Command & Control

[bad-dice]

I have a general question regarding the command methodology of current armies.

 

This is my take in broad terms of development over the last few centuries:

 

1. Traditional (can't think of a better term) where commanders at all levels operate to a set repertoire of manouvers and strict directions from above. E.G. the commander of wing in an 18th Century army.

 

2. Impulse where a commander of a corps or division will have a clearly defined order but it is left to him to set the formation and tactics of his own troops. E.G. French Napoleonic commanders and then most Western armies through to beyond WW2.

 

3. Mission where commanders of all levels are given a mission objective and left free to work out the best way to achieve it, higher authority limiting themselves to ensuring the subordinate stays within mission parameters and providing support. E.G. the German army from 1916(?).

 

In this forum we often discuss technical, tactical, strategic and even logistical aspects of campaigns, but to my knowledge have never considered them in the context of command methodologies. This I think adds a further dimension and should be considered, for instance the British in the Western Desert during ' 41 and the early to mid ' 42 constantly got a bloody nose trying to compete with Rommel at open manouver type warfare, but their command and control just could not match the Germans mission based orders for speed of action and speed in reaction. When Monty took over they never again tried this and only ever engaged the Germans in set piece battles in which they excelled, and consequently generally beat the Germans after this time. A similar process of events took place on the eastern front where after '42 the Germans were only really successful in counterpunches to breakthroughs that occurred after set piece Russians offensives.

 

Do you agree with my broad analysis? Do all armies now use mission based orders? When did they adopt them?

[Guest aevans]

I suppose you're more or less right in general outline, but some of the details are a bit off. Though some room for initiative existed in most 19th Century armies the initial tactical formation was set at the Corps level, except in close terrain, and the entire corps usually conformed to the same mission and axis of advance. Also, when given latitude to maneuver, divisions still often adopted stereoptyped formations whenever possible. During the Napoleonic Wars, for example, the Fench often adopted a two line formation, while the Prussians had a thee line one. Deploying divisions in two lines as a matter of standard practice persisted at least through the American Civil War.

[Wobbly Head]

With new technology involving GPS systems and computer mapping tied into encripted radio/data systems. Manovers are going to be more liking to playing a RTS game for a comander giving a whole new meaning to the phrase "micro managed to death."

[WRW]

With new technology involving GPS systems and computer mapping tied into encripted radio/data systems. Manovers are going to be more liking to playing a RTS game for a comander  giving a whole new meaning to the phrase "micro managed to death."

199210[/snapback]

 

 

I (unfortunately sometimes) spend a lot of my working day working with non military C&C systems and related technology.

 

A couple of things make me nervous - a lot of people (who maybe should know) do not know the capability of existing technology in this field and the urge to micro manage is so strong that very often I think the best way to elimintae it is by gene therapy or as an alternative - a base ball bat

 

WRW

[Zipperhead]

IMO it is exactly the fear of micro-management that has held up the development/acceptance of land C2 systems to our disadvantage. I call it the Big Brother syndrome, and to be honest I've yet to see these fears actualized.

 

Let's not forget the Navy has had functional C2 systems since the 60's, the air force also has been subject to this type of scrutiny, Commanders have not played pupet master with them why would one assume that it would or could be done with the army?

 

The people with these systems sitting back in HQ were also field commanders at one point. They know they can not see the ground, they are smart enough to realize that there is no effective way to command from afar on the basis of a computer generated display. To be honest I'd really like to see an example of this micro-management. I think it is a combat legend or a very rare occurance at worst.

[Guest aevans]

IMO it is exactly the fear of micro-management that has held up the development/acceptance of land C2 systems to our disadvantage. I call it the Big Brother syndrome, and to be honest I've yet to see these fears actualized.

 

Let's not forget the Navy has had functional C2 systems since the 60's, the air force also has been subject to this type of scrutiny, Commanders have not played pupet master with them why would one assume that it would or could be done with the army?

 

The people with these systems sitting back in HQ were also field commanders at one point. They know they can not see the ground, they are smart enough to realize that there is no effective way to command from afar on the basis of a computer generated display. To be honest I'd really like to see an example of this micro-management. I think it is a combat legend or a very rare occurance at worst.

199270[/snapback]

 

During the Vietnam war it was not at all uncommon for a platoon or company firefight to have the battalion commander on the radio net (okay so far), the brigade commander in a helicopter above the battle, the division commander in a helicopter above him, and sometimes even the corps commander somewhere in the mix. They didn't even need a tactical internet to do this, just enough FM radios. This was arguably a symptom of counterguerilla operations; IOW, too much army fighting too little war on any given day, but when you consider the type of battles that we are likely to fight in the future, is it not the shape of things to come?

 

Even with all of the simultaneous action going on in the initial stage of OIF, I sometimes wonder if the much commented necessity of using Iridium for tactical communications wasn't a blessing in disguise. After all, it did limit the number of people that a division commander could bother to 50-60, and then only one at a time.

Edited July 25, 2005 by aevans

[MDFeingold]

In Rick Atkinson's book about the 101st Air Assault Division in OIF, "In the Company of Soldiers," he mentions the division commander personally controlling attack helicopter strikes. The author does not discuss the conduct in depth, and there is nothing from which the reader can discern whether the division CO's involvement had a positive or negative effect. Either way, I would characterize this as micromanagement.

[Scott Cunningham]

The US Army is drifting towards a C2 method I would call "Oversynch" in which digital C2 systems allow unit commanders up to division level to manuever their 'pawns' across the chessboard. It is ineffective. The SAMS school, and FBCB2 or BLUEFORCE Tracker is making this disturbing possibility a reality.

 

Digital C2 systems need to be focused on freeing up lower unit commanders (much like radios did for the Wehrmacht) rather than provide higher unit commanders additional opportunities to micromanage his units.

[SCFalken]

Some please define "Set Piece" for me, I have heard wayyyy too many conflicting definitions.

 

 

 

Falken

[SCFalken]

With new technology involving GPS systems and computer mapping tied into encripted radio/data systems. Manovers are going to be more liking to playing a RTS game for a comander  giving a whole new meaning to the phrase "micro managed to death."

199210[/snapback]

 

CG: "1st/63rd AR, ZERG RUSH!!!"

 

 

Falken

[EchoFiveMike]

The people with these systems sitting back in HQ were also field commanders at one point. They know they can not see the ground, they are smart enough to realize that there is no effective way to command from afar on the basis of a computer generated display. To be honest I'd really like to see an example of this micro-management. I think it is a combat legend or a very rare occurance at worst.

 

 

Re-read my posts from Iraq. Although I agree that WAY too much precious sat uplink/downlink bandwidth is being consumed by HQ elements that are absolutely useless and add nothing to the fight. "Read Not a Good Day to Die" to get an idea of the useless lateral command structure we tend towards. Pick 50-75% of officers over O5 at random and retire them. S/F....Ken M

Edited July 25, 2005 by EchoFiveMike

[Guest Hans Engström]

Scott and I (as well as others) discussed this a few years back when FUM/SLB was first introduced for the Swedish Army. Seems even the Swedish Army (which pays much more than lip service to auftragstaktik, and whose officers do tend to forcefully argue that the US and Britain should let loose their small unit leaders) is becoming enamoured with micromanaging, a situation exasperated withthe currnet drawdowns, which lead to newly commisoned 2nd Leuitenants (who have done 10-15 months conscript service, and then attended the academy for 2 years) now command squads.

 

C4I advancs should be used to push information,set operational parameters, and encourage small unit initiative. Anything else andyou're screwing withthe efficiency of the unit.

[Scott Cunningham]

I am at Ft Irwin right now and just fought 3 battles against a 4th Gen unit. All the fancy C2 stuff did them little good. They should have been VERY fast to react (if they had pushed info/intel down), but instead were abnormally slow. We had little trouble maneuvering within their decision cycles.

 

Oversimplification of course, and this C2 stuff was not the only factor, but it certainly played a part.

[Ivanhoe]

Let's not forget the Navy has had functional C2 systems since the 60's, the air force also has been subject to this type of scrutiny, Commanders have not played pupet master with them why would one assume that it would or could be done with the army?

 

My understanding is that, at least in the US military, the commander of a vessel and the PIC of an aircraft have final authority, which offers greater latitude than ground units.

 

In some book I read on Vietnam, it might have been "Hunters and Shooters", a story is told wherein a saenior NCO in command of a ground element ignored the orders from an officer orbiting above, and the courts martial quickly determined the NCO was in the clear. What was remarkable about the story was that few involved were aware of the reg establishing final authority.

[aegandolfi]

The people with these systems sitting back in HQ were also field commanders at one point. They know they can not see the ground, they are smart enough to realize that there is no effective way to command from afar on the basis of a computer generated display. To be honest I'd really like to see an example of this micro-management. I think it is a combat legend or a very rare occurance at worst.

199270[/snapback]

 

Well, the first example that came to my mind was the bit from Somalia, as portrayed in Black Hawk Down, where the convoy is trying to reach a downed chopper. Instead of just saying the crash site is four blocks north and two blocks east (or whatever it was) the commanders hovering overhead were giving detailed driving directions to the CO on the ground, eg "turn left now", which he had to relay to his driver, which were too late to actually turn. So the convoy ended up going in circles, getting shot up, and having to retire without reaching the chopper.

 

Just an example from literature, as I don't have personal mititary experience.

 

ag

[bad-dice]

It is interesting that Moltke started the process of lower level control within an overall strategic plan/framework, because armies were growing beyond the point where a general on horseback could control them. Modern technology is giving generals the means to now achieve that control, and it is probably inevitable and natural that they try to do so.

 

It would be interesting to know what direction the Germans and Israelis are currently moving in.

[Guest aevans]

It is interesting that Moltke started the process of lower level control within an overall strategic plan/framework, because armies were growing beyond the point where a general on horseback could control them. Modern technology is giving generals the means to now achieve that control, and it is probably inevitable and natural that they try to do so.

 

It would be interesting to know what direction the Germans and Israelis are currently moving in.

201402[/snapback]

 

I think Moltke was philosophically inclined to mission orders and optional control. But in practice his instrument was terribly suited to such methods. The Prussian victory at Koniggratz was an accident of operational deployment. (Yes, I know we have long been taught that the Prussians did it that way on purpose, but it's pretty much undisputed that their logistics capabilities demanded a dispersed deployment along the frontier.) Likewise, Gravelotte-St. Privat was an unalloyed tactical disaster, largely caused by incompetent corps and division commanders, redeemed only by the fact that the French had already lost operationally before a single shot was fired.

[bad-dice]

I think Moltke was philosophically inclined to mission orders and optional control. But in practice his instrument was terribly suited to such methods. The Prussian victory at Koniggratz was an accident of operational deployment. (Yes, I know we have long been taught that the Prussians did it that way on purpose, but it's pretty much undisputed that their logistics capabilities demanded a dispersed deployment along the frontier.) Likewise, Gravelotte-St. Privat was an unalloyed tactical disaster, largely caused by incompetent corps and division commanders, redeemed only by the fact that the French had already lost operationally before a single shot was fired.

201540[/snapback]

 

I would agree, and additionally add that Molke was thinking only of army and corps commanders. The system in use at that time worked well at Tannenberg with Hoffman's initiative being decisive, but not so well with Kluck and Bulow deciding amongst themselves to scrap the Schleiffen plan on the Marne. Kluck and Bulow were not being provided with any direction by the younger Moltke and it can be argued this actually shows the strength of the method in that they reached the Marne while their overall commander had turned to jelly.

 

The practice giving junior commanders mission based orders and allowing them the initiative to act on them was fully embraced on the Western front when Lossburg saw it as the way to make “flexible defence” workable, and Ludendorf saw that the “rigid defence” adopted in the Somme battles was ruinous so implemented flexible defence as the German standard.

 

I find 1918 interesting because the Germans used the system in attack allowing small units to infiltrate through defences, but had not managed to train their whole army to act that way. And the British while trying to learn from the German defensive arrangements copied the “blob defence” tactics but still tried to rigidly control the actions of the lower level defence.

[Ken Estes]

There are detailed orders, and mission-type orders; I see no discrete instance of 'impulse', which could naturally occur in either type. It is the character of the commander and the intervening commanders, the service doctrine and the state of training of the troops that will dictate how these are accomplished. Interestingly, the reading of the operations orders will give little insight, although the maneuverist pundits and their imitators place great store in the use of a paragraph for 'commander's intent' also known as 'desired end-state' to distinguish the modern mission type order. In absence of the requirements for Auftragstaktik, they will still be detailed orders. Thanks to the technical advances and the desire to 'synchronize' [mentioned above] and an even scarier technique, the 'templating' of op plans -- a method that could be applied to the French in early 20th C, USSR in mid20th C and now the US Army and its imitators -- we will have real problems finding Auftragstaktik, and instead we will find 'helicopter syndrome' [VN era, now satelite or real-time display syndrome] . Thus we have both styles available at the same time, maybe in the same commander.

 

How can one leave the details of execution to a subordinate, when the technical aids allow the senior commander at the theater level [and above] the capability to adjust the formation of the right squad/platoon of the right company/battalion/brigade/division?

 

Mission orders can be done, but will require the utmost in restraint and the confidence in the service's doctrine, training and the personalities of the commanders to uphold a true mission-oriented atmosphere. So, we are already talking about a matter of ambience, not the system of command and control, which remains high tech, detailed and comprehensive. For instance, when fire support goes to the desired 'sensor-to-shooter' this implies mission oriented execution, yet the inevitable parameters and protocols [read ROEs] introduced into the system by the command will amount to detailed orders.

 

War is simple, except in its execution....

[KingSargent]

We have touched on this idea, especially when talking about France 1940.

 

The Germans used the mission statement, while the French used a doctrine called colmatage, which was carefully planned and rehearsed set-piece battle using coordinated artillery support. This had worked for them in 1918 and the results of earlier battles which had not been planned in detail were bloody enough that the French adopted colmatage with relief.

 

However, colmatage didn't work once the opponent had gotten inside your decision cycle. In 1940, the French commanders could not react quickly enough to counter German thrusts. When the Allies were falling back from the Dyle line, troops would move into a new defensive position as ordered, only to find the Gremans had already passed it and were in their rear. After a generation of training for a set-piece battle, the commanders just couldn't think fast or 'shoot from the hip.'

 

To be fair to the French lots of others had the colmatage idea, including many of the Germans - especially the ones who got upset and tried to stop Guderian.

 

The French never caught on to the disadvantages of their doctrine because their training was rehearsed and formalized, and the annual maneuvers were not war-games so much as playlets designed to let the conscripts see how well it worked. Colmatage was fine as long as both sides used it but it was outclassed by the German Auftragstaktik.

[Ken Estes]

I see you early arisen and alert in Festung Alaska, King, but please do not grace Guderian with any credit for Auftragstaktik, German tactics in general, tank pioneering, or the Blitzkrieg...I liked Macksey's books too, but they are cooked. G was a parvenu, at best.

 

Certainly we can look to the FR as the example of mid20th detailed tactics, but so were the Brits, Rus, etc. The US, Weigley asserts, waged mission orders tactics in Europe, although the Benning and Leavenworth training was detailed...the advantage of a small peacetime army and Marshall's remowned black book?

[Manu]

The wrding seems a bit odd to me - in french 'colmatage' has te meaning of plugging a leak.

 

I suppose that the idea was to create a 'watertight' front line, then set plans to plug the breachs that might appear.

 

something like : 'if frotn get breached a X location, then Y and Z units are to move this way and do that thing, artilley bateyr x will shoptt there' and so on.

[BansheeOne]

It would be interesting to know what direction the Germans and Israelis are currently moving in.

201402[/snapback]

 

Unfortunately it appears that the nation which gave birth to Auftragstaktik is headed the same direction as many others, i.e. micro management and rank inflation. Back when I was in, an infantry squad was led by an E-5/6 (Unteroffizier/Stabsunteroffizier) with an E-4 (Hauptgefreiter) as second, a platoon would as often have an E-9 (Hauptfeldwebel) in command as a Lieutenant.

 

I hear that now a squad will be led by upwards of an E-7 (Feldwebel) with E-5/E-6's as fire team leaders, and a line infantry platoon will only have two squads and the platoon leader's team. And you hear of instances where they put a lieutenant colonel in charge of a checkpoint because lowly grunts cannot be trusted to make sensible decisions in sensible spots (that might be tales from disgruntled oldtimers, of course).

 

Several reasons behind this, chiefly that the Bundeswehr seems to be lacking in qualified recruits. Auftragstaktik requires a modicum of smart soldiers in the mix, which obviously wasn't a problem when the draft pulled in large numbers of young folks from all educational levels, with quite a few staying in for a couple of years to become NCO's or officers. Unfortunately over the last decades those of higher education have increasingly tended to claim conscientious objection to armed service, which became not chic, politicially incorrect or uncool.

 

With the threat of the cold war gone and token conscription reduced to a nine month term (kept mostly for political reason in a much-reduced force, though conscripts basically never get out of training and cannot serve abroad unless they volunteer, including a somewhat extended term), the number of those going on alternate civilian service actually exceeds those on armed service. The Bundeswehr now finds itself in the same position as most Western all-volunteer forces: Smart folks can make a lot more money in the civilian economy, and people "wasting" their time in the armed forces are often considered stupid by their peers. Generally, wearing your country's uniform carries a lot less prestige in Germany compared to other places, especially the U.S. (or at least so it looks from here).

 

As a consequence, even with record unemployment numbers the Bundeswehr now seems to get a disproportionate number of recruits that nobody else would have taken (also insert appropriate complaints about the educational system going down the drains here). In true army style they have lowered the standards to bait people with higher rank (and corresponding pay), to include creation of new enlisted grades Stabs- and Oberstabsgefreiter (non-NCO E-5/6 ... this in a force that used to mock the U.S. practice of making anybody capable of more than firing an M16 a "specialist"). As a result there often seems no choice but to lead by order tactics rather than mission tactics nowadays ...

 

A complementary details I've heard is that a disproportionate number of both conscripts and volunteers are from a Russian-German immigrant background (some of which are very much removed from their German roots, if they actually have some at all) who still have a different notion about the duty of national service, but also about ... uh ... the way it is conducted. A lot of them seem to be not readily disposed to the principles of "modern human leadership", and/or infact to the use of the German language. They also tend to gravitate towards combat units as the only ones having a remote semblance of armed service by their standards. Bundeswehr lore knows of at least one Battalion order to not speak Russian at all goddammit.

[KingSargent]

The wrding seems a bit odd to me - in french 'colmatage' has te meaning of plugging a leak.

 

I suppose that the idea was to create a 'watertight' front line, then set plans to plug the breachs that might appear.

 

something like : 'if frotn get breached a X location, then Y and Z units are to move this way and do that thing, artilley bateyr x will shoptt there' and so on.

201648[/snapback]

 

I don't understand it either, but that was the term given and explanation of meaning in a recent history on France '40.

[KingSargent]

I see you early arisen and alert in Festung Alaska, King, but please do not grace Guderian with any credit for Auftragstaktik, German tactics in general, tank pioneering, or the Blitzkrieg...I liked Macksey's books too, but they are cooked.  G was a parvenu, at best.

201643[/snapback]

 

Ken, I didn't say Guderian had anything to do with developing it, I was referring to the orders for him to stop from Kleist and later OKW in May 1940.