What if...

[cdnsigop]

"Errhem, "spearheaded by the Canadian Corps"? I think you'll find there were a few contributions by several other nations to the "spearhead", other than just the Canadians."

 

Not taking away anyone elses thunder, but most the succuss of 100 days was due to the amazing advance of the Canadian corp. It was their succuss that ended war before 1919. Of you only get to read this on canadian histories as most US and british histories only feel need to give canada a page to two. Which of course is incorrect and give too much credit to British forces.

 

 

 

from the website listed in the above post.

 

"It is no wonder that Ludendorff and Byng made such statements. During the hundred days which followed the Canadian Corps’ initial and speedy penetration of the German line, the Corps, under Currie’s command, had liberated 500 square miles of territory containing 228 cities, towns, and villages and captured 31,000 prisoners, 590 heavy and field guns and thousands of machine guns and trench mortars. Fifty German divisions — approximately one-fourth of the total German forces on the Western Front — were defeated. By nightfall on the first day of the battle of Amiens, the Canadian Corps’ penetration of the enemy line was unequalled: no other engagement on the Western Front up to that time had achieved this kind of success as the result of a single day’s fighting."

[Lev]

[..] but in reality, its obvious that he, like all other generals of the period, were groping with how to come to terms with and control the new technology which had produced such a stalemate on the Western Front.  If you look at the experience of the battles on that front, as a learning experience, albeit an expensive one, Haig actually shines through by the end, when during the 100 days he broke the German front, [..]

 

On the face of it, that seems a logical enough conclusion. But, if true there should be something different about the way Haig handled the 1918 offensive -evidence of 'lessons learned' for one thing.

Now Haig was never the most progressive of commanders, and one is inclined to say that tactical innovatiion was made in spite of Haig. And strategically the situation had vastly improved because of german overextension and the arrival of the americans. So where does Haig fit in? What was that decisive contribution he made that allowed the allied armies to smash the germans in 4 months. And more to the point of the topic: can Haig use this 'edge' when the americans don't show up, and the germans don't go all-or-nothing? (or will we have another major offensive on the same old battlefields, because this time it will work).

[capt_starlight]

I'm surprised no one has mentioned this in any post so far, but if the war had of  gone past 1918; FM Haig would of been replaced by Canadian general Sir A Currie. So no more offensives like the Somme.  Currie was more aware of what was needed to win offensives, and I believe he would led the allies to victory by 1920 at the latest, had been there no US involvement and there fore no spring german offensive.

 

As a canadian I have always been proud of the fact that Currie was mostly the best general the british had; but if over looked in most WW1 histories.

196438[/snapback]

 

 

An interesting claim that has been made about Monash of the Australian Corps as well.

 

I know that the source for Monash was Lloyd George's post war memoirs but these were, like most political memoirs, self-serving. He was out to denigrate the then dead Haig for all he could (and bolster his own position) - his was not all that glorious from the war .......

 

What was the source for the Currie hypothesis ?

 

As Le Baron points out, Haig had the ear of the King (through his wife) as well as that of the military and political establishment (outside the Lloyd George followers and some others - they were not all that many or powerful). His successor would have to have come from one of the Army Commanders (Plumer, Rawlinson, Byng, Birdwood or Horne) or one of the theatre commanders (Allenby or Marshall) or possiby Lord Cavan. All were senior to either of the Dominion Commanders, had experience handling troops at Army level and many had distinguished themselves in action (eg Plumer at Ypres and Allenby in the desert - though not in France)

 

Only Byng and Allenby were cavalryman (and thus infected by "Haig's disease" of "searching for the green fields beyond" ) from memory - the others being Infantry, Artillery or Engineers.

 

Monash and Currie needed time as Army commanders (and I think there is an inkling at least that Monash did not want to go higher - certainly without that experience in command of an Army).

 

Currie was good - of that there was no doubt - but there are others that can claim similar success like those mentioned above. No one can claim to have the "best general" as they ALL suffered problems or had questions asked of their performance at one time or another.

 

What can be said is that the group that was in the field as of 8AUG18 was trained, equipped and led the probably best armies that the British Empire have ever raised to that time. They adapted to the change from trench warfare to open warfare, accepted and blunted several massive German attacks (albeit with difficulty) and then drove the enemy from the field.

 

Admittedly, they would have had to have paused about 15NOV18 for logistics reasons if the Germans had not sued for an Armistice…..

 

 

Frank

[Rickshaw]

On the face of it, that seems a logical enough conclusion. But, if true there should be something different about the way Haig handled the 1918 offensive -evidence of 'lessons learned' for one thing.

Now Haig was never the most progressive of commanders, and one is inclined to say that tactical innovatiion was made in spite of Haig. And strategically the situation had vastly improved because of german overextension and the arrival of the americans. So where does Haig fit in? What was that decisive contribution he made that allowed the allied armies to smash the germans in 4 months. And more to the point of the topic: can Haig use this 'edge' when the americans don't show up, and the germans don't go all-or-nothing? (or will we have another major offensive on the same old battlefields, because this time it will work).

196521[/snapback]

 

 

You have the move from the "big push", set piece offensives to the smaller, "bite and hold" sequential operations, requiring tactical and operational flexibility to take advantage of German weaknesses on the local and operational level. Haig while a bit of a reluctant convert to the latter type of operation, quickly embraced it, once the initial successes had been proved.

 

Then there is significant evidence that Haig was more than willing to back tactical innovation, both in the form of material means (tanks, improved artillery tactics, etc) and in innovatory tactical methods. Paddy Griffith makes it clear that Haig was well aware of and backed the improved tactical innovations that the infantry implemented through 1917, upon which the basis of the success of the 100 days is built.

 

Then, as Frank points out, you have the successful change over from trench warfare to open, maneauvre warfare that the 100 days achieved. At the end of which, the German Army had basically been broken and was in full retreat, being pursued by the Allies as quickly as they could go. As Frank also points out, the real determiner of that advance was the British logistics system, not enemy resistence.

[Victor]

I can't see the USA staying out of the war much longer. American morale was high - people were well paid in war industries, public sentiment was outraged by outrages like the Luisitania and casualties and disruption (Zepplins had a strong effect on staff absenteeism in Royal Ordnance) weren't having the effect they were in Europe.

 

A continued war would have led to further resources wasted on the war, worsening the depression and further shifting revolution in central Europe - a communist Germany? Fragmentation of Germany into ethnic or regional groups (although Germany was a lot more German than Austria-Hungary was Austrian or Hungarian)? Germany losing the Rhineland? Western intervention in Germany instead of Russia?

[Guest michigankid88]

Germany would have won the war if the united states did not enter by the spring of 1918 the french army was about read to mutiny, and the majority of the troops that historically stopped the last major german thrust twords paris were americans, that last major offensive might have been enough to have pushed the french over the edge giving the war to germany.

[cdnsigop]

"I can't see the USA staying out of the war much longer. American morale was high"

 

there were many riots and lots of public outragre when the US entered war. I see no public push for US involement in the war. It was still seen as a european war and US was getting rich off the war.

 

As Currie as head of British forces, I can't confirm this as it was few years that i read it and no longer have the books that listed it. It could be wrong and from the post here I can see how hard it would been for him to take over.

[FlyingCanOpener]

Any reasonable scenario that keeps the US out of the war requires Germany to avoid unrestricted submarine warfare and treat the US with care (i.e., no Zimmerman telegram). This alone wouldn't have impacted operations on the Western Front, but it would have made the Kaiser's position less tenable (he was under tremendous pressure from the Army and the Pan-Germans to wage all-out war) and have eased domestic conditions in Britain somewhat.

194783[/snapback]

 

Considering how Wilson responded with protests and negotiations to American losses until the Zimmerman Note, as well as popular opinion toward the war, I don't see why Germany would have to tip toe around US shipping more than they did already. The dumbest move was indeed the Zimmerman Note, which was the weapon Wilson could use to drag the US into the War. Without it, US entrance would not be guaranteed, with an entrance (if it occurred) not until 1918, which makes things interesting vis a vis Russia...

[capt_starlight]

Germany would have won the war if the united states did not enter by the spring of 1918 the french army was about read to mutiny, and the majority of the troops that historically stopped the last major german thrust twords paris were americans, that last major offensive might have been enough to have pushed the french over the edge giving the war to germany.

196923[/snapback]

 

An interesting viewpoint of history.

 

Would you care to back it up with some facts ? Citations would be the bare minimum.

 

Frank

[Guest michigankid88]

Germany would have won the war if the united states did not enter by the spring of 1918 the french army was about read to mutiny, and the majority of the troops that historically stopped the last major german thrust twords paris were americans, that last major offensive might have been enough to have pushed the french over the edge giving the war to germany.

An interesting viewpoint of history.

 

Would you care to back it up with some facts ?  Citations would be the bare minimum.

 

Frank

197050[/snapback]

 

Their were cases in the trenches of french troops refusing to move under the orders of their officers originally the french and british wanted to integrate the american expeditionary force into their forces Pershing wouldn't allow this so most americans were held in reserve when the german thrust broke through in the spring of 1918 Pershing got his chance to show the europeans what americans had we stopped them at places such as bella wood , so in essance no american reserves nothing would have been between the german army and paris

Edited July 19, 2005 by michigankid88

[capt_starlight]

"Errhem, "spearheaded by the Canadian Corps"? I think you'll find there were a few contributions by several other nations to the "spearhead", other than just the Canadians."

 

Not taking away anyone elses thunder, but  most the succuss of 100 days was due to the amazing advance of the Canadian corp.  It was their succuss that ended war before 1919.  Of you only get to read this on canadian histories as most US and british histories only feel need to give canada a page to two.  Which of course is incorrect and give too much credit to British forces.

from the website listed in the above post.

 

"It is no wonder that Ludendorff and Byng made such statements. During the hundred days which followed the Canadian Corps’ initial and speedy penetration of the German line, the Corps, under Currie’s command, had liberated 500 square miles of territory containing 228 cities, towns, and villages and captured 31,000 prisoners, 590 heavy and field guns and thousands of machine guns and trench mortars. Fifty German divisions — approximately one-fourth of the total German forces on the Western Front — were defeated. By nightfall on the first day of the battle of Amiens, the Canadian Corps’ penetration of the enemy line was unequalled: no other engagement on the Western Front up to that time had achieved this kind of success as the result of a single day’s fighting."

196519[/snapback]

 

 

And to quote of one other group's success during The Hundred Days:

 

The Interplay between Technology, Tactics and Organisation in the First AIF

 

MA (Hons) Thesis, Australian Defence Force Academy, , 1999

 

 

(the authour is Ross Mallett)

 

The role of the Australian Corps in 1918 was a remarkable one. Comprising only 9.5% of the BEF, it captured 18.5% of the German prisoners, 21.5% of the territory and 14% of the guns captured. This represented an effectiveness 1.95, 2.23 and 1.47 times that of the British Army average.86 These victories came at a cost: 14,116 Australian soldiers became battle casualties on the Western Front in August, the AIF's third most costly month of the war, 8,348 in September and 3,070 in October for a total of 25,534. This was still considerably less than the 29,843 in the Somme fighting of July and August 1916, or the Passchendaele fighting in September and October 1917 when 32,979 men were lost, or even the fighting at Bullecourt and Messines in April, May and June 1917 when there were 26,495 casualties and the results were immensely greater. The casualties were more or less matched by 25,000 German prisoners taken; that many more Germans were killed or wounded is certain but their numbers are not known. Certainly, some 623 square kilometres of France was recaptured from the enemy.

 

(I have Monash's book on the Australian Victories in France 1918 - it gives more complete statistics - but it is home....)

 

 

and from another part of the site:

 

In the wake of the victory, Monash was created a Knight Commander of St Michael and St George (KCMG) by King George V in a ceremony at his headquarters at Bertangles.

 

I understand that this was the last "battlefield knighting" conducted by the British.

 

The point I am trying to make is that none were really better than any other (we can spend hours and many posts comparing size/numbers/etc). All had to learn in the cruel classroom of the battlefield but, as pointed out in my earlier post, "...What can be said is that the group that was in the field as of 8AUG18 was trained, equipped and led the probably best armies that the British Empire have ever raised to that time. They adapted to the change from trench warfare to open warfare, accepted and blunted several massive German attacks (albeit with difficulty) and then drove the enemy from the field....." (Emphasis is mine)

 

Frank

[Redbeard]

Their were cases in the trenches of french troops refusing to move under the orders of their officers originally the french and british wanted to integrate the american expeditionary force into their forces Pershing wouldn't allow this so most americans were  held in reserve when the german thrust broke through in the spring of 1918 Pershing got his chance to show the europeans what americans had we stopped them at places such as bella wood , so in essance no american reserves nothing would have been between the german army and paris

197054[/snapback]

 

 

I think you mix this up with the 1917 mutinies. They were widespread in the French Army but never went beyond refusing to attack. No French Division refused to fight (defend). By 1918 boyh the British and French armies were recovered and in good fighting spirit (as witnessed by 5th Army's very tough defence in spring).

 

The German Spring offensive of 1918 was stopped in April 1918 by British and French troops, and with no significant US involvement (a few battalions). The German offensive of summer 1918 was just a weak try by a spent force, and would never have succeeded, even if thge couple of US Divisions had missed. The US part in the summer battles was very symbolic however and got all the spin that could be launched.

 

But the allied autumn offensive of 1918 would hardly have broken through without the addition of a million fresh US troops.

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

[capt_starlight]

Their were cases in the trenches of french troops refusing to move under the orders of their officers originally the french and british wanted to integrate the american expeditionary force into their forces Pershing wouldn't allow this so most americans were  held in reserve when the german thrust broke through in the spring of 1918 Pershing got his chance to show the europeans what americans had we stopped them at places such as bella wood , so in essance no american reserves nothing would have been between the german army and paris

197054[/snapback]

 

While there are elemets of historical fact in what is said above, there are also many that are less so....

 

The French Army was well and truely over their problems of mutiny after the Nievelle Offensives of 1917 by the time the Kaiserschlact. While they were still regarded as "sensitive" to casualties they conducted themselves well in the Chemin des Dames and later.

 

Remember the initial German Offensive was against the BEF (Michael) on 21MAR18 and petered out at Villers-Bretonneux against the Australians on 4-5APR18. The second of the series (Georgette) was against the BEF in Armentieres 9APR18 and stopped with two days again by British Commonwealth forces. The third was in the Chemin Des Dames area (Blucher) against the French 27MAY18 which is where the first US forces became involved. The fourth was started on 9JUN18 (Yorck) again against the French this time around Noyon-Montdidier (and stopped by them). The last (known as the Second Battle of the Marne) started on 15JUL18 near Reims against the French again. By 18JUL18 the French started a counter-offensive that took all the German gains plus a fair bit to be ended in preparation for the Amiens Offensive. In this last one, the French were preparing their own offensive to coincide with what became of the Amiens Offensive - they just changed direction sightly and advanced it a few days. On their part the Germans in the last two named actions suffered casualties in the forming up points because the French had anticipated their actions which was another rude shock to Ludendorff- it indicated that surprise was lacking.

 

All these German offensives had similar characteristics - sudden bombardment, a massing of overwhelming resources at the given point, an inability to support the advance beyond the range of the artillery, inability to supply across the battlefield and poor troop discipline (looting). Michael foundered on logistics grounds while Georgette mainly on artillery. All suffered from the loss of the cream of the troops - the stosstruppe who could not be replaced.

 

It was this last action that gave Ludendorff pause to reflect that Germany could at best hold out until 1919 when hopefully forces from the East could be released from their plundering (and creation of a “Greater German Empire”). There were more German forces engaged in occupying the Eastern Front area after the failure of Russia than had been engaged in combat there !

 

Amiens was just one part of the grand design that had been determined months before to conduct a series of offensives across the Western Front to keep the Germans off balance – it was not intended to end the war in 1918 but to prepare the way for the final “push” in 1919. The essential ingredient that Ludendorff provided was the necessary “fear factor” to ensure the Allies created an overall commander (Foch) to co-ordinate and inspire the forces and more importantly control – something that had been lacking for the previous 3 ½ years.

 

It is true that the two major allies competed to have the US forces amalgamated and “flesh out” their armies. You should remember that the US entered the war without equipment or personnel (the regular army was committed to garrison the Phillipines and the Mexico Border dispute). The French supplied the artillery to a large extent while the British provided much of the small arms (through the building of factories to supply their own needs). Aircraft were a mix of British and French. The troops were moved to the Western Front in British troopships.

 

Pershing kept them out but denied them valuable "trench experience" and training in the "classroom of battle" in so doing - to their detriment later on in 1918.

 

By the way casualties for the US troops in their actions were on a scale not seen by the British or the French since 1916 – that is in casualties per day of offensive. This is usually ascribed to poor fighting discipline, inexperience of troops and staff and poor staff work. You might want look this up.

 

The writing on the Great War is in itself an interesting subject – with about 4 discernable phases. The “straight telling of actions and glorious victory” school of 1918 to around 1930, “the war is hell” school of personal reminisces from then until 1940s or early 1950s, “the bloody butchers” or “lions led by donkeys” school that lasted until the late 1980s and the current “why the heck did they do that and did they learn anything from doing it ?” school that is round now. There are the occasional deviations where someone has brought out a publication that has not belonged to the then current fad but by and large they pretty well toe the line…..

 

I started with an attitiude of "lions led by donkeys" but have moved on to find the Great War fascinating and one that has only really been started to be analysed in an depth in the last 10 yars or so.

 

I suggest you delve a little more deeply into the subject as it will surprise you as to how little effect the US armed forces actually had on the Great War, but how much effect US production, finance and the threat of US forces in 1919 had on German thought in 1918 (and their ultimate loss in that conflict).

 

Frank

[Rickshaw]

I understand that this was the last "battlefield knighting" conducted by the British.

 

I think you'll find that Bill Slim was the last one done.

[Redbeard]

By the way casualties for the US troops in their actions were on a scale not seen by the British or the French since 1916 – that is in casualties per day of offensive.  This is usually ascribed to poor fighting discipline, inexperience of troops and staff and poor staff work. You might want look this up.

 

Frank

197083[/snapback]

 

Hi Frank

 

A very good post; I have been through pretty much the same stages in my attitudes towards WWI.

 

Concerning the US casualty rates could a contributing factor be the very large number of infantry men in a US Division? Where the other powers (having taken the heavy casualties already) moved towards smaller Divisions by reducing the infantry but keeping the artillery, the US Divisions still had more infantry pr. artillery piece, and thus could take big losses without loosing operationality, and anyway to a degree had to rely on moving masses of infantry, as the artillery rate was low? The only other army with a similar artillery/infantry ratio was the Russian, and they were renowned for heavy casualties too.

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

[Ken Estes]

You guys have it right; the Brits and the Frogs save themselves in 1918, and Haig's 'backs to the wall' message sums up the British Army in one of its finest hours. We Amis love the tales of Belleau Wood [uSMC!], Chateau Thierry, etc., but the fact remains that the Germans had already shot their bolt, trying to create a decision before the odds of 1919 overwhelmed them...in typical German strategic [not perhaps tactical] fashion, they advanced the timetable to their own demise. Even where they effected breakthroughs, the Stosstruppen stopped to loot the kitchens of the allies, who thus won the all-important 'battle of the stomachs.'

 

There is one of those odd statistics that begs the Q, from the French official hist of WWI, showing that the German population loses 10% of its body weight in 1918, thanks to another potato famine, blockade, etc.

[capt_starlight]

I think you'll find that Bill Slim was the last one done.

197084[/snapback]

 

Last one done by the sovereign, Monsieur Le Baron !

 

Mountbatten had be “deputised” to do the job on Slim - not that he did not deserve it as he was probably the best of the Allied land commanders in WW2

 

(I await the cries of foul on that last point!)

 

Frank

[BillB]

You guys have it right; the Brits and the Frogs save themselves in 1918, and Haig's 'backs to the wall' message sums up the British Army in one of its finest hours. We Amis love the tales of Belleau Wood [uSMC!], Chateau Thierry, etc., but the fact remains that the Germans had already shot their bolt, trying to create a decision before the odds of 1919 overwhelmed them...in typical German strategic [not perhaps tactical] fashion, they advanced the timetable to their own demise. Even where they effected breakthroughs, the Stosstruppen stopped to loot the kitchens of the allies, who thus won the all-important 'battle of the stomachs.'

 

There is one of those odd statistics that begs the Q, from the French official hist of WWI, showing that the German population loses 10% of its body weight in 1918, thanks to another potato famine, blockade, etc.

197281[/snapback]

 

Good summary, Ken. From what I've read, the Germans stopped to loot a lot more than kitchens and ration dumps. Booze and female clothing appears to have been high on the list too...

 

all the best

 

BillB

[Ken Estes]

Good summary, Ken. From what I've read, the Germans stopped to loot a lot more than kitchens and ration dumps. Booze and female clothing appears to have been high on the list too...  

 

all the best

 

BillB

197320[/snapback]

Ha! Apparently the Kaiser would have approved the last?? Ken

[capt_starlight]

Hi Frank

 

A very good post;  I have been through pretty much the same stages in my attitudes towards WWI.

 

Concerning the US casualty rates could a contributing factor be the very large number of infantry men in a US Division? Where the other powers (having taken the heavy casualties already) moved towards smaller Divisions by reducing the infantry but keeping the artillery, the US Divisions still had more infantry pr. artillery piece, and thus could take big losses without loosing operationality, and anyway to a degree had to rely on moving masses of infantry, as the artillery rate was low? The only other army with a similar artillery/infantry ratio was the Russian, and they were renowned for heavy casualties too.

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

197102[/snapback]

 

Another good point.

 

Pershing and those of his senior commanders thought still of the bayonet being the supreme weapon of the battlefield and it must be pointed out that their Allied or enemy counterparts did not think overly differently on the matter.

 

(This is from the British perspective and is applicable to an extent to the other combatants but there is little written of it in English)

 

The British started the war believing that the first pre-requisite to the achieving victory in the battle it self was the winning of the firefight. They relied on superb musketry skills supported by artillery but found that the New Armies lacked this training and the artillery through faults in ammunition supply and design (and needing to learn how to handle masses of artillery efficiently) could not provide the substitute firepower. Hence the sorry sight of lines of infantry marching to their doom so beloved of the “lions led by donkeys” school.

 

By Third Ypres they had learned to use their artillery and infantry in effective cooperation and together with tanks (finally demonstrated at Hamel) they had the right tools for the job.

 

Behind this learning period is the massive expansion of the British Army from something like 250,000 regulars and a similar number of TF and SR to over 3 million in France alone. They had approximately 400 personnel with psc after their name at the start so the need to train staff officers to co-ordinate this mass was probably the greatest difficulty they faced and overcome it they did. Where the Germans could break the line they could not sustain more than about 20 days of offensive while the BEF effectively did it for 100 days in 1918.

 

Now back to the US.

 

I would equate the US under Pershing as somewhere about 1915 in terms of the learning curve, with the luxury of the troops of 1916 but the attitude of 1914.

 

Pershing's failing was his extreme reluctance to accept liaison officers and even training personnel from the other allies as it would prejudice his troops to one operating method or another (and not the “American way”). They came after direct intervention on a governmental level and they improved standards but lack of “trench time” and their attempts to run with Armies without ever having even had a skeletal pre-war Corps organisation (at least the British had that pre-war!) meant that they were extremely badly organised – such that the much vaunted Meuse-Argonne offensive petered out because of a lack of supplies rather than a deliberate calling off by design (there were reports of troops starving in the front lines in trenches when the US first started assuming responsibilities for part of the Western Front!).

 

Pershing had the manpower that the New Armies gave the British in 1916 but the doctrine, organisation and attitude of worse than the levels of the British Army in 1914 – the bayonet was supreme but with out the concept of the fire fight before committing the PBR to the advance!

 

His troops were to pay the price for his follies.

 

(Was at a military history conference late last year where a paper was presented on the raising of the AEF and have just finished reading it in the much delayed proceedings)

 

Frank

 

Edited to correct a couple of typographical errors

Edited July 20, 2005 by capt_starlight

[BillB]

Not taking away anyone elses thunder, but  most the succuss of 100 days was due to the amazing advance of the Canadian corp.  It was their succuss that ended war before 1919.  Of you only get to read this on canadian histories as most US and british histories only feel need to give canada a page to two.  Which of course is incorrect and give too much credit to British forces.

from the website listed in the above post.

 

"It is no wonder that Ludendorff and Byng made such statements. During the hundred days which followed the Canadian Corps’ initial and speedy penetration of the German line, the Corps, under Currie’s command, had liberated 500 square miles of territory containing 228 cities, towns, and villages and captured 31,000 prisoners, 590 heavy and field guns and thousands of machine guns and trench mortars. Fifty German divisions — approximately one-fourth of the total German forces on the Western Front — were defeated. By nightfall on the first day of the battle of Amiens, the Canadian Corps’ penetration of the enemy line was unequalled: no other engagement on the Western Front up to that time had achieved this kind of success as the result of a single day’s fighting."

196519[/snapback]

 

Sorry mate, not having that. I've looked at the website and there is not a single reference for any of the facts or figures cited. Anyone can write stuff like that. Strikes me as highly slanted, not least because there was a lot more to the 100 Days than that. There is no mention of tanks, for example, which were one of the main prompts to Ludendorff's Black Day comment. Plus 500 hundred square miles is only an area 22.5 miles x 22.5 miles, which is an awfully small space for 228 cities, towns and villages. Oh, and I've never seen it refered to as the "Last 100 Days" before either.

 

all the best

 

BillB

[capt_starlight]

You guys have it right; the Brits and the Frogs save themselves in 1918, and Haig's 'backs to the wall' message sums up the British Army in one of its finest hours. We Amis love the tales of Belleau Wood [uSMC!], Chateau Thierry, etc., but the fact remains that the Germans had already shot their bolt, trying to create a decision before the odds of 1919 overwhelmed them...in typical German strategic [not perhaps tactical] fashion, they advanced the timetable to their own demise. Even where they effected breakthroughs, the Stosstruppen stopped to loot the kitchens of the allies, who thus won the all-important 'battle of the stomachs.'

 

There is one of those odd statistics that begs the Q, from the French official hist of WWI, showing that the German population loses 10% of its body weight in 1918, thanks to another potato famine, blockade, etc.

197281[/snapback]

 

Good points but there are a couple more that I would like to make.

 

First on the Stosstruppen.

 

By the time they had advanced to reach the un-destroyed dumps of food much of the elite had become casualties. Those that encountered the dumps were the follow-on divisions and a very tired cadre of the Stosstruppen. Remember, the four German offensives appear to have cost them slightly more than the casualties lost by the Allies over the same period and the German losses were mainly in the highly trained and motivated personnel of the Stosstruppen and that they were irreplaceable.

 

The Allies on the other hand tended not to create elites but make sure that there was a much wider pool of troops that could perform attack or defence. This was one of their great attavanges when they absorbed the German offensives and then went onto the attack themselves - to final victory.

 

Secondly on logistics itself.

 

The Allies learned to move supplies and personnel very early on in the conflict - the British in particular had far-flung forces across the globe and had been in many conflicts over time so had a long history of logistics planning. They had to learn anew that art of battlefield logistics but did so to such effect hat they could sustain an advance of 100 days across the same terrain that seem to have defeated the Germans in their so recent attempts.....

 

Finally on the art of war.

 

No one has commented on the higher direction of war (in the Great War). Everyone has talked of the tactical and perhaps the grand tactical aspects of the Armies (the levels to army group or so). Where the Allies seem to have a clear advantage was in their concept of where the war was going at the operational and strategic levels. They sustained a consistent (albeit with some aberrations - some see Gallipoli here) strategy f defeating Germany (as the main enemy) on the Western front (as the decisive theatre) and the other theatres were seen as fulfilling particular political (Salonika) or economic (Palestine and the Suez or Mesopotamia and the oil supplies) needs. As much as Churchill (early on) or Lloyd George (in the last year) tried to get a move away from the Western Front it was there the war was decided.

 

The Germans on the other hand seem to vacillate particularly on their attitude to the Eastern Front. From the extreme of the original Schleiffen Plan to the use of more troops (and not second line ones at that) attempting to loot and consolidate a “Greater German Empire” after the collapse of Russia they showed that they were opportunists rather than strategic thinkers. Perhaps this was due to the structure of German society and the relationship of the Military to the Head of State and to the Government ? Being extremely hierarchical, with the right to ignore the government and seemingly in control of the Emperor, the military though more of glory and loot than winning the war ?

 

(This leads me to wonder if there has been a study of the similarities of the decision making structure and process between Imperial and Nazi Germany in regard to the conduct of their respective World Wars ? I seem to find that similar opportunism crops up in both).

 

Frank

Edited July 20, 2005 by capt_starlight

[capt_starlight]

Sorry mate, not having that. I've looked at the website and there is not a single reference for any of the facts or figures cited. Anyone can write stuff like that. Strikes me as highly slanted, not least because there was a lot more to the 100 Days than that. There is no mention of tanks, for example, which were one of the main prompts to Ludendorff's  Black Day comment. Plus 500 hundred square miles is only an area 22.5 miles x 22.5 miles, which is an awfully small space for 228 cities, towns and villages. Oh, and I've never seen it refered to as the "Last 100 Days" before either.

 

all the best

 

BillB

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Actually I found it almost word for word here => Part of the Canadian Government Digital Collections.

 

I believe it comes from despatches prepared by Currie to the Canadian Government (much like Monash when he summarised the Australian Corps achievements in 1918).

 

It is more like a strip 5 miles wide (Corps frontage) by 100 miles deep (the extent of the advance) or some such. The Australian Corps advance was similar.

 

I was actually reading last night where the Australian Corps actually rose to about 7 divisions through the attachment 2 US divisions for the forcing the St Quentin Canal. I wonder if the Canadian Corps had such attachments ?

 

It is the only mention I have seen of the “The Last Hundred Days” as in Australian and UK literature it is referred to as “The Hundred Days” if anything at all.

 

Ludendorff’s remarks are for the overall effect – in particular the failure of the German Armies to counter-attack (indicating a serious decline in command and control as troop morale). Tanks were one element in the attack, they lasted in reality only one day - casualties in tanks due to enemy action, mechanical faults and tiredness of crews reduced day 2 runners to about 25% with similar effects on days 3 and 4 such that there were no tanks by day 5 of the offensive. Hence there arose the problem of pause for tanks to replenish or to go on with artillery and infantry alone (it reached the stage where one Australian Corps attack was supported by the massed Vickers guns of the Corps and was very successful).

 

The Hundred Days was in reality not one continuous offensive but a series of attacks spread across the entire Western Front, timed to prevent the Germans from resting and digging in to any degree because their flanks were turned repeatedly. The momentary pauses allowed rest and replenishment of particular Allied sectors while a general advance was allowed through the aforementioned forced withdrawal of the Germans.

 

 

Frank

[swerve]

Good summary, Ken. From what I've read, the Germans stopped to loot a lot more than kitchens and ration dumps. Booze and female clothing appears to have been high on the list too...  

 

all the best

 

BillB

 

German accounts tend to spend a lot of words on the morale-sapping effect of finding how much better fed, clothed & generally equipped the Allies were. The material superiority this was an effect of is the chief reason I'm sure we'd have won eventually, even with no Americans. The Austrians, Bulgarians, & even more the Turks, were in an even worse state: poorer to start with, & their economies had slumped even worse (Orhan Pamuk has just published estimates that the Ottoman economy in 1918 was 30-40% smaller than in 1913 - that basically meant the modern part of the economy had shut down), making the war insupportable. None of the Allies was hurting anywhere near as badly, & the economic disparity was growing all the time.

[Ken Estes]

German accounts tend to spend a lot of words on the morale-sapping effect of finding how much better fed, clothed & generally equipped the Allies were. The material superiority this was an effect of is the chief reason I'm sure we'd have won eventually, even with no Americans. The Austrians, Bulgarians, & even more the Turks, were in an even worse state: poorer to start with, & their economies had slumped even worse (Orhan Pamuk has just published estimates that the Ottoman economy in 1918 was 30-40% smaller than in 1913 - that basically meant the modern part of the economy had shut down), making the war insupportable. None of the Allies was hurting anywhere near as badly, & the economic disparity was growing all the time.

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By contrast, the Brit accounts of finding the relatively comfortable and deeply sited German entrenchments in their offensives 1915-18 caused no small amount of grousing about trench conditions on their side in the West, but it was the fate of the Allies to be offensive and the Germans defensive for most of the time in the Western Front, hence the priorities differed.