What if...

[BillB]

Actually I found it almost word for word here => Part of the Canadian Government Digital Collections.

 

I believe it comes from despatches prepared by Currie to the Canadian Government (much like Monash when he summarised the Australian Corps achievements in 1918).

 

Which is the same site I looked at. Merely being part of a government collection does not automatically confer accuracy or lack of bias, so my reservations stand. Not least because Currie would have been putting the best face on his activities for a variety of reasons, not least the human cost of Canadian involvement in the war. They didn't make the Vimy Memorial as large as it was and include the spirit of Canada weeping for her dead sons for fun.

 

It is more like a strip 5 miles wide (Corps frontage) by 100 miles deep (the extent of the advance) or some such.  The Australian Corps advance was similar.

 

As were those of the British Army formations involved too. And a strip of that size is still a bit small for 228 cities, towns and villages. Ref the use of tanks at Amiens, as I understand it they loomed large in Ludendorff losing his nerve because that finally made it clear that the Geman Army had no effective counter to massed tank attack. It didn't really matter that there were no tanks operational after Day 5 because the Allies were through the German defence zones (which was the whole purpose of tanks, remember) and carrying out mobile ops in open country. Had the Germans managed to gain sufficient space to dig in as they had in 1914, which the momentum of the Allied advance precluded, then the tanks could have been brought up to repeat the process.

 

Good point re the 100 Days being a series of co-ordinated attacks rather than a seamless whole.

 

all the best

 

BillB

[Redbeard]

It is more like a strip 5 miles wide (Corps frontage) by 100 miles deep (the extent of the advance) or some such.  The Australian Corps advance was similar.

 

197372[/snapback]

 

An exquisite and educational pleasure to read your posts Frank!

 

Just a nitpick - wouldn't 5 miles more be a Division frontage, even a small one? Anyway 10 miles Divisional frontage wouldn't be unusual by WWII and later.

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

[cdnsigop]

Bill,

 

A another good place to look is a documany series called "For King and Empime" in they go into detail how on the Canadian corp and its advances from 1915 thou to 1918 and last 100 days. Bias is an interesting thing, as i find most Histories of the Great War written by British authors to be very biased, including maybe a few pages on the important role played by Canada. You could read the "rites of spring" again a very good book that goes into detail on the Canadian involment.

 

As per the dispatches they reflex that the Canadian Corp was part of spearhead of the advance and so reflex that they stayed in combat for the whole hunderd days. and in some places had to be serectly moved up so the Germans would not be tipped off.

[cdnsigop]

all can found at http://www.collectionscanada.ca/firstworldwar/index-e.html

 

 

The 2nd Battle of Arras, Including the Battle of the Scarpe (August 26-30, 1918) and the Battle of Drocourt-Quéant (September 2-3, 1918)

 

The End Is Near

Battle Summary

Further Reading

Links to Online Information

 

The Allied Front: End of August 1918

 

The period between August 4 and November 11, 1918 is commonly referred to as "Canada’s Hundred Days," for the Canadians did indeed lead the offensives that culminated in the Allies’ final victory in Mons.

 

After the Allied success in the Battle of Amiens, August 8-11, it was expected that the enemy forces would be severely exhausted. "If we let the enemy rest," said Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the British Army, "it will regain its confidence and we will have to start using attrition tactics again." A renewal of the offensive on an extended front thus brought the Canadians back into action, this time with the British 1st Army in the Arras sector. "All units," directed Haig, "must charge their objectives while the reserve units will attack as we gain ground."

 

The British 1st Army was then ordered to strike eastward from Arras, and the Canadian Corps, under the command of General Sir Arthur Currie, became the spearhead of the attack, as it had been in earlier battles.

 

The Battle Zone: Arras

 

The Canadians were on the Arras-Cambrai Road, with the Scarpe on their left, opposite a series of enemy defensive positions that were afforded good protection by the topography of the region. The battle zone also extended northeast beyond the high Artois Hills. About 14 kilometres east of Arras was the Drocourt-Quéant Line, an impressive, well-fortified system of trenches and shelters. This line of defence was designed to keep the Allies from advancing into the Douai Plain.

 

Battle Plan: Attack by Two Canadian Divisions and One British Division

 

These positions thus became the initial objective of the Canadians. Since the enemy was expecting an attack, it was obviously impossible to surprise the Germans. Consequently, the strategy adopted was to launch successive frontal attacks to exhaust the enemy troops.

 

When the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions arrived in the sector, they became responsible for the front that extended northward from Neuville-Vitasse to the Scarpe River, two kilometres west of Fampoux. The 1st and 4th Divisions were not due to arrive until August 25 and 28 respectively. In the interim, the 51st British Division formed part of the Canadian Corps and provided flank protection north of the Cambrai Road. According to General Currie’s plan for the first phase of the offensive, simultaneous attacks were to be launched by the British Division on the left, the 3rd Canadian Division between the Scarpe and the Cambrai Road, and the 2nd Division on the right.

 

Key Factors: Use of Massive Artillery and Moving H-Hour Up

 

General Currie had no less than 14 field artillery brigades and nine heavy artillery brigades at his disposal in the way of supporting fire. In addition to the artillery of the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions already engaged in the offensive, these units included the artillery of the 15th, 16th and 39th British Divisions and three army brigades. In short, the massive artillery support proved to be crucial in advancing rapidly and exhausting enemy forces that were so well located in their defensive positions.

 

Monday, August 26, had been chosen as the day of attack. The drizzling rain would not make the advance easy. H-hour, which was initially set for dawn, was moved up to 3:00 a.m. in the hopes of deceiving the enemy. The ruse worked as the surprised German soldiers put up little resistance and the Canadian infantry was able to progress quickly in the first moments of battle, without having to use armoured equipment.

 

The Battle Objectives: Monchy-le-Preux, the Fresnes-Rouvroy Line, the Red Line (the Drocourt-Quéant Line at the Buissy Switch) and the Green Line (Opposite the Canal-du-Nord)

 

The first objective was to capture a north-south line, west of Monchy-le-Preux, and then move east as far as possible. The intermediate objective was to break the Fresnes-Rouvroy Line and capture Cagnicourt, Dury and Etaing.

 

Once these manoeuvres were successfully executed, an even larger task awaited the Canadians — breaking the Drocourt-Quéant Line and, finally, establishing a front line immediately west of Canal-du-Nord, beyond which the enemy would likely have retreated.

 

Preparations: Preliminary Raids, and Road and Railway Repairs

 

The Canadians did not enjoy the rest period that usually followed participation in major operations such as the earlier Battle of Amiens. Furthermore, on August 23, they raided the German-occupied city of Neuville-Vitasse in broad daylight and partially captured it. It is assumed that the enemy decided not to organize an extended defence when it realized that it was dealing with Canadians, whom it regarded as the best troops.

 

While the first objectives were being reached and the attack on the Drocourt-Quéant Line was being planned, the major task lay ahead of repairing and extending the roads and local railway lines, which were crucial to supplying the troops.

 

The Assault

 

H-hour: August 26, 3:00 a.m. The 2nd Division was on the right, south of the Cambrai Road; the 3rd Division, between the road and the Scarpe; the 51st Highland Division, on the left, north of the Scarpe. Supported by a powerful artillery and machine gun barrage, the attack made good progress. The 3rd Division captured Monchy, the first objective, with a skilfully executed encircling manoeuvre that was praised long after the tactical feat. On the right, the 2nd Division captured the villages of Guemappe and Wancourt during the afternoon. By nightfall, the Canadian line extended about 914 metres east of Monchy.

 

General Currie’s orders for the 27th were to break through the Fresnes-Rouvroy Line and thereby advance by eight kilometres. It took two more days of bitter fighting before this defence system near Boiry-Notre-Dame was penetrated, and when the Battle of the Scarpe ended on August 30, resolute German garrisons were still stubbornly clinging to it.

 

In the first three days of the battle, the 2nd and 3rd Divisions had advanced more than eight kilometres over rough, broken land furrowed with extremely well-fortified trenches. Nevertheless, the Canadians succeeded in reaching the great majority of their objectives and captured 3,300 prisoners and a large number of guns.

 

The Drocourt-Quéant Phase, September 2-3, 1918

 

After a 48-hour respite, the assault on the main enemy defensive line in the west, the Drocourt-Quéant Line, was launched. This time, the 1st and 4th Divisions led the charge. At dawn, armoured and infantry units advanced behind a powerful artillery barrage. South of the Cambrai Road, the 1st Division moved forward quickly as the tanks destroyed enemy posts that had survived the initial barrage. Just a few hours later, at around 7:30 a.m., one battalion had already cleared the main trenches, but not without suffering some heavy losses. Subsequently, the Canadians reached their objective of Buissy Switch before midnight.

 

In the centre, the 4th Canadian Division had also been fighting a hard battle between Dury and the main road, on the front trenches of the Drocourt-Quéant Line that were on a long exposed ridge of Mont Dury. Although the Germans had a topographical advantage that enabled them to fire and bomb from elevated positions, and despite their heavy losses, the Canadian battalions and the tanks reached the top of the ridge and drove the enemy back. The 4th Division had reached its first objective with the capture of Dury. During the night, the enemy pulled back, and on September 3, the Canadian Corps met no resistance when it advanced about six kilometres to take up positions facing the next obstacle, the Canal-du-Nord.

 

In the first four days of September, the Canadian Corps captured more than 6,000 unwounded prisoners and inflicted heavy losses on the German Army. Its own casualties amounted to 5,600 men in this short period.

 

The Successes: 1st Division (Major-General Macdonell)

 

When he spoke of the successes of the Army Corps, General Currie praised the 1st Canadian Division in particular for attacking and capturing the Fresnes-Rouvroy and Drocourt-Quéant Lines, which amounted to a penetration of almost ten kilometres.

 

The Ambushes: 2nd Division (Major-General Burstall)

 

During the operations on the first two days, the 2nd Division experienced some difficulty in the operations prior to capturing the two enemy lines. The objective of breaking through the Fresnes-Rouvroy enemy defence system was unsuccessful at first as the 2nd Division had difficulty breaking through these lines near Boiry-Notre-Dame, thus leaving the objective only partially achieved when the Battle of the Scarpe ended on August 30.

 

Wounded from All Segments of Canadian Society

 

The two phases of the Arras operation cost the Canadians nearly 11,000 men. It was during the Battle of the Scarpe that Georges Vanier, the future Governor General of Canada, lost his leg while commanding the 22nd Battalion. Although not loudly proclaimed, the cultural diversity of the Canadian Expeditionary Force is evident in those who were wounded; amongst the thousands of soldiers wounded in this battle is a Montreal car washer of Japanese origin, Ischimatsu Shintani, an infantryman with the 24th Battalion who suffered serious head injuries.

Top

 

Further Reading

 

Christie, N.M. The Canadians at Arras and the Drocourt-Quéant Line, August-September 1918: A Social History and Battlefield Tour. Nepean: CEF Books, 1997.

 

Granatstein, J.L. Canada’s Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace. Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 2002.

 

Morton, Desmond. When Your Number’s Up: The Canadian Soldier in the First World War. Toronto: Random House, 1993.

 

Morton, Desmond and J.L. Granatstein. Marching to Armageddon: Canadians and the Great War 1914-1919. Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys Ltd., 1989.

 

Nicholson, Colonel G.W.L., C.D. Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919: The Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War. Ottawa: Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1962.

 

Rawling, Bill. Surviving Trench Warfare. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992.

 

Top

 

Links to Online Information

The British Army in the Great War www.1914-1918.net/bat9.htm

 

First World War.com www.firstworldwar.com

 

The Western Front Association www.westernfront.co.uk

 

G.W.L. Nicholson's Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919, available online at http://www.dnd.ca/hr/dhh/downloads/Officia...ories/CEF_e.pdf

 

 

Canal-du-Nord and Cambrai - September 27-October 11, 1918

 

 

 

 

A Matter of Spirit

Battle Summary

Further Reading

Links to Online Information

 

Western Front Objectives: 1918

 

September 1918. The focus of Allied objectives was to break through that most formidable of German defensive systems, the Hindenburg Line. The risk of encountering the entire German reserve massed against an Allied onslaught was too great. Instead of trying to focus the Allied effort by attacking the enemy at his strongest point, a new strategy was employed—to utilise the entire front from the Meuse to the English Channel and attack at different points. Canadian forces were to advance toward Cambrai.

 

Battleground: Canal-du-Nord and Cambrai

 

Cambrai is situated in the Nord-Pas de Calais region in northern France. It is surrounded by an elaborate system of canals providing links to the Steele and Scheldt rivers to the northeast and drainage of marshy lands. West of Cambrai lies the Canal-du-Nord, whose construction at the outbreak of war had been left incomplete, a serious obstacle to Allied troops advancing from the west. The enemy had flooded the already swampy area and there was only a 4,000-metre southward stretch in which the ground was firm and the Canal-du-Nord (itself 35 metres wide) was dry. If this passage could be crossed, Bourlon Wood and the high ground to the north could be captured. The enemy placed machine-gun posts close to the canal's flanks and other units were locked into natural defences. The main German defences at the Marquion Line were only a mile past the canal. The problem was to quickly move the whole Corps, with heavy artillery, through that narrow defile before the enemy attacked.

 

The Plan: A Two-Division, Three-Brigade Attack

 

The Canadian Corps, under General Sir Arthur Currie, was put in charge of operations conceived as a set-piece attack. Because of the extremely narrow divide, at zero hour on September 27, the battlefront presented only two brigades on the left and one on the right, with a creeping artillery barrage and sappers following over hastily-built bridges, pontoons and cork slabs baled with wire netting. One artillery subsection supported each divisional artillery section behind the front line.

 

Once across the canal, troops would reassemble and the front had to be widened at lightning speed from 2,600 metres to 15,000 metres in order to circle Bourlon Wood, capture the Blue Line and prepare to press forward toward Cambrai. In 12 hours of fighting, the Canadians covered approximately 8,500 metres of ground with the 4th Division's 38th, 87th and 102nd Battalions arriving first and the 1st Division's 1st and 13th Battalions following with greater difficulty. In the following four days of difficult fighting, both divisions, along with reinforcements from the 3rd Division, managed to secure only a limited amount of territory and by October 1, exhausted troops were ordered to rest and reassemble. Operations to capture Cambrai and secure ground northeast of the city resumed on October 8, mainly involving in the 2nd and 3rd Divisions and lasting a total of four days.

 

The Keys: Artillery, Engineers, Tanks and Communications

 

If the infantry undertook this delicate mission, it absolutely needed finely-tuned support from other divisional and corps troops. First, groups of artillery field brigades would relay each other in a continuous rolling barrage to support the infantry as it progressed through the Red, Green and Blue Lines, and as it fought a stiff battle onto Cambrai. Second, the engineer brigades were rapidly deployed, often working under machine gun fire to make the canals passable by building vital bridges and pontoons for artillery troops and floating foot bridges over water-tilled portions of the canal. Third, British 7th Battalion tanks were deployed en masse (four tanks per attacking infantry brigade) to fire, crush wires and create smoke screens from their exhaust pipes. Many war diarists note the invaluable service the tanks provided. Finally, without accurate communications to coordinate infantry and artillery advances, the operation's success could at best be limited. For example, if an infantry battalion advanced beyond its objective, but if the support artillery behind it remained without accurate information on its position, the results could be disastrous.

 

Battle Objectives: Red, Green and Blue Lines; Fighting towards Cambrai; Capture of Cambrai

 

British and Canadian military leaders puzzled long and hard over which course to take through the almost impassable marshland and a system of canals over which the enemy had an almost uninterrupted view from the higher ground beyond. The objective was for the 1st and 4th Divisions to quickly cross the Canal-du-Nord, take Bourlon Wood, and capture surrounding towns, pushing to the northeast. Then the 3rd Division would join them and push to the Cambrai/Douai Road opposite Tilloy. The 3rd and 4th Divisions would seize bridgeheads over the Canal de l'Escaut at Ramillies and Eswars, northeast of Cambrai, after which the 1st Division was to pass through their ranks to capture Abancourt east of the Douai Railway pushing on to Fressies at the Sensée Canal. The 2nd Division would then take its turn for the heart of the operation to capture Cambrai by forcing a passage over the Canal de l'Escaut between Morenchies and Ramillies and establishing a line on high ground behind Escaudoeuvres, "joining hands" with the British positioned there. Combined troops would then cross the canal and establish bridgeheads at Cambrai, clear the city and open the front eastward. Finally, ground northeast of Cambrai on both sides of the Canal de l'Escaut had to be cleared up to Iwuy.

 

Preparations

 

For the Canal-du-Nord and Cambrai offensives, the strength of the Canadian Corps, including attached troops, stood at 118,194 men. Of the 98,790 Canadians in this Corps, direct assault troops accounted for less than half of combatants. This meant that a great portion of the Corps was involved in preparations. Engineers, signal troops, transport and labour companies, and medical and veterinary units were all heavily involved in building bridges, relaying vital intelligence, constructing and repairing railway and communication lines, delivering supplies, caring for the wounded and maintaining horses. Under heavy attack not only from shells, but also machine-gun fire, they unfailingly carried out their work.

 

The Attack

 

5:20 a.m. (zero hour) on September 27. An artillery barrage explodes over enemy positions and

the 1st Division begins to move swiftly. Crossing the dry bed of the Canal-du-Nord with success as dawn breaks, the Canadians rapidly secure the Green Line. Passing through their ranks, the 4th Division gains entry into the southern part of Bourlon Village around 9:45 a.m., but not without heavy casualties. By 2:00 p.m., they pass the Blue Line and attain the objective of capturing Bourlon Wood (Blue Line). Pushing on, by the end of the afternoon, while the 15th Infantry Brigade stands firm at the Blue Line, brigades from the 1st and 4th Canadian Division, plus the British 11th Division, clear the enemy's Marcoing trench system. Victory is assured by 8:00 p.m. as the last pocket of enemy resistance is overcome.

 

Success: lst Division (Major-General MacDonell) and 4th Division (Major-General Watson), September 27, 1918

 

Setback: 1st Division, 3rd Division (Major-General Loomis ) and 4th Division, September 28-October 1. The first day's resounding success is mitigated by the setbacks of the ensuing four days. Having brilliantly met the first objective of the battle, the 1st and 4th Divisions prepare to press eastward to Cambrai along with the 3rd Division. They run into unmapped wire and suffer heavy losses in front of the Douai Road, making progress only slowly and painfully to their intermediate objective of seizing bridges over the Canal de l'Escaut and establishing a united front across to the Canal de la Sensée. Before attempting to draw in on Cambrai, exhausted troops are forced to pause and reorganize.

 

Success: 2nd Division (Major-General Burstall) and 3rd Division, October 8-9. Attacking alone at 1:30 a.m. on October 8, after failing to make contact with British troops, the Canadian 2nd Division crosses a hastily-constructed bridge over the Canal de l'Escaut, successfully attaining the objective of forcing that passage. The 3rd Division establishes a line of posts on the eastern outskirts of Cambrai, and finally, the British move up and join with the 2nd Division northeast of Cambrai, as planned.

 

Setbacks for the 2nd Division in ending of the battle. In spite of its ultimate success, several incidents plague the 2nd Division as it continues its advance beyond Cambrai. As it begins to clear northeast of the city, it comes under heavy enemy fire and has to dig in. The Canadian Light Horse, also pushing ahead to secure the surrounding areas, falls into machine-gun fire at Iwuy and Naves. This causes heavy casualties to men and horses. Nevertheless, with Cambrai successfully captured and secured, at 5:00 p.m. on October 11, General Currie hands over the commands to the British 22nd Corps. The battle is over. Of the 68,500 men engaged in the conflict, 13,672 or 20 percent were lost in the Canal-du-Nord and Cambrai operations.

 

Top

 

Further Reading

 

Christie, N.M. The Canadians at Cambrai and the Canal du Nord, September-October

1918: A Social and Battlefield Tour. Nepean: CEF Books, 1997.

 

Granatstein, J.L. Canada's Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace. Toronto, Buffalo,

London: University of Toronto Press, 2002.

 

Morton, Desmond. When Your Number's Up: The Canadian Soldier in the First World

War. Toronto: Random House, 1993.

 

Morton, Desmond and J.L. Granatstein. Marching to Armageddon: Canadians and the

Great War 1914-1919. Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys Ltd., 1989.

 

Nicholson, Colonel G.W.L., C.D. Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919: The

Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War. Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1962.

 

Rawling, Bill. Surviving Trench Warfare. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992

 

Evolution of the Canadian Corps 1914-1918

 

 

 

One Division

 

On August 6, 1914, a grateful Empire sent word requesting that Canada's offer of soldiers be "dispatched as soon as possible." The next day, the Canadian Army Council advised that a "suitable composition" for Canada's overseas expeditionary force would be "one division."

 

First Contingent, August-September 1914

 

Canada's first contingent comprised four infantry brigades mobilized from militia districts across the country.

 

Brigades of the 1st Division

 

• 1st (Provisional) Infantry Brigade, containing the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Battalions, was mustered in Ontario.

 

• 2nd Infantry Brigade, containing the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th Battalions, hailed from western Canada.

 

• 3rd Infantry Brigade brought together volunteers from Montreal and the Maritimes in its 14th Battalion. The remaining three battalions of the 3rd Brigade were formed from Canadian Highland units.

 

• 4th Infantry Brigade, originally planned as a future 2nd Division, but quickly absorbed by the 1st Division, gathered recruits from the Prairies to fill the 9th, 10th and 11th Battalions. The 12th Battalion came from the Maritimes.

 

 

First Contingent Arrives in Britain, October 1914

 

On October 14, 1914, a total of 31,200 men of the Canadian Expeditionary Force arrived in Britain. Under the command of Lieutenant-General E.A.H. Alderson, Canada's first overseas division brought together infantry, supporting arms and specialist organizations, including artillery batteries of 18-pounder guns, militia engineering field companies, signal, medical and veterinary units, as well as the Army Service Corps tasked with delivering vital food, ammunition and fuel supplies.

 

 

First Units to See Service in France, November 1914

 

On November 8, No. 2 Stationary Hospital became the first Canadian unit to see service in France. A fortnight later, a privately raised Montreal infantry battalion, the Princess Patricia's Light Infantry (PPCLI), arrived on the western front, but as part of the British 80th Brigade. The PPCLI would not return to the Canadian fold for nearly a year. It was to lose 75 percent of its effective fighting strength during a gallant defensive stand during the battles at Ypres, April–May 1915.

 

 

The Western Front

 

The western front, which the Canadians joined as part of the British 1st and later 2nd Armies, consisted of a complex, hand-gouged system of trenches, wooden planking, barbed wire and mud, which snaked from the English Channel to the Swiss border. Between 1915 and 1917, this line changed little more than 16 kilometres in either direction. Offensive victories were calculated in metres.

 

 

1st and 2nd Divisions Arrive in France

 

In February 1915, the 1st Division arrived in France with 610 officers and 17,263 other ranks. The 2nd Division followed in September of the same year under the command of Major-General R.E.W. Turner.

 

Brigades of the 2nd Division

 

• 4th Brigade, which was newly formed, had its 18th, 19th, 20th and 21st Battalions mobilized from Ontario.

 

• 5th Brigade saw its Battalions (22nd, 24th, 25th and 26th) recruited from Quebec and the Maritimes. The 22nd Battalion was comprised entirely of French-Canadian soldiers.

 

• 6th Brigade, made up of the 27th, 28th, 29th and 31st Battalions consisted of western recruits. The 2nd Divisional Cavalry Squadron was formed at the end of March 1915. A lack of guns delayed the completion of the 2nd Divisional Artillery.

 

 

Creation of the Canadian Corps, September 1915

 

On September 13, 1915, Lieutenant-General Alderson opened the Canadian Corps Headquarters. The new formation comprised the 1st Division (Major-General A.W. Currie), 2nd Division (Major-General R.E.W. Turner) and Corp Troops under the command of Major-General M.S. Mercer. Mercer's Corp Troops included the Canadian Cavalry and the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery Brigades, as well as a group of infantry and dismounted cavalry units, which would later form the 7th and 8th Brigades of the future 3rd Division. By the beginning of November 1915, the Canadian Corps comprised 1,354 officers and 36,522 other ranks.

 

 

3rd Division

 

By the end of December 1915, Major-General Mercer, a Canadian by birth, commanded the Corps' 3rd Division. He held this command until his death during the Battle of Mount Sorrel, June 1916. By the end of 1916, all staff appointments in this Division, but for three, were held by Canadians.

 

Brigades of the 3rd Division

 

• 7th Brigade consisted of the Princess Patricia's Light Infantry (the only unit with active field experience), the Royal Canadian Regiment (Canada's only permanent force battalion newly arrived in France after garrison duty in Bermuda), the 42nd Battalion (Montreal) and the 49th Battalion (Edmonton).

 

• 8th Brigade was made up of the Canadian Mounted Rifle Battalion's 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battalions.

 

• 9th Brigade, which joined the Division in February 1916, comprised the 43rd (Winnipeg), 52nd (Port Arthur), 58th (Niagara area) and the 60th (Montreal) Battalions. By the end of January 1916, there were 50,000 Canadian troops in the field, serving in the Canadian Corps, as part of the British 2nd Army.

 

 

4th Division

 

In April 1916, the 4th Division, under the command of Major-General David Watson, was created from units already overseas or soon to arrive. Like the 2nd and 3rd Divisions (the 3rd now commanded by Major-General L.J. Lipsett), the 4th Division did not at first have its own artillery. The 4th Divisional Artillery was not formed until June 1917.

 

Brigades of the 4th Division

 

• 10th Brigade consisted of the 44th (Winnipeg), 46th (South Saskatchewan), 47th (New Westminster, Vancouver and Victoria) and 50th (Calgary) Battalions.

 

• 11th Brigade made up of the 54th (Kootenay, British Columbia), 75th (Toronto, Hamilton and London), 87th (Montreal) and 102nd (North British Columbia) Battalions.

 

• 12th Brigade comprised the 38th (Ottawa district), 72nd (British Columbia), 73rd (Montreal) and 78th (Winnipeg) Battalions. At the end of June 1916, the number of Corps casualties had mounted to 32,000—nearly equalling the total number of recruits who sailed to England with the first contingent in October 1914.

 

 

The Battle of Vimy Ridge, April 9–12, 1917

 

A year later, during the Battle of Vimy Ridge, April 9–12, 1917, Canadian soldiers in the Corps totalled 97,184 men. For the first time, the Corps' 1st Division (Major-General Arthur Currie), 2nd Division (Major-General Harry E. Burstall), 3rd Division (Major-General Louis. J. Lipsett) and 4th Division (Major-General David Watson), under Commander Lieutenant-General the Honourable Sir Julian H.G. Byng, attacked as a single formation.

 

Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Currie Commands the Canadian Corps, June 1917

 

On June 9, 1917, Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Currie, a Canadian by birth, and at 41, the "youngest officer to achieve Lieutenant-General's rank in the British armies," assumed command of the Canadian Corps. Lieutenant-General Sir Julian Byng took over the British 3rd Army.

 

 

Canada's Finest Formation, November 11, 1918

 

In the following year, at 6:30 a.m. on November 11, 1918, a message reached the Canadian Corps Headquarters announcing that hostilities would cease five hours later at 11:00 a.m. At the moment of the armistice, Lieutenant-General Currie commanded 110,000 Canadian troops. Historian Jack Granatstein writes: "Arthur Currie was the best soldier Canada ever produced. The Canadian Corps under his command became the finest formation this nation has ever put in the field."

 

 

Sources

 

Granatstein, J.L. Canada's Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace. Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 2002.

 

Nicholson, Colonel G.W.L. Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919: The Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War. Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1962.

 

Morton, Desmond and J.L. Granatstein. Marching to Armageddon: Canadians and the Great War 1914-1919. Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, Ltd., 1989.Evolution of the Canadian Corps 1914-1918

 

 

 

One Division

 

On August 6, 1914, a grateful Empire sent word requesting that Canada's offer of soldiers be "dispatched as soon as possible." The next day, the Canadian Army Council advised that a "suitable composition" for Canada's overseas expeditionary force would be "one division."

 

First Contingent, August-September 1914

 

Canada's first contingent comprised four infantry brigades mobilized from militia districts across the country.

 

Brigades of the 1st Division

 

• 1st (Provisional) Infantry Brigade, containing the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Battalions, was mustered in Ontario.

 

• 2nd Infantry Brigade, containing the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th Battalions, hailed from western Canada.

 

• 3rd Infantry Brigade brought together volunteers from Montreal and the Maritimes in its 14th Battalion. The remaining three battalions of the 3rd Brigade were formed from Canadian Highland units.

 

• 4th Infantry Brigade, originally planned as a future 2nd Division, but quickly absorbed by the 1st Division, gathered recruits from the Prairies to fill the 9th, 10th and 11th Battalions. The 12th Battalion came from the Maritimes.

 

 

First Contingent Arrives in Britain, October 1914

 

On October 14, 1914, a total of 31,200 men of the Canadian Expeditionary Force arrived in Britain. Under the command of Lieutenant-General E.A.H. Alderson, Canada's first overseas division brought together infantry, supporting arms and specialist organizations, including artillery batteries of 18-pounder guns, militia engineering field companies, signal, medical and veterinary units, as well as the Army Service Corps tasked with delivering vital food, ammunition and fuel supplies.

 

 

First Units to See Service in France, November 1914

 

On November 8, No. 2 Stationary Hospital became the first Canadian unit to see service in France. A fortnight later, a privately raised Montreal infantry battalion, the Princess Patricia's Light Infantry (PPCLI), arrived on the western front, but as part of the British 80th Brigade. The PPCLI would not return to the Canadian fold for nearly a year. It was to lose 75 percent of its effective fighting strength during a gallant defensive stand during the battles at Ypres, April–May 1915.

 

 

The Western Front

 

The western front, which the Canadians joined as part of the British 1st and later 2nd Armies, consisted of a complex, hand-gouged system of trenches, wooden planking, barbed wire and mud, which snaked from the English Channel to the Swiss border. Between 1915 and 1917, this line changed little more than 16 kilometres in either direction. Offensive victories were calculated in metres.

 

 

1st and 2nd Divisions Arrive in France

 

In February 1915, the 1st Division arrived in France with 610 officers and 17,263 other ranks. The 2nd Division followed in September of the same year under the command of Major-General R.E.W. Turner.

 

Brigades of the 2nd Division

 

• 4th Brigade, which was newly formed, had its 18th, 19th, 20th and 21st Battalions mobilized from Ontario.

 

• 5th Brigade saw its Battalions (22nd, 24th, 25th and 26th) recruited from Quebec and the Maritimes. The 22nd Battalion was comprised entirely of French-Canadian soldiers.

 

• 6th Brigade, made up of the 27th, 28th, 29th and 31st Battalions consisted of western recruits. The 2nd Divisional Cavalry Squadron was formed at the end of March 1915. A lack of guns delayed the completion of the 2nd Divisional Artillery.

 

 

Creation of the Canadian Corps, September 1915

 

On September 13, 1915, Lieutenant-General Alderson opened the Canadian Corps Headquarters. The new formation comprised the 1st Division (Major-General A.W. Currie), 2nd Division (Major-General R.E.W. Turner) and Corp Troops under the command of Major-General M.S. Mercer. Mercer's Corp Troops included the Canadian Cavalry and the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery Brigades, as well as a group of infantry and dismounted cavalry units, which would later form the 7th and 8th Brigades of the future 3rd Division. By the beginning of November 1915, the Canadian Corps comprised 1,354 officers and 36,522 other ranks.

 

 

3rd Division

 

By the end of December 1915, Major-General Mercer, a Canadian by birth, commanded the Corps' 3rd Division. He held this command until his death during the Battle of Mount Sorrel, June 1916. By the end of 1916, all staff appointments in this Division, but for three, were held by Canadians.

 

Brigades of the 3rd Division

 

• 7th Brigade consisted of the Princess Patricia's Light Infantry (the only unit with active field experience), the Royal Canadian Regiment (Canada's only permanent force battalion newly arrived in France after garrison duty in Bermuda), the 42nd Battalion (Montreal) and the 49th Battalion (Edmonton).

 

• 8th Brigade was made up of the Canadian Mounted Rifle Battalion's 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battalions.

 

• 9th Brigade, which joined the Division in February 1916, comprised the 43rd (Winnipeg), 52nd (Port Arthur), 58th (Niagara area) and the 60th (Montreal) Battalions. By the end of January 1916, there were 50,000 Canadian troops in the field, serving in the Canadian Corps, as part of the British 2nd Army.

 

 

4th Division

 

In April 1916, the 4th Division, under the command of Major-General David Watson, was created from units already overseas or soon to arrive. Like the 2nd and 3rd Divisions (the 3rd now commanded by Major-General L.J. Lipsett), the 4th Division did not at first have its own artillery. The 4th Divisional Artillery was not formed until June 1917.

 

Brigades of the 4th Division

 

• 10th Brigade consisted of the 44th (Winnipeg), 46th (South Saskatchewan), 47th (New Westminster, Vancouver and Victoria) and 50th (Calgary) Battalions.

 

• 11th Brigade made up of the 54th (Kootenay, British Columbia), 75th (Toronto, Hamilton and London), 87th (Montreal) and 102nd (North British Columbia) Battalions.

 

• 12th Brigade comprised the 38th (Ottawa district), 72nd (British Columbia), 73rd (Montreal) and 78th (Winnipeg) Battalions. At the end of June 1916, the number of Corps casualties had mounted to 32,000—nearly equalling the total number of recruits who sailed to England with the first contingent in October 1914.

 

 

The Battle of Vimy Ridge, April 9–12, 1917

 

A year later, during the Battle of Vimy Ridge, April 9–12, 1917, Canadian soldiers in the Corps totalled 97,184 men. For the first time, the Corps' 1st Division (Major-General Arthur Currie), 2nd Division (Major-General Harry E. Burstall), 3rd Division (Major-General Louis. J. Lipsett) and 4th Division (Major-General David Watson), under Commander Lieutenant-General the Honourable Sir Julian H.G. Byng, attacked as a single formation.

 

Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Currie Commands the Canadian Corps, June 1917

 

On June 9, 1917, Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Currie, a Canadian by birth, and at 41, the "youngest officer to achieve Lieutenant-General's rank in the British armies," assumed command of the Canadian Corps. Lieutenant-General Sir Julian Byng took over the British 3rd Army.

 

 

Canada's Finest Formation, November 11, 1918

 

In the following year, at 6:30 a.m. on November 11, 1918, a message reached the Canadian Corps Headquarters announcing that hostilities would cease five hours later at 11:00 a.m. At the moment of the armistice, Lieutenant-General Currie commanded 110,000 Canadian troops. Historian Jack Granatstein writes: "Arthur Currie was the best soldier Canada ever produced. The Canadian Corps under his command became the finest formation this nation has ever put in the field."

 

 

Sources

 

Granatstein, J.L. Canada's Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace. Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 2002.

 

Nicholson, Colonel G.W.L. Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919: The Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War. Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1962.

 

Morton, Desmond and J.L. Granatstein. Marching to Armageddon: Canadians and the Great War 1914-1919. Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, Ltd., 1989.

[BillB]

Bill,

 

A another good place to look is a documany series called "For King and Empime"  in they go into detail how on the Canadian corp and its advances from 1915 thou to 1918 and last 100 days. Bias is an interesting thing, as i find most Histories of the Great War written by British authors to be very biased, including maybe a few pages on the important role played by Canada.  You could read the "rites of spring" again a very good book that goes into detail on the Canadian involment.

 

As per the dispatches they reflex that the Canadian Corp was part of spearhead of the advance and so reflex that they stayed in combat for the whole hunderd days.  and in some places had to be serectly moved up so the Germans would not be tipped off.

197549[/snapback]

 

Cdnsigop,

 

nothing personal, but this merely supports my initial impression. I've seen these complaints about British bias before from Canadians and Autralians, and from the British about American accounts too. Even done the latter myself on occasion! Perhaps bias is sometimes too strong a word, as it is frequently merely a matter of perspective. Folk tend to like to hear about their own bits of what was going on as opposed to anyone elses. This is natural enough but is a dodgy foundation for objective analysis. Has it occurred to you that what you perceive as anti-Canadian bias merely reflects the big picture? Perhaps I am reading things wrong, but your posts on this topic thus far give the distinct impression that the Canadians won the last stages of WW1 virtually unaided, and that everyone else was merely playing a support role to their activities. This was simply not the case. Overstatement in response to perceived understatement is simply two wrongs not making a right.

 

all the best

 

BillB

[capt_starlight]

As per the dispatches they reflex that the Canadian Corp was part of spearhead of the advance and so reflex that they stayed in combat for the whole hunderd days.  and in some places had to be serectly moved up so the Germans would not be tipped off.

197549[/snapback]

 

Actually I think you will find that, while the Corps stayed in action for the "Hundred Days" not all elements did so. Divisions were rested.

 

I note for instance that the Australian Corps was officially rested from early OCT18 but the Corps and much of the Divisional Artillery, Engineers and other support elements continued in action until the end of combat operations in support of other Corps.

 

I can only concur with BillB about the problems of perspective versus bias - it started very early in the peace (sic). Monash wrote The Australians Victories in France 1918 in 1919 because of that perceived bias.

 

 

Frank

 

PS what does “…so reflex…” mean ?

[capt_starlight]

Merely being part of a government collection does not automatically confer accuracy or lack of bias, so my reservations stand.

197448[/snapback]

 

How apt in light of recent events!

 

Any government is capable of bias for whatever reason can be advanced. The most obvious ones include creating and fostering a national identity (modern Canada only dates from post WW2), to “pushing” a particular line or angle on events to “bring the populace along” (wartime propaganda when attacked is the probably the least reprehensible aspect whereas history can provide examples of propaganda to cause countries to go to war), to political parties in power using the apparat of government to ensure the continuation of their reign (all forms of government seem to be guilty of this).

 

My reservations stand in respect to any history (or ideed just about anything in life) – there are always different emphasis or rebuttals available to any case –it is the weighing up that each must decide if the case is made……

 

Frank

[cdnsigop]

"Perhaps I am reading things wrong, but your posts on this topic thus far give the distinct impression that the Canadians won the last stages of WW1 virtually unaided, and that everyone else was merely playing a support role to their activities. This was simply not the case. Overstatement in response to perceived understatement is simply two wrongs not making a right."

 

I can see why you might think that way. But that was not intention. My point was that and is that Canadian Corp played a very major part in the victory. And that is this major part that is over looked in most other histories of Great War. I see no where in my posts that I'm over stating the role of Canada, only making sure that what Canadians did is over looked or dismissed as it in most major histories on the subject and for that by most people in the UK and US. If you can't find those books I listed in teh Uk I'ld be happy to help send to you.

[capt_starlight]

An exquisite and educational pleasure to read your posts Frank!

 

Just a nitpick - wouldn't 5 miles more be a Division frontage, even a small one? Anyway 10 miles Divisional frontage wouldn't be unusual by WWII and later.

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

197450[/snapback]

 

Thankyou for the compliment. I post rarely but read here more often sometimes to my amazement of the depth of knowledge of participants on particular subjects. I only comment (nowadays) when I have something useful to provide. Unfortunately, that is not always true of all here.

 

I take your point - Corps frontages were more that 5 miles by the end of the war - the "thinning" of the front line (troops to ground ratio) had been going on since the start of the war but from memory at Amiens the Canadian and Australian Corps attacked on frontages of about 7-8 miles on a two up inital "push" with reliefs passing through to take the next objective.

 

Frank

[gewing]

I seem to remember from a History class that the US troops had trainers from the French army, and tended to use tactics more like the French forces than the British forces. It has been well over a decade, but "more use of grenades" comes to mind.

 

Any thoughts?