carriers/forcelev.htm

 

K Ballz. The RN and USN together together couldn't have put up the sustained effort required for a seriously resisted comtinental invasion. It's one thing to hang around a few days or a week while groundhogs capture some atoll, but both navies found out during and after Okinawa what happened when the carrier groups stayed too long in one place

 

What contest? Again, if you knew how tiny the German forces were in southern France at that time you would not have made such a statement.

 

KEConsider the time to ship/truck a round of ammo from Portsmouth-Bordeaux-Paris, for instance...

 

As opposed to... Might as well just do So. France and grind it out north from Marseilles.

 

Delaying the invasion from Autumn 1943 to June 1944 is penny wise and pound foolish. Heeren in France in 1943 was far weaker than mid 1944. Luftwaffe was alomost non-existant in that part of France at that time.

[Tony Williams]

The US navy had at least 2 dozen various CVs in mid-1943> http://www.hazegray.org/navhist/carriers/forcelev.htm

 

And how many of those could remain on war station at any given time? And how many of those were needed in the Pacific?

 

Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website and discussion forum

[KingSargent]

There was no way that Spain was going to enter the war in 1943, unless one of the beligerents invaded (not entered) Spanish territory. This was the time the Pyrenees were being fortified, in case the Germans were tempted. The S. coast was already fortified.

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You are right of course, but the Allied planners couldn't be sure of that. They even kept troops on the border of Spanish Morocco in case Hitler sent a Panzer Armee through Spain (with or without Franco's permission) that could cross the Strait of Gibraltar.

[Ken Estes]

The US navy had at least 2 dozen various CVs in mid-1943> http://www.hazegray.org/navhist/carriers/forcelev.htm

 

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OK, nice source, let's go with it.

 

31 Dec 42: Essex (CV-9) commissioned

 

So how soon can you train the crew, embark a trained air group, shape up both and be ready for combat operations?

 

Answer: Dictionary of American Fighting Ships “Following her shakedown cruise Essex sailed to the Pacific in May 1943…departing Pearl Harbor, she participated with Task Force 16 (TF 16) in carrier operations against Marcus Island (31 August 1943); was designated flagship of TF 14 and struck Wake Island (5-6 October); launched an attack with Task Group 50.3 (TG 50.3) against the Gilbert Islands where she also took part in her first amphibious assault, the landing on Tarawa (18-23 November). Refueling at se a, she cruised as flagship of TG 50.3 to attack Kwajalein (4 December). Her second amphibious assault delivered in company with TG 58.2 was against the Marshalls (29 January-2 February 1944).”

 

 

So building the ships, even placing them in commission gives not the right statistic. The Victory Fleet of the USN is not ready until 44.

 

 

[Edit to add: your source counts CVLs as CVs, not realistic in the case of the Independence Class conversions]. Note rest of 1943, for the two surviving real CVs: Enterprise 20 July 1943 Puget Sound Navy Yard, Bremerton, Wash., for a much needed overhaul…..Back in action waters by mid-November. Saratoga: steamed over a year without repairs, and detached on 30 November underwent overhaul at San Francisco from 9 December 1943 to 3 January 1944]

Edited August 1, 2005 by Ken Estes

[KingSargent]

And how many of those could remain on war station at any given time? And how many of those were needed in the Pacific?

 

Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website and discussion forum

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Two dozen, huh? Afloat maybe, operational - I doubt it.

 

If we had gone for Germany and just let the Pacific stew (as was the original plan), you could say that none of them were needed. There really wasn't a lot Japan could have done after the losses at Midway and Guadalcanal. Out of four fast carrier task groups by Autumn '43, I think a reasonable split would have been two groups in each ocean. In the PTO to keep the IJN honest, in the ETO to do raids, kill Tirpitz, whatever.

 

The nice thing about CV groups is that they can pop up virtually anywhere there is water, do a fairly massive raid, and be gone. No land-based force can respond. The only fast CV ever sunk by land-based air was Princeton and that was six different kinds of fluke. And Princeton's group was doing a no-no - staying in one area until the Japanese could find them and mount a strike. And the strike missed and a straggler got in and hit Princeton.

[RETAC21]

You are right of course, but the Allied planners couldn't be sure of that. They even kept troops on the border of Spanish Morocco in case Hitler sent a Panzer Armee through Spain (with or without Franco's permission) that could cross the Strait of Gibraltar.

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And plans were made for a conquest of Spanish Morocco (Backbone II) but after the Axis has been expelled from North Africa, Spain reverted to neutrality and it was made clear to the allies that we had no business in the war in the West. In fact, right about this time, the Blue division was being pulled out of the Eastern front too.

[Rich]

Amphibious lift available for HUSKY was extremely limited and included just 8 RN LSI, while 43 were assigned to NEPTUNE forces. HUSKY also had just 509 "major" landing craft (LST, LCT and LCI) and 1,225 "minor" landing craft (LCA, LCVP and LCM), there were a total of approximately (totals vary) 2,092 "major" and 1,991 "minor" landing craft assigned to NEPTUNE.

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Finally found the file that allows a complete comparison.

 

For NEPTUNE the assault forces assembled and assigned to the Western and Eastern Naval Task Forces (Assault Force U, O, G, J, S and Follow-on Force B and L) were:

 

2 HQ ships (Ancon and Bulolo)

10 APA/XAP

45 LSI

220 LST

195 LCI (L) (including those designated as LCH)

709 LCT (all types, but not including 36 LCT ®)

135 Support Craft (LCF, LCC, LCG, and LCT ®)

 

So actually it appears there were 1,259 "major" craft in the actual assault, not 2,092, although the difference could be in the follow-on forces.

 

That may be compared to HUSKY with:

 

5 HQ ships

57 APA and LSI

7 AKA

148 LST

235 LCI

238 LCT

 

The significant difference of course is the additional use of large ships in HUSKY, neccessary due to the long sea crossing, especially for 1 Canadian Division, and the much larger contingent of LCT for NEPTUNE, possible (barely) because of the much shorter distance. It is also interesting to note that only 268 US-built LST and 314 LCI (L) had been completed through June 1943 making HUSKY a substantial investment in those types and probably the upper limit of what could be done in mid-1943.

[seahawk]

You mean like shooting down Spanish planes? or like buzzing Spanish airbases? both happened during the war, a civilian Ju-52 was shot down over Gibraltar and an Air force SM-79 was shot down in the Med, US planes overflew Spanish Morocco and one got shot down by a He-112. Spanish flak fired on allied aircraft in the Canaries and CR.32 intercepted patrol planes in the area, with shots exchanged. Note that all this happened with allies fortunes being lower than in 1943 and yet nothing happened.

 

There was no way that Spain was going to enter the war in 1943, unless one of the beligerents invaded (not entered) Spanish territory. This was the time the Pyrenees were being fortified, in case the Germans were tempted. The S. coast was already fortified.

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Fully agree, however I was thinking about f***-ups on a bigger scale then such isloated events. Accidential heavy bombing a spanish city, having troops land in spain, and doing a full assault with shore bombardment and stuff. Now imagine a german sub refuels in a spanish ports and sinks some troop carriers. In retaliation the allies decide to bomb the port,...

Franco was not insane as Mussolini or Hitler, but the Allies could not be 100% sure of that and be certain that he would accept such an accident without joining the Axis. Now imagine a german sub refuels in a spanish ports and sinks some troop carriers. In retaliation the allies decide to bomb the port,...

[R011]

To be more precise, on 15 July 1943, the USN had seven CV's, five CVL's and eighteen CVE's in commission.

 

Of them, three CV's, four CVL's, and five CVE's had been in commission for under sixmonths. As Ken Estes noted, it took about six months after commissioning before a ship became operational.

 

This leaves four CV's, two CVL's, and thirteen CVE's to fight two oceanic wars.

[JWB]

Burma was a truly rotten place in which to fight.  The Brits (and US) didn't make much headway there either until the Nips were virtually on the edge of collapse.  Slim then was able to pull off a mini-blitzkreig in the closing months (not his fault, he was a super-soldier, but terain ruled against anything decisive there).

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Same would happen in Balkans only quicker. Losses on the Ostfront forced Hitler to re-deploy Balkans division to the East in 1944 in process similar to the Japanese in Burma to the Pacific. The real problem for Winnie's Balkan strategy was lack of landing ships. Ike wasn't about to hand over any US LSTs!

Edited August 1, 2005 by JWB

[JWB]

Operation Bordeaux would have been easier than Torch.

[RETAC21]

Fully agree, however I was thinking about f***-ups on a bigger scale then such isloated events. Accidential heavy bombing a spanish city, having troops land in spain, and doing a full assault with shore bombardment and stuff. Now imagine a german sub refuels in a spanish ports and sinks some troop carriers. In retaliation the allies decide to bomb the port,...

Franco was not insane as Mussolini or Hitler, but the Allies could not be 100% sure of that and be certain that he would accept such an accident without joining the Axis. Now imagine a german sub refuels in a spanish ports and sinks some troop carriers. In retaliation the allies decide to bomb the port,...

202011[/snapback]

 

I doubt even then. Franco would have sucked up the damage and shut up, because that's what they did when incidents happened, remember he was investing his own future into it, and by then it was clear that the allies were winning. Besides, it was hard to prove that a U boat had refueled in a Spanish port if done covertly (Das boot whitstanding). My wife's grandfather was in charge of doing just that and he was unable to catch the Germans at it, so either it was not done or was done so covertly the hosts didn't notice.

[DwightPruitt]

I think that someone who was a pre-teen living on a US Army post, who watched his father go off to fight those aforementioned "Nips" can be forgiven a few non-PC slips which might offend your delicate sensibilities.

201913[/snapback]

 

 

Agreed. I've met the man and I can say that he's far from racist.